• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
  • 同族专利
  • 引用文献
  • 法律状态
  • 优先权
    • 专利摘要:
    The invention relates to a near-field magnetic coupling anti-counterfeiting tag comprising a substrate (10) comprising a breaking zone (17a); a master microcircuit (14a) arranged on the substrate on one side of the breaking zone, and configured to be interrogated by a near-field reader; a slave microcircuit (14b) arranged on the substrate on the other side of the rupture zone; and a sacrificial link (L) connecting the two microcircuits, the two microcircuits being designed to negotiate mutual authentication by the sacrificial link.
    公开号:FR3038102A1
    申请号:FR1556076
    申请日:2015-06-29
    公开日:2016-12-30
    发明作者:Pierre Pic
    申请人:Inside Secure SA；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    [0001] BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION Field of the Invention The invention relates to close-field magnetic coupling non-contact identification devices, for example of the NFC (Near Field Communication) type, of the ISO 14443 type, or of the ISO 15693 type, and more specifically to a contactless anti-counterfeiting device for guaranteeing the authenticity of the contents of a bottle. BACKGROUND US7898422 discloses an anti-counterfeit NFC device embedded in a wine bottle stopper. The device is arranged so that the insertion of a tirebouchon damages the antenna or the control microcircuit. When the device is intact, it can be interrogated remotely by an NFC reader to read product information, and also to confirm the authenticity of the information. When the cap has been removed, the NFC device is damaged, so that the cap can not be reused to authenticate the contents of a new bottle. US Patent Application 2007-0210173 discloses a two-part RFID tag each of which is provided with an independent RFID component having cryptographic functions. A break in the label makes one of the two RFID components inoperative. A reader is programmed to signal that the label is intact if it manages to negotiate an authentication with both RFID components of the label. If only one authentication is negotiable, the label has been broken. Summary In general, there is provided a near-field magnetic coupling anti-counterfeiting tag comprising a substrate including a breaking zone; a master microcircuit arranged on the substrate on one side of the breaking zone, and configured to be interrogated by a near-field reader; a slave microcircuit arranged on the substrate on the other side of the rupture zone; and a sacrificial link connecting the two microcircuits, the two microcircuits being designed to negotiate mutual authentication by the sacrificial link.
    [0002] The label may comprise an antenna arranged to feed the master microcircuit, the sacrificial link being designed to feed the slave microcircuit from the master microcircuit. The sacrificial link may comprise a conductive track configured in a loop 5 passing through a second breaking zone. The sacrificial link may comprise a conductive path configured in slots occupying an area of interest of the substrate so that a piercing of the area of interest breaks the conductive track. The label may comprise two metal pads disposed facing opposite faces 10 of the substrate in an area of interest of the substrate, configured so that a piercing of the area of interest causes a permanent short-circuit between the two ranges. metallic, the metal pads being connected to the slave microcircuit so that the short circuit prevents the operation of the slave microcircuit. The two microcircuits may be of the same type, each comprising two specific pins designed to power an external circuit when the microcircuit is connected to an antenna, or to receive an external power supply when the microcircuit is not connected to an antenna. The master microcircuit may be designed to implement near field communication technology and the slave microcircuit be designed to implement a different communication technology. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS Embodiments will be set forth in the following description, which is made without implied limitation in relation to the accompanying figures in which: FIG. 1 represents an embodiment of an anti-counterfeiting NFC tag for a bottle; FIG. 2 represents another embodiment of an anti-counterfeiting NFC tag for a bottle; - Figure 3 shows another embodiment of anti-counterfeiting NFC tag for a bottle; and FIG. 4 represents a variant of the label of FIG. 2.
