• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
  • 同族专利
  • 引用文献
  • 法律状态
  • 优先权
    • 专利摘要:
    - Flight management set for an aircraft and method for securing data of the open world using such a set. The flight management assembly (1) comprises at least two flight management systems (2, 3), of which one (2) said active is part of an active guidance system (4) configured to provide data for the guidance of the aircraft and the other (3) is said to be non-active at the current time, the flight management assembly (1) also comprising a validation chain (7), the validation (7) comprising the non-active flight management system (3) and a validation unit (8) linked to said flight management systems (2, 3), the validation chain (7) being independent of the flight management system (2); active guidance (4) and being configured to implement data validation from the open world and to transmit at least to said active flight management system (2) the data that is validated during this validation.
    公开号:FR3051898A1
    申请号:FR1654626
    申请日:2016-05-24
    公开日:2017-12-01
    发明作者:Jean-Claude Mere
    申请人:Airbus Operations SAS；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    TECHNICAL AREA
    The present invention relates to a flight management assembly for an aircraft, in particular for a transport aircraft, and a method for securing data received from the open world using such a flight management assembly.
    This flight management set comprises at least two flight management systems of the FMS type ("Flight Management System").
    STATE OF THE ART
    Current avionics architectures generally include such a set of flight management in the avionics part, which notably offers the crew the ability to define before the flight and to maintain or evolve during the flight the route to follow to bring the passengers at destination.
    In parallel with these tools, mainly for reasons of cost and simplicity of development, many initiatives are emerging to implement functions in the open world to simplify the task of the crew relative to the management of the mission of the aircraft. .
    In the context of the present invention: an avionic part (or world) concerns elements (computer, systems, ...) embedded, which are secured so as to obey given data integrity and availability constraints; and an open world part concerns equipment (laptop, tablet, etc.) embedded in the cockpit of the aircraft and hosting applications and containing data, which are not sufficiently secure to be integrated as such in the aircraft. 'aircraft.
    In particular, airlines provide the crew with mission management assistance tools, which are integrated into an electronic flight bag (EFB) type other laptop or tablet computer.
    These tools allow the crew to prepare the mission in advance, or to modify it when it deems it necessary. The advantages of installing these tools on an EFB device are multiple for the company: lower cost, homogeneity in the fleet often mixed, greater flexibility of modification or installation, ...
    In the usual architectures, the transmission of information from the open world to an avionics system is made physically impossible to prevent a person from sending corrupted data or installing malicious software that could jeopardize the safety of the aircraft. .
    However, the data handled in the tools of an EFB device are likely to be loaded into the flight management systems to update the flight plan or the performance calculations, and the provision of a physical link secure between applications and open world data and the avionics flight management system would reduce the crew workload, which would no longer need to manually enter this data into the flight management system from calculation results of EFB device tools, with reduced error probability as well.
    STATEMENT OF THE INVENTION
    The present invention aims to secure the insertion of data from the open world in a set of flight management, allowing an effective operational validation of these data by the crew, without having to significantly modify the internal architecture of the data. flight management systems.
    The present invention relates to an aircraft flight management assembly, said flight management assembly comprising at least two flight management systems, of which one said active at a current time is part of an active guide chain. configured to provide data for the guidance of the aircraft at the current time and the other is said to be non-active at the current time.
    According to the invention, the flight management assembly comprises a validation chain, the validation chain comprising the non-active flight management system and a validation unit linked to said flight management systems, the validation chain being independent. of the active guidance system and being configured to implement validation of data from the open world and to transmit at least to said active flight management system the data that are validated during this validation.
    Thus, thanks to the validation implemented, the validation chain makes it possible to filter erroneous or malicious data coming from the open world. This architecture of the flight management set thus makes it possible to securely load data from the open world, notably from an EFB device. To do this, this architecture relies on standard flight management systems and does not require a heavy and costly modification of the internal software architecture of the flight management systems to ensure the absence of parameter corruption, such as the active flight path for example, using the data that you want to insert from the open world.
