• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
  • 同族专利
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    • 专利摘要:
    The present invention relates to a method for monitoring the flight path of an aircraft comprising the repeated steps in the time of receiving and comparing two trajectory objects, said trajectory objects being associated with two initially identical and determined flight paths. independently of each other over time; if there is a difference between the two trajectory objects, determining a defective trajectory among the two flight paths by comparison with the last known fault-free state, the last known fault-free state corresponding to two identical trajectory objects. Developments describe the use of flight plan segments, signatures, simultaneous failure isolation with active leg change, use of operating reliability levels according to an RNP-AR procedure and notification of the pilot of the trajectory determined as faulty. Aspects of software and system are also described.
    公开号:FR3037158A1
    申请号:FR1501164
    申请日:2015-06-05
    公开日:2016-12-09
    发明作者:Gregoire Jacotot；Cedric Flaven；Laurent Flotte
    申请人:Thales SA；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    [0001] FIELD OF THE INVENTION The invention relates to the field of systems and methods for monitoring the trajectory of an aircraft. STATE OF THE ART In terms of systems and processes for managing the trajectory of an aircraft, demanding operating safety conditions must be satisfied. In particular, RNP-AR type air operations are demanding. The Required Navigation Performance (RNP acronym) may be "Authorization Required" in the acronym AR. "Required navigation quality" or RNP means procedures that have been created to specify the conditions to be respected with respect to the airspace and its operation. RNP-AR procedures can provide significant operational and safety benefits over other surface navigation procedures (RNAVs) by prescribing increased accuracy, integrity and navigation functionality to enable Operations using reduced obstacle clearance margins that make it possible to implement approach and departure procedures in situations where the application of other procedures is not feasible or operationally acceptable. For example, in such an RNP-AR context, the regulations require maintaining the aircraft in a 2xRNP corridor around the reference trajectory in the event of a so-called "remote" failure (with a probability of failure of between 10 and 10 seconds). ^ -5 and 10A-7 per operation). In particular, in the configuration of a conventional dual system (two independent navigation chains), a system failure on one of its strings (or "sides") - involving the undesired modification of the path on which is enslaved the aircraft - must be able to be detected and especially isolated in order to continue the flight on the side without failure. The patent document US2012 / 0092193 entitled "METHOD AND DEVICE FOR AIDING THE MANAGING OF AIR OPERATIONS WITH REQUIRED NAVIGATION AND GUIDANCE PERFORMANCE" discloses a method and a device for aiding the conduct of air operations requiring a guarantee of navigation performance and guidance in an RNP-AR context. Disclosure requires the use of N equipment, where N is an integer greater than or equal to 3. The approaches to triplex architectures have limitations. Other known existing approaches concern the use of TAWS or manual means of cross-checking surveillance means. These approaches also have limitations.
    [0002] There is a need for advanced systems and processes, including coverage of operational safety requirements, particularly in an RNP AR context.
    [0003] SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates to a method for monitoring the flight path of an aircraft comprising the steps repeated in the time of receiving and comparing two trajectory objects, said trajectory objects being associated with two objects. flight paths initially identical and determined independently of each other over time; if there is a difference between the two trajectory objects, determining a faulty trajectory among the two flight paths 10 by comparison with the last known failure-free state, the last known fault-free state corresponding to two identical trajectory objects. Developments describe the use of legacies (or flight plan segments) or signatures, simultaneous failure isolation to active leg change, use of dependability levels 15 according to an RNP-AR procedure and the notification of the pilot of the trajectory determined as faulty. Aspects of software and system (e.g. FMS, FWS) are also described. The invention enables the detection and isolation of a failure of the trajectory calculation function in a dual system. It consists of a function, independent or not of the two navigation channels, the purpose of which is to monitor the trajectories of each navigation chain, to detect a fault on one of the chains and to alert the crew.
    [0004] The operating principle of the invention is based on the continuous comparison of the trajectories of each of the two navigation chains. In the absence of failure, the two trajectories are identical and stable. When a failure on one of the two chains occurs, a difference between the trajectories appears and it is possible to identify the failed side by comparing it to the last fail-safe state.
