• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
  • 同族专利
  • 引用文献
  • 法律状态
  • 优先权
    • 专利摘要:
    Sets, devices, and methods are provided for reliably authenticating asymmetric cryptographic IC circuits based on physically unclonable functions (PUFs) that are unresponsive to reverse engineering. Various embodiments of the invention improve the security level of IC circuit architectures without requiring connection to a remote CA, thus eliminating the disadvantages associated with online authentication. Some embodiments provide this by using a secure private code produced by PUF function that never needs to be issued by or exported from the PUF.
    公开号:FR3038416A1
    申请号:FR1556126
    申请日:2015-06-30
    公开日:2017-01-06
    发明作者:Christophe Tremlet；Scott Edward Jones
    申请人:Maxim Integrated Products Inc；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    AUTHENTICATION DEVICES AND METHODS BASED ON PHYSICALLY UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS
    The technical field of the present invention relates to the authentication of electronic devices and, more particularly, to sets, devices and methods for authenticating electronic devices by applying asymmetric cryptographic principles to authentication integrated circuits based on on physically non-clonable function (PUF function).
    In the background of the invention, a conventional authentication IC circuit is a device designed to securely hold cryptographic or secret code in a non-volatile memory (NVM memory) or produce a secret code by intermediate of a PUF circuit which is integrated in the device. The PUF function design takes advantage of small but unavoidable characteristic manufacturing variations on semiconductor physical components, with measurable variations in doping concentrations, gate oxide thicknesses, and geometric tolerances resulting from operations. imperfect semiconductor fabrication that electronic devices such as MOS devices undergo. These variations can be used to produce sequences of random and unique numerical values that can be used to produce cryptographic codes. A PUF circuit typically generates a random number that is reproducible but unique to the device that can be used to produce a single response for verification purposes. The response changes unpredictably - hence the term unclonable - when the physical state of the PUF changes even slightly (e.g., due to minor physical damage) once the device containing the PUF is explored or modified.
    There are two basic types of authentication ICs. A first type is based on symmetric cryptographic methods in which an authentication unit of a device, for example a host server such as a printer, shares a secret code with a device, for example a cartridge. The second type - the main subject of the present invention - is based on asymmetric cryptographic methods, in which the authentication entity of a device uses a public code, and in which the device uses a private code to prove its identity. While the public code may be freely disclosed, the disclosure of the private code must be strongly protected.
    Authentication ICs that store the secret code in NVM memory typically include some reverse engineering protection. Nevertheless, common authentication ICs suffer from a significant disadvantage, given that with sufficient time, money and expertise, adversaries can overcome existing protection mechanisms and extract identifiers even though such as private codes and cloned devices, for example, using fault analysis methods.
    Since it is known that PUFs provide the highest level of resistance against physical and invasive reverse engineering attacks, secret codes produced by PUF function are considered to be insensitive to these types of attacks. However, conventional authentication circuits that use secret codes produced by PUF function require that the device to be protected comprising the IC circuit is connected in order to access the manufacturer's database in order to perform the authentication, which will not is neither always possible nor appropriate nor safe.
    Variants of principles operate by producing a private code without using a PUF circuit or by using a secret code stored in a non-volatile memory. However, such principles are by no means insensitive to reverse engineering, and can be circumvented by sophisticated attackers.
    There is a need for devices and methods for overcoming the foregoing limitations. To this end, an integrated circuit for authenticating an electronic device without a connection to a remote certification authority is created, the integrated circuit comprising: a physically unclonable function element (PUF function) which produces a random number; and a processing unit configured to: receive the random number and determine whether the random number is other than zero; in response to a determination that the random number is different from zero, accept a device private code that is based on the random number; calculate a device public code associated with the random number; receiving, during a production operation, a public code certificate which is based on a calculated public code, the public code certificate being signed with an external private code; receive a challenge from a host server; sign the challenge with the device private code; and communicate the signed challenge to the host server. The challenge may be a random number that is not stored in non-volatile memory. The public code certificate may include a data field including a value that is representative of the device public code. The external private code can be issued by an external certification authority. The processing unit may be external to the integrated circuit. The signed public code certificate can be stored in a non-volatile memory. The non-volatile memory may be external to the integrated circuit.