    This flight management set architecture therefore makes it possible to solve the problem of integrating data from the open world into said flight management set.
    In a preferred embodiment, the validation unit comprises: a storage unit configured to store data from the open world to be validated; a calculation unit configured to calculate a value of at least one parameter from these data; and a display unit configured to display at least the calculated value of the parameter on at least one display screen, said display unit comprising at least one validation means enabling an operator to declare valid data from the open world, used to calculate this displayed value of the parameter.
    The present invention can be applied to various common flight management architecture architectures (including at least two flight management systems).
    In particular, in a first architecture, according to which the flight management assembly comprises the active flight management system, dedicated to a first pilot flying the aircraft at the current time, and the non-active flight management system. , dedicated to a second pilot not flying the aircraft at the current time. advantageously the validation chain comprises said flight management system dedicated to the second pilot not piloting the aircraft at the current time.
    Furthermore, in a second architecture, according to which the flight management assembly comprises at least one operational main flight management system and an emergency flight management system, advantageously the validation chain comprises the flight management system. rescue.
    In a preferred embodiment, the flight management assembly comprises a filtering unit configured to perform protocol filtering of data from the open world and received in the flight management assembly, before validation by the validation chain. .
    Moreover, advantageously: the validation unit is housed in a dedicated system; or the validation unit comprises a plurality of subsystems distributed and hosted in a plurality of different avionic systems.
    The present invention also relates to a method for securing data of the open world by means of a flight management assembly as described above, that is to say comprising at least two flight management systems, one said active at a current time is part of an active guide chain configured to provide data for the guidance of the aircraft at the current time and the other is said not active at the current time , and a validation chain, the validation chain comprising the non-active flight management system and a validation unit linked to said flight management systems, the validation chain being independent of the active guidance system and being configured to implement validation of data from the open world and to transmit at least to said active flight management system the data that are validated during this validation.
    According to the invention, said security method comprises a sequence of validation steps, implemented after reception by the flight management set of the data of the open world to be validated, and comprising: a desynchronization step of desynchronizing the two flight management systems, using a validation unit; a data processing step consisting in loading the data to be validated into a so-called secondary flight plan of the non-active flight management system, and in performing in the non-active flight management system a calculation of the value of least one corresponding parameter, using these data; a display step, implemented by a display unit, of displaying the results of the calculation on at least one display screen of the display unit for validation; a validation step, implemented using a validation means and consisting of validating or not the data; a subsequent step of, in the event of data validation, transferring the validated data to the active flight management system, emptying the secondary flight plan of the non-active flight management system after data transfer, and resynchronizing the data. two flight management systems for the non-active flight management system to initialize on at least one flight plan of the active flight management system.
    Furthermore, advantageously, in case of non-validation of the data, the subsequent step consists at least in sending an error message and in erasing the uncommitted data from the non-active flight management system.
    Furthermore, advantageously, said sequence of validation steps comprises, between the desynchronization step and the data processing step, an auxiliary processing step of emptying the non-active flight management system, the case appropriate, flight plans it contains.
    In addition, advantageously, the data processing step consists of performing a trajectory calculation and predictions.
    Furthermore, in a preferred embodiment, the security method comprises a protocol filtering step of the open world data, implemented by a filtering unit before the implementation of said sequence of validation steps.
    The present invention also relates to an aircraft, in particular a transport aircraft, which is provided with a flight management assembly such as that specified above.
    BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES
    The appended figures will make it clear how the invention can be realized. More particularly: FIG. 1 is the block diagram of a particular embodiment of a flight management assembly of an aircraft; and FIG. 2 schematically shows a method of securing data using the flight management set of FIG. 1.
    DETAILED DESCRIPTION
    FIG. 1 schematically shows a flight management assembly 1 of an aircraft, in particular a transport aircraft, which makes it possible to illustrate the invention.