    [0005] According to one aspect of the invention, the solution allows the detection and isolation of a failure of the trajectory calculation function in a dual navigation system which greatly reduces the probability of excursion beyond limits imposed by the requirements of safety of operation during this type of failure. Advantageously, the method according to the invention makes it possible to significantly reduce the probability of excursion beyond the limits imposed by the operational safety requirements (e.g., Flight path failure 10 on one of the chains of the dual navigation system). The probability of excursion away from the trajectory can be decreased if not optimized. Advantageously, the method according to the invention by performing the automatic identification of the part or side of the dual system failed (without resorting to other means during this type of failure), the invention reduces the load crew and can therefore limit the complexity of the system (ie without resorting to a three-way triplex configuration).
    [0006] In particular in a dual system where for a single channel the probability of occurrence of this failure exceeds 10 -5 per operation, the invention may allow the use of the system for RNP AR operations.
    [0007] Advantageously, the method implemented in a dual navigation system allows the automatic isolation of a failure of the trajectory calculation function on one of the navigation chains. By the term "isolating a failure", it is understood to detect the occurrence of a failure (to determine the existence of a problem) and to determine which of the two chains is faulty (to determine more precisely the origin of the failure or its perimeter or the characteristics or properties of the 5 3037158 failure). In existing systems, the crew must implement other means to identify a failure and / or to change the means of navigation to continue the flight; in an RNP AR context, the implementation of these existing means have limitations and insufficiencies in terms of dependability. Advantageously, according to some embodiments of the invention, the implementation of the means can be automatic and consequently spare any additional time for additional analysis and reaction from the crew, a delay which could also contribute equally to increase an excursion if necessary. DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES Various aspects and advantages of the invention will appear in support of the description of a preferred mode of implementation of the invention, but without limitation, with reference to the figures below: FIG. 1 illustrates the general operation of the invention; Figures 2A and 2B illustrate examples of failure detection; Figure 3 shows a diagram of the trajectory management function; Figure 4 shows examples of path comparison steps; FIG. 5 illustrates an exemplary implementation of the method according to the invention in a flight management system; Figure 6 illustrates an alternative implementation.
    [0008] DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION There is disclosed a method for monitoring the flight path of an aircraft comprising the time-repeated steps of receiving and comparing two trajectory objects, said trajectory objects being associated with two flight paths initially identical and determined independently of each other over time; at a given moment, in the event of a difference between the two trajectory objects, determining the defective trajectory among the two flight paths by comparison with the last state without known failure, the last known state without failure corresponding to two identical trajectory objects . The "last state without failure" can be defined as the last state where the two paths are identical. In order to detect a simultaneous failure at a change of the active leg, the knowledge of the expected state after change thus makes it possible to know also the last state without failure provided and thus to isolate in case of failure simultaneously with a change of the active leg.
    [0009] The two trajectories are determined independently of each other and under identical initial conditions. The continually recalculated trajectory determinations must therefore be congruent over time, modulo a short time delay for the conclusion of the associated calculations. Because of this supposed symmetry, the results must be identical, except a) cases of simultaneous failure of the two independent determinations and / or b) change of trajectory (e.g. change of leg, following manual modifications made by the pilot). The comparison with the last state without failure solves the indeterminacy of the first case. Other embodiments of the method according to the invention make it possible to lift the residual indeterminacy linked to the second.
    [0010] 7 303 7 1 5 8 In a development, trajectory objects are complete flight paths. Trajectory objects that are compared (i.e., transmitted to the deviation calculation function) may be complete trajectories (e.g., current or reference trajectories, as manipulated by a flight management system, for example). In a development, the trajectory objects being trajectory portions comprising one or more legs (for example TF and / or RF type). The step of comparing the trajectories can be performed on sequences of trajectory segments. In a development, trajectory objects are (or include) trajectory signatures. In one embodiment, each FMS transmits a 32-bit word representing the CRC of the trajectory (or part of a trajectory). The FWS then compares the 2 CRCs. A path signature may be (or include) a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) file. This embodiment allows calculations and quick comparisons. For example, if the trajectory 1 has a value of 00001111, there are 4 bits of value equal to 1. To have an odd bit number, one has to add one (the odd parity bit of the trajectory is 1). . If the trajectory 2 has a value of 00000111, there are 3 bits to 1. To have an odd bit number, it is necessary to add one, the odd parity bit of the trajectory is 0. In the first case, the FMS 1 therefore sends 1 to the FWS. In the second case, the FMS 2 sends 0 to the FWS. The two parity bits are not identical: the FWS can deduce that the two FMS do not have the same trajectory without receiving the complete trajectory. In one development, the method further comprises the steps of receiving an indication of change of active leg, and comparing the two path objects before and after change of leg. The indication of change may be received or determined in different ways. It may be received from a monitoring module (eg a third party system to the invention). The flying airplane progresses according to the flight plan points of the trajectory. Pilot commands (manual or automatic) modify the trajectory, recalculated by the FMS (in this case the dual system of independent FMS): different legacies are successively stolen and in fact a sequencing (change of leg) 10 can be done ( or detected or initialized or determined). The indication of change of active leg can for example come from the detection of a change of trajectory that becomes equal to the expected trajectory after leg change.
