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    • 专利摘要:
    The invention proposes a security method implemented by an electronic device (CD), the method comprising: a determination of a current point in time during which a current transaction is implemented; selecting, in a log file (LG) in which at least one transaction is recorded, each transaction implemented by said electronic device (CD) in a predefined period of time ending at the current point in time; a risk analysis, from at least one historization data item recorded in the log file in association with each selected transaction, for detecting whether abnormal use of the electronic device (CD) has occurred during said period of time; predefined time; and if so, triggering at least one security operation of the electronic device (CD) in response to said current transaction.
    公开号:FR3051579A1
    申请号:FR1654572
    申请日:2016-05-23
    公开日:2017-11-24
    发明作者:Francis Chamberot；Oliveira Marco De
    申请人:Oberthur Technologies SA；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    Background of the invention
    The present invention is in the general field of electronic devices and more particularly relates to an electronic device, such as a smart card for example, configured to cooperate with an external terminal to perform a transaction, in the banking field for example. The invention applies more particularly, but not exclusively, to smart cards (or microcircuit cards), conforming for example to the IS07816 standard. The invention aims in particular to secure a smart card operating according to the EMV protocol (for "Europay MasterCard Visa").
    In general, a smart card is designed to communicate with a device external to this card, otherwise called terminal or reader. These cards make it possible to carry out various types of transactions, such as, for example, payment, debit or carrier authentication transactions. Smart cards for banking applications (credit card, debit card etc.), for example, are able to cooperate with payment terminals or ATMs to carry out various financial transactions. EMV is the standardized protocol used today mainly in the world to secure payment transactions made by smart cards.
    The EMV protocol has been designed to reduce the risk of fraud during a payment transaction by allowing in particular the authentication of both the smart card and its holder. This authentication process uses a combination of cryptograms (or encrypted keys) and digital signatures and possibly requires the entry of a secret code (commonly called PIN) by the cardholder.
    Depending on the type of card used, the situation, or the amount considered, an EMV card can work online or offline. In online mode, the EMV card can communicate, via the reader, with the corresponding issuing entity (the bank at the origin of the card, for example) to verify in particular that the current transaction is legitimate. On the other hand, if the EMV card is operating in offline mode, it applies prerecorded verification criteria to decide whether the transaction should be allowed or denied.
    Figure 1 shows an example of implementation of an EMV-compliant payment transaction using an EMV 100 chip card. Some aspects of an EMV transaction have been omitted for the sake of simplicity.
    When implementing a transaction, the EMV protocol is divided into three phases, although variants are possible. During a first phase intended to authenticate the smart card 100 used, the terminal 110 and the card 100 exchange a certain number of messages including a RESFT message (RST) at S2 and then an ATR response at S4. In S6, the carrier of the card selects via the terminal 110 the desired transaction mode, thereby triggering the sending of a "SELECT" command to the card 100 to initiate the start of the EMV transaction.
    Once the card authentication phase is completed, the EMV protocol proceeds to an authentication phase (not shown) of the cardholder 100. The terminal 110 determines the authentication method of the bearer to be applied and determines in particular if the transaction must be performed in code verification mode or in non-code verification mode. If the code verification mode is selected, the smart card 100 verifies the validity of the PIN entered by the bearer on the terminal 110. If, on the other hand, the mode without code verification is selected, no PIN check is performed. performed.
    Once the carrier authentication phase is complete, the EMV protocol initiates the verification phase of the transaction. To do this, the terminal 110 sends (S8) to the smart card 100 a first APDU command called GENERATE AC or GAC (noted here GACl). This well-known order includes information about the current transaction such as the amount of the transaction, the currency used, the type of transaction, and so on. The EMV card then performs (S9) a verification of the transaction according to predefined verification criteria and sends (SIO), in response to the GAC1, a cryptogram (or cryptographic certificate) comprising a message authentication code (or MAC for " Message Authentication Code "). The response of the card 100 in the ARQC message depends in particular on the setting of the card made by the issuing entity 120 (called "issuer") of said card.
    If the online mode is chosen, as represented in the example of FIG. 1, the smart card 100 sends in SIO a message of the type ARCQ ("Authorization Request Cryptogram") indicating that the card 100 wishes to continue the transaction online with, for example, a remote server of the transmitter 120 (online mode). The cryptogram ARQC is transmitted by the terminal 110 to the transmitter 120 which can thus perform (S13) a number of checks to ensure that the transaction is valid. The transmitter 120 then sends (S14), in response to the received ARCQ message, an encrypted message of the ARPC type indicating the decision of the transmitter 120. This ARPC message is transmitted by the terminal 110 to the card 100 at S16.
    The card 100 determines whether or not it accepts the transaction from the ARPC response received at S16. If the card 100 accepts the transaction, the latter sends (S18) in response a cryptogram of TC type (accepted transaction) to the terminal 110. In the opposite case, the card 100 sends (S18) a cryptogram of AAC type indicating the refusal of the transaction.
    The online implementation of a transaction therefore makes it possible to implement security mechanisms that make it possible to identify risk situations and to trigger an appropriate security response. The issuer of the smart card can for example detect abnormal behavior during an online transaction and decline the transaction or trigger additional verification checks.
    Current EMV cards are typically configured to be able to perform a number of offline transactions, so that it is not possible for the card issuing entity to perform remote security checks in the course of time. the offline transaction. For example, certain EMV cards are configured to work offline if the amount of the current transaction does not reach a pre-defined minimum amount.
