• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
  • 同族专利
  • 引用文献
  • 法律状态
  • 优先权
    • 专利摘要:
    The invention relates to a method for verifying the authenticity of a product associated with a host device, wherein: a first electronic circuit (10) of the device initiates a charge retention circuit of a second electronic circuit (22) of the product ; and the first circuit interprets a discharge duration of the charge retention circuit to decide the authenticity of the product.
    公开号:FR3038411A1
    申请号:FR1556125
    申请日:2015-06-30
    公开日:2017-01-06
    发明作者:Jean-Louis Modave；Fabrice Marinet；Denis Farison
    申请人:Proton World International NV；STMicroelectronics Rousset SAS；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    DETECTION OF AUTHENTICITY OF AN ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT OR A PRODUCT CONTAINING SUCH A CIRCUIT
    Field
    The present description relates generally to electronic circuits and, more particularly, to a method of verifying the authenticity or origin of a product (an accessory or consumable) to cooperate with a device. State of the prior art
    In many fields, it is sought to ensure that a product, for example an ink cartridge, a battery, an accessory, etc., to be used in a device, either an original or authentic product, is ie approved by the device manufacturer. For this purpose, an authentication key is generally stored in an electronic circuit associated with this product and serves, when the product is installed in the device or when it must cooperate with it, to check that it is a product. 'an authentic product. However, if the secret is leaked and a manufacturer puts into circulation products that are not approved by the manufacturer of the device, but equipped with circuits having the correct key, the devices will consider these products as authentic. summary
    One embodiment proposes a solution that overcomes all or some of the disadvantages of the known electronic circuit product authentication techniques.
    One embodiment provides a solution particularly suitable for circuits that are not permanently powered.
    Thus, an embodiment provides a method for verifying the authenticity of a product associated with a host device, wherein: a first electronic circuit of the device initiates a charge retention circuit of a second electronic circuit of the product; and the first circuit interprets a discharge duration of the charge retention circuit to decide the authenticity of the product.
    According to one embodiment, the first circuit compares information representative of the time, provided by the charge retention circuit and compares it to an expected duration.
    According to one embodiment, the first circuit triggers an evaluation of the authenticity by cutting off the power supply of the second circuit.
    According to one embodiment, the duration of the power interruption of the second circuit is random.
    According to one embodiment: the first circuit communicates to the second circuit a voltage representative of a level of charges to be stored in the charge retention circuit; the second circuit charges the charge retention circuit; the first circuit interrupts the supply of the second circuit for a certain period of time at the end of which the second circuit measures the quantity of residual charges in the charge retention circuit; the second circuit communicates information representative of this residual quantity to the first circuit; and the first circuit compares this information to an expected value.
    According to one embodiment: the second circuit receives a time value during which the second circuit must abstain from responding to the first circuit; the second circuit charges the charge retention circuit; the first circuit interrupts the power supply of the second circuit and initiates a time counter; the first circuit turns on the second circuit and interrogates it periodically until it responds; and as soon as the second circuit responds, the first circuit compares the elapsed time to an expected duration, a function of the characteristics of the charge retention circuit of the second circuit.
    According to one embodiment, said time value is communicated to the second circuit by the first circuit.
    According to one embodiment, said time value is communicated to the first circuit and to the second circuit by a third circuit.
    One embodiment also provides a system comprising at least one host device and at least one product associated with this host device, adapted to the described method.
    According to one embodiment, the device is a printer and the product is an ink cartridge.
    Brief description of the drawings
    These and other features and advantages will be set forth in detail in the following description of particular embodiments made in a non-limiting manner in relation to the attached figures among which: FIG. 1 is a very diagrammatic representation and in the form of blocks of an exemplary system of the type to which exemplary embodiments are to be described; FIG. 2 illustrates, by a block diagram, an embodiment of the authentication method; FIG. 3 is a simplified electrical diagram of an example of a circuit adapted to hold electrical charges in a controllable manner for a time measurement; FIG. 4 is a graph illustrating the behavior of a charge retention circuit of a circuit 22 by application of the authentication method; Figure 5 is a block diagram of an embodiment of the authentication method; and Figure 6 is a block diagram of another embodiment of the authentication method.
    detailed description
    The same elements have been designated with the same references in the various figures.