    [0011] Comparing the trajectory objects before and after sequencing can provide teachings about failures. In one development, the method further comprises the step of determining the existence of a failing trajectory (from the two initially identical flight paths determined independently of one another over time) if the two objects after leg change are not equal. In other words, it is an "inter-object" comparison. If the two trajectory objects (determined independently) after change of leg are not equal: there is a faulty trajectory among the two. In one development, the method further comprises the step of determining the defective trajectory (from the two initially identical flight paths determined independently of one another over time) if the two objects after changing leg are not equal, said determination comprising the steps of comparing for each of the two trajectory objects, the following trajectory portion as planned before change of active leg and the portion of current trajectory as stolen after change of active leg. ; and determining the defective trajectory as that associated with the trajectory object for which the following trajectory portion such as planned before change of active leg is not equal to the current trajectory portion as stolen after active leg change. . In other words, it is an "intra-object" comparison. If the two trajectory objects are not equal, it is possible to lift the indetermination by further examining the contents of the trajectory objects, that is to say to compare the portions of the trajectories as provided by the FMS. and those actually stolen. If the two trajectory objects (independently determined) after leg change are equal, it is not possible to conclude (either the two trajectory objects are simultaneously false or they are simultaneously correct; is not determined).
    [0012] 20 In the absence of the indication of the occurrence of a "sequencing" (that a change of active legacy has taken place), no conclusion can be drawn. In a development, the trajectory objects are trajectory portions comprising one or more legs of TF and / or RF type.
    [0013] In one development, the method further comprises the step of receiving a level of dependability and the step of comparing the path objects being performed using a fault tolerance threshold, said fault tolerance threshold. being predefined according to the level of dependability received.
    [0014] The gap between the two paths must remain within certain limits, which are provided by the flight performance requirements which are input data. The subsections of trajectory segments that are compared are relevant to said level of operation safety. In a development, the safety level is associated with RNP values between 0.1 and 1 nautical mile for an RNP-AR type procedure. For example, in some advantageous embodiments, the security level may be RNP-0.3 (three-tenth of a nautical mile). In a development, the step of comparing the trajectory objects is performed at the expiration of a predefined time. The predefined delay covers the asynchronousness of the systems. In other words, the comparison to make sense is performed at the expiration of a predefined period, which covers the synchronization of the different systems used to determine the trajectories. For example, a FMS number 1 calculates a trajectory and a FMS number 2 as well. The two calculations do not start perfectly simultaneously. The predefined delay is the time tolerance between the two channels. In other words, the trajectories are compared after "stabilization" (update of the calculations).
    [0015] In one development, the method further comprises the step of notifying the aircraft pilot of the defective trajectory among the two independently determined paths over time.
    [0016] Other aspects of the invention are described below.
    [0017] According to one particular embodiment, the history of the trajectory objects, for example the successive legacies of the trajectory, is preserved (at least according to a certain depth of history). This history makes it possible to remove any uncertainties as to the faulty chain. In particular, this embodiment makes it possible to detect a failure occurring simultaneously with a "sequencing" of trajectory, that is to say a change of active leg. In a context where the system performs a sequencing of the elements 10 of the trajectory (ie once the carrier having crossed a trajectory element, this element is removed and the guidance is performed on the next), the comparison will use a) two trajectories for each string: current (current) and expected next sequencing (next) to detect simultaneous failure at sequencing or b) n 15 trajectories if multiple sequencing is possible on the navigation strings. A computer program product is disclosed, said computer program comprising code instructions for performing one or more process steps when said program is run on a computer. There is disclosed a system comprising means for carrying out one or more steps of the method. In one development, the system includes two flight management systems or FMS. In one development, the system includes monitoring means for monitoring both flight management systems or FMSs. In a development, the monitoring means comprise two flight alert systems or FWS.