    [0003] Embodiment Description In the context of the aforementioned US Pat. No. 7898422, once the bottle has been opened, the NFC device becomes mute. However, the user may wish to consult the information again, for example to share it with a friend, or to go to the producer's website to order new bottles. This feature is not feasible, since the security of the anti-counterfeiting device is based on the destruction of the NFC device. In the aforementioned US Patent Application 2007-0210173, each RFID component is independent and designed to communicate with a reader without cooperation with the second RFID component. The RFID component that remains operational after breaking the tag can therefore continue to communicate information to the reader. However, the system is relatively easy to compromise because the portion of the tag that has been separated can be repaired individually to make its RFID component operational again. It is then sufficient to put the two parts of the label together on a non-genuine product to foil an authenticity check. Non-contact anti-counterfeiting devices, for example of the NFC type, are proposed below for containers, in particular bottles or flasks, which are difficult to compromise while offering a simple reading of information when the container has been removed. open. Figure 1 illustrates a first embodiment of an NFC tag with enhanced security. The label is in the form of an insulating material ribbon 10 as a substrate for forming conductive tracks according to standard RFID tag fabrication techniques. One end of the ribbon is enlarged to house an NFC antenna 12 formed of several turns of a conductive track. A microcircuit 14a is disposed in the vicinity of the connection between the ribbon 10 and the antenna 12 and is connected to the terminals of the antenna by a track on the same face as the antenna, and a track on the opposite side, joining the antenna. end of the inner coil of the antenna via a via 16a. A via 16b allows the connection of the microcircuit 14a to the track of the opposite face 30. Further on the ribbon 10, beyond a rupture zone 17a, is fixed a second microcircuit 14b, "slave" microcircuit which can be of the same type as the microcircuit 14a, "master" microcircuit. The two microcircuits may be of the type 3038102 4 sold under the name Vau1tICTM 152 by Inside Secure. Such a microcircuit has two pins for connecting the antenna, two GND and VDC power pins, and an IO programmable input / output pin. When an antenna is used, as for the master microcircuit 14a, the pins 5 VDC and GND can be used to feed other circuits from the energy supplied to the antenna. When there is no antenna, as for the slave microcircuit 14b, VCC pins and GND can be used to feed the microcircuit by an external source (here the microcircuit 14a). The microcircuits 14a and 14b are designed to negotiate mutual authentication 10 by a sacrificial link L, materialized here by three conductive tracks connecting the microcircuits and passing through the rupture zone 17a. One of the tracks may, as shown, have a loop extending to the distal end of the ribbon 10 beyond a second break zone 17b. The microcircuits 14a and 14b can be assembled according to the so-called "flip-chip" technique 15 or by gluing with a conductive glue. The master microcircuit 14a integrates the management functions of the NFC device. The device can provide an authentication function, it is of active type, that is to say that the microcircuit 14a includes a microcontroller and cryptographic functions. The microcircuit 14a then draws its supply of energy supplied to the antenna 12 by an NFC reader, which can be a smartphone, a tablet, a watch, etc. equipped with an NFC interface. The slave microcircuit 14b, also incorporating a microcontroller and cryptographic functions, can be powered by the master microcircuit 14a. As previously indicated, the microcircuit 14a may have two pins VCC and GND for supplying other circuits from the energy supplied to the antenna 12. These pins VCC and GND 25 are connected to corresponding power pins of the slave circuit 14b by conductive tracks forming part of the sacrificial connection L between the two microcircuits. The sacrificial link L is completed by a communication track which connects an input / output pin IO of the microcircuit 14a to a corresponding pin of the microcircuit 14b. Any one of the tracks of the sacrificial link, here the GND supply track 30, can form the loop which passes through the rupture zone 17b. With this configuration, when a reader, such as a smartphone of a consumer, is approached to the antenna 12, the microcircuit 14a is powered. The power supply is transmitted to the microcircuit 14b by the sacrificial link L, so that the two microcircuits start their programmed functions.
    [0004] The master microcircuit 14a can be programmed to, at startup, initiate mutual authentication with the slave microcircuit 14b by the line IO. The slave microcircuit 14b is then programmed to, at startup, wait for the authentication request on the IO line and respond to it by this same line.
    [0005] If the mutual authentication succeeds, the microcircuit 14a can indicate to the reader that the product is intact. The consumer will then be able to carry out an external authentication, using keys contained in the master microcircuit 14a, used to confirm that the product conforms to the information provided by the tag via an authentication server and a dedicated application. He may also, using the same application or a generic application, consult the product characteristics, even if the mutual authentication has failed, including the type of information that may appear on a paper label of a bottle. of wine. Several bottles of the same lot may have labels sharing the same identifier or key. The label is adapted to be attached to a container, for example a bottle, so that the central portion of the ribbon is placed across a closure member 18 of the container, for example a cap. It is desired that the ribbon be broken, also causing the rupture of at least one track passing through any of the rupture zones 17a, 17b, when the bottle is open, that is to say when the cap 18 is took of.
