• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
  • 同族专利
  • 引用文献
  • 法律状态
  • 优先权
    • 专利摘要:

    公开号:SE0900918A1
    申请号:SE0900918
    申请日:2009-07-03
    公开日:2011-01-04
    发明作者:Elise Revell
    申请人:Kelisec Ab；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    15 20 25 30 35 publish his public key while keeping his private key secret, which allows anyone to send an encrypted message to this user.
    In order for a key to be considered "secure" in connection with symmetric encryption algorithms, a length of 80 bits is generally considered to be a minimum and 128 bit keys are generally considered to be very strong. The keys used in encryption with public keys have some mathematical structure. For example, the public keys used within the RSA system are the product of two prime numbers. Systems that use public keys therefore require larger key lengths than symmetrical systems to achieve a similar level of security. 3072 bits is proposed as key length for systems based on breakout and discrete integer logarithms whose purpose is to have a security level equivalent to a 128 bit symmetric cipher.
    As mentioned above, it is possible to generate keys with a high level of security if they are long enough, both for keys based on symmetric and asymmetric algorithms. However, there is a problem with key distribution. About Lex. two parties wish to communicate with each other using symmetric crypto, they must first decide which key to use and then distribute it securely from one party to the other. The key must also be kept secret by both parties. The risk that an intruder can find out the key increases with the time the key is used. It is therefore normal that these are only valid for a limited time, e.g. six or twelve months. After this time, a new key must be distributed.
    The distribution of keys with asymmetric encryption also has problems with the key distribution when two parties want to communicate with each other. In order to send information in both directions, they need to exchange public keys with each other. Also in this case, the keys often have a limited period of time during which they are valid. For a party that communicates with many different parties, the handling and distribution of valid public keys can be annoying. A typical example is that the validity of the key has expired when you need to send some secret information urgently to another party or that public keys have not yet been exchanged.
    Another type of cryptography is quantum encryption, which uses quantum mechanisms to ensure secure communication. This allows two parties to generate a shared random bit string that is known only by themselves and that can be used as a key to encrypt and decrypt messages. An important and unique feature of quantum encryption is the ability for the two communicating users to detect the presence of any third party trying to find out the key. This is the result of a fundamental aspect in quantum mechanics, ie. the process of measuring a quantum system will affect the system. Since a third party tries to eavesdrop on the key, they must somehow measure it and thereby become detectable. The security of quantum encryption thus rests on the basics of quantum mechanics as opposed to traditional key encryption which relies on the difficulty of calculating certain mathematical functions and which can give no indication of eavesdropping or guarantee key security.
    Quantum encryption is used only to generate and distribute a key and not to transmit any message data. This key can then be used for any selected encryption algorithm to encrypt and decrypt a message, which can then be sent over a standard communication channel. Although key generation in quantum encryption provides a very secure way to generate and distribute a key, it also has a significant disadvantage. The distance over which a quantum wrench can be distributed is limited to about 100 kilometers depending on the properties of quantum mechanics.
    In light of the above problems, there is a need to easily generate and distribute an encryption key.
    Summary of the invention The problem that the present invention intends to solve is to generate an encryption key, which does not need to be distributed to the nodes that want to communicate with each other, ie. where the key can be generated by the nodes themselves.