    This flight management set 1 ("set 1" below) which is embarked on the aircraft (not represented), comprises at least two flight management systems 2 ("FMS1") and 3 ("FMS2"). >>) type FMS ("Flight Management System"). The two flight management systems 2 and 3 are independent and are housed in different hardware. Set 1 may include more than two flight management systems.
    Each of said flight management systems 2 and 3 is conventionally configured to perform calculations, and in particular calculations of guidance instructions for the aircraft. The guidance of the aircraft is performed according to data (and in particular guidance instructions) provided by a guide chain, said active guide chain 4, which usually comprises only one of said flight management systems. This guide chain 4 of the usual type further comprises a set 4A of computing and data processing systems, and is not described further in the following description.
    In the following description, it is considered that at a current moment (that is to say during the implementation described below of the invention), the flight management system 2 (said active) is part of of the active guide chain 4, which is configured to provide the data for the guidance of the aircraft at the current time, and the flight management system 3 is not active at the current time. The assembly 1 which is part of the avionics M1 of the aircraft is configured to be able to secure data received from an M2 part from the open world, including navigation data to be loaded in the flight management set. (road, weather, ...).
    In a particular embodiment, the open world portion M2 comprises an electronic flight device 5, for example of the EFB type ("Electronic Flight Bag" in English), or any other laptop or tablet computer, allowing in particular to prepare a flight of the aircraft.
    The transmission of information from the open world part M2 to the set 1 may, in particular, be implemented by Ethernet link, by an A429 type bus, or by Wi-Fi connection, as illustrated in FIG. 1 by an arrow L illustrating a data link. The set 1 comprises, as represented in FIG. 1, a reception unit 6 ("RECEPT" for "Reception Unit" in English) configured to receive (or receive) the transmitted data, via the data link L, from of the open world.
    According to the invention, the assembly 1 comprises a validation chain 7.
    This validation chain 7 comprises the non-active flight management system 3 and a validation unit 8 linked to said flight management systems 2 and 3 via links 9 and 10, respectively.
    The validation chain 7 is independent of the active guidance chain 4 and is configured to implement a validation of data from the open world M2, specified below, for filtering erroneous or malicious data, and for transmitting at least the flight management system 2 activates the data that has been validated during this validation.
    In a preferred embodiment, the validation unit 8 comprises, as represented in FIG. 1: a storage unit 11 ("STORING" for "Storing Unit" in English) configured to store data from the open world to validate and received via the data link L; - a calculation unit 12 ("COMP" for "Computation Unit" in English) configured to calculate a value of at least one parameter from these data, which are stored in the storage unit 11; and a display unit 13 configured to display at least said calculated value of the parameter on at least one display screen 14 ("SCREEN" in English). The display unit 13 also comprises at least one validation means 15 ("VALID" for "Validation Unit" in English) which allows an operator to declare valid data of the open world, used to calculate this displayed value of the parameter . The validation means 15 may be a physical means, such as a button for example. It may also be preferably a man / machine interface which is displayed on the display screen 14 and which can be activated by a crew member.
    In addition, in a preferred embodiment, the set 1 also comprises a filtering unit 16 ("FILTER" for "Filtering Unit" in English), which is connected to the reception unit 6 and to the validation 8 respectively via links 17 and 18. This filtering unit 16 is configured to perform protocol filtering of data from the open world and received in the flight management assembly 1, before their validation by the chain of control. validation 7.
    Thus, in this preferred embodiment, securing the sending of data from the M2 portion of the open world to the flight management assembly 1 comprises the implementation of two levels of protection (or filtering): a first level of protection implemented by the filtering unit 16, which is related to the exchange protocol and the data format. This filtering makes it possible to overcome the problems of "flooding" and to reject frames that do not have the expected format or data outside the domain; and a second level of protection implemented by the validation unit 8, which is more operational and makes it possible to filter erroneous or malicious data with respect to the function that these data will supply at the level of the aircraft, but that were sent in the correct format and were not rejected by the first level of protection.
