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    • 专利摘要:
    The invention relates to an error detection method of a flight management system coupled to a guidance of an aircraft according to a flight plan, comprising the steps of: -generating (101) a first guidance instruction of reference (CG1COM), -controlling (102) the integrity, of the first reference position (POS1COM), -when the first reference position is not controlled integrates: * Invalidate (103) the first set FMS (E- FMS1) and the associated guidance system, - when the first reference position and the first reference path are controlled integrally: * generating (104) a first control guidance instruction (CG1MON), * generating (105) a first command reference flight (CV1COM) * generate (106) a first control flight command (CV1MON), to * Check (116) the integrity of the first reference guidance setpoint (CG1COM) -when the first guidance setpoint reference (CG1COM) is not integrally controlled: * Invalidate the first set FMS (E-FMS1) and the associated guidance.
    公开号:FR3028975A1
    申请号:FR1402675
    申请日:2014-11-26
    公开日:2016-05-27
    发明作者:Michel Roger；Alexandre Darbois
    申请人:Thales SA；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    [0001] FIELD OF THE INVENTION The present invention generally relates to the detection of an aircraft flight management and guidance system and to a high integrity flight management and guidance system. error in a flight management and guidance system of an aircraft. More particularly, the invention relates to an error detection for obtaining a flight management and guidance system having a high integrity. STATE OF THE ART A flight plan is the detailed description of the route to be followed by an aircraft as part of a planned flight. The flight plan is commonly managed on board civil aircraft by a system designated by the English terminology of "Flight Management System", which will be called FMS thereafter which provides the path to follow available to the staff on board and available to other embedded systems. This FMS system also allows a navigation aid, by displaying information useful to pilots, or by the communication of guidance instructions to an autopilot system. FIG. 1 presents a synthetic diagram illustrating the structure of an FMSO known from the state of the art. A known FMS type system has an HMI human-machine interface comprising for example a keyboard and a display screen, or simply a touch display screen, and at least the following functions, illustrated in a generic manner. by an associated module, described in the ARINC 702 standard: - Navigation LOC performs the optimal location of the aircraft according to geolocation GEOLOC means such as satellite or GPS, VHF radionavigation beacons, inertial units . This module communicates with the above-mentioned geo-localization devices. Thus the module LOC calculates the position (latitude, longitude, altitude) and the speed of the aircraft in the space. - FPLN flight plan captures the geographical elements constituting the skeleton of the route to be followed, such as the points imposed by the departure and arrival procedures, the waypoints, the air routes or airways according to the Anglo-Saxon denomination; - Navigation Database NAVDB contains waypoints, geographical routes, procedures and beacons - PERFDB Performance Database contains aerodynamic performance parameters and aircraft engines; - TRAJ lateral trajectory, built by calculation a continuous trajectory from the points of the flight plan, using the performances of the aircraft and respecting the constraints of confinement (RNP); Predictions PRED, builds an optimized vertical profile on the lateral trajectory and provides predictions in time of passage, remaining fuel quantity, altitude and speed of passage at each point of the flight plan. - Guidance GUID establishes, from the position and the calculated trajectory, guidance instructions to guide the aircraft in the lateral planes, vertical and speed to follow its three-dimensional trajectory, while optimizing its speed. The guidance instructions are transmitted to the autopilot. When the aircraft is equipped with a PA autopilot and is operating, it is he who transforms the guidance instructions into flight controls. - Linking digital data DATALINK communicates with the air traffic control centers, the operational centers on the ground and in the future the other aircraft 13. The flight plan is entered by the pilot, or by data link, from data contained in the navigation database. The pilot then enters the aircraft parameters: mass, flight plan, range of cruise levels, as well as one or a plurality of optimization criteria, such as the Cost Index C1. These inputs allow the 3028975 3 modules TRAJ and PRED to calculate respectively the lateral trajectory and the vertical profile, that is to say the flight profile in terms of altitude and speed, which for example minimizes the optimization criterion. Thus