• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
  • 同族专利
  • 引用文献
  • 法律状态
  • 优先权
    • 专利摘要:
    The invention relates to a method of loading, within a user terminal (T), a virtual key (VK) for controlling at least one feature of a vehicle (V). This method comprises the following steps: reception (E36) by the user terminal of the encrypted virtual key (VK); transfer (E38) of the virtual key (VK) encrypted to a secure element (SE) embedded in the user terminal (T); - decryption (E42) of the virtual key (VK) by means of a communication key (CK) stored in the secure element (SE). An associated user terminal is also described.
    公开号:FR3034550A1
    申请号:FR1552819
    申请日:2015-04-01
    公开日:2016-10-07
    发明作者:Aymeric Chalochet
    申请人:Valeo Comfort and Driving Assistance SAS；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    [0001] FIELD OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates to the management of virtual keys. It relates more particularly to a method of loading a virtual key within a user terminal and an associated user terminal. The invention applies particularly advantageously in the case where the virtual key makes it possible to authorize the control of at least one functionality of a vehicle. TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND It has been proposed to control certain features of a motor vehicle, such as unlocking the vehicle doors, by means of a user terminal, for example a mobile phone commonly used by the user of the vehicle. In order to allow this command only to those actually authorized, a virtual key stored in the user terminal is used and an electronic control unit of the vehicle checks the validity before controlling the unlocking of the doors.
    [0002] Such virtual keys may be distributed by means of a trusted server which then typically transmits the virtual key in encrypted form, for example to a secure element of the user terminal. This solution, however, involves the use of a trusted server as soon as a new virtual key is generated and must be communicated to a user terminal, which is particularly restrictive. OBJECT OF THE INVENTION In this context, the present invention proposes a method of loading, within a user terminal, a virtual control key of at least one functionality of a vehicle, characterized in that it comprises the following 30 steps: reception, by the user terminal, of the encrypted virtual key; transfer of the encrypted virtual key to a secure element embedded in the user terminal; - Decryption of the virtual key by means of a communication key 3034550 2 stored in the secure element. It is thus safe to load the virtual key in the user terminal without having recourse to a trusted server, except possibly (and in this case once and for all) for the loading of the communication key in the secure element. According to optional and therefore non-limiting characteristics: the method comprises a step of storing the virtual key in the secure element; the method comprises a preliminary step of loading the communication key in the secure element by means of a data exchange between a trusted server and the secure element; said data exchange is performed between the trusted server and a security domain of the secure element; said data exchange comprises transmitting the encrypted communication key from the trusted server to the secure element; the method comprises a step of transmitting an applet from the trusted server to the secure element; the method comprises a step of installing the applet in the secure element.
    [0003] The method may further comprise at least one of the following steps: determining, within the user terminal, an authentication datum according to the virtual key; transmission of the authentication data of the user terminal to an electronic unit equipping the vehicle; - verification of the authentication data by the electronic unit; - control of the functionality by the electronic unit in case of positive verification. The method may further include steps of generating and / or encrypting the virtual key by a server; the encrypted virtual key can then be received by the user terminal from said server. In practice, as explained in the description that follows, it can be provided that the virtual key is generated as a function of a root key and at least one temporal terminal. The invention also proposes a user terminal comprising a module 3034550 for receiving a virtual key for controlling at least one feature of a vehicle in encrypted form, a module for transferring the virtual key encrypted to an onboard secure element. in the user terminal, and a decryption module of the virtual key by means of a communication key 5 stored in the secure element. When the user terminal comprises a processor and a memory notably memorizing instructions executable by the processor, each of the aforementioned modules can be realized by a specific set of instructions making it possible to implement the function of the module concerned (possibly in cooperation with a circuit external to the processor such as a communication module) when the instructions of the set are executed by the processor. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF AN EXEMPLARY EMBODIMENT The following description with reference to the accompanying drawings, given as non-limiting examples, will make it clear what the invention consists of and how it can be achieved. In the accompanying drawings: FIG. 1 represents an exemplary context in which the invention may be implemented, notably comprising a vehicle and a user terminal; - Figure 2 schematically shows components useful for understanding the invention, the vehicle and the user terminal of Figure 1; FIG. 3 presents the main steps of an exemplary method of loading a virtual key within the user terminal according to the invention; FIG. 4 shows the main steps of an exemplary method of controlling a vehicle functionality by means of the user terminal. FIG. 1 represents an example of context in which the invention can be implemented. In this context, a vehicle V comprises an electronic control unit 11 (or ECU for "Electronic Control Unit") which can communicate via a wireless link L with a user terminal T, for example a mobile phone (or cell phone ), possibly of the "smart phone" or "smartphone" type according to the commonly used English name, in order to exchange data with this user terminal T, for example for the purpose of controlling the functionality of the vehicle V by means of of the user terminal T (such a function can be for example the unlocking of the doors of the vehicle V), as explained below. The wireless link L used to communicate between the electronic control unit 11 and the user terminal T is, for example, of the "Bluetooth Low Energy" (or BLE) type, and the user terminal T is designed to connect to a network. mobile telephone MN which comprises in particular a base station 32 in communication via a radio link with the user terminal T and a gateway 34 for connection to a public network I, for example the Internet network, different servers TSM, SP, SERV are also connected to the public network I so that the user terminal T and these servers TSM, SP, SERV can communicate in pairs and exchange data between them via the public network I (and possibly the mobile telephone network 15 MN) , for example as described below with reference to Figure 3. These different servers include: - a trusted server TSM (or, according to the English name "Trusted S ervice Manage '); an SP security platform, managed for example by the manufacturer of the electronic control unit 11, a SERV service access server to which users can connect to initiate the process of loading a virtual key in a server. user terminal as described below. FIG. 2 diagrammatically represents components useful for understanding the invention of the vehicle V and the user terminal T. The vehicle V comprises in particular the electronic control unit 11 already mentioned, an actuator 15 (designed here to enable the unlocking of the vehicle doors V), an actuator 17 (designed to allow the starting of the vehicle V), a wireless communication module 16 and a user interface 18. The electronic control unit comprises a processor 12 and a unit memory 14, for example a rewritable non-volatile memory or a hard disk. The storage unit 14 stores, in particular, computer programs comprising instructions whose execution by the processor 12 makes it possible for the electronic control unit 11 to implement the methods described below. The storage unit 14 also stores data used in the context of the methods described below, in particular a root key (or master key) MK, used as explained hereinafter. The root key MK is for example written in the storage unit 14 during the manufacture of the electronic control unit 11, before mounting of this electronic control unit 11 in the vehicle V.
    [0004] The root key MK is also stored at the level of the security platform SP, for example in association with a VID identifier of the vehicle V, such as the identifier VIN (for "Vehicle Identification Number"). The user terminal T comprises a processor 22, a memory 24 (for example a non-volatile rewritable memory), a wireless communication module 26 and a communication module 28 on the mobile telephone network MN, the memory 24 stores computer programs, particularly a APP application, including instructions whose execution by the processor 22 allows the implementation by the user terminal T of the methods described below.App APP has for example been downloaded in advance memory 24 by the user terminal user T. The wireless communication module 26 of the user terminal T allows to establish a wireless link (here of type "Bluetooth Low Energy as already i ndicated) with the wireless communication module 16 of the vehicle V through which the processor 12 of the electronic control unit 11 and the processor 22 of the user terminal T can exchange data, in particular as explained below. The communication module 28 allows the user terminal T (and specifically the processor 22 equipping this user terminal T) to exchange 30 as already indicated data with other devices connected to the MN