    Moreover, the validation unit 8 can be implemented in different ways.
    In a first embodiment, the validation unit 8 is housed in a dedicated system.
    In addition, in a second variant embodiment, the validation unit 8 comprises a plurality of sub-systems distributed and hosted in a plurality of different avionic systems or computers.
    Moreover, the present invention can be applied to various usual flight management architecture architectures comprising at least two flight management systems.
    In a first usual "split cockpit" type architecture, as represented for example in FIG. 1, the flight management assembly 1 comprises at least a first flight management system 2 dedicated to a first pilot piloting the flight. aircraft at the current time (or "pilot in operation", namely in English "PF" for "Pilot Flying") and a second flight management system 3 dedicated to a second pilot not piloting the aircraft at the current time (or "pilot not operating", namely in English "PNF >> for" Pilot Non Flying ").
    In this first architecture, said second flight management system 3 of the pilot not in use, is part of the validation chain 7.
    In addition, in a second usual architecture (not shown), the flight management set comprises at least one operational main flight management system and an emergency flight management system.
    In this second architecture, the emergency flight management system is part of the validation chain. The flight management assembly 1, as described above, therefore comprises: a usual architecture based on at least two flight management systems 2 and 3, identical to that of the existing aircraft; and a new function to allow a functional (or operational) validation on the result of the use of the data received by the client system of these data while ensuring a complete segregation between the validation chain 7 and the active guide chain. used to guide the aircraft.
    Said flight management set 1 thus makes it possible to ensure the security of the data received from the open world part M2. The flight management assembly 1 has an avionics architecture for securely loading data from the open world, this architecture based on the current flight management systems 2 and 3, without requiring any heavy and costly modification of the data. internal software architecture of these flight management systems 2 and 3 to ensure the absence of corruption of parameters, such as the active flight path, used by the data that you want to insert from the open world.
    The validation performed by the validation chain 7 when inserting data from the open world into the set 1 is not implemented over the entire duration of operation and flight of the aircraft. The insertion of data from the open world represents, in fact, a relatively short time and a relatively low frequency of occurrence over the duration of a flight. Thus, the non-active flight management system 3 (used for validation) remains available for the implementation of its usual functions for most of the flight time.
    This functional validation of data, in particular of navigation data to be loaded into a flight management system (road, weather, etc.), is effective because it relies in particular on a consistency check by the flight crew and predictions resulting from the use of these data by the flight management set 1.
    The operation of the flight management assembly 1 is described below to secure the received open-world data, by implementing a security method. The security method comprises in particular a sequence of validation steps, implemented after reception by the set 1 of flight management (via the reception unit 6) data of the open world to validate. The sequence of steps SE is represented in FIG.
    In a preferred embodiment, the security method also comprises, as represented in FIG. 2, an EO filtering step consisting of implementing protocol filtering of the open world data. This filtering step EO is implemented by the filtering unit 16, before the implementation of said sequence SE of validation steps.
    In normal operating mode, as part of a "split cockpit" architecture, in the usual way, the non-active flight management system 3 synchronizes with the active flight management system 2 and retrieves the flight plan. active flight and the corresponding data on a regular basis, to be able to replace the active flight management system 2 in case of failure or to meet the particular requirements of this architecture by presenting a second image to the PNF pilot.
    On receipt of data from the open world part M2, in particular from an EFB device, and after a successful protocol filtering implemented by the filtering unit 16, the active theft management system 2 is informed by the control unit. validation 8 of the availability of data from the open world part M2, using a displayed message, for example of the type "CPNY FPLN DATA".
    If the crew decides to receive the data, the validation unit 8 will manage the implementation of the SE sequence of steps.