conventionally a flight management system: -calcule a position of the aircraft (LOC) from data from onboard sensors listed above, -determines a trajectory (module TRAJ / PRED) with the databases PERF DB, according to the flight plan defined from the NAV DB, - provides, from the position and the trajectory, guidance instructions (GUID module), ("flight guidance target" in English) to follow this path. In a conventional manner, the calculated aircraft position makes it possible to identify a possible deviation with the trajectory or a change (turn, climb, acceleration, deceleration) to come from the trajectory. From this lateral deviation, GUID will establish a guidance set, in a conventional manner: lateral roll, vertical pitch or slope, speed or thrust level in speed. In the following description, the term "guidance guidance" ("flight guidance target" in English) covers all guidance instructions as defined above. The guidance instructions generated by GUID are transmitted to the autopilot PA. The PA converts the guidance instructions sent to him in flight commands directly applied to the aircraft (Ailerons, Elevators, Engines ...). In the following description, the term "flight control" ("Flight Control" In English) covers all flight controls as defined above. Conventionally, the autopilot generates and sends to the control surfaces of the aircraft the position (angle) for the ailerons and elevators, the thrust for the engines .... In general, an automatic pilot PA can guide an aircraft automatically from instructions provided, either by the pilot ("tactical") through an interface called FCU (AIRBUS) or MCP (BOEING), or by a system type FMS (strategic). We will focus on guidance from the FMS.
    [0002] These flight controls are presented to the pilot via the flight director (Flight Director in English) in the form for example of vertical and lateral bars (which the pilot must try to follow by hand when the autopilot is not available). engaged). Some procedures require a higher level of accuracy on aircraft guidance. For example, towards the end of the cruise phase and a few minutes before starting the descent, the pilot selects via the FMS the approach procedure he will use to land the aircraft on the runway of his destination airport. . The approach procedure for some airports is RNP AR with RNP <0.3 NM. The RNP concept used in the aviation industry is, firstly, in the ability of the aircraft's navigation system to monitor its performance (accuracy) and to inform the pilot whether or not operational requirements (error) are being met during the flight. operation, and secondly in the optimization of approach procedures based on the navigation performance of the aircraft. This concept makes it possible to reduce the spacings between cruising and terminal aircraft, to optimize take-off and landing procedures. It also reduces the minima associated with the approach procedures as well on non-precision approaches as on classical RNAV approaches. An RNP procedure refers to a specific procedure or block of space. For example, an RNP procedure xx means that the navigation systems of the aircraft must be able to calculate the position of the aircraft in a circle of xx Nm, for example an RNP 0.3 in a circle of 0.3 Nm. The RNP concept AR meanwhile allows to add several capacities: - access without specific ground means to land difficult to access because of the relief (eg Juneau, Queenstown) - to approximate the parallel approach procedures trajectories on airports (gain 1 RNP between two procedures (eg San Francisco) - build shorter procedures therefore less fuel consuming (eg Doha) - build procedures to reduce noise pollution (eg Washington, arrival on the Potomac) 3028975 - reduce trajectory dispersion Approach (vs. ATC) - replace approaches requiring ground means through reduced lateral uncertainty and vertical gap monitoring with reference profile (FAA has doubled CAT I approaches with RNP procedures often AR). The notion AR ("Authorization required") implies an obligation to obtain, on a case-by-case basis, the authorization of the local authorities to operate the approach in question with the defined minima. This authorization is issued to each crew on a given aircraft type and for each approach. For these specific approaches, such as RNP AR approaches, it is necessary to implement an avionics architecture that allows to automatically respect the integrity and continuity constraints associated with this type of approach. Continuity, or availability, means that when a failure of the associated FMS system or guidance system (autopilot) is detected, the aircraft is able to switch to another system offering the same level of service. Conventionally, availability is obtained by splitting the FMS and the associated autopilot, as shown in Figure 2. The two chains FMS10 / PA10 and FMS20 / PA20 are autonomous, that is to say independent of one of the other. The FMS10 calculates a position, a trajectory and the GUID