• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
  • 同族专利
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  • 优先权
    • 专利摘要:
    The invention relates to a method for securing access to at least one functionality of a motor vehicle (10) by a user, said user being equipped with a mobile terminal (20) in which is stored a virtual key (VK ) access to said functionality, said mobile terminal being adapted, when accessible, to communicate with a central server (50). According to the invention, the virtual key having a definite period of validity, it is expected: - before the end of validity of the virtual key, a first step during which the central server automatically updates the virtual key, then - when the mobile terminal is accessible, a second step during which the central server automatically communicates this virtual key update to the mobile terminal.
    公开号:FR3030830A1
    申请号:FR1500314
    申请日:2015-02-18
    公开日:2016-06-24
    发明作者:Eric Menard；Jerome Bauman；Fabienne Masson；Aymeric Chalochet
    申请人:Valeo Comfort and Driving Assistance SAS；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    [0001] TECHNICAL FIELD TO WHICH THE INVENTION RELATES The present invention generally relates to the control of functionalities of a motor vehicle by means of a mobile terminal. It relates more particularly to a method of securing access to at least one functionality of a motor vehicle by a user, said user being equipped with a mobile terminal in which is stored a virtual key access to said functionality, said mobile terminal being adapted, when accessible, to communicate with a central server. The invention applies particularly advantageously in the case where the controlled functionality is the unlocking of the doors of the vehicle or the starting of the vehicle. TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND It has been proposed to control certain features of a motor vehicle, such as unlocking the vehicle doors, by means of a mobile terminal, for example a mobile phone commonly used by the vehicle owner. In order to allow this order only to people actually authorized, virtual keys are used that are stored in the mobile phones of authorized persons and an electronic control unit 20 of the vehicle checks the presence before controlling the unlocking of the doors. Each virtual key is generally transmitted securely to the mobile phone, via the mobile phone network, by a central server belonging to the manufacturer of the motor vehicle. A risk is that the owner of the motor vehicle is stealing his mobile phone, and that the thief then has access to the motor vehicle. In this situation, the currently proposed solution consists, for the server, in sending to the mobile terminal a control signal for the deletion of the virtual key that it stores. This solution unfortunately only works if the mobile phone is connected to the mobile telephone network. Otherwise, the thief can maintain access to the motor vehicle. The disadvantage is that by keeping the mobile terminal disconnected from the mobile telephone network (for example "in airplane mode"), the thief keeps access to the motor vehicle. OBJECT OF THE INVENTION In order to overcome the aforementioned drawback of the state of the art, the present invention proposes to automatically disable the virtual key beyond a specified period of validity which is assigned to this key. More particularly, according to the invention, a method as defined in the introduction, in which, the virtual key having a determined validity period, is provided: - before the end of validity of the virtual key, a first step at which the central server automatically updates the virtual key, then - when the mobile terminal is accessible, a second step during which the server automatically communicates to the mobile terminal this virtual key updated. Thus, thanks to the invention, if the thief keeps the mobile terminal "in plane mode", he keeps access to the motor vehicle only during the validity period of the virtual key. Then this access is denied. It should be noted here that the validity period of the virtual key will preferably be expressed in the form of an expiration date. Alternatively, it could be expressed as a limited access number to said functionality (typically, the virtual key could be updated every one hundred uses). Advantageously, the motor vehicle being equipped with an electronic unit adapted to check the validity of the virtual key stored in the mobile terminal, the electronic unit is adapted to allow access to said functionality when the virtual key is invalid but that at least two conditions are met, namely that the virtual key stored in the mobile terminal was valid, and that the user has validly filled in personal information requested by the mobile terminal. It is understood that if the user is in a place or in a region of the globe in which his mobile terminal can not communicate with the server, his virtual key can not be updated. In this situation, it is expected that the user can retain the ability to access the vehicle by providing information on his mobile terminal personal information. Preferably, another condition is provided for the electronic unit to authorize access to said functionality, namely that the time passed since the end of validity of the virtual key has not exceeded a predetermined threshold. Thus, if the thief has not only stolen the mobile terminal, but also personal information to access the vehicle, this access will be automatically denied after a specified period or beyond a given number of uses. Other advantageous and nonlimiting features of the process according to the invention are the following: the virtual key being produced from a mother key to which at least one derivation parameter is applied, during the first step, the virtual key is updated by modifying the value of said derivation parameter, and