    For the sake of clarity, only the steps and elements useful for understanding the embodiments that will be described have been shown and will be detailed. In particular, the generation of the signals exchanged between the circuits and their interpretation on the terminal side and on the transponder side have not been detailed, the described embodiments being compatible with the usual techniques for generating and interpreting these signals. In the following description, when referring to the terms approximately, approximately and, in the order of, this means to within 10%, preferably to within 5%.
    FIG. 1 very schematically shows in the form of blocks an exemplary system of the type to which the embodiments which will be described apply. A host device 1 (HOST) is able to accommodate or operate with one or more products 2, accessories (ACC) or consumables (CONS). As an example of a particular application, the host device is a printer and the product (consumable) is an ink cartridge. According to another example, it is an electronic system (for example, a game console, a mobile phone, etc.) using accessories (for example joysticks, a headset, a shell, a case, etc.). More generally, it can be any type of system based on cooperation between a main device (host) and one or more accessories or consumables (products).
    Manufacturers of consumables or accessories generally seek to protect themselves against the use of pirated or non-genuine accessories in order, among other things, to guarantee their users the quality and reliability of the original products compared to copies or " clones ". Another goal is to avoid possible counterfeits. Reference will subsequently be made to copies of non-genuine products, whether they are servile copies or, more generally, similar products that may be used as authentic products.
    The protection usually consists of a mechanism for authenticating a new product introduced into the host device, or even an authentication each time the device is powered on, each standby mode output, or each use of the product (for example , with each impression). By taking again the example of a printer, the printer and all the cartridges are equipped with an electronic circuit adapted to such an authentication, for example a cryptographic processor or a program executed by a generic processor.
    For example, as illustrated in FIG. 1, the host device 1 comprises a microcontroller type circuit 12 (μΟ capable of communicating via one or more buses 13 of addresses, commands and data, with one or more memories 14 (FIG. MEM), one or more peripheral devices (PER), for example the various circuits of the device 1, and one or more input-output (I / O) circuits 16, among which a device able to communicate with the products 2.
    A product 2, whether a consumable or an accessory, comprises at least one circuit 22, preferably secure, for example of the microcontroller type, comprising the same type of components (not shown): a processor volatile and nonvolatile memories, an input-output interface to a communication bus with the device 1, etc.
    In the usual techniques, the device 1 and the products 2 share authentication keys stored in memory, on which the authentication procedures are based.
    In the embodiments described below, authentication is not performed by exchange of authentication keys stored in the form of digital words, but from electrical parameters intrinsic to the electronic circuit of the cartridge.
    More specifically, it is expected to operate a discharge rate of a product-side charge storage element 2. It is thus expected to intervene on the power supply of the electronic circuits 22 associated with the products 2 to determine their authenticity.
    FIG. 2 illustrates, by a block diagram, an embodiment of the authentication method.
    The electronic circuit of the product 1, symbolized here by a block 10 (HOST), controls the products 2, more precisely the electronic circuits 22 of the products constituting slave circuits (SLAVE), not only via a communication bus 13 , but also by controlling their power supply, that is to say by controlling their supply of energy, for example by providing a power bus 17.
    Each slave circuit 22 comprises a circuit 3 adapted to hold electrical charges in a controllable manner for a time measurement.
    Examples of such circuits are described in U.S. Patents 8,963,574; 8,872.177; 8,331,203; 8,320.176; 8,036,020; 8339848.
    Figure 3 is a simplified electrical diagram of an example of a circuit 3 adapted to hold electrical charges in a controllable manner for a time measurement.
