• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
  • 同族专利
  • 引用文献
  • 法律状态
  • 优先权
    • 专利摘要:
    A method of locating a signal jamming source of a satellite navigation system from detected powers received by at least one signal receiver of the satellite navigation system on board a carrier, comprising an estimate ( 12) the power of the output noise of each receiver according to the bearing angle relative to the carrier and the distance from the carrier, for each satellite (k) of the navigation system, by synthetic aperture antenna achieving coherent integration (6) in the direction of each bearing angle using the known displacement of the carrier.
    公开号:FR3038390A1
    申请号:FR1501416
    申请日:2015-07-03
    公开日:2017-01-06
    发明作者:Marc Revol
    申请人:Thales SA；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    The invention relates to a method for locating a signal jamming source of a satellite navigation system and to a method for locating a signal jamming source of a satellite navigation system and associated system. associated system.
    A source of interference is an intentional source of interference or a source of interference.
    A satellite navigation system, or GNSS as an acronym for "Global Navigation Satellites System" in English, uses a constellation of satellites that revolve around the Earth in very precisely defined orbits. Thus, it is possible to know at any time the position of any satellite. The orbits of the satellites are chosen so that at any given time, 6 to 12 satellites are visible in every point of the earth. Each satellite transmits several radio signals of modulation type and determined frequencies. On the ground or on a land, sea or air vehicle, a receiver receives signals from visible satellites.
    An on-board satellite navigation system receiver measures the propagation time required for a time stamp transmitted by a satellite to reach it. Time marks are encoded on carrier waves by the phase modulation technique. Each satellite transmits a set of pseudorandom codes that are unique to it. A replica of the code sequence is generated by the receiver and the offset that the replica must undergo in order to coincide with the received code corresponds to the duration of propagation of the signal to traverse the satellite-receiver distance. This duration multiplied by the speed of light in the medium traversed gives a measure of distance called pseudo-distance. From the measurements of the pseudo-distances separating it from each visible satellite, and from the knowledge of the position of the satellites, the receiver deduces its precise position in latitude, longitude, and altitude in a terrestrial reference by a numerical resolution close to the triangulation. From the carrier phase (Doppler) measurements, and the precise knowledge of the apparent speed of the satellites, the receiver precisely calculates the speed. It can also deduce the exact date and time in the satellite navigation system time frame.
    The reception of satellite signals and the accuracy of the measurements remains very sensitive, despite the widening of the spreading codes and the increase of the emission powers, to the presence of sources of interference and interference.
    Services based on GNSS location and time transfer systems are numerous and occupy an important place in the economy and operation of state infrastructures. As such, the protection of GNSS services from sources of interference is part of the requirements of states that will deploy detection and localization means throughout their territory, so as to ensure compliance of the environment of reception of signals with the standards of use. The proposed invention is part of an extended system for monitoring the quality of the signal receiving environment, including all GNSS constellations, dedicated to the detection and localization of interference sources. or interference that could degrade the quality of the position, speed and time measurements provided by GNSS systems. The invention is particularly interested in the ability to use rail, air, and maritime transport platforms, or even road transport to relax the network of a fixed surveillance network, and focus monitoring around transport routes of goods and people.
    In the face of early demonstrations of receiver vulnerabilities and the presence of low-cost personal jammers, conventional means of GNSS signal spectrum analysis are being progressively deployed near critical infrastructures such as airports, ports, communications hubs, nuclear power plants, ...
    However, such means (grid of the national territory by a network of spectral analysis stations allowing the detection of strong jammers) are relatively ineffective in the case of distant broadband jammers, since the level of interference sufficient to the disturbance of the signals GNSS is well below the standard thermal noise level.
    This makes it very difficult to detect weak sources of interference, however likely to disturb the operation of the receivers, as well as to predict their impact on the operation of user receivers located in the vicinity of the antenna of the analyzer.
    Such solutions require a large number of stations to cover the territory, thus a high cost. In addition, the detection zone is limited around each station. The location of a source of strong interference is made by crossing the levels measured on several stations.
    An object of the invention is to detect and locate sources of GNSS interference over large areas, for example around communication channels, from mobile receivers.
    Also, it is proposed, according to one aspect of the invention, a method of locating a signal jamming source of a satellite navigation system from detected powers received by at least one signal receiver of the navigation system. satellite navigation on board a carrier, comprising an estimate of the power of the output noise of each receiver according to the angle of bearing relative to the carrier and the distance relative to the carrier, for each satellite of the navigation system, using a synthetic aperture antenna achieving coherent integration in the direction of each target bearing angle using the known displacement of the carrier.