in the second step, said derivation parameter is communicated to the mobile terminal; the motor vehicle being equipped with an electronic unit adapted to check the validity of the virtual key stored in the mobile terminal, the electronic unit is adapted to refuse access to said functionality when the virtual key is invalid; to verify that the user has validly entered said personal information, the mobile terminal, or respectively the electronic unit of the motor vehicle, compares the personal information entered (or a value derived from this personal information) with a previously stored value; in the memory of the mobile terminal, or respectively of the electronic unit; said personal information comprises a secret code; said personal information comprises a biometric data item; Another condition is provided for the electronic unit to authorize access to said functionality, namely that the number of accesses to said functionality since the end of validity of the virtual key has not exceeded a predetermined threshold; ; another condition is provided for the electronic unit to authorize access to said functionality, namely that a right to temporarily exceed the period of validity is assigned to the virtual key. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF AN EXEMPLARY EMBODIMENT The following description with reference to the accompanying drawings, given as non-limiting examples, will make it clear what the invention consists of and how it can be achieved. In the accompanying drawings: FIG. 1 represents an exemplary context in which the invention may be implemented, notably comprising a server, a motor vehicle and a mobile terminal; - Figure 2 schematically shows components useful for understanding the invention, the motor vehicle and the mobile terminal of Figure 1; FIG. 3 presents the main steps of a method of secure transmission of a virtual key updated from the server to the mobile terminal of FIG. 1; and FIG. 4 presents the main steps of a method of authentication of the mobile terminal by the motor vehicle of FIG. 1. FIG. 1 represents an example of context in which the invention can be implemented. In this context, a motor vehicle 10 comprises an electronic control unit 11 (or ECU for "Electronic Control Unit") which is adapted to control the functionalities of the motor vehicle 10 and which can communicate via a wireless link with a mobile terminal 20.
    [0002] This mobile terminal 20 may be formed by a mobile phone (or cell phone), preferably of the "smart phone" or "smartphone" type according to the commonly used Anglo-Saxon name, it could also be a connected watch, a mobile phone or a smartphone. a pair of glasses connected ...
    [0003] The electronic control unit 11 is adapted to communicate with this mobile terminal 20 in order to exchange data, for example with a view to controlling the functionalities of the motor vehicle 10 by means of the mobile terminal 20 (such a function that can be, for example, the unlocking of the doors of the motor vehicle 10 or the starting of the motor vehicle engine 10), as explained below. The wireless link used to communicate between the electronic control unit 11 and the mobile terminal 20 is for example of the Bluetooth type. The mobile terminal 20 is furthermore designed to connect to a mobile telephone network 30 which notably comprises a base station 32 (or relay antenna) in communication via a radio link with the mobile terminal 20, and a gateway 34 for connection to a public network 40, for example the Internet network. It comprises means for connection to the base station 32, 5 by a type 2G mobile phone protocol, 3G, 4G or other. A server 50 (called a central server or web server) is also connected to the public network 40 so that the mobile terminal 20 and the server 50 can communicate and exchange data via the mobile telephone network 30 and the public network 40. The server 50 is here managed by the manufacturer of the motor vehicle 10 or by the manufacturer of the electronic control unit 11. FIG. 2 schematically represents components, useful for understanding the invention, of the motor vehicle 10 and the mobile terminal 20. The motor vehicle 10 comprises in particular the electronic control unit 11 already mentioned, an actuator 15 (designed here to allow the unlocking of the doors of the motor vehicle 10), a wireless communication module 16 and a user interface 18. An identifier is assigned to the motor vehicle 10 and is stored in a database of the server 50. This is an identi VIN 20 (for "Vehicle Identification Number"). It could alternatively be for example a serial number. The electronic control unit 11 comprises a processor 12 and a storage unit 14, for example a rewritable non-volatile memory or a hard disk. The storage unit 14 stores, in particular, computer programs comprising instructions, the execution of which by the processor 12 enables the control electronic unit 11 to implement the methods described below. The storage unit 14 also stores data used in the context of the methods described below, in particular a root key (or master key) VK0 and a cryptographic function f, used as explained hereinafter. The root key VK0 and the cryptographic function f are for example written in the storage unit 14 during the manufacture of the electronic control unit 11, before mounting of this electronic control unit 11 in the motor vehicle 10. The key root VK0 is also stored at the server 50 (which is reminded that it is managed by the manufacturer of the motor vehicle 10), in association with the identification number VIN assigned to the motor vehicle 10. The mobile terminal 20 includes it a processor 22, a memory 24 (for example a rewritable non-volatile memory), a wireless communication module 26 a communication module 28 on the mobile telephone network 30, and a user interface 27 (for example a touch screen ).