    [0006] A break in any one of the tracks crossing the zone 17a or 17b jeopardizes the operation of the slave microcircuit 14b, either by interrupting its power supply (VCC and GND tracks), or by cutting the link serving to carry out the operation. mutual authentication (IO track). In all cases, the microcircuit 14b remains silent at the start of the microcircuit 14a, causing mutual authentication to fail.
    [0007] Since the tracks are generally made of aluminum, it makes it difficult to repair the sections cut by welding or brazing because of the insulating oxide layer that forms on the aluminum as soon as it is exposed to air. With proper equipment, a malicious person may, however, recreate missing connections on a tag fragment, for example by shorting two loop segments that have been interrupted upon breaking the tag. If the operation of the tag is based on the continuity of the loop, then its security is compromised.
    [0008] The security of the tag of FIG. 1 rests in particular on the establishment of mutual authentication between microcircuits 14a and 14b. If the label has been broken by zone 17a, an ill-intentioned person faces several difficulties in recreating an operational label. It must first know that only one of the fragments of the label, even the one with the master microcircuit 14a fully operational, is not sufficient to obtain an operational label. It must then have both fragments, and restore the connections between the two fragments. However, even with sophisticated equipment, it is particularly difficult to sustainably restore connections between tracks of two tag fragments.
    [0009] If by chance a label of the type of FIG. 1 was broken only by zone 17b, microcircuit 14b would no longer be powered because of the breaking of the loop of the GND track. The tag fragment including the microcircuits 14a, 14b could however be repaired by short-circuiting the interrupted segments of the GND track. To compromise this type of repair, the microcircuit 14b can be placed beyond the area 17b, as shown in dashed lines, so that the sacrificial link L, i.e., the VCC supply tracks , GND and the IO communication track, passes through the two breaking zones 17a and 17b. To promote breakage of the label, the tape attachment to the container is designed to have a breaking strength greater than the breaking strength of the tape.
    [0010] High bond strength can be obtained by bonding, and the required strength can be ensured by gluing the tape over a sufficient area. The breaking strength of the tape can also be reduced by providing, as shown, break primers in the areas 17a, 17b. Preferably, these primers are located at the edge of the bonding zone of the ribbon, which causes stress concentration which promotes fracture. The ribbon can be glued to the container by the face on which are formed the majority of conductive tracks. Adherence by bonding the tracks to the container is generally higher than the adhesion of the tracks to the tape. As a result, any attempt to take off the label causes the conductive tracks to tear, which remain stuck to the container. An anti-counterfeit NFC tag of the type of Figure 1 is effective in identifying bottles that have been uncorked and potentially refilled with a product of questionable origin. It does not, however, make it possible to detect the removal or the replacement of contents by means of a syringe, for example according to the CoravinTM process which consists of piercing the stopper with the aid of a syringe and sucking up the contents. injecting an inert gas into the bottle. Such a technique would leave the label intact.
    [0011] FIG. 2 illustrates an NFC tag embodiment for detecting an attempt to pierce the plug. The central zone of the ribbon 10 intended to cover the cap is enlarged to occupy the surface of the cap and the neck of the bottle. One of the tracks of the sacrificial link, here the GND track, has, in the area of interest to be protected, a configuration in narrowed slots 22 occupying the entire surface of this area. As shown, starting from the microcircuit 14a, the GND track can cross the substrate via a via, extend on the rear face of the substrate to the distal end of the ribbon, and return to the front face by another via. The pitch of the slots is preferably smaller than the diameter of the piercing needle, so that insertion of the needle breaks the track in at least one location, cutting off power to the microcircuit 14b. If the slotted segment 22 can not be configured with a sufficiently small pitch, the track segment on the back side of the substrate can be configured in complementary slots, which virtually divides the pitch by two.