    Smart cards, especially EMVs, are therefore particularly vulnerable to malicious (or abnormal) attacks and behavior when they work offline. In the event, for example, of the theft of an EMV card, the author of the flight can then carry out multiple successive transactions, all of which are on moderate amounts so as not to trigger the online operation of the card and thus escape the vigilance of the customer. the issuer of the card.
    There is therefore today a need for a security mechanism to effectively protect smart cards, for example EMV type against abnormal and / or suspicious behavior occurring especially in offline transactions. In particular, enhanced security is necessary to protect smart cards against fraudulent use, in the event of theft, for example. A need exists more generally to better control the use of an electronic device such as a smart card for example (EMV type or other), including when this device works offline to implement a transaction.
    OBJECT AND SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION To this end, the present invention relates to a security method implemented by an electronic device, said method comprising: determining a current point in time during which a current transaction is or must be placed implemented by the electronic device; selecting, in a log file in which at least one transaction is recorded, each transaction implemented by said electronic device in a predefined period of time ending at the current point in time; risk analysis, from at least one history data item recorded in the log file in association with each selected transaction, for detecting whether abnormal use of said electronic device has occurred during said predefined period of time; and if yes, triggering at least one security operation of the electronic device in response to said current transaction
    The present invention advantageously makes it possible to effectively protect electronic devices, in particular smart cards (of EMV or other type), configured to cooperate with a terminal to implement a transaction (a banking or other transaction). The invention makes it possible in particular to secure such electronic devices against abnormal or suspicious behavior occurring during offline transactions.
    According to a particular embodiment, the current point in time comprises at least one of the current date and the current time of the current transaction.
    According to a particular embodiment, the determination of the current point comprises receiving, from a terminal with which the electronic device cooperates, a time data representative of the current point in time.
    According to a particular embodiment, said selection comprises a calculation of the point in time of the beginning of the predefined period of time, starting from the current point in time and a predefined duration attributed to said predefined period of time, each transaction. selected being later than the point in time of the beginning of the predefined period of time.
    According to a particular embodiment, during said selection, the electronic device: - determines, from the log file, as a reference transaction, the most recent transaction in the predefined period of time which satisfies at least one first predefined condition; and selects only each transaction implemented by said electronic device subsequent to said reference transaction in the predefined period of time.
    According to a particular embodiment, said at least one predefined condition comprises at least one of the following conditions: the reference transaction is an "on-line" transaction that has been carried out in cooperation with an entity issuing the electronic device; and the reference transaction is a said on-line transaction that has been successfully authenticated by the sending entity of the electronic device.
    In a particular embodiment, when said selection is made, the electronic device filters the transactions recorded in the log file to select only each transaction satisfying at least a second predefined condition.
    In a particular embodiment, the second predefined condition includes a condition on the type of terminal with which the electronic device cooperated during said transaction.
    In a particular embodiment, during said risk analysis, the electronic device detects whether abnormal use of said electronic device has occurred during said predefined period of time from at least one of: ## EQU1 ## selected transactions; and - the cumulative amount of each selected transaction.
    Seion a particular embodiment, wherein, during said risk analysis, the electronic device detects that abnormal use has occurred during said predefined period of time if at least one of the following three predefined conditions is satisfied: the number of transactions selected during said selection reaches a first predefined threshold value; and the cumulative amount of each transaction selected during said selection reaches a second predefined threshold value.
    According to a particular embodiment, said at least one security operation comprises at least one of; - sending a message informing said abnormal use detected; modifying at least one operating parameter of the electronic device; recording, in the log file, a security data representative of said abnormal use detected; and refusal to implement said current transaction.
    According to a particular embodiment, the electronic device is a smart card.
    In a particular embodiment, the various steps of the security method are determined by instructions of computer programs.
    Consequently, the invention also aims at a computer program on an information medium (or recording medium), this program being capable of being implemented in an electronic device such as a smart card, this program comprising instructions adapted to the implementation of the steps of a security method as defined above.
    This program can use any programming language, and be in the form of source code, object code, or intermediate code between source code and object code, such as in a partially compiled form, or in any other desirable form.
    The invention also provides a computer-readable information carrier (or recording medium), and including instructions of a computer program as mentioned above.
    The information carrier may be any entity or device capable of storing the program. For example, the medium may comprise storage means, such as a ROM, for example a CD ROM or a microelectronic circuit ROM, or a magnetic recording medium, for example a floppy disk or a disk. hard. On the other hand, the information medium may be a transmissible medium such as an electrical or optical signal, which may be conveyed via an electrical or optical cable, by radio or by other means. The program according to the invention can be downloaded in particular on an Internet type network.
    Alternatively, the information carrier may be an integrated circuit in which the program is incorporated, the circuit being adapted to execute or to be used in the execution of the method in question.
    The invention also relates to an electronic device comprising; a determination module for determining a current point in time during which a current transaction is or must be implemented by the electronic device; a selection module for selecting, in a log file in which at least one transaction is recorded, each transaction implemented by said electronic device in a predefined period of time ending at the current point in time; a risk analysis module for detecting, from at least one historization data item recorded in the log file in association with each selected transaction, whether an abnormal use of said electronic device occurred during said period predefined time; and a security module configured, in the event of a positive result of said detection by the risk analysis module, for triggering a security operation of the electronic device in response to said current transaction.
    According to a particular embodiment, the invention is implemented by means of software and / or hardware components. In this context, the term "module" may correspond in this document to both an iogiciei component, a hardware component or a set of hardware and software components.
    According to a particular embodiment, the electronic device is a chip card, of the EMV type for example. In a particular example, the smart card is in accordance with the ISO 7816 standard.
    According to a particular embodiment, the electronic device comprises a memory in which the log file is saved.
