• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
  • 同族专利
  • 引用文献
  • 法律状态
  • 优先权
    • 专利摘要:
    The flight management assembly (1) comprises two guide chains (2A, 2B) each provided with a flight management system (3A, 3B), said flight management systems (3A, 3B); being independent and housed in different equipment, each of said flight management systems (3A, 3B) being configured to perform at least one calculation of guidance instructions for the aircraft, said flight management set (1) also comprising the least one monitoring unit (4A, 4B) housed in a different equipment equipment hosting the two flight management systems (3A, 3B) and configured to perform monitoring (4A, 4B) at least guidance instructions calculated by the two flight management systems (3A, 3B) so as to detect and identify a defective flight management system.
    公开号:FR3030095A1
    申请号:FR1462151
    申请日:2014-12-10
    公开日:2016-06-17
    发明作者:Jean-Claude Mere；Mathieu Versini
    申请人:Airbus Operations SAS；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    [0001] TECHNICAL FIELD The present invention relates to a set of flight management of an aircraft, in particular of a transport aircraft, and a method for monitoring guidance instructions generated by such a flight management assembly. Although not exclusively, the present invention applies more particularly to an aircraft implementing RNP AR (Required Navigation Performance with Authorization Required) operations with the required authorization. These RNP AR operations are based on an RNAV ("aRea NAVigation") type surface navigation and on required RNP (Required Navigation Performance) navigation performance operations. They have the particularity of requiring special authorization to be implemented on an aircraft. It is known that the RNP concept corresponds to a surface navigation, for which are added (on board the aircraft) monitoring and warning means that make it possible to ensure that the aircraft remains in a corridor, said RNP, around a reference trajectory. Outside this corridor is potentially relief or other aircraft. The performance required for a type of RNP operation is defined by an RNP value which represents the half-width (in nautical miles: NM) of the corridor around the reference path, in which the aircraft must remain 95% of the time at during the operation. A second corridor (around the reference path) of half width twice the RNP value is also defined. The probability of the aircraft leaving this second lane must be less than 10-7 per flying hour. The concept of RNP AR operations is even more restrictive. The RNP AR procedures are, in fact, characterized by: RNP values: which are less than or equal to 0.3NM in approach, and which can go down to 0.1NM; and 3030095 2 - which are strictly less than 1NM initially and during a go-around, and which can also go down to 0.1NM; - a final approach segment that can be curved; and obstacles (mountains, traffic, etc.) which can be situated at twice the RNP value with respect to the reference trajectory, whereas for the usual RNP operations, an additional margin with respect to the obstacles is provided. The aviation authorities have set a TLS (Target Level of Safety) target safety level of 10-7 per flight hour. In the case of RNP AR operations, as the RNP values can go down to 0.1NM and the obstacles can be located at twice the RNP value of the reference trajectory, this objective results in a probability that the aircraft sort of the half-width corridor D = 2.RNP which must not exceed i07 per hour of flight. The present invention applies to a flight management set comprising two guide channels each provided with a flight management system of the FMS type ("Flight Management System"). STATE OF THE ART The equipment on board an aircraft and in particular the flight management assembly must make it possible to achieve the desired level of safety, if the aircraft must implement navigation performance operations required with the aircraft. RNP AR authorization required. The objective is to have the ability to fly RNP AR procedures with RNP values up to 0.1NM, and this without restriction (in normal situation and in case of failure) at departure, approach and go-around. However, for an aircraft to have the capacity to steal such RNP AR procedures, it is necessary in particular to be able to eliminate from the guide loop an erroneous source for calculating orders (or instructions) for guiding, in order to counteract its possible effects on the flight path of the aircraft.