    [0004] The wireless communication module 26 of the mobile terminal 20 makes it possible to establish a wireless link (here Bluetooth type as already indicated) with the wireless communication module 16 of the motor vehicle 10 through which the processor 12 of the unit electronic control 11 and the processor 22 of the mobile terminal 20 can exchange data, especially as explained below. The communication module 28 enables the mobile terminal 20 (and specifically the processor 22 equipping this mobile terminal 20) to exchange, as already indicated, data with other devices connected to the mobile telephone network 30 or to the public network 40, in particular with the server 50.
    [0005] The memory 24 stores in particular applications comprising instructions whose execution by the processor 22 allows the implementation by the mobile terminal 20 of the methods described below. The memory 24 also stores data used in the context of the methods described below.
    [0006] With reference to FIGS. 3 and 4, a method for securing access to the motor vehicle 10 will now be described. It will be considered that prior to the implementation of this method, the mobile terminal 20 is prepared for controlling the functionalities of the vehicle. automotive 10 and for communication with the server 50.
    [0007] It will thus be considered that it embeds a user application adapted to communicate with the electronic control unit 11 of the motor vehicle and the interest of which will be well described later in this presentation. It will also be considered that it stores in its memory a virtual key VK and the cryptographic function f.
    [0008] Similarly, before the implementation of the method, the mobile terminal 20 is well known to the server 50, which is therefore aware of data associated with the mobile terminal 20. It is indeed the server 50 that will have previously developed the virtual key VK and who transmitted it to the mobile terminal 20. This virtual key VK was calculated in the following manner by the server 50. A mother key VKi is firstly calculated according to the root key VK0 and at least a DP derivation parameter. Here, this mother key VK, is calculated according to the root key VK0 and start and end dates of sharing of the motor vehicle 10 (it is here in the case of a loan or rental of the vehicle) . Alternatively, the derivation parameters used could be different. The virtual key VK is then calculated according to the master key VKi and at least one other DP derivation parameter. Here, this virtual key VK is calculated according to the mother key VKi and the date of creation of the virtual key VK. Alternatively, the derivation parameter (s) used could be different. Note that when the server transmits the virtual key VK to the mobile terminal 20, it also transmits the DP derivation parameters, for a reason which will become clear in the remainder of the description, with reference to FIG. Securing access to the motor vehicle 10 then has two aspects, which will be well described with reference to FIGS. 3 and 4. This method comprises a first aspect, which can be exhibited in the form of a secure transmission method. a virtual key VK from the server 50 to the mobile terminal 20, the main stages of which are illustrated in FIG. 3. It also comprises a second aspect, which can be exhibited in the form of a method of authentication of the mobile terminal 20 by the electronic control unit 11, the main stages of which are illustrated in FIG. 4. According to a particularly advantageous characteristic of the invention, the VK virtual key has a limited validity period. The method of secure transmission of the virtual key VK illustrated in Figure 3 is then provided to allow to update the virtual key VK stored in the mobile terminal 20 before the latter expires.
    [0009] Thus, it is expected, before the end of validity of the virtual key VK, a step during which the central server 50 automatically updates the virtual key VK, then when the mobile terminal 20 is accessible via the mobile network a step during which the central server 50 automatically communicates this updated virtual key VK to the mobile terminal 20, as well as the derivation parameters DP. Specifically, as shown in Figure 3, in a first step El, the server 50 determines whether the virtual key is nearing its end of validity. The validity period of the virtual key VK may for example be set equal to 24 hours.