    It will be noted that the various embodiments mentioned above in relation to the security method of the invention as well as the associated advantages apply analogously to the electronic device of the invention.
    BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS Other features and advantages of the present invention will emerge from the description given below, with reference to the accompanying drawings which illustrate embodiments having no limiting character. In the figures: FIG. 1 already described represents, in a schematic manner, a transaction implemented according to the EMV protocol; FIGS. 2A and 2B schematically represent a first mechanism for securing an EMV chip card; - Figure 3 schematically shows the structure of a smart card according to a particular embodiment of the invention; FIG. 4 schematically represents modules implemented in the smart card of FIG. 3, according to a particular embodiment of the invention; FIG. 5 represents, in the form of a flowchart, the steps of a security method according to a particular embodiment of the invention; FIG. 6 represents a log file according to a particular embodiment of the invention; - Figure 7 schematically shows transactions implemented over time by the smart card of Figure 3, according to a particular embodiment; and FIG. 8 represents, in the form of a flowchart, the steps of a security method according to a particular embodiment of the invention.
    Detailed description of several embodiments
    As indicated above, the present invention relates to electronic devices, such as smart cards for example, configured to cooperate with an external terminal to perform a transaction, in the banking field for example. The invention relates more particularly to the security of the configured smart cards, in particular when they are configured to process an offline transaction as explained above.
    FIGS. 2A and 2B illustrate a first mechanism for securing an EMV chip card 130. In this example, the smart card 130 is configured to calculate the cumulative amount of TR transactions that it has successfully performed during a fixed period of time CL, called "cycle", and then to check whether this cumulative amount reaches a certain amount. maximum threshold value. This period of time CL begins at a fixed position (or point) DRef in time, called reference position in time, corresponding for example to the date of a given transaction TRI. The CL time period also ends at a fixed position DF in time.
    In the example illustrated in FIG. 1A, the EMV card 130 checks, during the transaction TR4, the cumulative amount of the transactions TR1, TR2 and TR3 performed previously during the same cycle CL, as well as the amount of the transaction TR4. Classes. If this accumulated amount reaches at least the maximum threshold value, the card 130 asks for example to continue in online mode. Subsequently, when the card 130 detects that a new transaction occurs after the instant DF, it resets the reference point DRef in order to initiate a new time cycle CL also fixed in time.
    However, this technique has a disadvantage in that it is not always possible to detect in particular a significant increase, potentially abnormal, amounts of transactions.
    As illustrated in FIG. 2B, it is assumed for example that the smart card 130 is stolen at the instant V and that the author of the flight performs successive transactions TRI-TR5 in a relatively limited time interval. Assuming that the amount of each transaction remains below the maximum threshold allowed in offline mode, it is not certain that the card 130 is able to detect the abnormal behavior resulting from the flight, despite the security mechanism described. with reference to Figure 2A.
    FIG. 2B illustrates an example in which the card 130 performs the transactions TR1 and TR2 during a first cycle CL1 and then initiates a new cycle CL2 in which it performs the transactions TR3 - TR5. During the transaction TR5, for example, the smart card 130 verifies the cumulative amount of transactions TR3, TR4 and TR5 included in the cycle CL2 but does not take into account the transactions TRI and TR2 because the latter have been carried out in the previous cycle CLl. The time distribution of the TRI - TR5 transactions over two distinct cycles CL1 - CL2 thus increases the risks that these off - line transactions are not identified by the card 130 as constituting abnormal or suspicious behavior. The invention proposes to overcome these disadvantages in particular by means of a security mechanism making it possible to effectively detect abnormal or suspicious behaviors, even when the smart card is operating offline, so that an appropriate security response can be brought if necessary.
    According to various embodiments, the method of the invention, implemented by an electronic device such as a smart card for example, comprises the following steps: determining a current point in time during which a current transaction is or must be implemented by the electronic device; selecting, in a log file in which at least one transaction is recorded, each transaction implemented by said electronic device in a predefined period of time ending at the current point in time; risk analysis, from at least one historian data recorded in the log file in association with each selected transaction, for detecting whether abnormal use of said electronic device has occurred during said predefined period of time; and, if so, initiating a secure operation of the electronic device in response to said current transaction.
    The invention also relates to such an electronic device capable of implementing a security method as defined above. Other aspects and advantages of the present invention will emerge from the exemplary embodiments described below with reference to the drawings mentioned above.
    In the present description, examples of implementations of the invention are described in relation to an EMV chip card. It is understood that the invention is not limited exclusively to EMV cards but more generally applies to any electronic device configured to implement a transaction, including devices other than smart cards, this device can use the standard EMV or other transaction standards.
    In a particular example, the electronic device of the invention is a smart card in accordance with the ISO 7816 standard. It should also be noted that the notion of transaction is here understood in a broad sense and includes, for example, in the banking field, as well as a payment or transfer transaction than a consultation of a bank account on a bank terminal. The various embodiments of the invention are here described in the context of a payment card configured to perform banking transactions. It will be understood that other types of transactions or operations are conceivable within the scope of the invention.
    Unless otherwise indicated, the elements common or similar to several figures bear the same reference signs and have identical or similar characteristics, so that these common elements are generally not described again for the sake of simplicity.
    FIG. 3 schematically represents the structure of a CD chip card according to a particular embodiment of the invention.
    It will be understood that certain elements generally present in a smart card have been deliberately omitted because they are not necessary for the understanding of the present invention. It should also be noted that the CD chip card represented in FIG. 3 constitutes only one example of implementation, other implementations being possible in the context of the invention. Those skilled in the art will understand in particular that certain elements of the smart card CD are described here only to facilitate the understanding of the invention, these elements not being necessary to implement the invention.