    [0002] In order to be able to implement an operation of the RNP type 0.1, the flight management assembly must make it possible to respect a "hazardous" type of severity in the event of loss or error of the guidance instructions. In addition, it is necessary that, in the event of detection of an erroneous calculation, the aircraft can continue to be guided in automatic mode to be maintained in the RNP corridor. With a flight management set with two flight management systems, in case of disagreement between the two flight management systems, the set is not able to identify the one that is defective, and the aircraft does not therefore can no longer be guided in automatic mode and is not able to implement such RNP operations. SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The object of the present invention is to overcome this disadvantage. It relates to a set of flight management of an aircraft, making it possible to implement RNP operations as mentioned above, said flight management set comprising two guide chains provided, each, with a flight management system, said flight management systems being independent and housed in different equipment, each of said flight management systems being configured to perform at least one calculation of guidance instructions for the aircraft, said flight management set also comprising at least one monitoring unit configured to perform data monitoring generated by the flight management systems. According to the invention, the monitoring unit is housed in equipment other than the equipment hosting the two flight management systems, and the monitoring unit is configured to carry out a monitoring of the guidance instructions calculated by the two management systems. of flight so as to be able to detect and identify a defective flight management system. In addition to guidance (or orders) guidance, the monitoring unit is also configured to monitor deviations. Thus, thanks to this architecture, the monitoring unit is able to identify a defective flight management system in order to guide the aircraft using a non-faulty flight management system, which as specified below, allows the aircraft to have the ability to fly RNP-type operations as mentioned above, and to remedy the aforementioned drawback.
    [0003] Advantageously, said monitoring unit is configured to calculate the difference between a guidance set calculated by one of said flight management systems and a corresponding guidance set calculated by the other of said flight management systems. and to compare this difference to a predetermined margin; and if said difference is greater than said margin, to analyze the evolutions of extrapolations of the position of the aircraft, deduced from the respective guidance instructions, so as to be able to detect an incoherent guide setpoint and thus detect as defective the system flight management having calculated this incoherent guidance set. In addition, advantageously, each of the flight management systems is configured to also perform at least one of the following calculations: a calculation of a position of the aircraft; a calculation of a trajectory of the aircraft; and a calculation of the difference between the position and the trajectory of the aircraft. In addition, advantageously, the monitoring unit is configured to also perform at least one of the following monitoring: - a monitoring of a calculation of a position of the aircraft; monitoring a retrieval of a procedure to implement a navigation performance operation required with required authorization from a navigation database and loading the procedure into a flight plan; and - a monitoring of a trajectory calculation. Furthermore, advantageously, the guidance of the aircraft is carried out according to data provided by one of the two guide chains, called the active guidance line, and the flight management assembly comprises switching means configured for, in case of detection by the monitoring unit of a defective flight management system and if the active guidance system is that comprising this defective flight management system, generating a switch of activating the other of said two guide chains.
    [0004] In addition, in a particular embodiment, the flight management assembly comprises two monitoring units configured to perform the same monitoring. The present invention also relates to a method of monitoring 5 at least one guidance set (or order) provided (or generated) by a flight management set as described above. According to the invention, said monitoring method comprises the following successive steps: a step of receiving at least one guidance instruction to be monitored and a current value of at least one parameter illustrating the current state of the aircraft; a first calculation step, at least starting from said guidance instruction and from said current value of the aircraft, of a plurality of so-called extrapolated positions of the aircraft, for successive durations given from a moment current; A second step of calculating extrapolated route deviations, corresponding to deviations from said extrapolated positions with respect to a reference segment; and a step of analyzing extrapolated route deviations, to determine whether they diverge or converge so as to be able to deduce whether the guidance setpoint 20 is correct or not. Advantageously, said successive steps are implemented separately for two guidance instructions, received from the two flight management systems of the flight management assembly, if the difference between these two guidance instructions is greater than a predetermined margin.
    [0005] Furthermore, advantageously, the first calculation step (of extrapolated positions) consists of calculating an extrapolated position of the aircraft, using the following data: the parameter values of the aircraft, previously validated, illustrating the state of the aircraft; A rolling order representing the guidance setpoint to be monitored; the current value of at least one atmospheric parameter; and - a performance model of the aircraft.
    [0006] In addition, advantageously, said reference segment is one of the following segments: an active segment of a flight plan followed by the aircraft; an active segment of a trajectory followed by the aircraft.