module 10 generates a guidance set CG10 as described previously. The guidance instruction CG1 is sent to the autopilot PA10. Similarly, the FMS20 calculates a position, a trajectory and a module GUID20 generates a guidance set CG20 as described above. The guidance instruction CG10 is sent to the autopilot PA10 and the guidance setpoint CG20 is sent to the autopilot PA20. When a fault is detected on the FMS10 + PA10 system, the global system switches to the FMS20 + PA20 system, either automatically or by a pilot action. In order to achieve "autoland" type approaches in which the autopilot is able to land the aircraft, some 3028975 6 automatic pilots have a so-called COM / MON architecture. The part COM (for "command" in English) of the autopilot establishes a setpoint CV10 using the driving laws. In a conventional manner, the autopilot determines the difference between the current attitude (roll, pitch) of the aircraft and the desired set point (pilot selection or command to control the FM) and generates from a control law a CV10 flight control. Furthermore, the COM part of the autopilot transmits the desired setpoint to the MON part (for "monitoring" in English), which implements in the same way as COM the same control law to generate a CV1bis flight command. The integrity of the CV10 flight control is verified by comparison with CV1bis. The COM part of the PA autopilot transmitted its CV10 command to the MON part of the PA and the MON part of the PA transmitted its CV1bis command to the COM part of the AP. PA COM and MON compare their respective commands and invalidate the AP if a representative discrepancy is measured. Each autopilot uses a single guidance instruction from the corresponding FMS. With regard to the problem of system integrity for these specific approaches, for example to be able to follow an RNP xx procedure, the navigation system of the aircraft must be able to calculate the position of the aircraft in a circle of xx Nm, but the autopilot system must also guarantee that it will be able to guide the aircraft with the same precision. The level of precision of the guidance is fixed and known, while the accuracy of the calculation of the position may vary along the flight (different GPS coverage, drifts of inertial units, coverage of radio navigation means more or less dense). Typically, the calculation error of the aircraft position called TSE (Total System Error) represented in FIG. 3 is the quadratic sum of 3 components: The airplane location error or PEE for "Position Estimation Error" in English, The flight path error or PDE for "Path Definition Error" in English, 3028975 7 - The plane guidance error or PSE for "Path steering error" in English. The DesP arrow corresponds to the desired path, the dotted arrow DefP (defined path) corresponds to the calculated trajectory. The FMS flight management system is a contributor to the three components of the TSE as illustrated in FIG. 4. The term "outer loop" for large loop in French corresponds to the servo laws governing the displacement of the center of gravity of the aircraft (instruction high-level input such as heading, altitude, ... and low level setpoint roll output, pitch). The term "inner loop" or small loop in French designates the enslavement laws managing the balance of the aircraft around the center of gravity (low level setpoint such as roll, pitching input, flight control outputs as the angles on the control surfaces). PFD stands for Primary Flight Display, where Flight Director instructions are displayed. But it is the components (position, trajectory and guidance) of this TSE which are one of the sources of error leading to a potentially undetected erroneous calculation of a lateral or vertical guidance. The demand for greater integrity of the TSE appears for RNP AR approaches with RNP <0.3NM. To help respect this integrity, a strong constraint has appeared on the definition of the trajectory which must be "geo" referenced in lateral and vertical, ie the straight and curved segments for the lateral and the slopes for the vertical are fixed by ground ratio and all aircraft will follow exactly the same trajectory. It appears that for the FMS using a good representation of the "earth" (WGS84 compatible), the error related to the construction of the trajectory can be ignored in the formula of the TSE It is therefore appropriate for the FMS system to ensure the integrity required by detecting calculation errors on position and guidance. Current platforms supporting the FMS application do not guarantee an occurrence per flight hour of an erroneous non-detection of less than a few 10-6, typically 5.10-6. However, for RNP type approaches with RNP <0.3 NM for example, a level of integrity called "hazardous", corresponding to a failure occurrence of less than 10-7 per flight hour, is required. An FMS alone can not ensure integrity of this level. The duplication of the FMS used to obtain continuity does not solve this problem, each