mobile network or to the public network I, in particular with the SP server. The user terminal T also comprises a secure element SE (or "Secure Element" according to the English name). This secure element SE can, for example, store connection data associated with a subscription to the mobile telephone service and making it possible to establish the connection on the mobile telephone network MN. This secure element SE is for example a chip card (such as a universal integrated circuit card or UICC) received in a reader (not shown) of the user terminal T connected to the processor alternatively, the secure element SE could be of embedded type (for example of eSE type for "embedded Secure Element"). The secure element SE is for example welded in the user terminal T and connected to the processor 22. In another variant, the secure element could be of the hybrid hardware and software type (for example of the HCE type for Host Card Emulation "or TEE for" Trusted Execution Environment ") Figure 3 shows the main steps of an exemplary method of loading a virtual key VK within the user terminal T. This process begins at step E0 to which a user connects to the SERV service access server, for example by means of a personal computer (not shown) connected to the public network I or by means of the user terminal T (either because of the execution by the processor 22 of the APP application, 20 because of the execution by the processor 22 of a browser.) The identity of the user can be verified during this connection, for example by entering a word password or other method of authentication (possibly based on at least two recognition factors). The user can thus communicate to the SERV service access server 25 the following information: a TID associated with the user terminal T with which it is desired to be able to control the functionalities of the vehicle V; time limits T1, T2 defining a period of validity of the virtual key VK which will be delivered and transmitted to the user terminal T; The VID identifier of the vehicle V whose functions are desired to be controlled. Naturally, the user who thus connects to the SERV access server may want to allow the control of the functions of the vehicle V by its own user terminal, or by the user terminal of a person 3034550 7 of his entourage, or (in the case of vehicle rental) to a temporary user of the vehicle V. The TID identifier associated with the user terminal T is for example the call number assigned to the user as part of his subscription to the service 5 of aforementioned mobile telephony (or MSISDN for "Mobile Station ISDN number"), the subscriber number (or IMSI for "International Subscriber Mobile Identity") of the user or the identifier of the user terminal T (or IMEI for "International Mobile Equipment In step E2, the service access server SERV can thus transmit to the security platform SP the data entered in the step E0, for example the identifier TID associated with the security server SP. user terminal T, the identifier VID of the vehicle V and the time limits Ti, T2. The security platform SP receives this data in step E4 and can thus determine in step E6 whether the user terminal T designated by the received identifier TID (in step E4) has already been provided with a key CK communication (and a virtual key management applet using this CK communication key), for example by checking the presence of the TID in a list of identifiers associated with user terminals for which the steps E8 to E28 described below have already been implemented. Since the communication key is stored in the secure element SE as explained below, the identifier TID can be an identifier of the user terminal T when the secure element SE is soldered to the user terminal, or an identifier associated with the subscription. to the mobile telephony service (for example the MSISDN number) when the secure element SE contains connection data related to this subscription, as indicated above. If the user terminal T is provided with a communication key CK (stored in the secure element SE of this user terminal T), the method continues in step E30 described below. On the other hand, if the user terminal T is not provided with a communication key CK, the method continues in step E8 at which the security platform SP sends the trusted server TSM the terminal TID of the terminal T user to be provided with a communication key CK, and the communication key CK to be stored in the secure element SE of the terminal T. The exchanges between the security platform SP and the trust server TSM 3034550 8 are typically encrypted, for example by means of a public key infrastructure (PKI) and mutual authentication prior (not described here) between these two servers. The trusted server TSM receives the identifier TID and the communication key CK in step E10 and obtains a public key PK associated with the secure element SE in step E12. This public key PK is here associated with a private key stored (for example within a security domain) in the secure element SE (in a public key infrastructure or PKI for "Public Key Infrastructure").