    [0007] The present invention also relates to an aircraft, in particular a transport aircraft, which is provided with a flight management assembly such as that specified above. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES The appended figures will make it clear how the invention can be realized. In these figures, identical references designate similar elements. Figure 1 is a block diagram of a particular embodiment of an aircraft flight management assembly. FIG. 2 is a diagram showing an aircraft flying in an extrapolated flight path, on which road deviations with respect to a reference segment have been demonstrated. FIG. 3 is a graph illustrating the evolution of the differences in the course of an aircraft, as well as the changes in road deviations for different anticipation times, as a function of time, in the case of an instruction of erroneous roll. FIG. 4 is a graph illustrating the evolution of the differences of course of an aircraft, as well as the evolution of road deviations for different times of anticipation, as a function of time, in the case of a gust of wind lateral and a non-errored roll direction. DETAILED DESCRIPTION FIG. 1 schematically shows a flight management assembly 1 of an aircraft, in particular a transport aircraft, which makes it possible to illustrate the invention.
    [0008] This flight management assembly 1 which is embarked on the aircraft, comprises two guide chains 2A and 2B each provided with a flight management system 3A and 3B of type FMS ("Flight Management System" in English). English). Both flight management systems 3A and 3B are independent and are hosted in different hardware. Each of said flight management systems 3A and 3B is configured to perform the calculations specified below, and in particular a calculation of guidance instructions for the aircraft. The guidance of the aircraft is carried out according to data (and in particular guidance instructions) provided by only one of said two guide chains 2A and 2B, said active guide chain. Said flight management set 1 also comprises at least one monitoring unit 4A, 4B configured to carry out data monitoring generated by the flight management systems 3A and 3B.
    [0009] According to the invention, the monitoring unit 4A, 4B is housed in hardware ("hardware") different from the equipment hosting the two flight management systems 3A and 3B. In addition, according to the invention, the monitoring unit 4A, 4B is configured to monitor the guidance (or orders) calculated by the two flight management systems 3A and 3B so as to be able to detect and identify , where appropriate, a defective flight management system, among the flight management systems 3A and 3B, as specified below. The defective flight management system means a flight management system which calculates and transmits at least one guidance instruction which is erroneous (or incorrect). In addition, guidance (or orders) guidance, the monitoring unit 4A, 4B is also configured to monitor deviations. In a preferred embodiment, shown in FIG. 1, the flight management assembly 1 comprises two monitoring units 4A and 4B which are configured to perform the same monitoring. This makes it possible, in the event of failure of one of these monitoring units 4A and 4B in RNP operation, to still be able to detect, if necessary, a defective flight management system 3A 3030095 8 or 3B, and thus to ensure the integrity required for this type of RNP operation. Furthermore, the flight management assembly 1 comprises switching means configured for, in the event of detection by the monitoring unit 4A, 4B of a defective flight management system (for example the flight management system). 3A) and if the active guidance system is the one comprising this defective flight management system (the guide chain 2A in this example), generating a commutation consisting in making the other of said two guide chains 2A and 2B active ( that is, the guide chain 2B in this example).
    [0010] In a particular embodiment, the switching means comprise a button (not shown) which is installed in the cockpit and which allows a crew member to manually control the switching. Furthermore, in an alternative embodiment, the control means 15 comprise at least one control unit 5A, 5B which is installed in a guidance computer 8A, 8B specified below, and which switches according to a surveillance status received. The monitoring unit 4A, 4B is thus able to isolate a defective flight management system in order to allow the crew to perform an RNP operation, with an acceptable response time. In addition, as specified below, the monitoring unit 4A, 4B performs a monitoring based on a current real state of the aircraft (speed, position, roll, ...) instead of predicted data (flight plan , trajectory). In order to be able to identify which of the two flight management systems 3A and 3B is wrong, the monitoring unit 4A, 4B monitors each calculation step implemented by the latter and ensures that the two flight management systems 3A and 3B use a consistent reference for the next step. The monitoring unit 4A, 4B is configured: to calculate the difference between a guidance set calculated by one of said flight management systems 3A and 3B at a corresponding guidance set calculated by the other of said flight management systems. flight management 3A and 3B, and for comparing this difference to a predetermined margin; and 3030095 9 - if said difference is greater than said margin, to carry out a consistency check by analyzing the evolutions of the extrapolations of the position of the aircraft, deduced from the respective guidance instructions, so as to be able to detect an incoherent guidance setpoint (That is to say, erroneous) and thus detect as defective the flight management system having calculated this incoherent guide setpoint. The flight management assembly 1 is therefore based on a new architecture with two flight management systems 3A and 3B, which implements monitoring, in particular, the calculation of deviations and orders (or instructions) guidance. The monitoring of the guidance instructions generated by a flight management system 3A, 3B is based on an extrapolation of the position of the aircraft. Moreover, each of the flight management systems 3A and 3B is configured to also perform, in addition to developing the guidance instructions for controlling the position of the aircraft on the trajectory, the following calculations: a calculation of the position of the aircraft; a calculation of the trajectory of the aircraft; and a calculation of the difference between the position and the trajectory of the aircraft. In addition, each of the monitoring units 4A and 4B is configured to perform, in addition to the monitoring of the deviations and the orders (or instructions) of guidance, also the following monitoring calculations made by the flight management systems 3A and 4A. 3B: - monitoring of a calculation of a position of the aircraft; monitoring of an extraction of an RNP procedure from a navigation data base of the NDB (Navigation Data Base) type, the RNP procedure being stored in the navigation database of the system flight management, and loading the procedure into a flight plan; and - a monitoring of a trajectory calculation. These monitoring are specified below.