FMS being individually limited in integrity. A first solution of the state of the art to reach the "hazardous" integrity level is described in US Pat. No. 86,60745. The system architecture comprises two FMSs, a "master" FMS performing "computing" and a second one. FMS "slave" performing the "monitoring" .The commands issued by the master are verified by the slave: If the slave FMS does not consider it to be in the conditions (sequencing of the point of the flight plan to move to the next point), it rejects the guidance instruction causing the passage to independent. The 2 FMS are no longer in DUAL mode and work without exchanging information. Thus the crew knows that the RNP maneuver is problematic, but the difficulty is to know which FMS is valid and which FMS is in default. This architecture makes it possible to maintain the right level of integrity since the guiding error is detected but does not respect the requirement of continuity since the pilot can not continue the operation, because even if he manages to detect the "good" FMS, it does not have the same level of integrity with a single FM. A second state-of-the-art solution for reaching the "hazardous" integrity level is described in document US20120092193 and in FIG. 5. This architecture called "Triplex" implements 3 FMS and two automatic pilots. The principle is that each of the three FMSs, FMS1, FMS2 and FMS3, is capable of independently generating a guidance setpoint. From these three guide setpoint values, a vote is made in the first automatic pilot PA1, that is to say that a value is calculated in the middle, and if a value is too far from the middle value, then it is discarded and the corresponding FMS is invalidated. When an FMS is discarded, there are always two FMSs that can be compared, ensuring the availability and level of integrity required. Thus this architecture allows, in case of failure of a first FMS to continue to guide the aircraft (availability) 3028975 9 along the trajectory with the same level of integrity ("hazardous") during the approach procedure of type RNP xx. A disadvantage of this architecture is that it is expensive to develop, because the vote is complex to develop and requires a significant modification of the autopilot. In addition, many aircraft are equipped with only 2 FMS and do not have the ability to add a third instance at least at a lower cost. On the other hand, they may want to access airports with RNP AR type approaches with RNP <0.3 NM. An object of the invention is to overcome the aforementioned drawbacks, by proposing a simplified avionics architecture (and a method) compatible with a 2 FMS system and capable of automatically guiding an aircraft by guaranteeing a high level of integrity, and the case appropriate by also guaranteeing continuity. DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates to an error detection method of a flight management system coupled to a guidance of an aircraft according to a flight plan, comprising the steps of: -generating a first reference guidance setpoint calculated by a part of a first set FMS called calculation part of the first set FMS from a first reference position and a first reference trajectory calculated by the calculation part of the first set FMS from data from on-board sensors, a first navigation database and a first performance database, -control integrity, by a part of the first set FMS called control part of the first set FMS of the first reference position, from at least part of said data from on-board sensors, when the first reference position is not controlled integrates: * Invalidate the first set FMS and the associated guidance system, 3028975 - when the first reference position is checked integrates: * generate a first control guidance set calculated by the control part of the first set FMS, from of the first reference position and the first reference trajectory, * generate a first reference flight command, by a reference part of a first autopilot, from the first reference guidance reference, * generate a first control flight control, by a control part of the first autopilot, from the first control guidance setpoint, * check the integrity of the first reference guidance setpoint using the first setpoint of control guidance, -when the first reference guidance instruction is not controlled integrates: * invalidate the first together FMS and the associated guidance, -when the first reference guide setpoint is checked integrates: * deliver the first integrated reference guide set. Advantageously, the method further comprises the step consisting in, when the first reference guidance reference is controlled integrates: -check the coherence of the first reference and control flight commands, + when the first reference flight commands and control are inconsistent: invalidate the first autopilot, + when the first reference and control flight commands are consistent: issue the first coherent reference flight command Other features, purposes