    [0005] The trusted server TSM can obtain the public key PK associated with the secure element SE either by consulting a database (stored for example within the TSM trusted server) or by addressing a server (not shown ) management of the secure element SE. As already indicated, when the secure element SE is a smart card 15 associated with a subscription to the mobile telephony service, the identifier TID is for example an identifier linked to the subscription, such as the call number MSISDN, and the public key PK can be obtained from a management server of the mobile telephone service. According to another possibility, when the secure element SE is soldered to the user terminal T, the identifier TID is an identifier of the terminal T 20 and the public key PK can be obtained from a server managed by the manufacturer of the terminal T. The trusted server TSM then sends (step E14) to the secure element SE a request to install an applet and customization of this applet with the communication key CK. In this step E14, the communication key CK (as well as possibly the applet) is transmitted encrypted by means of the public key PK. This transmission of data from the trusted server TSM to the secure element SE uses the communication means of the user terminal T (and in particular the communication module 28) although this does not appear in FIG. 3 because the processor 22 of the user terminal T then performs no processing of the transmitted data. Note that in practice two separate requests could be transmitted from the trusted server TSM to the secure element SE, one for the installation of the applet, the other the personalization of the applet by means of the CK communication key. In the example described here, the secure element SE receives the request for installation and personalization of the applet in step E16. The secure element SE proceeds then to the installation of the applet in step E18 (possibly after decryption of the encrypted received applet, by means of the private key associated with the public key PK and stored in the element secure SE as already indicated). The secure element SE then proceeds, during step E20, to decryption of the communication key CK, by means of the private key associated with the public key PK and stored in the secure element SE, and to the personalization of the it is applied by means of the decrypted communication key CK (which implies in particular the storage of the communication key CK in the secure element SE). The secure element SE sends a reply to the trusted server TSM in step E22 to confirm to it that the steps E18 and E20 are proceeding smoothly. The trusted server TSM receives in step E24 confirmation of the smooth progress of the installation and customization of the applet and can thus transmit in step E26 a message to the security platform 20 SP for confirmation storing a communication key CK in the secure element SE. The security platform SP receives this confirmation in step E28 and then adds, for example, the identifier TID (issued in step E8 and for which confirmation has been received in step E28) in the aforementioned list of identifiers 25. associated with user terminals for which steps E8 to E28 have been implemented. The security platform SP then generates in step E30 a virtual key VK as a function of the root key MK associated with the identifier VID of the vehicle V received at the step E4 and of the time limits Ti, T2 (also received at step E4), for example by means of a cryptographic function f (such as a key derivation cryptographic function): VK = f (MK, T1, T2). It may be provided in some embodiments that the virtual key VK is further determined according to the TID of the user terminal 3034550 10 T, in which case VK = f (MK, Ti, T2, TID), and / or depending on other information (such as information about the features that the virtual key VK can control). The security platform SP then encrypts in step E32 the virtual key VK using the communication key CK, for example by applying to the virtual key VK a cryptographic encryption algorithm using the communication key CK. The security platform then transmits the virtual key VK, encrypted by means of the communication key CK, to the user terminal T 10 (step E34). To carry out this transmission, the security platform SP for example transmits to the user terminal T an availability notification and the user terminal T then sends a request (for example of the https type) for obtaining the virtual key VK, the transmission of the step E34 being performed in response to this request. As a variant, this transmission could be carried out during the execution of the APP application by the processor 22 of the user terminal T, for example following a selection (by the user of the user terminal T), on a touch screen of user terminal T, a virtual virtual key loading button. In this case, a virtual key request is sent from the user terminal T to the security platform SP when the virtual button is selected and the step E34 is implemented only upon receipt of this request. According to yet another variant, the virtual key VK encrypted by the communication key CK could be transmitted within a message sent by the security platform SP and sent to the user terminal T whose TID identifier has been received by the step E4. Here, it is furthermore proposed to transmit, in step E34, the time terminals Ti, T2 for storing them in the memory 24 of the user terminal T.
    [0006] The processor 22 of the user terminal T, on which the application APP executes here, receives the virtual key VK, encrypted by means of the communication key CK, and here the time limits T1, T2 at the step E36. . The time limits T1, T2 can then be stored in the memory 24. The processor 22 (due to the execution of the APP application) then sends (for example within an APDU command) the virtual key VK encrypted by means of the communication key CK to the secure element SE (step E38) for decryption and storage, for example by using the applet installed in step E18.