    [0011] As shown in FIG. 1, each guide chain 2A, 2B comprises an assembly 6A, 6B of conventional sensors for determining (measuring, calculating, ...) the values of parameters related to the state (position, speed ,. ..) 3030095 10 the aircraft and its environment (temperature, ...). These values are provided via a link 11A, I 1B of the set 6A, 6B to the corresponding flight management system 3A, 3B ("corresponding" meaning that part of the same guide chain 2A, 2B).
    [0012] Each flight management system 3A, 3B calculates a position of the aircraft on the basis of values received from the corresponding sensor assembly 6A, 6B. The flight management assembly 1 also comprises an auxiliary unit 7 which calculates a third position on the basis of values received from the sets 6A and 6B via, respectively, links I2A and I2B. This auxiliary unit 7 serves as the third data source for comparison and voting in the monitoring unit 4A, 4B. This auxiliary unit 7 performs only the calculations and operations indicated and does not correspond to a (third) flight management system. The monitoring unit 4A receives information from the flight management system 3A, the flight management system 3B and the auxiliary unit 7, respectively via links I4A, I5B and I6A, and can provide information to the system. corresponding flight management 3A via a link 17A. The monitoring unit 4A can also provide the monitoring results implemented (and in particular the monitoring status) directly to the guidance calculator 8A specified below. Similarly, the monitoring unit 4B receives information from the flight management system 3A, the flight management system 3B and the auxiliary unit 7, respectively via links I5A, I4B, and I6B, and can provide information to the corresponding flight management system 3B via an I7B link.
    [0013] The monitoring unit 4B can also provide the monitoring results implemented (and in particular the monitoring status) directly to the guidance calculator 8B specified below. The position calculation monitoring is carried out in the monitoring unit 4A, 4B (or in the flight management system 2A, 2B) by comparing and voting positions provided by the two flight management systems 4A and 4A. 4B, with the position provided by the auxiliary unit 7.
    [0014] In addition, each flight management system 3A, 3B extracts the RNP procedure from its database before the operation and loads it into a flight plan. The two flight plans are sent to the monitoring units 4A and 4B which compare them. Monitoring is therefore performed by comparing the two flight plans after loading the procedure. As the loading is done before stealing the procedure, in case of disagreement, the monitoring units 4A and 4B require a calculation to each flight management system 3A, 3B. After several unsuccessful attempts (at least two), the operation is declared impossible and the crew is encouraged to consider another approach procedure.