    [0010] However, it could be envisaged that this validity period varies according to various parameters, such as for example: the identity of the owner of the mobile terminal 20 (the validity period being chosen greater if the owner of the mobile terminal is the owner of the mobile terminal); vehicle, and being chosen smaller if it is a person renting the motor vehicle, ...), - the region in which the motor vehicle 10 evolves (the period of validity being chosen greater in the regions where mobile phone networks are of lower quality). Then, as soon as the server 50 determines that the virtual key VK approaches or reaches its end of validity, it develops a new updated virtual key VK (step E2). This new virtual key VK is calculated according to the mother key VKi (which remains here unchanged during the entire duration of the lease of the vehicle) and the date of creation of this new virtual key VK.
    [0011] During a step E3, the server 50 attempts to make contact with the mobile terminal 20 (via the public network 40, the gateway 34, the base station 31 and the radio link). If the mobile terminal 20 is not accessible, the server 50 tries again to make contact with the mobile terminal 20, at regular intervals, for example every minute. On the other hand, if the mobile terminal 20 is accessible, the contact is established and it enables the server 50 to transmit to the mobile terminal 20 the new virtual key VK updated as well as the derivation parameters DP (step E4).
    [0012] When it receives this information, the mobile terminal 20 replaces in its memory 24 the old virtual key with the new and the old DP derivation parameters by the new ones (step E5). If, after twenty-four hours, the server 50 has not been able to establish contact with the mobile terminal 20, the method is reset in step E2.
    [0013] It will now be noted that when the owner of the mobile terminal 20 is robbed of his mobile terminal, he can inform the motor vehicle manufacturer 10 of this theft, so that the server 50 can transmit to the mobile terminal 20 a request for deletion of the its virtual key VK. The server 50 can of course communicate this request to the mobile terminal 20 only if it is connected to the mobile network. In the opposite case, the risk is that the thief retains access to the motor vehicle. It is to reduce this risk that the authentication method illustrated in FIG. 4 is implemented.
    [0014] This method of authentication of the mobile terminal 20 by the electronic control unit 11 embedded in the motor vehicle 10 is then implemented as follows. During a step S2, the electronic control unit 11 of the motor vehicle 10 receives a request to unlock the doors of the vehicle. Here, it will be considered that this request is transmitted by the mobile terminal 20 (step S1). Thus, by way of example, this request can be executed manually by the user, using the user application installed on his mobile terminal 20, when a Bluetooth link is established between the mobile terminal 20 and the mobile terminal 20. electronic control unit 11. This request is formed by a set of data transmitted to the electronic control unit 11, comprising in particular a request for unlocking the doors and the DP derivation parameters (the same ones that allowed the server 50 to calculate the virtual key VK from the root key VK0). This request could alternatively be executed differently. It could for example be executed by the user when operating one of the door handles of the motor vehicle. In this variant, the motor vehicle then transmits a message to the mobile terminal so that it returns the aforementioned derivation parameters. Anyway, when it receives a request to unlock the doors and the DP derivation parameters, the electronic control unit 11 generates a challenge, for example a random number RND (Step S3). The electronic control unit 11 then calculates in step S4 a response RESP associated with this challenge RND by application of the cryptographic function f using the virtual key VK, which can be written: RESP = f (RND, VK). Indeed, the electronic control unit 11 having in memory the root key VK0 and having received DP derivation parameters, it is adapted to calculate beforehand the virtual key VK. The electronic control unit 11 of the motor vehicle 10 then transmits at step S5 the RND challenge to the mobile terminal 20, thanks to the established Bluetooth link. In step S6, the mobile terminal 20 receives the challenge RND. The user application in turn calculates, in step 57, the expected answer RESP 'by applying to the challenge RND received from the cryptographic function using the virtual key VK stored, which can be written: RESP' = f (RND, VK). In step 58, the user application communicates the expected response RESP 'to the electronic control unit 11, thanks to the Bluetooth link. In step S9, the electronic control unit 11 of the automobile vehicle 10 thus receives this expected response RESP '. It then compares the response RESP with the expected response RESP ', verifying whether these two responses are equal (step S10). If the equality is not verified, the electronic control unit 11 proceeds to step S11, ending the authentication process. As a result, access to unlock the doors will not be allowed. Indeed, if the equality is not verified, it means that the virtual key used for calculating the expected response RESP 'is not valid. On the other hand, if the equality is