    Such a method makes it possible to obtain a map of the sources of interference near communication paths likely to disturb the navigation of the mobiles, taking advantage of the displacement of the receiver to achieve a spatial location of these sources.
    According to one embodiment, said estimate of the power of the output noise of each receiver uses a plurality of coherent integrators and a plurality of non-coherent integrators, durations adapted to the time of passage of a source in the beam of the antenna for different distances.
    Thus, it is possible to perform a source tracking without having to deploy a complex spatial processing antenna, based on a standard GNSS receiving antenna.
    In one embodiment, said estimation comprises a correction of the carrier phase of said signal corresponding to the displacement of the carrier projected orthogonally in the direction of each target bearing angle, in the acquisition phase or in the tracking phase.
    Thus, the movement of the carrier is used to achieve an angle and distance tracking targets by exploiting their scroll speed.
    According to one embodiment, said correction comprises a determination of a carrier speed vector.
    Thus, knowing the speed of movement of the carrier allows both to reconstruct a synthetic antenna to simultaneously aim in different directions to monitor the surrounding space moving wearer and perform a target trajectory once detected.
    In one embodiment, said determination of a carrier displacement velocity vector comprises a synchronization in time to raise the reference trajectory of the carrier and apply displacement corrections necessary to produce a synthetic antenna, at the moment of reception of the signals from the satellite navigation system.
    Thus, the signals are maintained stationary phase over a compatible duration of the apparent length of the synthetic antenna and each of its viewing directions.
    According to one embodiment, said determination of a carrier speed vector uses data provided by a signal receiver of a satellite navigation system and / or data provided by an inertial unit.
    Thus, the system for locating sources of interference is autonomous and can easily adapt to different types of carriers.
    It is also proposed, according to another aspect of the invention, a system for locating a signal jamming source of a satellite navigation system from detected powers received by at least one signal receiver of the navigation system. satellite navigation on board a carrier, comprising a computer configured to estimate the power of the output noise of each receiver according to the bearing angle relative to the carrier and the distance from the carrier, for each satellite of the navigation system, by synthetic aperture antenna achieving coherent integration in the direction of each (target) bearing angle using the known displacement of the carrier.
    In one embodiment, the scrambling source localization system comprises track tracking means according to the azimetric bearing angles and azimetry track of these tracks.
    Azimetry is understood to mean the method, mainly applied in the radar and sonar fields, which makes it possible, thanks to the evolution of the azimuth measurements and to the knowledge of the trajectory of the receiving antenna at the same instants, to go back to the localization. of the signal source, under certain assumptions of simple displacements (fixed, uniform rectilinear motion). The invention will be better understood from the study of some embodiments described by way of non-limiting examples and illustrated by the appended drawings in which: FIG. 1 schematically illustrates an embodiment of a system according to an aspect of FIG. the invention; and - Figure 2 schematically illustrates the operation of the system, according to one aspect of the invention.
    In the set of figures, the elements having the same references are similar.
    Figure 1 schematically represents an implementation of the present invention.
    Spatial processing for the formation of the guidance channels is based on that of the synthetic antenna in reception, as described in French patent FR2962812 B1.
    The synthetic antenna processing makes it possible to achieve coherent integrations of the signals received, spatially, by exploitation of the carrier displacement, assumed to be known. The basic principle consists in compensating the movement of the projected wearer on the expected directions of the signal supposed to be stationary, so as to maintain a stationary phase during the integration period.
    It is therefore possible to define the viewing angles of the antenna corresponding to the directions in which it is desired to carry out the detection of the signals.
    The function of the spatial processing is to achieve a complete coverage of the angles in the bearing (360 °) with respect to the axis of displacement of the carrier, thanks to the directivity beams of the synthetic antenna intersecting at -3 dB from each other .
    These beams are made in parallel and continuously.
    Since the GNSS receiver is tuned to the frequencies of the satellite signals, it is only interested in the sources of interference likely to be received in the vicinity of these reception frequencies.
    However, relative Doppler dependent satellites, the spatial processing is conducted in a manner adapted to each satellite pursued. Depending on the calculation capabilities of the GNSS receiver, it is possible to consider adding the detection outputs of the space treatments to all or only part of the satellites being tracked. The estimation of the distance of the jamming source is carried out by adapting the non-coherent integration time of the detection chain in each of the synthetic antenna's aiming channels, in terms of bearing, as a function of the speed of scrolling. of the target in the track, for different distance assumptions.