    [0018] Figure 1 illustrates the general operation of the invention.
    [0019] 12 303 7 1 5 8 The function of the trajectory management 100 (i.e. trajectory monitoring and fault isolation) results from the comparison of two navigation chains 110 and 120 ("dual system"). Each navigation chain (110, 120) comprises various data and instructions. Data sources as to the position of the aircraft (111,211) allow the calculation of the actual position (112,212). navigation information (113,213) allows calculation of the current trajectory (114,114). From this current trajectory and aircraft position information, a deviation is determined (115,215) and a guidance instruction is issued to the pilot and / or the autopilot system (116,216). In other words, according to one aspect of the invention, a monitoring function, independent or not of the two navigation chains, compares the reference trajectories used by each chain, so as to detect the differences and to identify the broken chain. The comparison of the trajectory objects, that is to say the step of detecting a difference and / or identifying a broken chain, can be done in different ways over time (ie periodically or aperiodically, continuously or intermittently). The monitoring can be conducted exclusively temporally (i.e. only by reference to time) and / or according to the occurrence of events during the flight. In one embodiment of the invention using one or more FWS "Flight Warning System" systems, the latter initiate and control the frequency i.e. the rate of comparisons. In some embodiments, the verification frequency is of the order of one second.
    [0020] Figures 2A and 2B illustrate examples of failure detection. In 13 3 0 3 7 1 5 8 the absence of failure, the two reference paths are identical and stable. A flight plan is constituted by a series of segments, called "legacies", 5 making it possible to connect a starting point to a point of arrival. Legacy sequences are themselves standardized. Legacies are therefore associated with a flight path. FIG. 2A illustrates an example of trajectory comparison, according to a first embodiment of the invention. When a failure occurs, a difference 201 between the trajectories appears and it is possible to identify the failed side, for example by comparing it to the last state without failure (state 202).
    [0021] FIG. 2B illustrates another embodiment, for which the monitoring method according to the invention proceeds by analyzing the legacy sequence ("sequencing"). The terms "current" 203 ("current" in English) and "next" 204 ("next" in English) apply, for example, to "legs" of trajectory, and respectively designate the current trajectory 203 (or a representative element from the last point sequenced to the arrival and the current trajectory) and a representative element of the next point 204 of the trajectory (to be sequenced until arrival). The term "sequencing" means a change of active leg, that is to say that the leg following the active leg becomes the active leg. The "current leg" or "current leg" or "active leg" translates to "current leg" in English. The "next leg" or "next leg" translates to "next leg" in English. In one embodiment, it is possible to detect a failure due to the analysis of the legacy sequence. This sequence analysis allows the identification of a simultaneous failure to a change of leg.
    [0022] 14 3 0 3 7 1 5 8 The example shown in the figure shows that the occurrence of a fault is detected at point 211 (sequencing error): the trajectory sequences diverge and the number 2 chain appears to be out of order. Indeed, in the sequence at time 210, the chain 1 indicates an object of current trajectory B and a trajectory object along C, as well as the chain 2. At a later time 211, following a change of active leg, on string 1 the current path object has become C and the next path object is indicated as D while for string 2 the active path object is X and not C. The comparison allows 10 immediately determine that the string 2 is faulty and that the string 1 is a priori correct. If for example at time 211, the string 1 indicates C / D and the string 2 indicates C / Y, there is (still) no path failure. On the other hand, at the next leg change, a failure will occur (without it being possible, in principle, to detect which of the two channels has failed). This situation (temporary, provided for the example) would translate a failure of the trajectory emitting function because the latter is designed to normally give the same results for the 'Next' trajectory if the 'Current' trajectory is the same. According to some embodiments, detection and / or comparison of the failed string is performed after a certain predefined time. Indeed, in flight contexts where the manual course changes are allowed and assumed to be synchronized between the two chains (with sufficient level of dependability), a special time delay for detecting the failed side may be necessary in order to to wait for the "updating" of the trajectories.