    The smart card CD is configured to cooperate with a terminal (or reader) T to perform a transaction TR, such as a financial transaction or bank (payment transaction or otherwise) in this case.
    The terminal T is configured to interface between the smart card CD and a remote server SV. In this case, the server SV is a server of the sending entity EM (i.e., a banking institution for example) of the smart card CD. In this example, the card CD is able to communicate, via the terminal T, with the remote server SV in order to implement, according to the EMV protocol, a so-called "online" transaction, that is to say involving a exchange with the EM issuer as already explained above.
    More precisely, the smart card CD comprises in this example external contacts 4 able to cooperate with the reader T, at least one processor 6, a rewritable volatile memory (of the RAM type) 8 and a rewritable non-volatile memory 10 (of type Flash for example).
    The memory 10 constitutes in this example a recording medium (or information medium) according to a particular embodiment, readable by the smart card C2, and on which is recorded a computer program PG corresponding to a particular embodiment. This PG computer program includes instructions for executing the steps of a securing method according to a particular embodiment. The main steps of this method are shown, in particular embodiments of the invention, in Figures 5 and 8 described later.
    In a particular example, the CD chip card is in accordance with the ISO 7816 standard. In this case, the external contacts 4 have characteristics in accordance with this standard. However, it will be understood that other embodiments are possible. The smart card CD can for example cooperate with the reader T in contactless mode via an RF antenna integrated in the CD card.
    Still in the example considered here, a log file LG (also called "Log" in English) and at least one criterion (or parameter) CR predefined are stored in the rewritable non-volatile memory 10 of the CD card.
    In this example, at least one transaction TR implemented in the past by the smart card CD is recorded in the log file LG. In association with each transaction TR, at least one DLG history data is recorded in the log file LG. A DLG logging datum is for example a transaction datum characterizing the corresponding transaction TR. This log file LG allows the CD card to keep in memory useful DLG data concerning the transactions it makes, this information can then if necessary be accessed, processed and / or sent by the CD card.
    A particular example of such an LG log file in which TR transactions (and, more particularly, historization data associated with these transactions) are recorded is described later with reference to FIG. DLG that can be recorded in the log file LG include for example at least one of: a transaction identifier ID, a point in time PT (for example a date and / or a time) characterizing when the transaction was carried out, an amount MT of the transaction, a log data DNl indicating whether the transaction was performed online or offline, a log data DN2 indicating whether the authentication (or validation) online by the EM issuer has been passed successfully in the case of an online transaction, and a DN3 log datum indicating the type of terminal T cooperating with the CD card during the transaction . Among the possible types of terminals T may be, for example, automatic ticket machines (ATMs) and payment terminals, other types of terminals being possible.
    Furthermore, the CR criterion or criteria stored in the memory 10 may comprise at least one selection criterion CRI and / or at least one analysis criterion CR2. Criteria for selection and analysis CRI, CR2 configure, if necessary, how the card implements the method of the invention, as explained later. In the example represented in FIG. 3, the criteria CR stored in the memory 10 comprise two predefined conditions CD1 and CD2 each constituting a triggering criterion CRI, as well as a condition CD3 constituting an analysis criterion CR2. As already indicated, other exemplary embodiments are possible within the scope of the invention, the number and the nature of the triggering criteria and the analysis criteria in particular being able to vary according to the use case.
    The criteria CR and the log file LOG will be described in more detail below according to a particular embodiment with reference to FIGS. 4-9.
    In a particular embodiment, the processor 6 controlled by the computer program PG, implements a number of modules shown in FIG. 4, namely: a determination module MD2, a selection module MD4, a module d MD6 analysis and an MDS security module.
    In this particular example, the determining module MD2 is configured to determine a point (or position) current in time, denoted by PC, during which a current transaction is, or must be, implemented by the smart card CD. "Current point in time" means a given moment in time when a current transaction is, or must be, implemented by the smart card CD. A point in time can be defined for example by a date and / or a time, and more generally by any temporal data making it possible to define a given position in time.
    Different methods can be used to allow the CD card to determine the current PC point in time during which a current transaction is, or must be, implemented by the CD card. In an example described in more detail later, the determination module MD2 determines the current point PC in time from a received temporal data, for example from the terminal T. Alternatively, the smart card CD comprises a communication unit. calculation of the current date and / or time.
    In this particular example, the selection module MD4 is configured to select, in the log file LG in which is recorded at least one transaction TR passed, each transaction TR implemented the smart card CD in a period (or window ) of predefined time (denoted PD) ending at the current point in the PC time. Since the period of time PD has a fixed duration, it moves in time so that it always ends at the current point PC in the time determined by the determination module MD2. In other words, the predefined time period PD is a sliding time period whose end terminal is defined by the current point PC in the time determined by the determination module MD2. Whenever a new current point PC in time is determined by the determining module MD2, the period of time PD slides in time so that it always ends with the current point PC. Examples of embodiments will be described later with reference in particular to FIG.
    In a particular example, the selection module MD4 is configured to select, among the transactions TR recorded in the log file LG, all the transactions TR that have been implemented in the predefined period of time PD.
    In a particular example, the selection module MD4 is configured to select, among the transactions TR recorded in the log file LG, the transactions TR which have been implemented in the predefined period of time PD and which also comply with the minus one predefined selection criterion (or condition) CRI. These criteria CRI seiection are for example recorded in the memory 10 of the CD card. As already indicated, Fig. 3 represents a particular example where the CRI selection criteria comprise two conditions CD1 and CD2.