    The duration of integration is determined by the speed of the carrier, the width and the direction in bearing of the way, and of course assumptions of distance of the source of jamming. Each channel is therefore associated with a battery of non-coherent integrators specific to the direction of bearing of the channel. The non-coherent integration (which allows the adaptation in distance) is itself preceded by a step of coherent integration, on a constant and identical elementary duration for all the ways, which makes it possible to reconstitute the apparent spreading (size ) of the antenna, over the duration of the coherent integration.
    This coherent integration processing thus makes it possible to provide an estimate of the power field of the signal in the field, updated at each coherent integration period. The non-coherent integration makes it possible to accumulate the power field over durations corresponding to the transit time of the target under various assumptions of angle and distance, for the current speed of the carrier, this under the assumption that the trajectory remains rectilinear during the non-coherent integration period, or else under the condition of carrying out the non-coherent accumulation of the powers according to stable directions in azimuth (thus after compensation of the variation of direction of movement of the carrier).
    FIG. 1 represents the principle of application of the synthetic aperture antenna for the detection and localization of sources of interference and / or interference. The coherent integration is performed taking into account the movement of the carrier.
    A determination is made 1 of the expected late and Doppler values for receiving GNSS signals. This determination of the frequency and distance tracking parameters carries out the maintenance of the carrier Doppler value corresponding to the speed of the satellite, calculated from the position of the carrier at the current time, associated with a physical "top" ("1PPS " entrance). This maintenance is carried out for each satellite of the GNSS system, from the knowledge of the ephemerides which allows to calculate their precise positions at each instant (provided by 1 reference PPS) and positions and speeds of the carrier that can be provided by any reference providing a dated position (GPS receiver for example, hybridized or not with inertia). This calculation being specific to each satellite, there are as many calculations as satellites.
    A calculation 2 of the correction of the additional carrier phase makes it possible to compensate for the evolution of the phase related to the movement of the carrier in the direction of the aiming path; this correction is added to the conventional Doppler correction of the satellite to reconstitute the direction of the directivity channels (upper left part of the diagram: carrier NCO).
    This phase evolution corresponds to the projection of the carrier displacement (defined by a calculated speed of the carrier) on the direction targeted by the antenna (there are as many phase corrections as target directions, this for each of the satellites pursued) .
    This phase correction 2 is calculated by the following expression:
    in which: f0 represents the frequency of the Doppler channel considered (it is carried out identically on all K Doppler channels), in Hz; tk represents the coherent integration start time 4 which provides the date of origin of the phase, in s; ti represents the current moment, in s; d, represents the unit vector of the direction of the satellite seen from the carrier (unit vector), in Cartesian coordinates;
    Vp represents the carrier velocity vector, in m / s; and C represents the speed of light, in m / s.
    This phase is then introduced and corrected 4 by a carrier phase NCO digital oscillator which makes it possible to generate and maintain a correction signal.
    For each satellite taken into account, there are as many oscillators with digital control 4 of the carrier phase as of directional directions in the bearing.
    The carrier phase of a satellite is thus corrected from the phase corresponding to the aiming direction, by the numerically controlled oscillators 4 and multipliers 5.
    This phase correction corresponds to the projection of the moving speed of the carrier in the direction of the received signal, this during a coherent integration time T relative to a particular position of the delay of the local signal being tested. implementation of a correlation between the interfering signal (jammer) and the synchronized local code on each of the signals received from the satellites makes it possible to make an accurate estimation of the effect of the disturbing signal on the reception string of the GNSS receiver, whose sensitivity to interference sources depends both on the spectrum of the interference signal and the spectral spread of this signal after the spectral convolution achieved by the correlation with the local codes. The application of phase compensations in each direction is synchronized with the application of coherent integration 6.
    The duration T of the coherent integration is determined by the number of pathways that it is desired to form. For example, the generation of 16 channels in the field requires a coherent integration time of 20 ms for a vehicle traveling at 35 m / s, ie 126 km / h.
    The synchronization of the local code (for each of the channel directions) is performed by controlling the code delay 13 to be applied to the generation 14 of a GNSS local code signal (BPSK type modulation) by an NCO digital control oscillator code 14 , and calculated from step 1 of determining the expected values in delay and doppler GNSS signals. This estimate is performed independently of that of the GNSS receiver that may have been affected by the source of interference.
    Generation 14 of the local code with the expected delay is made by a digitally controlled code generator. The received signal is multiplied by a multiplier 15 by the generated signal 14 by the digitally controlled code generator. The noncoherent integration 12 is performed on each channel in the field, after coherent integration and quadratic detection 11. The received power can then be estimated by summing the channel channel outputs, under the assumption of a rectilinear motion for the duration non-coherent integration 12.