    [0023] Figure 3 shows a diagram of the trajectory management function.
    [0024] 15 303 7 1 5 8 Each instance of the trajectory calculation system provided to the "Trajectory monitoring and fault isolation" function 100 represents the trajectory. This can be a) the complete trajectory emitted towards the deviation calculation function; or (b) a relevant subset for the intended level of operational safety (eg only for TF and RF legacies) or (c) a signature representing the chosen trajectory or subset. In a particular case, one or more trajectory or trajectory portion signatures (i.e., condensates or compact representations) may be used by the method of the invention. Such signatures may for example comprise a cyclic redundancy check (CRC), which makes it possible to detect transmission or transfer errors by adding, combining and comparing redundant data, obtained by means of a hashing procedure. CRCs are usually evaluated (sampled) before and after the transmission or transfer, and compared to ensure that the data is strictly identical. The most used CRC calculations are designed to always be able to detect errors of certain types, such as those due for example to interference during transmission. In this context of the invention, a "current" CRC and a "next" CRC may be calculated by each of the instances of the trajectory calculation system on the chosen element or set of elements. The length (in bits) of the CRC may for example be selected or determined according to the level of detection required by the safety analysis ("safety").
    [0025] The "Trajectory monitoring and fault isolation" function 100 stores the elements received by each trajectory calculation chain. When a change is detected on one of the two strings (i.e. the data received is different from the stored data), it is determined which calculation function is faulty.
    [0026] The determination of the faulty calculation function is made by performing a comparison of the elements transmitted by the trajectory calculation function No. 1 with those transmitted by the function No. 2. For complex data sets, the comparison is done using the two-by-two elements.
    [0027] FIG. 3A shows that as soon as a difference is found, the "Trajectory monitoring and fault isolation" function 100 considers that the trajectory calculation chain which does not do what was intended has erroneous operation. If the representative element of the path "next 15 side x before" sequencing "is equal to or identical to the" next side x "element after" sequencing ", then the trajectory management function has achieved what it has planned to do. do and there is no issued trouble alert. An optional timer may be added to ensure that both trajectory calculation functions are in a stable state (ie, the point sequencing on the trajectory has occurred on both sides) before making the comparison. FIG. 3B shows that if the representative element of the "next side x before" sequencing trajectory is not equal to the "next side x 25" element after "sequencing", then the trajectory management function has no effect. not realized what she planned to do: a breakdown can be determined by comparing the two navigation channels. Figure 4 shows examples of steps comparison steps.
    [0028] 17 3 0 3 7 1 5 8 In the example shown, the trajectory segments (or legacy for example) are compared with step 400. If they are identical for each chain, the index i is incremented ( ie there is no breakdown). If a difference is detected in step 412, it is determined whether the trajectory segments (or legacy) of the chain 1 are equal to the reference trajectory element in step 421. Where appropriate, the chain 2 is checked (it is determined whether the trajectory element of the chain 2 is equal to the reference trajectory element, at fault 432, the string 2 is determined to be defective, if it is 431 it is a contradiction, therefore an impossibility). If the path element of the channel 1 is not identical to the reference path element in step 421, the chain 2 is checked (it is determined whether the path element of the path 2 is equal to the reference trajectory element, in the affirmative 433, the chain 1 is determined to be faulty and in the negative 434, no conclusion can be given because either it is a "double failure" or the flight plan has been modified differently on each side.) In one embodiment of the invention, trajectory legacies are compared.
    [0029] FIG. 5 illustrates an exemplary implementation of the method according to the invention in a flight management system. In an optional embodiment, to detect and isolate a simultaneous failure at an active leg change, the function 100 ensures that only one of the two path calculation chains is involved. According to this embodiment, the steps of the method are the following: each function 100 of "Trajectory monitoring and fault isolation" uses two elements of "current" and "next" type: the elements stored before the sequencing and the current elements. At the beginning of the flight, all the elements are initialized in the current state (i.e. stored current element equal current element, next element stored equal element following current). A trajectory deviation is detected if i) the two trajectory calculation functions are in "dual" mode operation (ie they both operate on the same trajectory), ii) a trajectory calculation chain comprises a next element memorized which is different from its current element, iii) the second trajectory calculation chain comprises a memorized following type element which is equal to its current element.