    [0015] In addition, each of the flight management systems 3A and 3B calculates a trajectory based on the validated flight plan. The auxiliary unit 7 calculates the active segment (or some segments in front of the current position of the aircraft) on the basis of the same validated flight plan. The monitoring may consist of: either a comparison of the three active segments received respectively from the flight management systems 3A and 3B and the auxiliary unit 7 with a vote in case of disagreement; - or in a consistency check on the basis of the flight plan validated during the previous operation. In this case, it is not necessary for the auxiliary unit 7 to calculate an active segment. The monitoring unit 4A, 4B calculates a check zone around the flight plan and checks whether the active segments received from the flight management systems 3A and 3B are contained in this zone to validate them. Moreover, each of the flight management systems 3A and 3B calculates the guidance instructions (or orders) on the basis of the validated position and the previously validated active segment and sends it to the monitoring unit 4A, 4B which monitors the evolution of the extrapolation of the position of the aircraft, derived from these guidance instructions, and invalidates the calculation in case of anomaly detection by setting a monitoring status to invalid. As shown in FIG. 1, each of the two guide chains 2A and 2B of the flight management assembly 1 comprises a guidance computer 8A, 8B of the FG type ("Flight Guidance" in English). One of said guiding calculators 8A, 8B, namely the guiding computer of the active guiding chain, drives conventional aircraft control servocontrols to guide the aircraft in accordance with the guidance instructions. The selection logic (depending on the monitoring status) between the guidance computer 8A and the guidance computer 8B, for controlling the servocontrols and guiding the aircraft, is implemented at these guiding computers 8A and 8B. in the usual way via the usual communication units 5A and 5B. If there is a difference greater than the aforementioned predetermined margin between the two guidance instructions, respectively generated by the flight management systems 3A and 3B, the monitoring of these guidance instructions, implemented by the monitoring units 4A and 4B , is based on the analysis of the guidance instructions, correlated with the current state of the aircraft, in order to calculate extrapolated positions of the aircraft for defined durations (for example every second up to ten seconds) and of compare them with a reference segment (of a flight plan or trajectory). To do this, each of the monitoring units 4A and 4B implements the following successive steps: a calculation step ET1 for calculating from the guidance setpoint to be monitored, a plurality of positions P1, P2, P3, P4 called extrapolated from the aircraft AC, as shown in FIG. 2, for durations given from the current time; a step ET2 for calculating the so-called extrapolated E1, E2, E3, E4 deviations respectively corresponding to deviations of the extrapolated positions P1, P2, P3, P4 of the aircraft AC, which form an extrapolated trajectory TE (of which the direction of flight 25 is shown by an arrow F in FIG. 2) with respect to a reference segment SR (FIG. 2); and an ET3 step for analyzing extrapolated route deviations E1 to E4, in order to determine whether they are diverging or converging (with respect to the reference segment SR), in order to be able to determine whether the guidance setpoint is correct or not, the 30 flight management system 3A, 3B calculating in principle a guidance set to converge the aircraft to the reference segment SR.
    [0016] Thus, a method (implemented by the flight management assembly 1) for monitoring the guidance instructions at the output of a flight management system 3A, 3B is obtained which is fast, simple, inexpensive and effective. The steps ET1 to ET3 of said monitoring method are specified below.
    [0017] Step ET1 consists in calculating an extrapolated position of the aircraft, for example in 1, 2,..., 10 seconds, using the following data: the current values of parameters (position, speed,. ..) of the aircraft illustrating the current state of the aircraft. These values must be validated by a position monitoring (comparison of data from three sources to verify whether the source 10 used is correct or not); a roll order (or roll order) representing the guidance instruction whose validity is to be evaluated; - the current values of atmospheric parameters (wind, altitude, temperature, ...); and 15 - a usual model of aircraft performance. In this step ET1, the monitoring, implemented by the monitoring unit 4A, 4B, considers that the aircraft is flying for a predefined period of time with a roll angle equal to the roll order provided by the control system. flight considered.