    [0012] FIG. 3 illustrates another embodiment of an NFC tag for detecting an attempt to pierce the plug. The central zone of the substrate covering the stopper 18 and the neck of the bottle comprises two facing metal surfaces, one formed on the rear face of the substrate (greyed) and the other 31 on the front face of the substrate (in black). The ranges have not been shown to the same dimensions to be able to distinguish them in the figure - in practice they are of the same dimensions and fill as much as possible the area of interest corresponding to the upper face of the plug. One of the tracks, here the track 31, can be connected to the GND track. The other range 30 may be connected to the IO track. Thus, when the ranges are short-circuited, the track IO 30 is connected to the power supply line GND, making any communication between the microcircuits impossible. The two ranges can be connected in various other ways causing the inactivation of the microcircuit 14b. For example, if the microcircuit 3038102 has a reset terminal, the pads can be connected to force the reset when they are shorted. The central area of the label can be glued by its entire surface on the cap. Any attempt to access the stopper then results in the drilling of the two metal surfaces facing each other. During drilling, the plastic substrate between the two metal pads compresses permanently, while the metal of the upper deck stretches, following the movement of the piercing object (a needle or a corkscrew) , to reach the lower beach. The lower range, because it is retained by a layer of glue, generally harder than the substrate, deforms less than the upper range. This results in a crimping of the deformed zone of the upper range in the lower range, and therefore that the two beaches are found in permanent short circuit, even at the extraction of the piercing object. This short-circuit also occurs if the capacitor pads are made of aluminum, since this aluminum is used in the manufacture in an inert atmosphere preventing the formation of oxide, and the contacted areas of the two ranges remain devoid of oxide because they are protected by the substrate. The labels of Figures 2 and 3 can detect two events, namely breaking the label and piercing the cap. Both events have the same result, namely the cessation of communication between the two microcircuits 14a and 14b. Thus, the user knows that the product has been compromised, but he does not know how. Figure 4 shows a variant of the label of Figure 2 to discriminate these two events. The microcircuit 14b may have a second output input terminal. In this case, the crenellated segment 22 'is formed independently of the GND track. The segment 22 'is then connected between one of the supply terminals, for example GND, and the second input / output terminal of the circuit 14b, as shown. With this configuration, the break of the crenelated segment 22 'does not prevent the operation of the microcircuit 14b, but changes the state of its second input / output terminal. The microcircuit 14b can be programmed to detect this change of state and communicate it to the master microcircuit 14a via the line I0. The master microcircuit can then signal the event to the consumer by the NFC reader. The rupture of the label is detected as previously, by the absence of response of the slave microcircuit.
    [0013] Numerous variations and modifications of the embodiments described herein will be apparent to those skilled in the art. The slave microcircuit 14b could have its own NFC antenna and thus be powered by the same field that feeds the master microcircuit 14a. In this case, the VCC line between the two microcircuits could be omitted. This variant can offer an additional degree of security in that the antennas of the two microcircuits must be sufficiently close to each other to be powered by the same reader. The slave microcircuit 14b could have another non-contact communication technology, for example RF UHF type. The tag can then offer two read modes, by NFC or RF. The labels described here are also usable on metal containers or closure elements, providing the underside of the label at the antenna with a layer of electromagnetic insulation, such as ferrite.
    权利要求:
    Claims (7)
    [0001]
    REVENDICATIONS1. A near-field magnetic coupling anti-counterfeiting tag, comprising: - a substrate (10) comprising a breaking zone (17a); a master microcircuit (14a) arranged on the substrate on one side of the rupture zone, and configured to be interrogated by a reader in the near field; and - a slave microcircuit (14b) arranged on the substrate on the other side of the rupture zone; characterized in that it comprises: - a sacrificial link (L) connecting the two microcircuits, the two microcircuits being designed to negotiate mutual authentication by the sacrificial link.
    [0002]
    2. Label according to claim 1, comprising an antenna (12) arranged to feed the master microcircuit (14a), the sacrificial connection (L) being designed to feed the slave microcircuit from the master microcircuit.
    [0003]
    3. Label according to claim 2, wherein the sacrificial connection (L) comprises a conducting track (GND) configured in a loop passing through a second breaking zone (17b).
    [0004]
    The label of claim 2, wherein the sacrificial link (L) comprises a nonconducting conductive track (GND) occupying an area of interest of the substrate such that a piercing of the area of interest breaks the conductive track. .