and advantages of the present invention will be apparent on reading of the detailed description which follows and with reference to the accompanying drawings given by way of non-limiting examples and in which: FIG. 1 already cited shows a synthetic diagram illustrating the structure of an FMS known from the state of the art. , 3028975 11 - Figure 2 already cited illustrates an architecture of the state of the art assures the figure 3 already mentioned illustrates the three components of the error of calculation of the airplane position (TSE), - figure 4 already cited illustrates the contribution of a management system the three-component flight error of the airplane position (TSE) error; FIG. 5, already cited, illustrates an architecture of the state of the art compatible with an RNP approach; FIG. of error detection of a flight management system and guidance of an aircraft according to the invention. FIG. 7 describes an embodiment of the method according to the invention; FIG. 8a describes the method according to the invention further comprising duplicated steps on a second system executing the same method; FIG. 8b describes an embodiment of the method executed by the second system. FIG. 8c describes another embodiment of the method executed by the second system. FIG. 9 describes a system 10 for managing flight and guiding an aircraft according to the invention with high integrity. - Figure 10 describes a more detailed implementation of the system according to the invention. - Figure 11 illustrates a variant of the system 10 for flight management and guidance of a high integrity aircraft according to the invention comprising a second set FMS and a second autopilot. FIG. 12 describes an example of a detailed implementation of the system of FIG. 11. FIG. 13 illustrates another variant of the system according to the invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION FIG. 6 describes a method 100 for error detection of an aircraft flight management and guidance system according to a PV flight plan according to the invention.
    [0003] The method comprises a first step 101 of generating a first reference guide setpoint CG1com calculated in a conventional manner from a first reference position POS1com and a first reference path TRAJ1com. The first reference guide setpoint CG1com is calculated by a part of a first set FMS called E-FMS1, the part being called FMS1-COM calculation part of the first set FMS E-FMS1. POS1com and TRAM com are calculated by FMS1-COM in a conventional way from DATA data from on-board sensors such as GPS receivers, inertial units, signals from VHF radio beacons, a first navigation database NAV1 DB and d. a first performance database PERF1 DB. CG1com is calculated conventionally, the function being provided by a GUID1com module of FMS1-COM. The method 100 according to the invention then comprises a step 102 of checking the integrity of the first reference position POS1com from at least part of said data from on-board sensors. The check is carried out by a part of E-FMS1 called control part F1-MON, independent of the F1-COM part; in other words, carried by a computing platform different from that of FMS1-COM. Typically, the FMSI-MON receives the information from the position sensors (GPS, Inertia) and POS1com position that is transmitted to it by FMS1-MON. FMS1-MON performs a likelihood test by comparing POS1com position with GPS positions, which for example gives three positions forming a triangle in which the aircraft should be located. If the difference is too large the position POS1com is considered invalid. For example, during an RNM procedure <0.3mn, we look at whether POS1com is not more than 0.1 nm away from the GPS position. The position is not recalculated completely by FMS1-MON, it is sought here to verify that the calculation performed by FMS1-COM does not present an anomaly. Thus the control of POS1com makes it possible to detect an error of the type PEE. When the first reference position POS1com is not integrally controlled, the method 100 comprises a step 103 of invalidating the first set FMS E-FMS1 and the associated guidance system PA1. This invalidation consists of disengaging the set FMS1 / PA1. When the first reference position POS1com is controlled integrates the method 100 generates in a step 104 a first control guidance set CGIMON from the first reference position POSlcom controlled and the first reference trajectory TRAJlcom which has been sent to F1 -MON by FMS1-COM, which memorizes it. The calculation of CGIMON is done by the control part F1-MON. The CGIMON guidance setpoint is calculated from a position and trajectory identical to that of FMS1-COM. This calculation is performed by F1-MON independently using the same guidance laws. So CGIMON is calculated independently of CG1 com, which will make it possible to detect possible errors in the calculation of the guidance setpoint used to guide the aircraft. The method 100 also comprises