    The circuit 3 comprises a first capacitive element C1 of which a first electrode 31 is connected to a floating node F and of which a second electrode 32 is connected to a terminal 33 for applying a potential, and a second capacitive element C2 whose first electrode 34 is connected to the node F and a second electrode 35 is connected to a terminal 36 for applying a potential. The circuit 3 further comprises a third capacitive element C3 of which a first electrode 37 is connected to the node F and a second electrode 38 is connected to a terminal 39 for applying a potential, and whose dielectric space is designed, by its permittivity and / or its thickness, to present significant leaks over time. The capacitive element C1 has a higher capacity for the retention of charges than that of the element C3, and the capacitive element C2 has a higher capacity for the retention of charges than that of the element C3, but lower than that of the element C3. Cl element. A role of the capacitive element Cl (storage element) is to store electrical charges. A role of the capacitive element C3 (flow element) is to discharge the storage element C1, relatively slowly with respect to a direct connection of its electrode 31 to ground. A role of the capacitive element C2 is to allow a charge injection in the capacitive element C1, avoiding the stresses (stress) that would result, for the flow element C3, a direct charge of the element storage C1 by applying a supply voltage between the node F and the terminal 33.
    During a step of initialization of a charge retention phase, the terminals 33 and 39 are at a reference potential, for example the ground, and a high supply potential (positive with respect to the ground). is applied to the terminal 36, which causes the charging of the capacitive element C1. In a variant, to charge the element C1, the terminal 39 can be grounded, and the terminals 36 and 33 to potentials respectively positive and negative with respect to the mass. When the supply voltage is no longer applied between the terminals 36 and 33, for example when the circuit is no longer powered, the storage element C1 discharges in a controlled manner (relatively slowly) through the d element. C3 flow. It should be noted that a controlled discharge phase can also be provided when the circuit is still powered. During the discharge phase, the terminals 33, 36 and 39 may be left floating, or put at the same reference potential, for example ground. During a reading step, after a discharge phase, the residual charge of the storage element C1 is measured (for the measurement, the device must be powered). The residual charge of the element C1 is considered as representative of the time elapsed between the end of the initialization step and the reading step.
    It is planned to use such electrical charge retention circuits to determine the authenticity of the products 2.
    For this purpose, for each authentication requirement (for example, each time a new cartridge is inserted into a printer, each time the printer is turned on, each standby output, each print, etc.), the circuit 10 (FIG. 2) determines whether the charge retention circuit 3 of the circuit 22 behaves in an expected manner, that is to say that its discharge time corresponds to an expected duration.
    The circuit 10 therefore contains, in its memory 14, information relating to the behavior of the circuits 3 of the authentic products 2. For example, the circuits 22 are subjected to a phase of test or characterization at the end of manufacture making it possible to determine the discharge profile of their circuits 3. According to another example, the circuits 3 are produced in a sufficiently reproducible manner so that that it is possible to characterize their temporal behavior.
    FIG. 4 is a graph illustrating the behavior of a circuit 3 for the retention of charges of a circuit 22 by application of the authentication method.
    It is assumed that the circuit 10 causes the supply of the circuit 22 and that, in a step of initialization of the measurement, it causes the charging of the circuit 3 to a level representing a voltage V0 at the node F of the retention circuit 3 loads.
    Then, at a time T0, the circuit 3 cuts the power of the circuit 22 for a time that he chooses. This duration is a fixed duration or, preferably, a random duration. At the end of this period (time T1 in FIG. 4), the circuit 10 turns on the circuit 22 and requests the measurement of the value of charges or residual voltage. This measurement provides a level representing a voltage VI.
    The circuit 22 then communicates the measured value VI to the circuit 10 which compares this value with an expected value. This expected value is obtained, for example, from a table stored in memory of the circuit 10. In the case of a power failure of random duration, the circuit 10 measures this duration to extract, from the characteristic of the figure. 4 stored in the memory of the circuit 10, the value of the voltage to be supplied by the circuit 22.
    Depending on the duration (for example T1 or Tn) during which the supply of the circuit 22 is cut off, the measurement of the voltage (for example VI or Vu) differs. Thus, it is possible for the circuit 10 to know after how long a voltage level (decreasing with time) must be reached or what voltage value is reached after a certain period of time.
    For the interpretation of the measurements, the circuit 22 communicates either the voltage value V or the corresponding time T or evaluates itself a duration as will be seen later.