    [0018] The step ET2 consists of calculating the E1 to E4 road deviations of the extrapolated positions, with respect to the active segment validated by the trajectory calculation monitoring. In addition, step ET3 performs an analysis of the extrapolated deviation values. The evolution of the extrapolated deviation values is analyzed to determine if they diverge or converge to detect and identify a defective flight management system. This corresponds to the analysis of a graph of the variation of road deviation with respect to time, for different periods of anticipation. This analysis is highlighted in FIG. 3. In this FIG. 3: the axis of the abscissa represents the time T in seconds, and the axis of the ordinates represents the value of the difference of road E in meters (relative to to the 3030095 14 reference segment) with an indication of a limit of 9 at 185.2 meters (which represents a boundary of a 0.1 NM RNP corridor); and - the dashed CO curve represents the variation of the aircraft's time course deviation, in a case where an incorrect roll order is calculated by a flight management system between 20 seconds and 26 seconds. . In addition, the curves C1 to C5 represent the evolution of road deviation for five different periods (or times) of anticipation. In these anticipations, we consider the positions that are expected in the duration corresponding to the anticipation period, with the roll order considered, and therefore the road deviations corresponding to these positions. In the example of FIG. 3, provision is made: for Cl: an anticipation of 8 seconds; for C2: an anticipation of 9 seconds; for C3: an anticipation of 10 seconds; - for C4: an anticipation of 11 seconds; 15 - for C5: an anticipation of 12 seconds. Three different situations Si, S2 and S3 can be observed in this FIG. 3: a first situation S1 between 0 and 20 seconds; a second situation S2 between 20 seconds and 26 seconds; and 20 - a third situation S3 after 26 seconds. In the first situation S1 (between 0 and 20 seconds), the aircraft is exactly on the reference segment considered (ie a straight segment). The road deviation and the road angle error are zero. Thus, the calculated roll order is zero. An anticipation of the position of the aircraft with a zero roll order remains on the trajectory. Thus, the corresponding road difference is also zero for the curves C1 to C5. All the curves CO to C5 are therefore identical. In the second situation S2 (between 20 seconds and 26 seconds), the flight management system considered incorrectly generates a roll order of 15 °, while the reference segment is still a straight segment. Due to this erroneous roll order, the aircraft slowly begins to diverge from the reference segment. The anticipation of the position of the aircraft is 3030095 15 faster. Considering an aircraft displacement using a constant roll of 15 ° (the current order received from the flight management system), the aircraft is expected to have a 185.2-meter difference in seconds (curve C5 to 20 seconds). Expectations with a shorter anticipation time lead to 5 values of road difference between 80 and 160 meters (curves C1 to C4). Over time, the actual course deviation and the course angle error values increase, resulting in the anticipated route deviation also increasing. As the roll order is incorrect, the aircraft will not converge to the reference segment. Also, 12 seconds of anticipation (curve C5) provide 10 values of road deviation larger than 8 seconds of anticipation (curve C1). After several seconds of monitoring, the monitoring unit 4A, 4B detects that the road deviations are diverging, and the aircraft is switched to the non-faulty flight management system which calculates a correct roll order.
    [0019] In the third situation S3 (from 26 seconds), the flight management system calculates a correct roll order with respect to the current road deviation and the current road angle error. The aircraft slowly begins to return to the reference segment, but as the roll has already increased between 20 seconds and 26 seconds, it takes approximately 15 seconds until the course deviation begins to decrease. As the (correct) roll order provided by the flight management system returns the aircraft to the reference segment, the anticipation of the rolling order over a long duration (12 seconds) provides a further deviation of course. weak than anticipation over a short time (8 seconds). This means that the roll order 25 is consistent and the aircraft will converge. This can be seen in the graph of FIG. 3 by the inversion of curves C1 to C5. The curve C1 for example is the weakest when the rolling order of the flight management system is incorrect, and it becomes the highest when the roll order of the flight management system is correct. With an adequate choice of anticipation time values and taking into account the fact that, in the absence of an erroneous roll order, the roll order is calculated so as to always bring the aircraft back onto the trajectory under consideration. The evolution of the extrapolated deviation values provides good information for determining whether the roll order is correct or not, or at least if the aircraft diverges or converges with respect to the considered trajectory. In addition, the monitoring implemented by the monitoring unit 4A, 4B in particular, is configured to avoid unwanted detections, particularly in 5 cases of lateral wind gust. It is known that, in the event of a lateral wind gust, the lateral deviation induced by the lateral displacement of the aircraft and the roll induced by the gust of lateral wind can lead to an anticipated difference in high values. By way of illustration, FIG. 4 shows the same type of graph as FIG. 3 (with curves C1A to C5A corresponding to the same anticipation times as the curves C1 to C5 of FIG. 3, COA corresponding to CO). , in the case where the roll order is calculated correctly, but a side wind gust or abnormal guidance causes the roll of the aircraft to grow 5 ° per second, between 20 seconds and 23 seconds.