    To be more robust to changes in the carrier's trajectory, a variant of the noncoherent integration 12, it is possible to interpolate the output power of the bearing channels, so as to reconstruct a distribution of the stable received power. azimuth, this using the displacement heading available at each coherent integration period. This requires beforehand a transformation of the scale of the measurements in deposit (obtained after coherent integration and quadration 6 and 11) in a scale of measurement in azimuth, this by using the known cape of the carrier.
    This detection is conducted in parallel in all directions of the channels. This parallel tracking of channels whose directivity intersects at -3 dB of the main lobe makes it possible to carry out an angular interpolation for a precise localization of the angle of incidence of the signal, by searching local maxima along the azimuth or bearing directions. .
    After the determination 1 of the expected delay and Doppler values for acquisition of GNSS signals, a Doppler control 7 makes it possible to control the value of the reference carrier frequency according to the expected value of the Doppler of the signal received from each satellite.
    Generation 8 of a signal at the expected frequency of the Doppler channel is made by a digitally controlled carrier oscillator. The received signal S (t) is multiplied by a multiplier 9 by the signal generated 8 by the digitally controlled oscillator of the carrier.
    A timing synchronization 10 makes it possible to synchronize the carrier's reference trajectory estimate 3 on the timebase of the receiver by providing a common clock. The output signal of the synchronization 10 makes it possible to determine the trajectory reference 3 of the carrier, i.e. the position, the speed and the direction of movement of the carrier.
    At the output of the non-coherent integration 12, the power of the signal received in each of the directions of the channels in the array and for different hypotheses of running the target in the channel, adapted to the different non-coherent integration periods, are available.
    FIG. 2 is a diagrammatic representation of the method for locating interference sources using the angle-distance outputs of the processing of FIG. 1. From the powers detected in the GNSS geometry and satellite range k, FIG. 2 illustrates how is determined the presence of a jammer and its location.
    FIG. 1 illustrates the principle of calculating the power or energy received according to the location and distance of the noncoherent integration times Nj which provides a received energy grid Ek (di, Nj) this by satellite k, the generated code for the correlation being specific to each satellite.
    In FIG. 2 is represented in input the powers detected in bearing and distance by satellite k, corresponding to the output of FIG.
    A cumulative 20 of the energies Ek (di, Nj) on the set of satellites k, using a table of energies deposit and distance by satellite k.
    Then, extractions 21 of the local maxima are made in the field and distance using a table of reservoir energies and global distance.
    Then, an initialization 22 of tracking tracks corresponding to the local maxima from the same jamming source identified by a continuous and coherent detection in direction on several successive recurrences is carried out; a principle of initialization of tracks consists of identifying the existence of N detections of local maxima in the same direction in the bearing (for example, on 3 successive recurrences in an interval depending on the signal-to-noise ratio of the local maximum).
    Then, the tracks are maintained and continued 23; once the track has been initialized, the proximity of the new local maxima (successive recurrences) with each of the existing tracks is evaluated and the new event is associated or not, at each recurrence t, according to a distance criterion depending on the age (since the initialization time of the track) of the track and the signal-to-noise ratio of the local maximum tested. The retained maxima are then integrated in a recursive filter of type Alpha-Beta which makes it possible to filter the noise of measurement in deposit associated with the track and to predict the position in deposit for the following recurrence (t + 1) in order to renew the test association of future events. The bearing tracks are then converted into azimuth so as to be able to visualize the evolution of their scrolling independently of the variations in the trajectory of the wearer.
    Finally, the position of the transmitter or emitters is determined from the sequence of filtered measurements constituting each of the tracks 23; for this it is assumed that the source is fixed and that the trajectory of the carrier is known over the duration of observation of the tracks. Several methods of angle-distance azimetry, of the type applied on radar or sonar, can be used for this purpose.
    The steps of the method described above may be performed by one or more programmable processors executing a computer program for performing the functions of the invention by operating on input data and generating output data.
    A computer program can be written in any form of programming language, including compiled or interpreted languages, and the computer program can be deployed in any form, including as a stand-alone program or as a subroutine, element or other unit suitable for use in a computing environment. A computer program can be deployed to run on one computer or multiple computers at a single site or spread across multiple sites and interconnected by a communications network.
    The preferred embodiment of the present invention has been described. Various modifications can be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Therefore, other implementations are within the scope of the following claims.