    The risk analysis module MD6 is configured to detect, from at least one DLG history data item recorded in the log file LG in association with each transaction TR selected by the selection module MD4, whether a use abnormal (or suspicious) of said CD card occurred during said predefined period of time PD.
    By "abnormal use" is meant here any use of the smart card CD deemed, according to at least one predefined analysis criterion, to be potentially at risk, fraudulent or abnormal.
    Still in this example, the security module MDS is configured, in case of a positive result of the detection by the risk analysis module MD6 (that is to say if abnormal use of the CD card is detected by the MD6 analysis module), for triggering at least one security operation of the CD chip card in response to the current transaction TR. Each security operation is configured to secure the smart card CD in response to the current transaction TR. Examples of such operations are described hereinafter with reference to FIGS. 5-9.
    The steps performed by the smart card CD during a security method according to a particular embodiment are now described with reference to Figure 5. To do this, the smart card CD executes the computer program PG.
    It is assumed here that the smart card CD has initiated, in cooperation with the terminal T, the processing of a transaction TR, called the current transaction. According to one variant, the current transaction TR has not yet been initiated.
    In this example, the transaction TR conforms to the EMV protocol.
    During a determination step S30, the chip card CD determines a current point PC in the time during which the current transaction TR is, or must be, implemented by the smart card CD. This current point PC comprises for example at least one of the date (called current date) and time (known as current time) of the current transaction.
    In S32, the smart card CD selects, in the log file LG in which is recorded at least one transaction TR passed, each transaction TR implemented by the smart card CD in a predefined period of time PD ending at the point PC current in time. As already indicated, this period PD is a sliding time window, of predefined duration, whose end terminal is defined by the current position in the PC time.
    In a particular example, the current point PC in time is defined by the current date DC = [16 February 2016] and the current time HC = [16.00], and the duration of the period of time PD is fixed at 30 days . As explained below, the duration of the period of time PD can in particular be adapted according to the desired configuration in view of the type of events or behaviors that it is desired to monitor at the level of the smart card CD.
    The smart card CD then carries out in S34 a risk analysis (or a transaction analysis), from at least one DLG historization data item recorded in the log file LG in association with each TR transaction selected in S32. , to detect whether abnormal (or suspicious) use of the CD chip card has occurred during the predefined time period PD. At 534, the CD chip card detects, for example, whether abnormal use of said CD card has occurred during the predefined PD period from at least one of; the number of TR transactions selected in 532; and - the accumulated amount (ie, the total MT amounts) of each TR transaction selected in 532.
    For example, during this risk analysis 534, the smart card CD detects that abnormal use has occurred during the predefined period of time PD if at least one of the following predefined conditions is satisfied: - the number of transactions selected in the selection 532 reaches at least a first predefined threshold value; and the cumulative amount of each TR transaction selected during the selection 532 reaches at least a second predefined threshold value. If an abnormal use is detected at 534, the smart card CD triggers at least 536 a secure operation of the smart card CD in response to the current transaction TR.
    Each security operation aims at securing the CD chip card vis-à-vis the current transaction TR, and more generally, vis-à-vis the use of the smart card CD over the PD period of time. The number and nature of these security operations may vary depending on the use case. According to a particular embodiment, said at least one security operation 536 comprises at least one of: - sending a message (for example to the terminal T and / or the server 5V) informing said abnormal use detected in 534; modifying at least one operating parameter of the smart card CD; recording, in the log file LG, a security data representative of said abnormal use detected in 534; and - refusal to implement the current TR transaction.
    The nature of the operating parameter (s) PR to be modified if necessary in 536 may vary according to the case. In general, an operation parameter PR configures the manner in which the smart card CD processes a transaction TR with an external terminal, such as the reader T in this example. The operating parameter PR to be modified may, for example, be a counter stored in the smart card CD. Such a counter can for example represent a number of offline transactions already performed by the smart card CD, or the cumulative amount of offline transactions already made by the smart card CD. The parameter PR can moreover relate to a threshold value of such a counter. The modification of the PR parameter may constitute an update of the configuration of the CD chip card causing a change in the processing of TR transactions by the smart card CD.
    A particular embodiment is now described with reference to FIGS. 6-8. More specifically, the smart card CD implements an example of a security method by executing the computer program PG.
    FIG. 7 represents, along a time line, TRI-TR5 transactions that have been successively implemented in the past by the EMV chip card.
    Figure 6 shows the recording of these transactions TRI to TR5 in the LG historian file of the smart card CD. More specifically, DLG logging data is stored in the LG log file in association with each TRI-TR5 transaction. This DLG history data characterizes the TRI - TR5 transactions that have already been implemented by the CD chip card. In this particular example, the DLG history data recorded in the log file LG includes, in association with each referenced transaction TR, a transaction identifier ID, a point in time PT (for example a date and / or a time) where the transaction was carried out and an amount MT of the transaction, and possibly at least one of: a log data DNl indicating whether the transaction was performed online or offline, a log data DN2 indicating whether the online authentication (or validation) by the emitter EM has been successfully passed in the case of an online transaction, and a log data item DN3 indicating the type of terminal T cooperating with the card CD during the transaction. Among the types of terminals T possible, there may be mentioned for example ATMs (or ATMs) and payment terminals, other types of terminals being conceivable.