    The response of the charge retention circuit 3 is specific to the integrated circuit chip forming the circuit 3, included in the circuit 22. Consequently, this response differs from one chip to another (in fact a category of chips to another). A non-authentic cartridge whose circuit 22 has been made in a different technology will therefore not provide the same answer and will not be authenticated.
    Depending on the variability of the responses of the circuits 3, for example related to the manufacturing tolerances, it is possible to provide approximate measurement thresholds taking account of these tolerances. As a variant, the characteristics of the responses of the various circuits are communicated to the host devices with an identifier (code) of the series of products.
    Fig. 5 is a block diagram of an embodiment of the authentication method.
    The master circuit 10 or host begins by communicating the voltage V0 to the slave circuit 22 (block 51, V0 -> SLAVE). Alternatively, the voltage V0 is measured by the slave circuit itself on receipt of a command from the master circuit. Then, the circuit 10 interrupts the supply of the slave circuit 22 (block 52, SWITCH OFF 22). This interruption of the supply lasts a predetermined or random time interval ΔΤ. At the end of the time interval ΔΤ, the circuit 10 supplies the circuit 22 (block 23, SWITCH ON 22). As soon as it is refueled, the circuit 22 evaluates (block 54, SLAVE MEASURES T / V) the corresponding time value T or voltage V, then communicates this value to the circuit 10 (block 55, V or T -> HOST). Finally, the circuit 10 compares (block 56, HOST COMPARES) the value transmitted by the circuit 22 to an expected value, a function of the time interval ΔΤ.
    The conversion between the voltage values and the time values is, for example, carried out using a conversion table stored on the master and / or slave side. The authenticity is validated (block 57, DECISION) only if this comparison results in an identity of the values (or an approximate identity according to the expected measurement tolerances and technological dispersion of manufacturing).
    Fig. 6 is a block diagram of another embodiment of the authentication method.
    The master circuit 10 or host begins by communicating a duration T1 to the slave circuit 22 (block 51, T1 -> SLAVE). This duration is stored by the circuit 22 and represents a time during which it is forbidden to answer any interrogation of the circuit 10. Then, the circuit 10 cuts the power supply of the circuit 22 and initializes a time counter that it contains (block 52, SWITCH OFF 22, INIT TIMER). The circuit 10 then periodically interrogates (63) the circuit 22. For example, it re-circuits the circuit 22 (block 631, SWITCH ON 22) and sends a request (block 633, INTERROGATE 22). As long as the circuit 22 does not respond (output N of the block 634, RESPONSE ), The circuit 10 continues to measure the time that elapses (loops on the block 633). As soon as the circuit 22 responds (output Y of the block 634), this means that the circuit for retaining charges of the circuit 22 has reached a level of charges representing the duration T1. The circuit 10 then reads the value of its time counter (block 64, READ TIMER), then compares this value with the value that it initially communicated (block 61) to the circuit 22 to take a decision of authenticity (block 67, DECISION).
    In the embodiment of Figure 6, the circuit 22 does not need to communicate data to the circuit 10, which is particularly suitable for simple circuits 22. It is sufficient that it responds by an acknowledgment to a query request to allow an authentication decision.
    According to an alternative embodiment, the duration T1 is not communicated by the master circuit to the slave circuit, but this value or information representative of this value (encrypted value or cryptogram) is transmitted to the master circuit and to the slave circuit by a circuit third, where appropriate remote, for example generated by a data server with which the circuits 10 and 22 communicate remotely.
    The exchanges between the host device and the product or products can be secured in the usual manner, for example with symmetrical or asymmetric encryption based on keys contained in the product 2 and in the device 1.
    Various embodiments have been described. Various modifications will occur to those skilled in the art. In particular, the choice of the value of the authentication thresholds depends on the voltage withstand of the transponder components and can vary from one application to another. In addition, the practical implementation of the embodiments that have been described is within the abilities of those skilled in the art using the functional indications given above and using electronic components in themselves usual.
    权利要求:
    Claims (10)
    [1" id="c-fr-0001]
    A method of verifying the authenticity of a product (2) associated with a host device (1), wherein: a first electronic circuit (10) of the device initiates a charge retention circuit (3) of a second electronic circuit (22) of the product; and the first circuit interprets a discharge duration of the charge retention circuit to decide the authenticity of the product.