verified, it only means that the virtual key used is or was valid. Then, if the equality is verified, the electronic control unit 11 proceeds to step S12 to verify if the virtual key VK used is still valid. During this step, the electronic control unit 11 checks whether the date of creation of the virtual key VK used (which is recalled that it forms a DP derivation parameter and that it was communicated to the electronic unit control 11 at step S1) date less than 24 hours. Here, it is considered that the duration of validity of a virtual key is always 24 hours, and that this period of validity is therefore known to the electronic control unit 11. As a variant, particularly in the case where this duration of validity is variable from one key to the other, it can be provided that this period of validity form a DP derivation parameter and that it is therefore transmitted to the electronic control unit 11 during step S1 . During this step S12, the electronic control unit 11 can also verify that the user has, at the time of the attempt to unlock the doors, a right of access to the vehicle. It can indeed control that the moment of the attempt to unlock the doors is between the dates of the beginning and end of sharing of the motor vehicle 10 (which is recalled that they form DP derivation parameters). Then, if the virtual key VK is valid and if the user has a right of access to the vehicle, the electronic control unit 11 proceeds to step S13, sending to the actuator 15 a signal of the requested functionality, here the unlocking of the doors of the motor vehicle 30 10. In the case where the user no longer has a right of access to the vehicle, this access is denied. In the case where the user has a right of access to the vehicle but where the virtual key is no longer valid, different solutions can be envisaged.
    [0015] The simplest solution is that, if the virtual key VK is no longer valid, the electronic control unit terminates the authentication process directly. As a result, access to unlock the doors will not be allowed. Thus, when the mobile terminal 20 has been stolen and the thief has placed this mobile terminal 20 "in airplane mode", the virtual key stored in the mobile terminal 20 remains valid for a maximum of one day. After this day, the thief no longer has access to the motor vehicle 10.
    [0016] One can alternatively consider another solution, which is that illustrated in Figure 4 and, if the VK virtual key is no longer valid, however allows the user to unlock, under certain conditions, the doors. It may happen that the mobile terminal 20, although worn by its owner, does not have access to the mobile telephone network and the server 50 has therefore not been able to establish contact with it for updating. the virtual key VK. In order not to prevent this owner from accessing the motor vehicle 10, it is then planned to verify the identity of the carrier of the mobile terminal 20, so as to verify that this denier is authorized to access the vehicle and that it is not a thief having stolen the mobile terminal 20 from its owner. These additional steps can be implemented either directly by the user application of the mobile terminal 20 (the result of this verification is then transmitted to the motor vehicle), or by the electronic control unit 11 of the motor vehicle 10. We will consider here the case where these steps are implemented by the electronic control unit 11 of the motor vehicle 10. Thus, during a step S14, the electronic control unit 11 controls the rights attached to the virtual key VK.
    [0017] It will be considered here that each virtual key VK has either a right temporarily exceeding the validity period of this virtual key VK (for example where the owner of the mobile terminal is the owner of the motor vehicle), or no right to a temporary overrun the validity period of this virtual key VK (for example where the owner of the mobile terminal rents the motor vehicle for a reduced period). Here, it will be considered that this right is attached to the virtual key VK in the sense that this right is part of the DP derivation parameters having, among other things, to result in the calculation of the virtual key VK and that, as such, its value is transmitted. by the mobile terminal 20 to the motor vehicle 10. In the case where the virtual key VK has no overtaking rights, the electronic control unit 11 ends the authentication process (step S15). As a result, access to unlock the doors is not allowed. In the opposite case, the method continues in a step S16 during which the electronic control unit 11 will check if the virtual key VK stored in the mobile terminal 20 is not invalid for too long a duration. For this purpose, the electronic control unit 11 reads, from among the received bypass parameters 15, the date of creation of the virtual key VK stored in the mobile terminal. If this date is too old (if for example it has been exceeded for more than seven days), the electronic control unit 11 ends the authentication process (step S17). If the virtual key VK was generated less than seven days ago, the method continues in a step S18 during which the identity of the bearer of the mobile terminal 20 will be verified. This step consists, for the electronic control unit 11, in controlling the mobile terminal 20 so that the latter displays on its touch screen 27 a message asking the user to enter personal information (step S19). This personal information