    [0007] The processor 22, thanks to the execution of the APP application, is therefore used here as an intermediate (or "proxy" according to the English name) between the security platform SP and the secure element SE. secure element SE receives the virtual key VK encrypted in step E40 and proceeds to step E42 to its decryption by means of the communication key 10 CK (stored in step E20), for example by application to the virtual key An encrypted VK of a decryption cryptographic algorithm using the communication key CK The virtual key VK, once decrypted, is stored in the secure element SE in step E44.
    [0008] The steps E40, E42 and E44 are for example implemented because of the execution of the applet (installed in step E18) within the secure element SE. The user terminal T (here specifically the secure element SE) now holds the virtual key VK and can thus control at least one feature of the vehicle V, for example according to the method described below with reference to FIG. 4. It should be noted that the method just described only makes use of the trusted server TSM during the first loading of a virtual key within the user terminal T (or, precisely, of the secure element SE). Indeed, for other loadings of a virtual key in this same user terminal T (or, precisely, in the same secure element SE), the method described above forks in step E6 to step E30 and the trusted server TSM is not solicited. FIG. 4 shows the main steps of an exemplary method of controlling a function of the vehicle V (in this case unlocking the doors of the vehicle V) by means of the user terminal T. Other steps than those described below can naturally be implemented in practice, in particular beforehand in order to establish a communication channel between the electronic control unit 11 of the vehicle V and the user terminal T. The terminal T transmits in the step E102 a request for implementation of the functionality, accompanied by the time limits T1, T2, to the electronic control unit 11 of the vehicle V (step E102).
    [0009] The electronic control unit 11 then verifies in step E104 that the current time is well between the time limits T1, T2 (which is recalled that they define the period of validity of the virtual key VK). If not, the electronic control unit 11 terminates the process in step E106 without performing the required functionality (i.e., without unlocking the vehicle doors V). A failure message may possibly be transmitted to the terminal T for display on the terminal T of a corresponding indication. In the case of positive verification in step E104, the method continues in step E108 at which the electronic control unit 11 calculates the virtual key VK on the basis of the root key MK (stored as indicated above in the storage unit 14) and the time limits Ti, T2, according to the same calculation as that carried out as indicated above within the PS security platform (see the description of the step E30 above), here by applying the key derivation cryptographic function f to the root key MK and to the time terminals T1, T2, ie VK = f (MK, T1, T2). In the embodiments where other information (for example the identifier TID of the user terminal T) has been used in the step E30 for the generation of the virtual key VK, this information is also used in the step E104 for calculate the virtual key VK.
    [0010] The electronic control unit 11 then generates in step E110 a challenge, for example a random number RND, and issues this challenge to the user terminal T. The user terminal T (specifically the processor 22) receives this challenge at step E112.
    [0011] In step E114, the processor 22 transmits the received challenge RND to the secure element SE by asking (for example, by initiating the execution of a function of the applet installed in the step E18 described above). high) the RND challenge application, a cryptographic function h using the virtual key VK (stored in the secure element in step E44 described above). The processor 3034550 13 thus obtains from the secure element SE a response R: R = h RND (VK). In parallel, the electronic control unit 11 performs in step E115 an identical calculation (in normal operation) in order to obtain on its side the expected response; R 'is the result of this calculation: R' = h RND (VK).