    The present invention relates to a method of authenticating an electronic device without connection to a remote certification authority, the method comprising: a physically non-clonable function element (PUF function) that produces a random number; and a processing unit configured to: receive the random number and determine whether the random number is other than zero; in response to a determination that the random number is different from zero, accept a device private code that is based on the random number; calculate a device public code associated with the random number; receiving, during a production operation, a public code certificate which is based on a calculated public code, the public code certificate being signed with an external private code; receive a challenge from a host server; sign the challenge with the device private code; and communicate the signed challenge to the host server. The production of the random number can be performed during a production operation. The calculation of the device public code may include performing an elliptic curve multiplication. The method may further comprise, in response to a determination that the random number is zero, the rejection of the electronic device. The method may further include receiving the external private code from an external certification authority.
    The present invention further relates to an authentication device of an electronic device without a connection to a remote certification authority, the device comprising: a non-volatile memory for storing a public code certificate; a circuit comprising a physically unclonable function element (PUF function) which produces a random number; and a processing unit configured to: use the random number as a device private code in response to a determination that the random number is different from zero; calculate the device public code associated with the random number; and receive the public code certificate associated with the random number; and sign the public code certificate with an external private code; and communicating the signed challenge to a host server to enable authentication of the electronic device by the host server. The authentication may include the challenge of the signed challenge with the device public code to validate a physical state of the electronic device including the PUF function. The signed public code certificate can be stored in the non-volatile memory. The host server can read the public code certificate from the nonvolatile memory. The device may further include an external certification authority that delivers the external private code. The device may further include a certification authority that pre-calculates a device public code. The host server can check the public code certificate with the device public code. The device may further include a cryptographic engine configured to perform an elliptical curve point multiplication.
    A brief description of the drawings will now be made below.
    Reference will be made to embodiments of the invention, examples of which will be shown in the accompanying figures. These figures should be considered as representative and not limiting. Although the invention is described primarily in the context of these embodiments, it should be understood that this is not intended to limit the scope of the invention to these particular embodiments.
    Figure 1 shows an authentication circuit IC based on conventional PUF function requiring online authentication from a manufacturer database.
    Figure 2 is an algorithm of a representative initialization procedure for authenticating a device according to different embodiments of the invention.
    Fig. 3 is an algorithm of a representative method for authenticating a device through a host server during field use, according to various embodiments of the invention.
    FIG. 4 represents an exemplary block diagram of an authentication circuit of a device according to different embodiments of the invention.
    FIG. 5 represents an exemplary block diagram of an authentication device of a device according to various embodiments of the invention.
    A detailed description of the preferred embodiments will now be made.
    In the following description, for explanation purposes, specific details are presented for the purpose of understanding the invention. However, it will be obvious to those skilled in the art that the invention can be implemented without these details. It will be apparent to one skilled in the art that embodiments of the present invention, described below, can be implemented in a variety of ways and using a variety of means. It will also be apparent to those skilled in the art that additional variants, applications and embodiments are within the scope thereof, as are additional areas in which the invention may be used. Therefore, the embodiments described below are representative of the specific embodiments of the invention and are intended to avoid obscuration of the invention.
    The reference in the description to a "first embodiment" or "an embodiment" means that a feature, structure, feature or specific function described in connection with the embodiment is contained in at least one mode. embodiment of the invention. The presence of the phrase "in a first embodiment", "in one embodiment," or the like at different locations of the description does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment.
    In addition, the links between the components or between the process steps in the figures are not limited to the links that are directly affected. Instead, the links shown in the figures between components or process steps can be modified or otherwise changed by adding intermediate components or process steps thereto without depart from the teachings of the present invention.
    In this document, the term "PUF function" includes physical, chemical, and other PUF functions known to those skilled in the art. Such PUF functions can be used as a secure physical element since it is determined by the hardware of a particular device.