    According to a first aspect of the invention, this problem is solved by a method for generating an encryption / decryption key, which is useful for secure communication between a first node and a second node. The method includes the steps of: sending a request from the first node A to a central server to set up a connection with the second node, sending from the central server a first key generator fi l to the first node and second key generator fi l to the second node in response to a request from the first node, process the first key generation at the first node and the second key generation at the second node, generate a first temporary data set at the first node and a second temporary data set at the second node, send the first temporary data set from the first to the second node, comparing the bits in the first temporary data set with the corresponding bits in the second temporary data set, creating a new third temporary data set based on a bit by bit comparison between the first and the second temporary data set by setting a first value of the compared bit a is equal and a second value if the compared bits are different, send the third temporary data set from the second node to the first node, compare the bits in the third temporary data set with corresponding bits in the first temporary data set, generate a first encryption key based on a bit by bit comparison between the third and the first temporary data set by maintaining the value of the bit of the first data set if the corresponding bit of the third temporary data set is set to the first value and ignoring the bit of the first temporary data set if the corresponding the bit of the third temporary data set is set to the second value, generating a second encryption key based on a bit by bit comparison between the first and the second temporary data set by maintaining the value of the bit of the second data set if the corresponding bit of the first temporary data set is equal and ignore this bit of the second temporary data set if the compared bits are different, the first and second encryption keys being the same.
    According to a second aspect of the present invention, the problem is solved by a method for generating an encryption / decryption key in a first node, which is useful for secure communication between the first node and a second node. The method according to the second aspect comprises the following steps of: sending a request to a central server to set up a secure communication with the second node, receiving a first key generation file from the central server in response to this request, processing the first key generating file , generating a first temporary data set, sending the first temporary data set to the second node, receiving a third temporary data set from the second node, comparing the bits of the third temporary data set with corresponding bits in the first temporary data set, generating a first encryption key based on a bit by bit comparison between the third and the first temporary data set by maintaining the value of the bit of the first data set if the corresponding bit of the third temporary data set is set to a first value and ignoring the bit of the first temporary data set about mots the current bit of the third temporary data set is set to a second value.
    According to a third aspect of the present invention, the problem is solved by a method for generating an encryption / decryption key in a second node, which is useful for secure communication between a first and a second node. According to this third aspect, the method comprises the following steps of: receiving a second key generating file from a central server in response to a request from the first node to initiate secure communication between the first node and the second node, processing the second key generating file, generating a second temporary data set, receive a first temporary data set from the first node, compare the bits of the first temporary data set with corresponding bits of the second temporary data set, create a new third temporary data set based on a bit-by-bit comparison between the first and second temporary the data set by setting a first value if the compared bits are equal and a second value in case the compared bits are different, send the third temporary data set to the first node, generate a second encryption key based on a bit by bit comparison between the first and the second temporary data set through maintaining the value of the bit in the second data set if the corresponding bit of the first temporary data set is equal and ignoring the bit of the second temporary data set if the compared bits are different.
    According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the step of sending the first and second key generating files also comprises sending metadata attached to each key generating file. In a further preferred embodiment of the present invention, the metadata comprises a constant which can be used to generate both the first and the second encryption key. Metadata can also include information about the length of the encryption key.
    In another embodiment, the key length can be generated randomly within a predetermined range.
    According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, there is provided a computer program comprising code for performing the steps of the procedure when the program is run on a computer.
    According to a fifth aspect of the invention, there is provided a computer program product comprising program code stored on a computer readable media for performing the steps of the process when the product is run on a computer.
    The great advantage of the present invention is that the key is generated at the nodes that want to communicate with each other and thus there is no need to distribute keys.
    Brief Description of the Drawings The invention will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which Fig. 1 is a flow chart showing the method of generating an encryption key according to the present invention, Fig. 2 is an example of a key generation fil transmitted from the central server to the nodes wanting to communicate, Fig. 3 is an example of a constant used to generate the first and the second temporary data set, Fig. 4 is an example of the first temporary data set in the first node A and the the second temporary data set at the second node B, Fig. 5 is an example of a matching process between the first and the second temporary data set and the generation of an encryption key for the second node B, and Fig. 6 is an example of the generation of an encryption key for detailed node A. Detailed description of the invention The present invention will now be described. vase in detail using various embodiments thereof. The embodiments are to be considered as exemplary and explanatory in order to understand the present invention and not as limiting.