    As illustrated in FIG. 7, it is now assumed that the smart card CD has initiated, in cooperation with the terminal T, the processing according to the EMV protocol of a new transaction TR6, called the current transaction. The smart card CD is for example inserted in the terminal T to allow communication by contact. In a particular example, it is assumed that the smart card CD has received a first GENERATE AC APDU command, denoted GAC1, as already explained above with reference to step S8 in FIG. 1, and that the smart card CD implements the security method according to a particular embodiment of the invention in response to this GAC1 command. According to one variant, the security method is implemented at another stage of the EMV protocol. According to yet another variant, the smart card CD implements the security method whereas the processing of the current transaction TR according to the EMV protocol has not yet been initiated.
    Steps A4, A6, A12 and A14 described hereinafter with reference to FIG. 8 respectively correspond to steps S30, S32, S34 and S36, represented in FIG. 5, implemented in a particular embodiment of the invention.
    During a sending step B2, the terminal T sends a time data DNT to the chip card CD which receives it at A2. The time data DNT is representative of a current point PC in time. This time data DNT may have any appropriate format and here includes for example the current date DC and the current time HC.
    In A4, the chip card CD determines, from the time data DNT received at A2, the current point in time PC during which the current transaction TR6 must be implemented. In this example, the current point PC is defined by the current date DC and the current time HC at the time of initiation of the EMV protocol between the smart card DC and the terminal T to implement the current transaction TR6. Other techniques for determining the current date and / or time are possible, however.
    The chip card CD then selects (A6), in the log file LG, each transaction TR implemented by the smart card CD in the predefined period of time PD ending at the current point PC in the time determined in A4. In this example, the time period PD is a time window of a predefined duration DT. The value of DT can be adapted according to the desired purpose as explained later.
    More specifically, during the selection A6, the smart card CD (more particularly the selection module MD4) determines in this example the reference point in time, denoted PRef, corresponding to the beginning of the predefined period of time PD ( Figure 7). To do this, in this particular example, the chip card CD calculates the reference point PRef in time from the current point PC in time and the predefined duration DT assigned to the time period PD. More precisely, the chip card CD calculates PRef such that:
    PRef = PC - DT
    In this example, the reference point PRef includes the date and time of the beginning of the period of time PD.
    The reference point PRef in time can correspond to a transaction previously implemented by the smart card CD.
    Still in A6, the smart card CD selects (AlO) then each transaction TR, recorded in the log file LG, which is later than the reference point PRef in time. In a particular example, the selection AlO includes the transaction TR implemented, if appropriate, at the reference point PRef in time (no transaction is recorded at the point PRef in this example).
    In this example, the smart card CD determines that at this time a TR transaction referenced in the log file LG has been implemented (or processed) from the point in time PT recorded in the log file LG. association with the relevant TR transaction. PT includes for example the date and / or time of the corresponding TR transaction.
    In this particular example, the chip card CD selects in AlO the transactions TR2, TR3, TR4 and TR5 whose point in time PT (ie the date and time) is later than the position PRef reference in time. The chip card CD further selects the current TR6 transaction in AlO, although variants are possible in which the current TR transaction is not selected in AlO.
    The smart card CD can also be configured to apply at least one selection criterion CRI to refine the selection made in AlO. According to one variant, the chip card CD determines for example in AlO, from the log file LG, as reference transaction TRef, the most recent transaction TR in the period of time PD that satisfies the first predefined condition CDI. Here is meant by "most recent" the transaction TR whose point in time PT is closest to the current point PC. The chip card CD then selects in AlO only each TR transaction implemented by said CD card after the reference transaction TRef in the predefined period of time PD. According to a particular embodiment, the first condition CD1 comprises at least one of the following conditions: CDU: the reference transaction TRef is an online transaction that has been performed in cooperation with the issuer EM; and CD12: the TRef reference transaction is an online transaction carried out in cooperation with the EM issuer and that has been successfully authenticated (or validated) by said EM issuer.
    When the condition CDU above is applied, the chip card CD determines, for each transaction TR whose point in the time PT is subsequent to the reference transaction TRef, and from the associated data DN1, if said transaction TR is an online transaction.
    When the condition CD12 above is additionally applied, the CD chip card determines, for each online transaction whose point in time PT is subsequent to the reference transaction TRef, and from the corresponding data DN2 in the LG history file, if said TR transaction has been successfully authenticated (or validated) by the EM issuer.
    In a particular embodiment, the smart card CD applies the condition CDU but not the condition CD12 in AlO. According to the example shown in FIG. 6, the transaction TR3 then constitutes the reference transaction TRef (DN1 = ON LINE) so that the chip card CD selects in AlO, according to the condition CDU, the transactions TR4 and TR5.
    According to another embodiment, the smart card CD applies the condition CD12 above. According to the example shown in FIG. 6, the transaction TR3 then also constitutes the reference transaction TRef because the associated DN2 data indicates that this online transaction has been successfully authenticated (or validated) by the issuer EM (DN2 = OK) . Accordingly, the CD chip card selects in AlO, in accordance with condition CD12, the transactions TR4 and TR5.
    As already indicated, the smart card CD can be configured to apply at least one selection criterion CRI to refine the selection made in AlO. The number and nature of CRI selection criteria may vary from case to case. In a particular example, during the selection AlO, the smart card CD filters the transactions TR recorded in the log file LG to select only each transaction TR satisfying at least a second predefined condition CD2.
    In a particular example, the second predefined condition CD2 includes a condition on the type of the terminal T with which the smart card CD cooperated during said transaction TR. In the example represented in FIG. 6, the log file LG records as log data DN3, for each transaction TR, whether said transaction was carried out in cooperation with a terminal T according to a first type ΤΎ1 or according to a second type TY2. In a particular example, the states ΤΎ1 and ΊΎ2 respectively indicate that the terminal T is an automatic cash dispenser (ATM) and a payment terminal (a mobile terminal for example). If for example condition CD2 is applied, the smart card CD excludes from the selection AlO the transactions TR which are in the predefined period PD and but do not satisfy the state ΤΎ1 (the transaction TR5 is therefore excluded in this example).