    Figure 1 shows an authentication circuit IC based on conventional PUF function that requires online authentication by an authentication device. An authentication IC circuit 102 comprises a PUF circuit 104, a secret code produced by function PUF 106, and a processing unit 108. The PUF circuit 104 is a circuit that can be integrated into a device to be authenticated, such as a cell phone. An authentication device 150 includes a manufacturer database 152. In this example, the manufacturer database 152 contains a set of challenge and response pairs.
    In operation, the PUF circuit 104 forms an authentication IC circuit protection means 102 against reverse engineering attempts by attackers. The PUF circuit 104 uses physical states of a device to produce a secret code 106, such as a random number, which is unique to the device. The random number may be used to produce a corresponding response 122 that the authentication device 150 can then use to verify the authenticity of the authentication IC circuit 102. The challenge 120 is a public random number while the response 122 is a calculated response delivered by the authentication IC circuit 102. The processing unit 108 generally performs calculations and communicates with the authentication device 150.
    Typically, during the authentication IC circuit 102 production operation, a set of challenge and response pairs is registered in a manufacturer database 152, which is a secure database that combines challenges. 120 to PUF 122 function responses for later use in authentication operations. Typically, the PUF circuit 104 receives a large number of challenges 120 and issues corresponding responses 122 that are stored in the manufacturer database 152. The challenge and response authentication principles are based on detecting that a secret code, here a secret code produced by function PUF 106, is known without actually disclosing the secret code. The details of Challenge and Response authentication are not described here in detail.
    In order to authenticate the device containing the authentication IC circuit 102 during field use, the authentication IC circuit 102 is conventionally connected to a manufacturer database 152 by the intermediate of a network, and a challenge and response pair is randomly selected from the database 152 to perform the authentication. The challenge 120, which is typically a random number, is sent to the authentication IC 102, which calculates and returns a response 122 based on the secret code 106 and the random number. The response 122 is then compared to an expected response stored in the database 152. Finally, if the response 122 corresponds to the challenge 120 in the database 152, the authentication IC 102 is successfully authenticated. However, the need for an online check makes use of existing PUF-based authentication IC circuits, such as authentication IC circuit 102, impractical in some contexts as well as vulnerable to base attacks. Therefore, it may be desirable to have operational devices and methods that provide the highest level of burglar protection for the authentication IC circuit 102 and can be used appropriately even when the connection to database 152 is unavailable.
    Figure 2 is an algorithm of a representative initialization procedure for authenticating a device, according to different embodiments of the invention. The initialization operation 200, as it can be implemented as part of a production operation, begins at step 204, when a random number, k, is produced by a PUF function element. for example, an integrated PUF circuit. In embodiments, the random number produced by function PUF is not stored in a non-volatile memory. In step 206, it is determined whether the value of the random number produced by function PUF is equal to zero.
    If yes, then, in step 208, the device comprising the authentication circuit IC and the function element PUF is rejected as unacceptable.
    If, on the other hand, the value of a random number, k, is not zero, then, in step 210, k is accepted as function-based code PUF, for example, as than private code. In step 212, the function-based code PUF is used to calculate an associated public code, Q. In embodiments, for an ECDSA cryptographic algorithm, the private and public codes are linked by a mathematical property, here by the equation Q = k * P. The codes P and Q constitute points of an elliptic curve on GF (p), a prime field of order p. In step 214, a certificate that is associated with the public code is produced. In embodiments, once the authentication circuit IC has issued the public code, in order to ensure that the code is genuine and not issued by any unauthorized entity, the public code certificate is generated for the Q code, for example, by a certification authority during the production operation (for example, during a production control of the IC circuit). The public code certificate may be a record that includes data fields of a predetermined format. For example, one of the data fields may contain a value that is representative of the public code Q.
    In embodiments, the production of the public code certificate in step 214 includes signing the certificate with a device private code. The device private code may be a number that is generated externally to the IC circuit during device manufacture. In one embodiment, the device private code is a private code of the certification authority.
    Finally, in step 216, the public code certificate signed for Q may be stored in a nonvolatile memory of the authentication circuit IC.