    Fig. 1 shows the method for generating an encryption key according to the present invention. The overall procedure is executed by two nodes A and B which want to set up a secure communication with each other by using a secure encryption / decryption key. The method is further executed by means of a central server 2. In Fig. 1 the first node A is shown on the left side and the second node B on the right side, i.e. the steps performed by the first node A are displayed on the left side of the dashed line and the steps performed by the second node B are displayed on the right side of the dashed line. In practice, the first node A may be a computer whose users want to start a secure communication with a computer, the second node B, at their bank. As will be apparent to those skilled in the art, both the first node A and the second node B may be any communication device that wishes to communicate with another.
    The central server 2 can be any communication device that is capable of receiving and sending data in a secure manner by means of some type of security certificate. In order for a node to be able to use the key generation method according to the present invention, the node must be authorized to communicate with the central server 2. The central server 2 thus keeps track of all users who are authorized to use the key generation method. As mentioned above, communication between the central server 2 and the nodes or vice versa can be made secure by using some type of security certificate. Preferably, an X5 09 certificate or similar is used for secure communication.
    The method of generating an encryption / decryption key according to the present invention will now be described by means of an example.
    The procedure begins with a node, in this example the first node A, sending a request to the central server 2 to set up a connection with the second node B.
    The central server 2 first checks whether the first node A is authorized to communicate with the second node B and also whether the second node B is authorized to communicate with the central server 2 and the first node A. If both nodes are authorized to start communication together, the central server 2 will, in response to a request from the first node A, send a first key generation file to the first node A and a second key generation file 1 to the second node B. Fig. 2 shows an example of a key generation fi l which is sent from the central server to the first node A and the second node B. The file comprises a processing fi l which when executed by the first node A and the second node B will generate the encryption / decryption key. Since the processing at the first node A and the second node B differs, as will be described below, the processing path sent to the first node A differs from the processing path sent to the second node B. As shown in Figs. 2, the key generation file also includes metadata M1, M2 ... Mn. The metadata may contain information used to generate the encryption / decryption key and the same metadata will be sent both to the first node A and to the second node B. Examples of metadata are a constant used to generate the keys. Fig. 3 shows an example of such a constant used to generate a first and a second temporary data set used during the key generation. The metadata may also include a time stamp used to compare whether the two key generators have the same origin.
    The metadata can further also include information about the key length to be used or which bits of the key are to be used to generate the key.
    As will be apparent to those skilled in the art, there is a wealth of other metadata that can be used to further increase the security of the key generation process.
    Once the key generation file has been received by the first node A and the second node B, each node will begin processing the file. Node A will first generate a first temporary data set and the second node B will generate a second temporary data set using the value of the constant, as shown in Fig. 3. The constant in this case comprises four binary bits associated with a letter .
    The length of the constant can vary arbitrarily and the pieces that belong together can be letters, fi gures, Greek symbols etc.
    An example of the first temporary data set for the first node A and the second temporary data set for the second node B is shown in Fig. 4. The temporary data sets are generated using some type of known pseudo-random number generator, using such pseudo-random algorithms as Blum Blum Shub , Fortuna or Mersenne twister, to generate an arbitrary sequence of in this case the letters AD. The random sequence of letters is shown in the header of the first and second temporary data sets in Fig.4. To generate the temporary data set, the sequence of the letters is determined pseudo-randomly and then the correct corresponding value to the letters will be assigned in accordance with the constant in Fig. 3. If the assignment results in the generation of, for example, only zeros or only ones for the temporary data set, this result will be filtered out and a new random sequence will be generated.
    Since both the first and the second temporary data sets are generated pseudo-randomly, they will never be the same. The length of the temporary data sets in this example is only eight bits to easily illustrate the present invention in one example. In practice, however, the length of the temporary data sets is typically between 64 and 2048 bits. The length can be part of the metadata as mentioned above and can be set arbitrarily by the central server 2 each time a new request is made from a node.
    After the generation of the first and the second temporary data set, the first node will send the first temporary data set to the second node B without any protection, i.e. public.