may consist of a secret code previously agreed with the owner of the mobile terminal 20 (a digital alpha code, a drawing to be made on the touch screen, ...). It may also consist of a biometric datum, in which case the mobile terminal 20 must be equipped with a suitable device (fingerprint reader, image sensor whose definition makes it possible to acquire a very precise image of the iris. , ...). Here, we will consider the case where the personal information is a secret code. Then, in step S20, the user enters the secret code on the touch screen and then validates it. Two solutions can then be envisaged. The first solution consists, for the mobile terminal 20, to transmit this secret code to the electronic control unit 11 so that it verifies that it is accurate. This first solution however requires that the electronic control unit 11 has in memory the value of this secret code. The second solution is that the user application stored in the mobile terminal 20 itself checks whether this code is valid (step S21). This solution requires the mobile terminal 20 to have in memory either the code or a means of checking the accuracy of this code. Storing this code in the mobile terminal may be a not sufficiently secure solution. It will then be preferred to store in the memory 24 of the mobile terminal 20 a "hash function" and a "fingerprint". Such a function, known to those skilled in the art, allows, from an input information (here the secret code), to give a result (call "imprint"). Such a function is however characterized by the impossibility for an attacker to find the input information from the fingerprint. Another type of so-called "one-way" function could also be used.
    [0018] Thus, during this step S21, after the user has entered the secret code, the mobile terminal calculates, by means of the hash function, the fingerprint associated with it and verifies that it corresponds to the fingerprint stored in its memory 24. If this is not the case, that is to say if the secret code entered is not valid, the mobile terminal 20 ends the authentication process (step S22) . In the opposite case, the mobile terminal sends back to the electronic control unit 11 a message validating the identity of the bearer of the mobile terminal. Then, the electronic control unit 11 proceeds to step S23, transmitting to the actuator 15 a control signal of the requested functionality, here the unlocking of the doors of the motor vehicle 10. In fact, in this case it will have been verified that the virtual key VK stored in the mobile terminal 20 was a valid key, that this virtual key VK is not too old, and that the user was in possession of the requested personal information. It is thus understood that in the case where the holder of the mobile terminal 20 is the owner of the motor vehicle 10, he keeps access to the latter for eight days after the last update of the virtual key VK.
    [0019] It is also understood that in the case of a thief not having access to personal information, this thief can only access the vehicle when the virtual key VK is valid, that is to say less than 24 hours, as long as the mobile terminal 20 is not accessible ("airplane mode"). Finally, in the case of a thief having at his disposal the personal information 10 (including the secret code that he has extorted from the owner of the mobile terminal 20), he can only dispose of the motor vehicle a maximum of one week, as long as the mobile terminal remains in "airplane mode". The present invention is in no way limited to the embodiment described and shown, but the skilled person will be able to make any variant 15 in accordance with his spirit. In particular, the functionality of the motor vehicle for which it is desired to control access may be the starting of the engine of the motor vehicle. In an alternative embodiment of the invention, it may be envisaged that, in the case where the virtual key is no longer valid, access to the functionality is authorized if the bearer of the mobile terminal can inform not one but several personal information (for example a secret code and then a biometric information). According to another embodiment of the invention, it may be envisaged that, in the case where the virtual key is no longer valid, the secret code is not requested for each attempt to access the vehicle by the mobile terminal 20 It can thus be provided that, in step S23, the electronic control unit 11 renews the virtual key VK on the mobile terminal 20, so that this key is again valid for 24 hours. In this variant, this renewal may preferentially be repeated only a limited number of consecutive times, for example seven times.
    权利要求:
    Claims (10)
    [0001]
    REVENDICATIONS1. A method of securing access to at least one feature of a motor vehicle (10) by a user, said user being equipped with a mobile terminal (20) in which is stored a virtual key (VK) for access to said functionality, said mobile terminal (20) being adapted, when accessible, to communicate with a central server (50), characterized in that, the virtual key (VK) having a determined validity period, it is provided: - before the end of validity of the virtual key (VK), a first step in which the central server (50) automatically updates the virtual key (VK), and - when the mobile terminal is accessible, a second step wherein the central server (50) automatically communicates this updated virtual key (VK) to the mobile terminal (20).