    Fig. 3 is an algorithm of a representative method for authenticating a device via a host server during field use, according to various embodiments of the invention. The authentication procedure 300 begins at step 302, when a certificate from a device to be authenticated is read, for example, by a host server that receives a device public code and stores it in a memory. In step 304, the host server verifies the IC public code certificate with a device public code i.e., for example, a public code of a certification authority that has been previously computed.
    If, in step 306, the IC public code certificate can not be verified, then the verification attempt is considered to have failed. In step 308, the host server retrieves or searches for the IC device public code from the certificate.
    Once the IC device public code is known, the host server, in step 310, sends a challenge, such as a random number, to the authentication IC circuit device. In step 312, the authentication IC circuit device signs the challenge with its private code produced by function PUF. In step 314, the host server verifies the circuit challenge signature IC with the public code of the circuit device IC, i.e., the host server verifies the authenticity of the circuit device IC.
    If the verification is successful, the device is successfully authenticated at step 318.
    Otherwise, in step 316, the device authentication is considered to have failed.
    It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the authentication IC circuit that stores a PIN may include a cryptographic engine to perform cryptographic computations.
    FIG. 4 represents an exemplary block diagram of an integrated circuit for authenticating a device according to different embodiments of the invention. The circuit 400 comprises a PUF function element 402, a processing unit 410 and a non-volatile memory 420. It is noted that any of the processing unit 410 and the non-volatile memory 402 may be located external to the integrated circuit 400.
    In some embodiments, the PUF function element 402 is a circuit that produces a random number, including during a production operation. The number may be a reproducible and unique number, for example, a 256-bit value, and may be used as a unique cryptographic secret code. Several PUF function circuits can be used to generate multiple private codes.
    In some embodiments, based on an inherent property of asymmetric encryption algorithms, such as an elliptic curve digital signature (ECDSA) algorithm, the number produced must be a non-zero integer to produce a valid public code.
    The random number produced by function PUF is delivered to the processing unit 410 which first determines if the number is equal to zero. If so, circuit 400 is rejected as unacceptable. The ability of the PUF function element 402 to produce a null value that can lead to the creation of an invalid public code is based on the inherent unpredictable nature of the PUF function elements. In some embodiments, a nonzero random number is accepted or used to produce an associated device private code 404.
    It is noted that algorithms such as RSA do not tend to be used themselves with PUF function elements since non-harmless numbers alone do not guarantee the validity of a random number. In fact, numbers used for private codes for the RSA algorithm are subject to additional specifications, such as having the particular feature of being a prime number, etc.
    In some embodiments, device private code 404 is used to compute an associated public code, Q, using the equation Q - k * P. In general, the equation Q = k * P defines a set of points that create an elliptic curve. Scalar multiplication is a basic operation on elliptic curve points, which can be used to sign data. A point on an elliptic curve is multiplied by a scalar in a classical way by adding a point several times to itself in order to lead to another point on the curve. However, knowing only resulting points, it is theoretically impossible to determine the number of times that the addition has been implemented in order to arrive at a resulting point, which makes the elliptical point multiplication attractive for use in cryptography. The public code can be produced in an integrated manner by executing a scalar multiplication. In embodiments, the random number produced by function PUF is not stored in a nonvolatile memory 420 which may or may not be external to the integrated circuit 400.
    In some embodiments, after the circuit 400 has issued the device public code 412, in order to ensure that the code 412 is true and not issued by any unauthorized entity, the processing unit 410 produces a public code certificate 414 for the public code 412. It should be noted that the processing unit 410 may be remotely located and controlled by an external entity, such as a controller. In some embodiments, the processing unit 410 generates a certificate that is based on a result from a PUF function 402 and is stored in non-volatile memory 420. The public code certificate may be a record that includes data fields of a predetermined format. For example, one of the data fields may contain a value that is representative of the public code.
    In some embodiments, the processing unit 410 externally signs the certificate with a device private code, for example, a private code of a certification authority which is an externally generated number, for example, during of a device production operation, such as during a circuit production control 400, thereby preventing the device private code from being imported into the authentication device.