    The second node B will compare the first and second temporary data sets with each other. The result of this comparison is called Match l in the table shown in Figs. 5. The value A and the value B correspond to the first and the second temporary data set respectively. The comparison is a bit by bit comparison and results in True if the value of the first and second data set bits is the same and False if they are different. The result, Match 1, of the comparison is used to create a new third temporary data set, Value 1, by setting a first value if the compared bits are equal and a second value if the compared bits are different. In this case, 1 is used when the ironed pieces are equal and 0 is used if the compared pieces are different. It should be understood, however, that it may also be the other way around without departing from the present invention.
    The third temporary set of data is then sent publicly from the second node B to the first node A. The first node A then generates a first encryption key based on a bit by bit comparison between the third and the first temporary data set by retaining the value on the bit of the first data set if the corresponding bit of the third temporary data set is set to the first value and ignore the bit of the first temporary data set if the corresponding bit of the third temporary data set is set to the second value. In this case, as shown in Fig. 6, the first value corresponds to a 1 and the second value to a 0. As shown in Figs. 6, the key comprises four bits instead of the original eight bits because four bits have been ignored during the generation of the key. 10 15 20 25 30 35 10 As mentioned above, both the first temporary data set and the third temporary data set are sent publicly. Even if they were intercepted, there is no way for a third party to generate a key by using this data because the value of a 1 in a third data set does not in reality mean the value l, but only that the first data set and the second data set have same value. Thus, an l in the third data set can actually mean either a 1 or a 0.
    In node B, the second encryption key is generated based on a bit by bit comparison between the first and the second temporary data set, see Fig. 5, by keeping the value of the bit of the second data set if the corresponding one of the first temporary data set is equal and ignore the bit of the second temporary data set if the compared bits are different. As shown in Figures 5 and 6, the first and second encryption keys are the same keys. The keys may then be used to encrypt / decrypt information transmitted between the first node A and the second node B. Any known encryption method may be used in conjunction with the key generated by the method of the present invention. The present invention is thus not focused on how the encryption / decryption is done, but is instead focused on how the encryption keys are generated. The generated key will be valid as long as the communication between the first and the second node is in progress. Once the key has been generated by the first node A and the second node B, the key generators received by the central server will be deleted in the respective node.
    The overall procedure for the present invention has now been described in detail. However, the present invention also relates to a method for generating an encryption / decryption key at the first node A. This method is part of the overall method described above and will therefore only be briefly described. The procedure executed by the first node starts with a request being sent to the central server 2 to set up a secure communication with the second node B. The first node then receives the first key generation signal from the central server and starts processing the. This will generate the first temporary data set, which as mentioned above is sent to the second node B.
    The first node A will then receive the third temporary data set from the second node B and compare the bits of the third temporary data set with the corresponding bits of the first temporary data set. The first node A will generate the first encryption key based on a bit by bit comparison between the third and the first temporary data set by maintaining the value of the bit of the first data set if the corresponding bit of the third temporary data set is set to the first value and ignore the bit of the first temporary data set if the corresponding bit of the third temporary data set is set to the second value.
    The second node B will also execute part of the overall procedure, which will now be briefly described. The method of generating an encryption / decryption key in the second node B begins with the second node B receiving the second key generation key from the central server 2 and starting processing thereof.
    This will generate the second temporary data set. The second node B will then receive the first temporary data set from the first node A and compare the bits of the first temporary data set with the corresponding bits of the second temporary data set. Then, the second node B will create a new third temporary data set based on a bit by bit comparison between the first and the second temporary data set by setting the first value if the compared bits are equal and the second value if the compared bits are different. . The third temporary data set is then sent to the first node A.
    The second node B then generates the second encryption key based on a bit by bit comparison between the first and the second temporary data set by maintaining the value of the bit of the second data set if the corresponding bit of the first temporary data set is equal and ignoring the bit of the second the temporary data set if the compared bit is different.