a step 105 of generating a first reference flight control CV1com from the first reference guidance set CG1com. CV1com is conventionally generated by a PA1COM reference part of a first automatic pilot PA1 coupled to the first set FMS E-FMS1. The automatic pilot PA1 has a conventional COM / MON architecture, that is to say that it comprises a reference part PA1-COM and a control part PA1-MON as described in the state of the art. Thus, steps 101 and 105 are conventional steps performed by the FMS1-COM part which performs the functions of a conventional FMS coupled to the COM part of the autopilot PA1. A step 106 generates a first control flight command CV1 MON from the first reference guidance set CG1com, which is sent by E-FMSldirectly to the PA1-MON part of PA1 (see later in the description of the architecture). The generation of CV1 MON is performed by the control part PA1-MON of the first automatic pilot PA1. Thus, the control flight control CV1MON is generated by PA1-MON independently of the flight command CV1com generated by PA1-COM to 3028975 from the same guidance instruction CG1com The autopilot PA1 is used here differently from the state of the art, because in the implementation of the method 100 the PA1-MON part directly receives the guidance instruction CG1com without going through PA1-COM, from which it generates a clean flight control CV1 MON. A step 116 checks the integrity of the first reference guide setpoint CG1 com with the aid of the first control guidance setpoint CGIMON. This control is made possible because the existence of a CG1MON instruction generated by FMS1-MON by the method according to the invention. This check detects a PSE error. Thus the method 100 according to the invention outputs a guidance instruction CG1com integrates. Typically the reference trajectory TRAJlcom calculated by FMS1-COM and transmitted by FMS1-COM to F1-MON which stores it, decomposes into a lateral trajectory TRAJ1L-com and a vertical trajectory TRAJ1v-com. Similarly, a guidance set is broken down into a CGC lateral guidance setpoint and a vertical guidance setpoint CGv. The FMS1-COM calculates a guidance setpoint along the three axes, ie a lateral guidance setpoint, a vertical guidance setpoint and a speed setpoint. According to one variant, the control of the guidance carried out by F1-MON is carried out on the global guidance setpoint, that is to say that the MON part performs a calculation of the lateral setpoint and the vertical setpoint and the setpoint of speed, which will be compared to the lateral, vertical and speed instructions calculated by the COM part. According to another preferred variant, the control of the guidance carried out by F1-MON is carried out by comparison with the lateral guidance setpoint according to the following steps: calculation by F1-MON of a lateral guidance setpoint from the first trajectory lateral reference TRAJ1L-com stored by F1- 3028975 MON and position POS1com (use of the same guidance laws by FMS1-COM and F1-MON), -comparison of the lateral guidance setpoint calculated by F1-MON with the setpoint lateral guidance calculated by FMS1-COM. According to one embodiment, the control of the vertical guidance is not performed by calculation by the F1-MON of a vertical guidance setpoint (to be compared to the vertical setpoint from the FMS1-COM), but is performed according to the following steps: - from TRAJ1v-com and the POS1com position, calculation of the desired altitude and / or speed and / or slope parameters, - comparison of the desired parameters with these same measured parameters (from a part of the data from embedded sensors) corresponding to what the aircraft actually does. For example, if the aircraft is to be at 2500ft passing a point on the flight plan, F1-MON checks that the altitude of the aircraft is equal to 2500ft +/- 50ft as the point passes. Indeed, the vertical control laws are very complex and their duplication on the one hand would increase the complexity of F1-MON and on the other hand would increase the difficulty of setting up the comparators of the guidance instructions. The above variant therefore sticks to the comparison of the aforementioned parameters, making it possible to verify that the aircraft is following the desired vertical trajectory. When the first reference guidance instruction CG1com is not controlled integrates the method 100 invalidates in 103 the first set FMS E-FMS1 and the associated guidance, which makes it possible to prevent the aircraft from taking an erroneous trajectory, consequence of wrong guidance. The integrity check of CG1com invalidates the first set E-FMS1 as soon as an anomaly is detected. The method thus allows a control of the position and the guidance setpoint to achieve a high level of integrity "hazardous" on the calculation of CG1com. This increase in integrity is achieved by a single FMS with simple modifications of the FMS, the increase in integrity being carried entirely by the MON part.