    This sequence of steps SE comprises, as represented in FIG. 2 (in connection with the elements of FIG. 1): a desynchronization step E1 consisting in desynchronizing the two flight management systems 2 and 3, using the validation unit 8, with the passage of the flight management system 3 not active in an independent mode; an auxiliary processing step E2 consisting in emptying the non-active flight management system 3, if any, from the flight plans it contains; a data processing step E3 consisting in loading the data to be validated in a so-called secondary flight plan of the non-active flight management system 3, and in carrying out, using the calculation unit 12 or another calculation element, a calculation of the value of at least one parameter from these data. Preferably, the data processing step E3 consists of performing a trajectory and prediction calculation; a display step E4, implemented by the display unit 13, consisting of displaying the results of the calculation on the display screen 14 of the display unit 13 to inform the crew with a view to validation, and to display a man / machine interface validation / rejection (validation means 15) so that the crew can accept or refuse the data; a validation step E5, implemented by the crew using the validation means 15, namely said human / machine interface, and consisting in validating or not validating the data by the crew; a further step E6A consisting, in the event of validation of the data by the crew: to transfer the validated data to the active flight management system 2 (in a secondary flight plan or alternatively directly in the active flight plan of this flight management system 2); • emptying the flight plan of the non-active flight management system 3 after the transfer of the data; and resynchronizing the two flight management systems 2 and 3 so that the non-active flight management system 3 initializes on at least one flight plan of the active flight management system 2 and thus resumes its system role. dual to serve as both a second source of information and backup system.
    In addition, in case of non-validation of the data by the crew, the method comprises a subsequent step E6B consisting of: - issuing an error message; and - erasing the uncommitted data of the non-active flight management system 3.
    In a "split cockpit" type architecture, the flight management system dedicated to the PNF pilot (not piloting the aircraft) is used for open world data validation, presenting these data only on the PNF side, the active data remaining on the other side (PF) to follow the guidance of the aircraft, or by temporarily hiding the active data possibly to perform this validation on both sides.
    In a first embodiment, the calculation unit 12 is integrated in the flight management system 3, and in a second embodiment, the calculation unit 12 is not integrated into the flight management system. 3. The flight management assembly 1, as described above, has many advantages. In particular, it makes it possible: to optimize the avionic architecture by balancing the roles of the different instances of the flight management assembly; - to avoid heavy and costly modifications of the flight management systems; and - not to base the safety demonstration on the architecture of the OEM liability system.
    权利要求:
    Claims (13)
    [1" id="c-fr-0001]
    A flight management assembly of an aircraft, said flight management assembly (1) comprising at least two flight management systems (2, 3), one of which (2) said to be active at a current time makes part of an active guide chain (4) configured to provide data for the guidance of the aircraft at the current time and the other (3) is said to be non-active at the current time, characterized in that it comprises a validation chain (7), the validation chain (7) comprising the non-active flight management system (3) and a validation unit (8) linked to said flight management systems (2, 3), the validation chain (7) being independent of the active guidance chain (4) and being configured to implement a validation of data from the open world and to transmit at least to said flight management system (2) activates the data that is validated during this validation.
    [2" id="c-fr-0002]
    2. flight management assembly according to claim 1, characterized in that the validation unit (8) comprises: - a storage unit (11) configured to store data from the open world to validate; - a computing unit (12) configured to calculate a value of at least one parameter from these data; and - a display unit (13) configured to display at least the calculated value of the parameter on at least one display screen (14), said display unit (13) comprising at least one validation means (15) enabling an operator to declare valid open world data, used to calculate this displayed value of the parameter.
    [3" id="c-fr-0003]
    3. flight management set according to one of claims 1 and 2, said flight management assembly (1) comprising the active flight management system (2) dedicated to a first pilot flying the aircraft at the moment current and the non-active flight management system (3) dedicated to a second pilot not piloting the aircraft at the current time, characterized in that the validation chain (7) comprises said flight management system (3). ) dedicated to the second pilot not flying the aircraft at the current time.