    [0002]
    2. Securing method according to the preceding claim, wherein the virtual key (VK) is developed from a key (VKi) to which is applied at least one derivation parameter (DP), - in the first step , the virtual key (VK) is updated by changing the value of said derivation parameter (DP), and - in the second step, said derivation parameter (DP) is communicated to the mobile terminal.
    [0003]
    3. Securing method according to one of claims 1 and 2, wherein, the motor vehicle (10) being equipped with an electronic unit (11) adapted to control the validity of the virtual key (VK) stored in the terminal mobile (20), the electronic unit (11) is adapted to deny access to said functionality when the virtual key (VK) is invalid.
    [0004]
    4. Securing method according to one of claims 1 and 2, wherein, the motor vehicle (10) being equipped with an electronic unit (11) adapted to control the validity of the virtual key (VK) stored in the terminal mobile (20), the electronic unit (11) is adapted to allow access to said functionality when the virtual key (VK) is invalid and that at least two conditions are met, namely: - that the virtual key (VK ) stored in the mobile terminal (20) was previously valid, and - the user has validly entered a personal information requested by the mobile terminal (20).
    [0005]
    5. Securing method according to claim 4, wherein, to verify that the user has validly filled said personal information, the mobile terminal (20), or respectively the electronic unit (11) of the motor vehicle (10), compares the personal information entered, or a value derived from this personal information, with a value previously stored in the memory of the mobile terminal (20), or respectively the electronic unit (11).
    [0006]
    6. Securing method according to one of claims 4 and 5, wherein said personal information comprises a secret code.
    [0007]
    7. Securing method according to one of claims 4 to 6, wherein said personal information comprises a biometric data.
    [0008]
    8. Securing method according to one of claims 4 to 7, wherein there is provided another condition for the electronic unit (11) allows access to said functionality, namely that the time passed since the end of validity of the virtual key (VK) has not exceeded a predetermined threshold.
    [0009]
    9. Securing method according to one of claims 4 to 7, wherein there is provided another condition for the electronic unit (11) allows access to said functionality, namely that the number of accesses to said functionality since the end of validity of the virtual key (VK) has not exceeded a predetermined threshold.
    [0010]
    10. Securing method according to one of claims 4 to 9, wherein there is provided another condition for the electronic unit (11) authorizes access to said functionality, namely that a right of temporary overrun of the validity period is assigned to the virtual key (VK).
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    FR3107153A1|2021-08-13|Access control procedures and system implementing said procedures
    FR3035248A1|2016-10-21|SECURE-OPERATING-ON-CHIP SYSTEM AND USES THEREOF
    FR3113634A1|2022-03-04|Method and system for supervising digital vehicle keys
    WO2021209693A1|2021-10-21|Method for monitoring the use of a vehicle
    同族专利:
    公开号 | 公开日
    JP6732752B2|2020-07-29|
    CN107251106B|2020-12-22|
    EP3269108A1|2018-01-17|
    US10529157B2|2020-01-07|
    EP3269108B1|2021-05-26|
    EP3259896A1|2017-12-27|
    FR3030818B1|2016-12-23|
    FR3030830B1|2017-07-28|
    WO2016102888A1|2016-06-30|
    JP2018502505A|2018-01-25|
    FR3030818A1|2016-06-24|
    US20170330402A1|2017-11-16|
    CN107251106A|2017-10-13|
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    法律状态:
    2016-02-29| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 2 |
    2016-06-24| PLSC| Search report ready|Effective date: 20160624 |
    2017-02-28| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 3 |
    2018-02-26| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 4 |
    2020-02-28| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 6 |
    2021-02-26| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 7 |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    FR1403003A|FR3030818B1|2014-12-23|2014-12-23|METHOD FOR SECURELY TRANSMITTING A VIRTUAL KEY AND METHOD OF AUTHENTICATING A MOBILE TERMINAL|EP16713956.7A| EP3259896A1|2014-12-23|2016-02-18|Method of securing access to at least one functionality of a motor vehicle by a mobile terminal|
    PCT/FR2016/050377| WO2016132078A1|2015-02-18|2016-02-18|Method of securing access to at least one functionality of a motor vehicle by a mobile terminal|
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