    With the method described above, it is thus possible to easily and securely generate encryption keys where they are used, ie. at the nodes. This is particularly beneficial because the need to distribute keys no longer exists. The key is a one-time type and will be valid only for one communication session and as long as it is active. The keys are further generated in two independent processes at two separate nodes. Although it is considered that the procedure described above is very secure, security can be further enhanced by using metadata attached to the key generation file. For example, metadata can determine that only every third or every second bit of the result in the key generation process should be used as a key. Similarly, metadata can also be used to determine that only every third or every second bit should be read when the first node A and the second node B communicate with each other during the key generation process.
    It is to be understood that although the invention has been described with reference to preferred embodiments, the invention is not limited thereto. There are many different embodiments and variants which are nevertheless within the scope of the invention and are best defined by the appended claims.
    权利要求:
    Claims (15)
    [1]
    A method for generating an encryption / decryption key useful for secure communication between a first node (A) and a second node (B), the method comprising the steps of: sending a request from the first node (A ) to a central server (2) to set up a connection with the second node (B), send a first key generation fi l from the central server (2) to the first node (A) and a second key generation fi l to the second node (B ) in response to a request from the first node (A), start processing the first key generation field in the first node (A) and the second key generation field in the second node (B), generate a first temporary data set at the first node (A) and a second temporary data set at the second node (B), sending the first temporary data set from the first node (A) to the second node (B), comparing the bits in the first temporary data set with the corresponding bits in the second temporary the data set, create a new third temporary data set based on a bit by bit comparison between the first and the second temporary data set by setting a first value if the compared bits are equal and a second value if the compared bits are different, send the third temporary the data set from the second node (B) to the first node (A), comparing the bits of the third temporary data set with the corresponding bits of the first temporary data set, generating a first encryption key based on a bit by bit comparison between the third and the first temporary the data set by keeping the value of the bit of the first data set if the corresponding bit of the third temporary data set is set to the first value and ignoring the bit of the first temporary data set if the corresponding bit of the third temporary data set is set to the second value, generating a second encryption key b based on a bit by bit comparison between the first and the second temporary data set by maintaining the value of the bit of the second data set if the corresponding bit of the first temporary data set is equal and ignoring the bit of the second temporary data set if the The compared bits are different, the first and second encryption keys being the same.
    [2]
    A method according to claim 1, in which the step of sending the first key generation till to the first node (A) and the second key generation till to the second node (B) also comprises sending the metadata attached to the respective key generation fi 1.
    [3]
    A method according to claim 2, in which the metadata comprises a constant used to generate both the first and the second encryption key.
    [4]
    A method according to claim 2 or 3, in which the metadata includes information about the length of the encryption key.
    [5]
    A method according to claim 4, further comprising the step of randomly generating the length of the encryption key within a predetermined interval.
    [6]
    A method for generating an encryption / decryption key in a first node (A), which is useful for secure communication between the first node (A) and a second node (B), the method comprising the steps of sending a request to a central server (2) for setting up a connection with the second node (B), receiving a first key generation file from the central server (2) in response to a request, processing the first key generation file, generating a first temporary data set, sending the first the temporary data set to the second node (B), receive a third temporary data set from the second node (B), compare the bits of the third temporary data set with the corresponding bits of the first temporary data set, generate a first encryption key based on a bit by bit comparison between the third and the first temporary data set by keeping the value in the first data set of the corresponding bit in the third supply the default data set is set to a first value and ignore the bit in the first temporary data set if the corresponding bit in the third temporary data set is set to a second value.
    [7]
    A method according to claim 6, in which the step of receiving the first key generation file also comprises receiving the metadata attached to the file.
    [8]
    A method according to claim 7, in which the metadata comprises a constant used to generate the first encryption key. 10 15 20 25 30 35 15
    [9]
    A method according to claim 7 or 8, in which the metadata includes information about the length of the encryption key.