    [4" id="c-fr-0004]
    4. Flight management assembly according to one of claims 1 and 2, said flight management assembly comprising at least one operational main flight management system and a backup flight management system, characterized in that the chain Validation includes the emergency flight management system.
    [5" id="c-fr-0005]
    5. Flight management assembly according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that it comprises a filter unit (16) configured to perform protocol filtering of data from the open world and received in the management set. of flight (1), before their validation by the validation chain (7).
    [6" id="c-fr-0006]
    6. flight management assembly according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that the validation unit (8) is hosted in a dedicated system.
    [7" id="c-fr-0007]
    7. flight management assembly according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that the validation unit comprises a plurality of subsystems distributed and hosted in a plurality of different avionics systems.
    [8" id="c-fr-0008]
    8. Method of securing data of the open world using a flight management assembly (1) according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that it comprises a sequence of validation steps (SE), implemented after reception by the flight management unit (1) of the data of the open world to be validated, and comprising: - a desynchronization step (El) of desynchronizing the two flight management systems ( 2,3), using a validation unit (8); a data processing step (E3) of loading the data to be validated into a so-called secondary flight plan of the non-active flight management system (3), and to be performed in the flight management system (3) no active calculating the value of at least one corresponding parameter, using these data; a display step (E4), implemented by a display unit (13), comprising displaying the results of the calculation on at least one display screen (14) of the display unit (13) for validation ; a validation step (E5), implemented using a validation means (15) and consisting of validating or not the data; a subsequent step (E6A) consisting, in the case of data validation, in transferring the validated data to the active flight management system (2), emptying the secondary flight plan of the non-active flight management system (3); after transferring the data, and resynchronizing the two flight management systems (2,3) for the non-active flight management system (3) to initialize on at least one flight plan of the flight management system ( 2) active.
    [9" id="c-fr-0009]
    9. Method according to claim 8, characterized in that in the event of non-validation of the data, the subsequent step (E6B) consists at least in sending an error message and in erasing the uncommitted data from the management system of the device. flight (3) not active.
    [10" id="c-fr-0010]
    10. Method according to one of claims 8 and 9, characterized in that said sequence of validation steps (SE) comprises, between the desynchronization step (El) and the data processing step (E3), an auxiliary processing step (E2) of emptying the flight management system (3) not active, if any, flight plans it contains.
    [11" id="c-fr-0011]
    11. Method according to one of claims 8 to 10, characterized in that the data processing step (E3) consists of performing a trajectory calculation and predictions.
    [12" id="c-fr-0012]
    12. Method according to one of claims 8 to 11, characterized in that it comprises a step (EO) of protocol filtering of the open world data, implemented by a filter unit (12), before the implementation. of said sequence of validation steps (SE).
    [13" id="c-fr-0013]
    13. Aircraft, characterized in that it comprises a flight management assembly (1) according to any one of claims 1 to 7.
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    US10616241B2|2017-06-05|2020-04-07|Honeywell International Inc.|Systems and methods for performing external data validation for aircraft onboard systems|
    US10991255B2|2018-04-05|2021-04-27|Ge Aviation Systems Llc|Providing an open interface to a flight management system|
    FR3108199A1|2020-03-16|2021-09-17|Thales|Open world device for communication with an avionics system, communication system and associated communication method|
    法律状态:
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    2017-12-01| PLSC| Search report ready|Effective date: 20171201 |
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    2021-05-20| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 6 |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    FR1654626A|FR3051898B1|2016-05-24|2016-05-24|FLIGHT MANAGEMENT KIT FOR AN AIRCRAFT AND OPEN WORLD DATA SECURITY PROCESS USING SUCH A SET|FR1654626A| FR3051898B1|2016-05-24|2016-05-24|FLIGHT MANAGEMENT KIT FOR AN AIRCRAFT AND OPEN WORLD DATA SECURITY PROCESS USING SUCH A SET|
    US15/603,000| US10295349B2|2016-05-24|2017-05-23|Flight management system for an aircraft and method of securing open world data using such a system|
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