    [0012] The user terminal T transmits the answer R (calculated within the secure element SE in step E114) to the electronic control unit 11 (step E116). The electronic control unit 11 then verifies in step E118 that the response R received from the user terminal T is equal to the expected response R ', in which case the electronic control unit 11 can consider that the user terminal T holds the virtual key VK which gives a right of access to the vehicle. If the verification at step E118 fails (which is not the case in the normal operation described above, but may be the case when a malicious person tries to access the vehicle without knowing virtual key VK), the electronic control unit 11 terminates the process in step E120 without performing the required functionality (i.e., without unlocking the vehicle doors V). A failure message may possibly be transmitted to the terminal T for display on the terminal T of a corresponding indication. When the equality between the response R received from the user terminal T and the expected answer R 'calculated by the electronic control unit 11 is verified at step E118, step E122 is carried out at which the electronic unit 11 performs the requested function, here the unlocking of the vehicle doors, by issuing a corresponding command, here to the actuator 15 for unlocking the doors (or, in the case of starting the vehicle, the actuator 17). In the example just described, a simple authentication is used; However, it is possible alternatively to use mutual authentication, for example when the desired functionality is the vehicle start. 30
    权利要求:
    Claims (10)
    [0001]
    REVENDICATIONS1. A method of loading, within a user terminal (T), a virtual key (VK) for controlling at least one feature of a vehicle (V), characterized in that it comprises the following steps: - receiving (E36), by the user terminal, the encrypted virtual key (VK); transfer (E38) of the virtual key (VK) encrypted to a secure element (SE) embedded in the user terminal (T); - decryption (E42) of the virtual key (VK) by means of a communication key (CK) stored in the secure element (SE).
    [0002]
    2. Method according to claim 1, comprising a step of storing (E44) the virtual key (VK) in the secure element (SE).
    [0003]
    3. Method according to claim 1 or 2, comprising a preliminary step of loading (E20) the communication key (CK) in the secure element (SE) by means of a data exchange between a trusted server (TSM). ) and the secure element (SE).
    [0004]
    The method of claim 3, wherein said data exchange is performed between the trusted server (TSM) and a security domain of the secure element (SE). 25
    [0005]
    The method of claim 3 or 4, wherein said data exchange comprises transmitting (E14) the encrypted communication key (CK) from the trusted server (TSM) to the secure element (SE).
    [0006]
    6. Method according to one of claims 3 to 5, comprising a step 30 for transmitting (E14) a trusted server applet (TSM) to the secure element (SE) and an installation step (E18). of the applet in the secure element (SE).
    [0007]
    7. Method according to one of claims 1 to 6, comprising the following steps: - determination (E114), within the user terminal (T), an authentication data (R) according to the virtual key (VK); - transmission (E116) of the authentication data (R) of the user terminal (T) to an electronic unit (11) equipping the vehicle (V); - verification (E118) of the authentication data (R) by the electronic unit (11); - control of the functionality by the electronic unit (11) in case of positive verification. 10
    [0008]
    8. Method according to one of claims 1 to 7, comprising steps of generation (E30) and encryption (E32) of the virtual key (VK) by a server (SP), the encrypted virtual key (VK) being received. by the user terminal (T) from said server (SP). 15
    [0009]
    9. The method of claim 8, wherein the virtual key (VK) is generated according to a root key (MK) and at least one time terminal (T1, T2).
    [0010]
    10. User terminal (T) comprising: - a module for receiving a virtual key (VK) for controlling at least one feature of a vehicle (V) in encrypted form; - A virtual key transfer module (VK) encrypted to a secure element (SE) embedded in the user terminal (T); and a module for decrypting the virtual key (VK) by means of a communication key (CK) stored in the secure element (SE).
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    法律状态:
    2016-04-28| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 2 |
    2016-10-07| PLSC| Search report ready|Effective date: 20161007 |
    2017-04-28| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 3 |
    2018-04-26| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 4 |
    2019-04-29| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 5 |
    2020-04-30| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 6 |
    2021-04-29| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 7 |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    FR1552819A|FR3034550B1|2015-04-01|2015-04-01|METHOD FOR LOADING A KEY WITHIN A USER TERMINAL AND ASSOCIATED USER TERMINAL|
    FR1552819|2015-04-01|FR1552819A| FR3034550B1|2015-04-01|2015-04-01|METHOD FOR LOADING A KEY WITHIN A USER TERMINAL AND ASSOCIATED USER TERMINAL|
    EP16721459.2A| EP3348085A1|2015-04-01|2016-04-01|Method for loading a virtual key in a user terminal and associated user terminal|
    PCT/FR2016/000063| WO2016156682A1|2015-04-01|2016-04-01|Method for loading a virtual key in a user terminal and associated user terminal|
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