    [0030] In certain (optional) embodiments, a course change made by the crew may be determined in certain cases, for example if a) both trajectory calculation functions are in "dual" mode operation (ie operate all the two on the same trajectory), b) a trajectory calculation chain has its stored "next" type element which is different from its current current element, c) the other trajectory calculation chain also has its element of stored "next" type which is different from its current current element and d) the current and next current elements of the two trajectory calculation functions are coherent. This embodiment illustrates that the method 20 according to the invention makes it possible to confirm the existence of a change of trajectory. In one (optional) embodiment, a simultaneous loss of the two trajectory calculation functions can be determined if 1) the two trajectory calculation functions are in "dual" type operation (ie they both operate on the same trajectory), 2) a trajectory calculation chain has its stored "next" type element which is different from its current current element, 3) the other trajectory calculation chain has its stored "next" type element which is different from its current current element, 4) the current and next current elements of the two trajectory calculation functions are different. The method aims to detect and isolate a single fault but incidentally can also detect a double failure. Figure 6 shows a variant of implementation.
    [0031] According to a particular embodiment, the trajectory calculation function is implemented in a flight management system ("Flight Management System") implemented in redundancy (521, 522) and a monitoring module ("monitoring"). in English) or control organ 530 which makes the comparisons (at the required granularity level, also according to a verification frequency which is specific to this system). The variant monitoring module 530 may be a redundant Flight Warning System (FWS) system for issuing alerts. Each FMS has an FWS. In a particular embodiment, the operating mode is of the "primary / backup" type (i.e. one of the FWS is active while the other remains passive and takes control only in case of failure of the active FWS). This "alert" oriented embodiment is only one example. The 530 module more generally can have more features than the communication of alerts. The 530 module can communicate with other embedded avionics systems.
    [0032] The present invention may be implemented from hardware and / or software elements. It may be available as a computer program product on a computer readable medium. The support can be electronic, magnetic, optical or electromagnetic. 30 20
    权利要求:
    Claims (17)
    [0001]
    REVENDICATIONS1. A method for monitoring the flight path of an aircraft comprising the time-repeated steps of: receiving and comparing two trajectory objects, said trajectory objects being associated with two initially identical flight trajectories independently determined from one another over time; at a given instant, in the event of a difference between the two trajectory objects, determining the defective trajectory among the two flight trajectories compared with the last known failure-free state, the last known failure-free state corresponding to two trajectory objects. identical.
    [0002]
    2. The method of claim 1, wherein the trajectory objects are complete flight paths.
    [0003]
    3. Method according to claim 1, the trajectory objects being trajectory portions comprising one or more flight plan segments. 20
    [0004]
    4. The method of claim 1, the trajectory objects being trajectory signatures.
    [0005]
    5. The method according to any one of the preceding claims, further comprising the steps of: receiving an indication of change of active leg; comparing the two trajectory objects before and after leg change. 30
    [0006]
    The method of claim 5, further comprising the step of determining the existence of a defective trajectory among the two initially identical and determined flight paths independently of each other over time if both objects after leg change are not equal.
    [0007]
    The method of claim 5, further comprising the step of determining the defective trajectory among the two initially identical flight paths determined independently of one another over time if the two objects after changing leg are not equal, said determination comprising the steps of: comparing for each of the two trajectory objects, the following trajectory portion as planned before change of active leg and the current trajectory portion as stolen after change of active leg; determining the faulty trajectory as that associated with the trajectory object for which the following trajectory portion such as planned before change of active leg is not equal to the current trajectory portion as stolen after change of active leg.
    [0008]
    8. Method according to claim 3, the trajectory objects being trajectory portions comprising one or more legs of the TF and / or RF type.
    [0009]
    The method of claim 1, further comprising a step of receiving a level of dependability and the step of comparing the path objects being performed using a fault tolerance threshold, said tolerance threshold of failure is predefined according to the level of safety received.
    [0010]
    The method of claim 9, wherein the security level is associated with RNP values between 0.1 and 1 nautical mile for an RNP-AR type procedure. 22,303,715 8
    [0011]
    11. A method according to any one of the preceding claims, the step of comparing the trajectory objects being performed at the expiration of a predefined time.
    [0012]
    12. The method as claimed in claim 1, further comprising a step of notifying the pilot of the aircraft of the defective trajectory among the two trajectories determined independently of one another over time.