    [0005]
    5. Label according to claim 2, comprising two metal pads (30, 31) disposed facing opposite faces of the substrate in an area of interest of the substrate, configured so that a piercing of the area of interest causes a permanent short-circuit between the two metal pads, the metal pads being connected to the slave microcircuit so that the short circuit prevents the operation of the slave microcircuit.
    [0006]
    6. Label according to claim 1, wherein the two microcircuits (14a, 14b) are of the same type, each comprising two specific pins (VCC, GND) designed to supply an external circuit when the microcircuit is connected to an antenna, or to receive an external power supply when the microcircuit is not connected to an antenna.
    [0007]
    The label of claim 1, wherein the master microcircuit (14a) is configured to implement near field communication technology and the slave microcircuit (14b) is configured to implement a different communication technology.
    类似技术:
    公开号 | 公开日 | 专利标题
    EP3146645B1|2019-07-24|Anti-counterfeiting tag maintaining a functionality after use
    EP3314539B1|2019-07-31|Anti-counterfeit label having increased security
    EP0617826B1|1996-04-10|Security sealing device
    CA2506931A1|2004-07-08|Securing device for a security module connector
    FR3021439A1|2015-11-27|ANTI-COUNTERFEIT LABEL THAT PRESERVES FUNCTIONALITY AFTER USE
    EP3248147B1|2019-02-20|Authentication of a bottle and of its content
    EP3213263B1|2019-09-18|Hybrid anti-counterfeit label
    FR3021462A1|2015-11-27|ANTI-COUNTERCLASS LABEL
    EP0658864A1|1995-06-21|Marking device
    WO2017153668A1|2017-09-14|Crack-resistant counterfeit-proof label
    FR3106425A1|2021-07-23|Radio frequency label comprising a means of destruction and associated method
    EP3881237A1|2021-09-22|Device and method for detecting an opening or an attempt to open a closed container
    同族专利:
    公开号 | 公开日
    WO2017001739A1|2017-01-05|
    US20180197057A1|2018-07-12|
    US10108894B2|2018-10-23|
    FR3038102B1|2017-08-11|
    EP3314539B1|2019-07-31|
    EP3314539A1|2018-05-02|
    引用文献:
    公开号 | 申请日 | 公开日 | 申请人 | 专利标题
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    EP1857374A1|2005-02-24|2007-11-21|Mobile Safe Data Services, SL|Bottle cap and bottle|
    US20070210173A1|2006-03-13|2007-09-13|Nagel Andreas R|System, method and device to detect product tampering|WO2020099747A1|2018-11-12|2020-05-22|StmicroelectronicsSas|Device and method for detecting an opening or an attempt to open a closed container|AT136674T|1991-12-19|1996-04-15|Ake Gustafson|SECURITY LOCKING DEVICE|
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    法律状态:
    2016-06-13| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 2 |
    2016-12-30| PLSC| Search report ready|Effective date: 20161230 |
    2017-06-19| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 3 |
    2017-09-01| CD| Change of name or company name|Owner name: WISEKEY SEMICONDUCTORS, FR Effective date: 20170727 |
    2017-09-01| TP| Transmission of property|Owner name: WISEKEY SEMICONDUCTORS, FR Effective date: 20170727 |
    2017-10-27| GC| Lien (pledge) constituted|Effective date: 20170926 |
    2017-12-22| TP| Transmission of property|Owner name: EXWORKS CAPITAL FUND I, L.P., US Effective date: 20171120 |
    2018-06-20| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 4 |
    2019-06-24| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 5 |
    2019-11-15| RG| Lien (pledge) cancelled|Effective date: 20191010 |
    2021-03-12| ST| Notification of lapse|Effective date: 20210205 |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    FR1556076A|FR3038102B1|2015-06-29|2015-06-29|REINFORCED SAFETY ANTI-COUNTERFEIT LABEL|FR1556076A| FR3038102B1|2015-06-29|2015-06-29|REINFORCED SAFETY ANTI-COUNTERFEIT LABEL|
    PCT/FR2016/051434| WO2017001739A1|2015-06-29|2016-06-14|Anti-counterfeit label having increased security|
    EP16735914.0A| EP3314539B1|2015-06-29|2016-06-14|Anti-counterfeit label having increased security|
    US15/740,990| US10108894B2|2015-06-29|2016-06-14|Anti-counterfeit label having increased security|
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