    [0020] The main difference of FIG. 4 with respect to FIG. 3 is that the curve C1A (8 seconds of anticipation) has higher values of course deviation than the other curves. As the roll order is correct, the aircraft is expected to converge on the reference segment, using this correct roll order. As a result, even if the anticipated deviation values increase to nearly 185m, no alert is issued. The monitoring takes into account margins and filters to avoid false detections (for example in the case of lateral wind gusts). The aforementioned monitoring (steps ET1 to ET3) is added to the direct comparison of the guidance instructions received from the two flight management systems 3A and 3B, in the event of a discrepancy, to discriminate the flight management system that has failed. The flight management assembly 1, as described above, therefore has an architecture based on two flight management systems 3A and 3B and 30 monitors (implemented in particular by the monitoring units 4A and 4B). , including a monitoring guidance guidance, to be able to implement RNP 0.1 type operations.
    [0021] This architecture makes it possible: - to avoid having to install a third flight management system (to serve as a third source of voting), which would be expensive and complicated; - to obtain a fast response time; and 5 - to identify, if necessary, a defective flight management system (in the event of calculation of erroneous guidance instructions) making it possible to invalidate the defective flight management system and to continue the operation on the flight management system. flight remaining unbroken, and if possible resynchronize the defective flight management system on the non-faulty flight management system.
    权利要求:
    Claims (11)
    [0001]
    REVENDICATIONS1. An aircraft flight management assembly, said flight management assembly (1) comprising two guide chains (2A, 2B) each provided with a flight management system (3A, 3B), said systems flight management systems (3A, 3B) being independent and housed in different equipment, each of said flight management systems (3A, 3B) being configured to perform at least one calculation of guidance instructions for the aircraft (AC), said flight management set (1) also comprising at least one monitoring unit (4A, 4B) configured to perform data monitoring generated by the flight management systems (3A, 3B), characterized in that the monitoring unit (4A, 4B) is housed in a different equipment equipment hosting the two flight management systems (3A, 3B), and in that the monitoring unit (4A, 4B) is configured to perform a monitoring guidance instructions calculated by both flight management systems (3A, 3B) so as to detect and identify a defective flight management system.
    [0002]
    2. Flight management assembly according to claim 1, characterized in that said monitoring unit (4A, 4B) is configured: to calculate the difference between a guidance set calculated by one of said flight management systems (3A, 3B) and a corresponding guidance set calculated by the other of said flight management systems (3A, 3B) and for comparing this difference to a predetermined margin; and if said difference is greater than said margin, to analyze the evolution of extrapolations of the position of the aircraft (AC), deduced from the respective guidance instructions, so as to be able to detect an incoherent guide setpoint and thus detect as defective the flight management system having calculated this incoherent guidance set.
    [0003]
    3. flight management assembly according to one of claims 1 and 2, characterized in that each of the flight management systems (3A, 3B) is configured to perform at least one of the following calculations: - a calculating a position of the aircraft (AC); A calculation of a trajectory of the aircraft (AC); and a calculation of the difference between the position and the trajectory of the aircraft (AC).
    [0004]
    4. Flight management assembly according to one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that the monitoring unit (4A, 4B) is configured to perform also at least one of the following monitoring: - monitoring of a calculation of a position of the aircraft (AC); monitoring a retrieval of a procedure to implement a navigation performance operation required with required authorization from a navigation database and loading the procedure into a flight plan; and - a monitoring of a trajectory calculation.
    [0005]
    5. flight management assembly according to any one of claims 1 to 4, the guidance of the aircraft (AC) being performed according to data provided by one of the two guide chains (2A, 2B), said chain active guidance device, characterized in that it comprises switching means (5A, 5B) configured for, in case of detection by the monitoring unit (4A, 4B) of a defective flight management system and if the active guide chain is that comprising this defective flight management system, generating a switching consisting of making active the other of said two guide chains (2A, 2B).
    [0006]
    6. Flight management assembly according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that it comprises two monitoring units (4A, 4B) configured to perform the same monitoring.
    [0007]
    7. A method of monitoring at least one guidance set provided by a flight management assembly (1) according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that it comprises the following successive steps: - a step receiving the guidance instruction to be monitored and a current value of at least one parameter illustrating the current state of the aircraft (AC); a first step of calculating a plurality of positions (P1 to P4) said extrapolated from the aircraft (AC), at least from said guidance setpoint and from said current value of the aircraft (AC), for successive durations given from a current moment; a second step of calculating said extrapolated route deviations (E1-E4) corresponding to deviations of said extrapolated positions (P1 to P4) relative to a reference segment (SR); and an extrapolated route difference analysis step (E1-E4), to determine whether they diverge or converge so as to be able to deduce whether the guidance setpoint is correct or not.