    FIG. 5 represents an exemplary functional diagram of a device intended to authenticate a device according to various embodiments of the invention. For clarity, components similar to those shown in FIG. 4 are numbered in a similar manner. For the sake of brevity, a description of their function is not repeated here.
    The device 500 comprises a circuit 400 and a host server 504. The host server 504 itself comprises a certificate verification module 510, a Q code extraction module 512 and a signature verification module 514. It should be noted that modules 510 to 514 can be implemented as stand-alone units or integrated into a single unit. In embodiments, the circuit 400 is integrated in a device to authenticate to a good, such as an electronic device, which communicates through appropriate communication interfaces (not shown).
    In operation, in a manner similar to FIG. 4, the circuit 400 issues a certificate that includes a device public code. In some embodiments, during field use, the host server 504 reads the public code certificate 520 through the certificate verification module 510. The public code certificate 520 includes a device public code for example, a public code of a certification authority that has been calculated previously. The certificate verification module 510 checks the certificate 520 or rejects the circuit 400 as defective.
    In some embodiments, the Q 512 retrieval module retrieves or searches the device public code from the certificate 520. In response, the host server 504 sends a challenge 522 (e.g., a random number) to the circuit 400 to sign with a private code generated by the PUF circuit 402. When receiving the response 524 from the circuit 400 to the challenge 522, the host server 504 checks the signed challenge 524 with the public circuit code 400 in order to authenticate circuit 400 or any device comprising circuit 400.
    In some embodiments, at least one circuit 400 and a host server 504 include a cryptographic engine that performs cryptographic computations.
    It should be understood that other asymmetric cryptographic principles can also be applied to the authentication circuit 400.
    It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that fewer steps or additional steps may be incorporated into the steps shown herein without departing from the scope of the invention. No particular order is imposed by the arrangement of blocks within the present algorithm or description.
    It will further be appreciated that the foregoing examples and embodiments are examples and are given for purposes of clarity and comprehension and do not limit the scope of the present invention. It must be considered that all the permutations, improvements, equivalents, associations, and improvements made on it, which will become apparent to those skilled in the art upon reading the specification and studying the drawings, are contained within the scope of the present invention. Numerical references and legends of the figures Figure 1
    PRIOR ART 102 Authentication IC circuit
    104 PUF Circuit
    106 Secret code produced by PUF 108 Processing unit
    Online Registration 120 Challenge 122 Response 150 Authentication Device 152 Manufacturer Database with Challenge-Response Pairs Figure 2 Initialization Start 204 Output Random Number k, by PUF Function 206 k = 0 Yes 208 Device rejection
    No
    210 Accepting k as PUF based private code 212 Public code calculation Q = k * P 214 Generating public code certificate and signing with device private code
    216 Memorisation certificate in memory device NVM
    End of initialization
    Figure 3 Beginning of authentication 302 Read certificate from device to authenticate 304 Verified certificate with device public code 306 Authentication failure 308 Extraction device public code from certificate 310 Dispatch challenge to device 312 Challenge signature with private code 314 Verified challenge signature with device public code
    No 316 Authentication failure
    Yes 318 Successful authentication
    Figure 4
    402 PUF Circuit 404 Device Private Code Produced by PUF Circuit, k 410 Processing Unit
    412 Public Code, Q 414 Public Code Certificate (Signed with Device Private Code)
    420 NVM Memory
    Figure 5
    402 PUF 410 Processor Unit
    420 NVM 520 Memory Certificate with 522 Device Public Code Challenge
    524 Signed Challenge Code P 510 Certificate Verification Module
    512 Q code extraction module
    514 Signature Verification Module using Q
    权利要求:
    Claims (20)
    [1" id="c-fr-0001]
    An integrated authentication circuit (400) of an electronic device without connection to a remote certification authority, the integrated circuit comprising: a physically unclonable function element (PUF function) which produces a random number; and a processing unit (410) configured to receive the random number and determine whether the random number is different from zero; in response to a determination that the random number is different from zero, accept a device private code that is based on the random number; calculate a device public code associated with the random number; receiving, during a production operation, a public code certificate which is based on a calculated public code, the public code certificate being signed with an external private code; receive a challenge from a host server (504); sign the challenge with the device private code; and communicate the signed challenge to the host server.