    It will be understood that it is possible to configure the smart card CD to apply at least a first condition CD1 and / or at least a second condition CD2 as explained above.
    It will be assumed in the following of this example that the smart card CD applies the condition CDU and consequently selects in AlO the transactions TR4 and TR5.
    During an analysis step A12, the smart card CD (more particularly the risk analysis module MD6) performs a risk analysis (or transaction analysis), based on the recorded DLG history data. in the LG history file in association with each TR transaction selected in A6 (ie TR4 and TR5 in this example), to detect whether abnormal (or suspicious) use of the CD chip card occurred during the period predefined time PD.
    In this exemplary embodiment, during said analysis A12, the smart card CD detects whether an abnormal use of said CD card has occurred during the predefined period of time PD from at least one of: number of TR transactions selected in A6; and - the cumulative amount of each TR transaction selected in A6.
    It is assumed in this example that the number of TR transactions selected in A6 and the cumulative amount of each TR transaction selected in A6 are taken into account by the chip card CD during the risk analysis A12. In the example considered here and as represented in FIG. 6, two transactions (TR4 and TR5) are selected in A6 and the cumulative amount of transactions TR4 and TR5 amounts to MT4 + MTS.
    According to one particular example, during the risk analysis A12, the smart card CD detects whether abnormal (or suspect) use has occurred during the predefined period PD according to at least one criterion CR2, recorded in this example in the memory 10. In this example, during the analysis A12, the smart card CD applies, as analysis criteria CR2, the following predefined conditions CD3: - CD31: the number of transactions selected during said selection A6 reaches at least a first predefined threshold value Lmax1; and - CD32: the cumulative amount (TR4 + TR5 in this example) of each transaction TR selected in A6 reaches at least a second predefined threshold value Lmax2.
    In other words, during analysis A12, the smart card CD detects that abnormal or suspect use has occurred during the predefined period of time PD if conditions CD32 and CD32 are satisfied. The values Lmaxl and Lmax2 are set according to the needs of the case.
    According to one variant, only one of the predefined conditions CD31 and CD32 is applied by the chip card CD during the analysis A12.
    If no abnormal use is detected during analysis A12, the securing process is terminated. In this case, the smart card CD resumes for example a normal processing of the transaction according to the EMV protocol.
    If, on the other hand, an abnormal use is detected in A12, the smart card CD triggers in A14 at least one operation of securing the smart card CD in response to the current transaction TR6. Each security operation is configured to secure the CD chip card with respect to the current transaction TR, and more generally, with respect to the use made of the CD chip card over the period of PD time. . The number and nature of these security operations may vary depending on the use case.
    In this example, the smart card CD carries out in A14 at least one of the following security operations: - sending (A16) to the terminal T of a message MSGl informing said abnormal or suspicious detected use. The terminal T may optionally transmit (B17) the message MSG1 to the remote server SV so that the sender SV is informed of the abnormal or suspicious use detected by the smart card CD; modification of at least one operating parameter PR of the electronic device. As already indicated, various operating parameters PR of the smart card CD can be modified as needed. In general terms, an operation parameter PR configures the manner in which the smart card CD processes a transaction TR with the terminal T. - recording (A20), in the log file LG, of a security data item DS representative of said abnormal or suspect use detected at A12; and - refusal (A22) to authorize the current transaction. The CD chip CD sends for example a refusal message MSG2 which is received by the terminal T in B22.
    The present invention advantageously makes it possible to effectively protect smart cards, for example of the EMV type, against abnormal or suspicious behavior occurring especially during offline transactions. A smart card according to the invention is thus capable of storing in memory memory data relating to transactions processed by said card over time. From this historization data, the smart card can then analyze the use that is made of the card in a relevant time window, namely a time window corresponding here to a period of time immediately preceding the transaction. In progress. It is thus possible to take into account all relevant transactions for each analysis made by the smart card, without there being a risk that certain transactions are excluded from the analysis as is the case for example in the mechanism security described above with reference to Figures 2A and 2B.
    It is possible to set the duration DT of the period of time PD according to the type of abnormal or unauthorized use that is to be detected. In order to overcome the flight problems described above, it is possible, for example, to set the duration DT such that DT = 10 minutes (or any value less than 60 or 10 minutes). If, on the other hand, one seeks to detect an abnormal behavior of the authentic carrier (for example a number and / or a cumulative amount of abnormal or suspicious expenditure), one can for example set the duration DT such that DT = 30 days. In this way, the issuer can control the consumption habits of the genuine carrier and, if necessary, contact the carrier or take any other appropriate action.
    It is thus possible to configure the smart card in order to trigger a security response adapted to the abnormal use detected. A reinforced security of the smart card against fraudulent uses (in case of theft for example) is for example possible.
    In general, the invention makes it possible to better control the use of a smart card, of EMV type in particular, even when it operates offline.
    Those skilled in the art will understand that the embodiments and variants described above are only non-limiting examples of implementation of the invention. In particular, those skilled in the art may consider any adaptation or combination of the embodiments and variants described above to meet a particular need.