    权利要求:
    Claims (8)
    [1" id="c-fr-0001]
    A method of locating a signal jamming source of a satellite navigation system from detected powers received by at least one signal receiver of the on-board satellite navigation system on a carrier, comprising a estimation (12) of the power of the output noise of each receiver according to the bearing angle relative to the carrier and the distance from the carrier, for each satellite (k) of the navigation system, using a synthetic aperture antenna realizing a coherent integration (6) in the direction of each bearing angle using the known displacement of the carrier.
    [2" id="c-fr-0002]
    2. The method according to claim 1, wherein said estimate (12) of the output noise power of each receiver uses a plurality of coherent integrators and a plurality of non-coherent integrators, of durations adapted to the passage time of a source in the antenna beam for different distances.
    [3" id="c-fr-0003]
    3. Method according to claim 2, wherein said estimate (12) comprises a correction (4) of the carrier phase of said signal corresponding to the displacement of the carrier projected orthogonally in the direction of each angle of deposit, in acquisition phase or in the pursuit phase.
    [4" id="c-fr-0004]
    The method of claim 3 wherein said correction (4) comprises determining (10) a carrier velocity vector.
    [5" id="c-fr-0005]
    The method of claim 4, wherein said determining (10) of a carrier velocity vector comprises time synchronization for raising the reference trajectory of the carrier and applying displacement corrections necessary to realize a synthetic antenna, at the moment of reception of the signals of the satellite navigation system.
    [6" id="c-fr-0006]
    The method of claim 4 or 5, wherein said determining (10) of a carrier traveling speed vector uses data provided by a satellite navigation system signal receiver and / or data provided by an inertial unit.
    [7" id="c-fr-0007]
    7. A system for locating a signal jamming source of a satellite navigation system from detected powers received by at least one signal receiver of the onboard satellite navigation system on board a carrier, comprising a computer configured to make an estimate (12) of the output noise power of each receiver according to the bearing angle relative to the carrier and the distance from the carrier, for each satellite (k) of the navigation system, by antenna synthetic aperture effecting a coherent integration (6) in the direction of each bearing angle using the known displacement of the carrier.
    [8" id="c-fr-0008]
    8. A source of jamming source system according to claim 7, comprising tracking means tracks according to the azimetry angles and azimetry track these tracks.
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    同族专利:
    公开号 | 公开日
    EP3112904A1|2017-01-04|
    CA2934755A1|2017-01-03|
    US20170003394A1|2017-01-05|
    FR3038390B1|2019-09-20|
    EP3112904B1|2018-10-17|
    US10330791B2|2019-06-25|
    引用文献:
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    DE19512787A1|1995-02-19|1996-09-12|Horn Wolfgang|Location detector using synthetic aperture, for locating e.g. microwave interference source|
    EP2410352A1|2010-07-19|2012-01-25|Thales|Antenna device with synthetic opening for receiving signals of a system including a carrier and a means for determining the trajectory thereof|
    DE3106958A1|1981-02-25|1982-10-28|Olympia Werke Ag, 2940 Wilhelmshaven|RIBBON TAPE CASSETABLE ON A WRITING OR SIMILAR OFFICE MACHINE|
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    CN111366950B|2020-05-31|2020-08-28|湖南跨线桥航天科技有限公司|Comprehensive detection method and system for satellite navigation suppression type interference and deception interference|
    CN111965671B|2020-09-28|2022-02-01|中国电波传播研究所（中国电子科技集团公司第二十二研究所）|GNSS signal quality monitoring and interference monitoring positioning system and method|
    法律状态:
    2016-06-28| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 2 |
    2017-01-06| PLSC| Publication of the preliminary search report|Effective date: 20170106 |
    2017-06-28| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 3 |
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    2021-04-09| ST| Notification of lapse|Effective date: 20210305 |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    FR1501416A|FR3038390B1|2015-07-03|2015-07-03|METHOD FOR LOCATING A SIGNAL INTERFERENCE SOURCE OF A SATELLITE NAVIGATION SYSTEM AND ASSOCIATED SYSTEM|
    FR1501416|2015-07-03|FR1501416A| FR3038390B1|2015-07-03|2015-07-03|METHOD FOR LOCATING A SIGNAL INTERFERENCE SOURCE OF A SATELLITE NAVIGATION SYSTEM AND ASSOCIATED SYSTEM|
    EP16176960.9A| EP3112904B1|2015-07-03|2016-06-29|Method for locating a source of interference of signals from a satellite navigation system and system thereof|
    US15/199,670| US10330791B2|2015-07-03|2016-06-30|Method for locating a jamming source jamming signals of a satellite navigation system and associated system|
    CA2934755A| CA2934755A1|2015-07-03|2016-06-30|Method for locating a jamming source jamming signals of a satellite navigation system and associated system|
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