    [0008]
    8. Method according to claim 7, characterized in that the first step of calculating extrapolated positions consists in calculating an extrapolated position (P1 to P4) of the aircraft (AC), using the following data: previously validated aircraft parameter values (AC), illustrating the state of the aircraft (AC); A rolling order representing the guidance instruction to be monitored; the current value of at least one atmospheric parameter; and - an aircraft performance model (AC).
    [0009]
    9. Method according to one of claims 7 and 8, characterized in that said reference segment (SR) is one of the following segments: an active segment of a flight plan followed by the aircraft; an active segment of a trajectory followed by the aircraft.
    [0010]
    10. Method according to any one of claims 7 to 9, characterized in that said successive steps are implemented separately for two guidance instructions received from the two flight management systems (3A, 3B) of the assembly. of flight management (1), if the difference between these two guidance instructions is greater than a predetermined margin.
    [0011]
    11. Aircraft, characterized in that it comprises a flight management assembly (1) according to any one of claims 1 to 6.
    类似技术:
    公开号 | 公开日 | 专利标题
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    同族专利:
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    引用文献:
    公开号 | 申请日 | 公开日 | 申请人 | 专利标题
    FR2901893A1|2006-06-06|2007-12-07|Airbus France Sas|Aircraft`s e.g. airbus A320 type civil transport aircraft, control information e.g. commanded roll, monitoring device, has alerting system generating signal when difference between control information is higher than preset threshold value|
    FR2955192A1|2010-01-12|2011-07-15|Thales Sa|METHOD AND DEVICE FOR VERIFYING THE CONFORMITY OF A TRACK OF AN AIRCRAFT|
    FR2983598A1|2011-12-06|2013-06-07|Airbus Operations Sas|Method for automatic monitoring of flight management assembly of transport aircraft, involves comparing deviations between current position and flight trajectory and control guidance commands on trajectory to deduce incoherence of data|
    EP2648017A1|2012-04-06|2013-10-09|Thales|On-board system for piloting an aircraft, based on a GNSS system, with redundant, dissimilar architecture for high level of integrity|
    FR2970093B1|2011-01-05|2013-12-13|Airbus Operations Sas|METHOD AND DEVICE FOR AUTOMATIC MONITORING OF AIR OPERATIONS REQUIRING GUARANTEE OF NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE AND GUIDANCE|FR3044758B1|2015-12-08|2018-01-12|Airbus Operations|AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MANAGEMENT ASSEMBLY AND METHOD OF MONITORING GUIDING INSTRUCTIONS OF SUCH AN ASSEMBLY.|
    US10877952B2|2016-09-23|2020-12-29|The Boeing Company|Flight management system updates|
    FR3062745B1|2017-02-03|2020-11-20|Airbus Operations Sas|DEVICE AND METHOD FOR SAFE FLIGHT MANAGEMENT OF AN AIRCRAFT.|
    GB2564864B|2017-07-24|2020-02-12|Ge Aviat Systems Ltd|Operator behaviour specific input protection|
    CN113538975B|2021-09-09|2021-12-21|中国商用飞机有限责任公司|RNP AR autonomous monitoring and alarming method and system based on cloud flight tube|
    法律状态:
    2015-12-21| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 2 |
    2016-06-17| PLSC| Publication of the preliminary search report|Effective date: 20160617 |
    2016-12-22| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 3 |
    2017-12-21| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 4 |
    2018-12-19| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 5 |
    2019-12-19| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 6 |
    2020-12-23| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 7 |
    2021-12-24| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 8 |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    FR1462151A|FR3030095B1|2014-12-10|2014-12-10|AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MANAGEMENT UNIT AND PROCESS FOR MONITORING GUIDANCE INSTRUCTIONS FROM SUCH ASSEMBLY.|FR1462151A| FR3030095B1|2014-12-10|2014-12-10|AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MANAGEMENT UNIT AND PROCESS FOR MONITORING GUIDANCE INSTRUCTIONS FROM SUCH ASSEMBLY.|
    US14/965,509| US9741252B2|2014-12-10|2015-12-10|Flight management system and method for monitoring flight guidance instructions|
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