    [2" id="c-fr-0002]
    The method of claim 1, wherein the first circuit (10) compares information representative of the time provided by the charge retention circuit (3) and compares it to an expected time.
    [3" id="c-fr-0003]
    The method of claim 1, wherein the first circuit (10) triggers an authenticity evaluation by cutting off power to the second circuit (22).
    [4" id="c-fr-0004]
    4. The method of claim 3, wherein the duration of the power interruption of the second circuit (22) is random.
    [5" id="c-fr-0005]
    5. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein: the first circuit (10) communicates (51) to the second circuit (22) a voltage (V0) representative of a level of charges to be stored in the circuit charge retention (3); the second circuit charges the charge retention circuit; the first circuit interrupts the power supply (52) of the second circuit for a certain duration (ΔΤ) after which the second circuit measures (54) the quantity of residual charges in the charge retention circuit; the second circuit communicates (55) information representative of this residual quantity to the first circuit; and the first circuit compares (56) this information to an expected value.
    [6" id="c-fr-0006]
    The method of any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein: the second circuit (22) receives a time value (T1) during which the second circuit must abstain from responding to the first circuit (10); the second circuit charges the charge retention circuit (3); the first circuit interrupts the power supply (62) of the second circuit and initializes a time counter; the first circuit turns on the second circuit and interrogates it periodically until it responds (63); and as soon as the second circuit responds, the first circuit compares (66) the elapsed time to an expected duration, as a function of the characteristics of the charge retention circuit of the second circuit.
    [7" id="c-fr-0007]
    The method of claim 6, wherein said time value is communicated to the second circuit (22) by the first circuit (10).
    [8" id="c-fr-0008]
    The method of claim 6, wherein said time value is communicated to the first circuit (10) and the second circuit (22) by a third circuit.
    [9" id="c-fr-0009]
    9. System comprising at least one host device (1) and at least one product (2) associated with this host device, adapted to the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.
    [10" id="c-fr-0010]
    The system of claim 9, wherein the device is a printer and the product is an ink cartridge.
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    同族专利:
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    CN106326161B|2019-07-30|
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    法律状态:
    2016-05-24| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 2 |
    2017-01-06| PLSC| Publication of the preliminary search report|Effective date: 20170106 |
    2017-05-23| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 3 |
    2017-07-28| CA| Change of address|Effective date: 20170626 |
    2018-05-25| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 4 |
    2020-03-13| ST| Notification of lapse|Effective date: 20200206 |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    FR1556125A|FR3038411B1|2015-06-30|2015-06-30|DETECTION OF AUTHENTICITY OF AN ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT OR A PRODUCT CONTAINING SUCH A CIRCUIT|
    FR1556125|2015-06-30|FR1556125A| FR3038411B1|2015-06-30|2015-06-30|DETECTION OF AUTHENTICITY OF AN ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT OR A PRODUCT CONTAINING SUCH A CIRCUIT|
    EP15190644.3A| EP3113067B1|2015-06-30|2015-10-20|Detection of the authenticity of an electronic circuit or a product containing such a circuit|
    CN201510836277.2A| CN106326161B|2015-06-30|2015-11-26|The detection of the authenticity of electronic circuit or the product comprising this circuit|
    CN201910649593.7A| CN110377541A|2015-06-30|2015-11-26|The detection of the authenticity of electronic circuit or the product comprising this circuit|
    CN201520954704.2U| CN205608714U|2015-06-30|2015-11-26|Electronic equipment and electronic system|
    US14/970,161| US9870489B2|2015-06-30|2015-12-15|Detection of the authenticity of an electronic circuit or of a product containing such a circuit|
    US15/836,626| US10169622B2|2015-06-30|2017-12-08|Detection of the authenticity of an electronic circuit or of a product containing such a circuit|
    US16/200,370| US10579832B2|2015-06-30|2018-11-26|Detection of the authenticity of an electronic circuit or of a product containing such a circuit|
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