    权利要求:
    Claims (17)
    [1" id="c-fr-0001]
    A method of securing implemented by an electronic device (CD), said method comprising: determining (S30; A4) a current point in time (PC) in which a current transaction (TR) is or must be implemented by the electronic device; selection (S32; A6), in a history file (LG) in which at least one transaction (TR) is recorded, of each transaction implemented by said electronic device in a predefined period of time (PD) ending at the point current in time; risk analysis (S34; A12), based on at least one logging datum (DLG) recorded in the log file in association with each selected transaction (TR), for detecting if an abnormal use of said electronic device occurred during said predefined period of time; and if so, triggering (S36; A14) at least one securing operation (A16-A22) of the electronic device in response to said current transaction.
    [2" id="c-fr-0002]
    The method of claim 1, wherein the current point in time comprises at least one of the current date and the current time of the current transaction.
    [3" id="c-fr-0003]
    3. Method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the determination of the current point comprises receiving, from a terminal with which the electronic device cooperates, a temporal data representative of the current point in time.
    [4" id="c-fr-0004]
    The method of any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein said selecting comprises calculating the point in time of the beginning of the predefined period of time from the current point in time and a predefined duration at said predefined period of time, each selected transaction being subsequent to the point in time of the beginning of the predefined period of time.
    [5" id="c-fr-0005]
    5. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein, during said selection, the electronic device: - determines, from the file history, as a reference transaction, the most recent transaction in the period of time predefined which satisfies at least a first predefined condition; and selects only each transaction implemented by said electronic device subsequent to said reference transaction in the predefined period of time.
    [6" id="c-fr-0006]
    The method according to claim 5, wherein said at least one predefined condition comprises at least one of the following conditions: the reference transaction is a so-called "on-line" transaction having been carried out in cooperation with a transmission entity of the electronic device; and the reference transaction is an online transaction that has been successfully authenticated by the issuing entity of the electronic device.
    [7" id="c-fr-0007]
    7. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein, during said selection, the electronic device filters the transactions recorded in the log file to select only each transaction satisfying at least a second predefined condition.
    [8" id="c-fr-0008]
    The method of claim 7, wherein the second predefined condition includes a condition on the type of the terminal with which the electronic device cooperated in said transaction.
    [9" id="c-fr-0009]
    The method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, wherein, in said risk analysis, the electronic device detects whether abnormal use of said electronic device has occurred during said predefined time period from to one of: - the number of transactions selected; and - the cumulative amount of each selected transaction.
    [10" id="c-fr-0010]
    The method of claim 9, wherein, during said risk analysis, the electronic device detects that abnormal use has occurred during said predefined period of time if at least one of the following three predefined conditions is satisfied. the number of transactions selected during said selection reaches a first predefined threshold value; and the cumulative amount of each transaction selected during said selection reaches a second predefined threshold value.
    [11" id="c-fr-0011]
    11. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 10, wherein said at least one security operation comprises at least one of: - sending a message informing said abnormal use detected; modifying at least one operating parameter of the electronic device; recording, in the log file, a security data representative of said abnormal use detected; and refusal to implement said current transaction.
    [12" id="c-fr-0012]
    The method of any one of claims 1 to 11, wherein the electronic device is a smart card.
    [13" id="c-fr-0013]
    A computer program (PG1) comprising instructions for performing the steps of a securing method according to any one of claims 1 to 12 when said program is executed by a computer.
    [14" id="c-fr-0014]
    A computer-readable recording medium on which a computer program (PG1) is recorded including instructions for executing the steps of a securing method according to any one of claims 1 to 12.
    [15" id="c-fr-0015]
    An electronic device comprising; a determination module for determining a current point in time during which a current transaction is or must be implemented by the electronic device; a selection module for selecting, in a log file in which at least one transaction is recorded, each transaction implemented by said electronic device in a predefined period of time ending at the current point in time; a risk analysis module for detecting, from at least one historization data item recorded in the log file in association with each selected transaction, whether an abnormal use of said electronic device occurred during said period predefined time; and a security module configured, in the event of a positive result of said detection by the risk analysis module, for triggering a security operation of the electronic device in response to said current transaction.
    [16" id="c-fr-0016]
    16. An electronic device according to claim 15, comprising a memory in which the log file is recorded.
    [17" id="c-fr-0017]
    An electronic device according to claim 15 or 16, wherein the electronic device is a smart card.
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    同族专利:
    公开号 | 公开日
    US20200320535A1|2020-10-08|
    WO2017203146A1|2017-11-30|
    EP3465584A1|2019-04-10|
    FR3051579B1|2021-11-19|
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    法律状态:
    2017-04-20| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 2 |
    2017-11-24| PLSC| Publication of the preliminary search report|Effective date: 20171124 |
    2018-04-23| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 3 |
    2018-07-20| CD| Change of name or company name|Owner name: IDEMIA FRANCE, FR Effective date: 20180618 |
    2018-07-20| CJ| Change in legal form|Effective date: 20180618 |
    2019-04-19| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 4 |
    2020-04-22| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 5 |
    2021-04-21| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 6 |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    FR1654572A|FR3051579B1|2016-05-23|2016-05-23|METHOD FOR SECURING AN ELECTRONIC DEVICE, AND CORRESPONDING ELECTRONIC DEVICE|FR1654572A| FR3051579B1|2016-05-23|2016-05-23|METHOD FOR SECURING AN ELECTRONIC DEVICE, AND CORRESPONDING ELECTRONIC DEVICE|
    EP17729524.3A| EP3465584A1|2016-05-23|2017-05-22|Method for securing an electronic device and corresponding electronic device|
    US16/304,235| US20200320535A1|2016-05-23|2017-05-22|Method for securing an electronic device and corresponding electronic device|
    PCT/FR2017/051254| WO2017203146A1|2016-05-23|2017-05-22|Method for securing an electronic device and corresponding electronic device|
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