    [2" id="c-fr-0002]
    The integrated circuit of claim 1, wherein the challenge is a random number that is not stored in a nonvolatile memory.
    [3" id="c-fr-0003]
    The integrated circuit of claim 1, wherein the public code certificate comprises a data field comprising a value that is representative of the device public code.
    [4" id="c-fr-0004]
    The integrated circuit of claim 1, wherein the external private code is issued by an external certification authority.
    [5" id="c-fr-0005]
    An integrated circuit according to claim 1, wherein the processing unit is external to the integrated circuit.
    [6" id="c-fr-0006]
    An integrated circuit according to claim 1, wherein the signed public code certificate is stored in non-volatile memory (420).
    [7" id="c-fr-0007]
    The integrated circuit of claim 6, wherein the non-volatile memory is external to the integrated circuit.
    [8" id="c-fr-0008]
    A method of authenticating an electronic device without a connection to a remote certification authority, the method comprising: a physically non-clonable function element (PUF function) that produces a random number; and a processing unit configured to receive the random number and determine if the random number is other than zero (206); in response to a determination that the random number is different from zero, accept a device private code that is based on the random number (210); computing a device public code associated with the random number (212); receiving, during a production operation, a public code certificate which is based on a calculated public code, the public code certificate being signed with an external private code; receive a challenge from a host server; sign the challenge with the device private code; and communicate the signed challenge to the host server.
    [9" id="c-fr-0009]
    The method of claim 8, wherein the production of the random number is performed during a production operation.
    [10" id="c-fr-0010]
    The method of claim 8, wherein computing the device public code includes performing an elliptic curve multiplication.
    [11" id="c-fr-0011]
    The method of claim 8, further comprising, in response to a determination that the random number is zero, the rejection of the electronic device.
    [12" id="c-fr-0012]
    The method of claim 8, further comprising receiving the external private code from an external certification authority.
    [13" id="c-fr-0013]
    An authentication device (400) for an electronic device without a remote CA binding, the device comprising: a nonvolatile memory (420) for storing a public code certificate; a circuit (402) comprising a physically unclonable function element (PUF function) that produces a random number; and a processing unit (410) configured to: use the random number as a device private code in response to a determination that the random number is other than zero; calculate the device public code associated with the random number; and receive the public code certificate associated with the random number; and sign the public code certificate with an external private code; and communicating the signed challenge to a host server to enable authentication of the electronic device by the host server.
    [14" id="c-fr-0014]
    The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the authentication comprises the challenge of the signed challenge with the device public code to validate a physical state of the electronic device comprising the PUF function.
    [15" id="c-fr-0015]
    15. Device according to claim 13, wherein the signed public code certificate is stored in the non-volatile memory.
    [16" id="c-fr-0016]
    The apparatus of claim 15, wherein the host server reads the public code certificate from the nonvolatile memory.
    [17" id="c-fr-0017]
    The apparatus of claim 13, further comprising an external certification authority that delivers the external private code.
    [18" id="c-fr-0018]
    The apparatus of claim 13, further comprising a certification authority that pre-calculates a device public code.
    [19" id="c-fr-0019]
    The apparatus of claim 17, wherein the host server verifies the public code certificate with the device public code.
    [20" id="c-fr-0020]
    The apparatus of claim 13, further comprising a cryptographic engine adapted to perform an elliptic curve point multiplication.
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    US11269999B2|2019-07-01|2022-03-08|At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P.|Protecting computing devices from malicious tampering|
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    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    FR1556126A|FR3038416B1|2015-06-30|2015-06-30|AUTHENTICATION DEVICES AND METHODS BASED ON PHYSICALLY NON-CLONABLE FUNCTIONS|FR1556126A| FR3038416B1|2015-06-30|2015-06-30|AUTHENTICATION DEVICES AND METHODS BASED ON PHYSICALLY NON-CLONABLE FUNCTIONS|
    US14/842,661| US9621359B2|2015-06-30|2015-09-01|Systems and methods for authentication based on physically unclonable functions|
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