    [0013]
    A computer program product, said computer program comprising code instructions for performing the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 12, when said program is run on a computer.
    [0014]
    14. System comprising means for implementing the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 12.
    [0015]
    15. System according to claim 14 comprising two flight management systems or FMS.
    [0016]
    16. System according to claim 15 comprising means for monitoring the two flight management systems or FMS. 25
    [0017]
    17. System according to claim 16, the monitoring means comprising two flight alert systems or FWS. 5 10 15 30
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    同族专利:
    公开号 | 公开日
    CN106251705A|2016-12-21|
    FR3037158B1|2018-06-01|
    US9965963B2|2018-05-08|
    US20160358482A1|2016-12-08|
    引用文献:
    公开号 | 申请日 | 公开日 | 申请人 | 专利标题
    US20070022348A1|2005-06-30|2007-01-25|Racunas Paul B|Reducing the uncorrectable error rate in a lockstepped dual-modular redundancy system|
    US20100010692A1|2005-11-14|2010-01-14|Honeywell International Inc.|Integrating avionics system with single event upset autonomous recovery|
    US20130184899A1|2011-12-06|2013-07-18|Airbus Operations |Method for the automatic monitoring of air operations necessitating guaranteed navigation and guidance performance|
    FR2923614B1|2007-11-14|2015-04-03|Thales Sa|METHOD FOR THE PROTECTION BY SIGNALING OF AN AIRCRAFT AGAINST THE RISK OF COLLISION WITH THE FIELD DURING REDUCED PROTECTION CORRIDOR PROCEDURES|
    CN101477169B|2009-01-16|2011-07-13|华北电力大学|Electric power circuit detection method by polling flying robot|
    CN101572019B|2009-06-01|2011-04-20|民航数据通信有限责任公司|Radar track fitting and statistical analysis device|
    CN101692315B|2009-09-25|2011-08-10|民航总局空管局技术中心|Method for analyzing high precision 4D flight trajectory of airplane based on real-time radar data|
    FR2966259B1|2010-10-18|2012-11-30|Airbus Operations Sas|METHOD AND DEVICE FOR AIDING THE CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS REQUIRING A GUARANTEE OF NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE AND GUIDANCE.|
    US8594917B2|2011-01-25|2013-11-26|Nextgen Aerosciences, Llc|Method and apparatus for dynamic aircraft trajectory management|
    CN202221566U|2011-07-08|2012-05-16|中国民航科学技术研究院|Flight programming system and verification platform of performance-based navigation|
    FR3010541B1|2013-09-10|2015-10-02|Airbus Operations Sas|METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR AUTOMATICALLY MANAGING A FLIGHT TRACK CHANGE ON AN AIRCRAFT, PARTICULARLY FOR LOW ALTITUDE FLIGHT.|
    FR3025920B1|2014-09-15|2016-11-04|Thales Sa|METHOD FOR REAL-TIME CALCULATION OF A PLANNED TRACK, IN PARTICULAR A FLIGHT PLAN, COMBINING A MISSION, AND A SYSTEM FOR MANAGING SUCH A TRAJECTORY|DE102017201517A1|2017-01-31|2018-08-02|Robert Bosch Gmbh|Method and device for plausibility of a vehicle trajectory for controlling a vehicle|
    CN108417096A|2018-02-01|2018-08-17|四川九洲电器集团有限责任公司|A kind of state of flight appraisal procedure and system|
    CN113535484B|2021-09-08|2021-12-17|中国商用飞机有限责任公司|System and method for realizing RNP AR function through extended computer|
    法律状态:
    2016-05-26| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 2 |
    2016-12-09| PLSC| Search report ready|Effective date: 20161209 |
    2017-05-30| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 3 |
    2018-05-29| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 4 |
    2020-05-26| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 6 |
    2021-05-27| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 7 |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    FR1501164|2015-06-05|
    FR1501164A|FR3037158B1|2015-06-05|2015-06-05|TRACK MONITORING|FR1501164A| FR3037158B1|2015-06-05|2015-06-05|TRACK MONITORING|
    US15/171,887| US9965963B2|2015-06-05|2016-06-02|Trajectory monitoring|
    CN201610393144.7A| CN106251705A|2015-06-05|2016-06-06|Track monitors|
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