    [10]
    A method of generating an encryption / decryption key in a second node (B), which is useful for secure communication between a first node (A) and the second node (B), the method comprising the steps of: receiving a second key generation from a central server (2) in response to a request from the first node (A) to initiate secure communication between the first node (A) and the second node (B), process the second key generation, generate a second temporary data set , receiving a first temporary data set from the first node (A), comparing the bits of the first temporary data set with the corresponding bits of the second temporary data set, creating a new third temporary data set based on a bit by bit comparison between the first and the second temporary the data set by setting a first value if the compared bits are equal and a second value if the compared bits are different, send the third temporary data set setting to the first node (A), generating a second encryption key based on a bit by bit comparison between the first and the second temporary data set by maintaining the value of the bit for the second data set if the corresponding bit for the first temporary data set is equal and ignoring the bit of the second temporary data set if the compared bits are different.
    [11]
    A method according to claim 10, in which the step of receiving the second key generation file also comprises receiving metadata attached to the file.
    [12]
    A method according to claim 11, in which the metadata comprises a constant used to generate the second encryption key.
    [13]
    A method according to claim 10 or 11, wherein the metadata includes information about the length of the encryption key.
    [14]
    A computer program comprising code for performing the steps of any of claims 1 to 13, when the program is run on a computer.
    [15]
    A computer program product comprising program code stored in a computer readable media for performing the method according to any one of claims 1 to 13, when the product is run on a computer.
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    法律状态:
    2018-03-13| NUG| Patent has lapsed|
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    SE0900918A|SE534384C2|2009-07-03|2009-07-03|Method of generating an encryption / decryption key|SE0900918A| SE534384C2|2009-07-03|2009-07-03|Method of generating an encryption / decryption key|
    PCT/SE2010/050780| WO2011002412A1|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Method for generating an encryption/decryption key|
    PL10794465T| PL2361462T3|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Method for generating an encryption/decryption key|
    BRPI1014192A| BRPI1014192A2|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|"method for generating an encryption / decryption key"|
    NZ596935A| NZ596935A|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Generating an encryption/decryption key by comparing data sets received from a central server|
    ES10794465.4T| ES2566160T3|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Method to generate an encryption / decryption key|
    SG2011090362A| SG176707A1|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Method for generating an encryption/decryption key|
    CA2747891A| CA2747891C|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Method for generating an encryption/decryption key|
    JP2012517459A| JP2012532486A|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Method for generating encryption / decryption key|
    DK10794465.4T| DK2361462T3|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|METHOD FOR GENERATING an encryption / decryption|
    AU2010266760A| AU2010266760B2|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Method for generating an encryption/decryption key|
    US13/129,682| US8433066B2|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Method for generating an encryption/decryption key|
    EA201100887A| EA019411B1|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Method for generating an encryption/decryption key|
    KR1020117015215A| KR101747888B1|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Method for generating an encryption/ decryption key|
    CN201080003360.7A| CN102227887B|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Method for generating encryption/decryption key|
    MX2012000104A| MX2012000104A|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Method for generating an encryption/decryption key.|
    EP10794465.4A| EP2361462B1|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Method for generating an encryption/decryption key|
    EG2012010007A| EG26868A|2009-07-03|2010-07-05|Method for generating an encryption/decryption key|
    ZA2011/03163A| ZA201103163B|2009-07-03|2011-04-29|Method for generating an encryption/decryption key|
    HK11112317.8A| HK1157972A1|2009-07-03|2011-11-15|Method for generating an encryption decryption key|
    IL216897A| IL216897A|2009-07-03|2011-12-11|Method for generating an encryption/decryption key|
    JP2015001958A| JP2015092745A|2009-07-03|2015-01-08|Method of generating encryption/decryption key|
    CY20161100226T| CY1117345T1|2009-07-03|2016-03-17|METHOD FOR CREATING A COPYRIGHT / DECYPTION KEY|
    JP2016191229A| JP2017022773A|2009-07-03|2016-09-29|Method for generating encryption/decryption key|
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