    [0004] When the first reference guide setpoint CG1com is integrally controlled, the method 100 according to the invention outputs a first reference guide setpoint CG1com with an integrity level improved by the integrity check steps 102 and 116. Thus the method 100 delivers a first reference guide flight control integrates CG1com, a first reference flight control CV1com and a first control flight control CV1moN generated from the first CG1com reference flight guide command integrated. Improved integrity is not achieved at the cost of a significant increase in computing resources. The method according to the invention is implemented in real time and permanently, thus the steps 105, 106 and 116 are performed almost simultaneously. In a preferred embodiment, the step 116 for checking the integrity of the first reference guide setpoint CG1com consists in comparing it with the first control guidance setpoint CGIMON by means of a guidance criterion. This comparison follows the same logic as that made by a COM / MON type autopilot. Just like this PA COM / MON comparison, FMS-COM and F-MON can exchange their CG1com and CG1 MON. Preferably, the comparison is made in the FMS1-MON part, the FMS1-COM part transmitting the CG1com instruction for this purpose. Thus in this preferred mode FMS1-COM transmits CG1 com to FMS1-MON (for comparison), and to PA1-COM and PA1 MON (for guidance). Preferably, the method 100 further comprises a step 107 consisting in checking the consistency of the first CV1com reference flight and CVI MON control commands, as shown in FIG. 7. Typically this verification is performed using the conventional autopilot comparator. . When the CV1com CV1moN flight controls are inconsistent, the method 100 includes a step 108 which invalidates the first automatic pilot PA1 (that is, the disengage, "disengage" or "disconnect" in English). From an operational point of view, the method 100 delivers a guidance setpoint CG1com (step 101) which is sent on the PA1 to generate a command flight CV1 com according to the steps 105, 106, 107 and 109 and 110. The control to using the steps 104 and 116 is performed in parallel. Thus, when an uncompromising CG1com instruction is sent to the PA1 which generates a CV1com, in a very short time the string E-FMS / PA is disabled. When the CV1com and CV1moN flight controls are consistent, the method outputs a consistent CV1com flight control. Preferably, the method further comprises a step 109 of displaying the first coherent reference flight command CV1com. Preferably, this display is made on the PFD (Primary Flight Display) in the form of flight director bars. The pilot thus benefits from a CV1com flight control whose integrity has been reinforced by the verification step 107, which uses the CV1 MON command calculated independently as explained above. The method 100 thus makes it possible to obtain a flight control of the aircraft having a high integrity compatible with the "hazardous" level required for the RNP xx procedures, for example RNP 0.3. The pilot may well if he wishes to fly the aircraft with the handle with the help of the CV1com display. In a preferred variant, the method 100 further comprises a step 110 (also illustrated in FIG. 7) of triggering the automatic guidance of the aircraft with the first reference flight control CV1com (when the first reference flight commands CV1com and CV1moN control are consistent). According to one option the triggering is automatic, according to another option the triggering is carried out by a pilot action, such as pressing a button. The aircraft thus has a high integrity flight control enabling automatic guidance of the aircraft compatible with an RNP AR procedure with RNP <0.3 NM.
    [0005] Preferably, the method 100 according to the invention further comprises a step 111 consisting in informing the pilot of the invalidation of the first set FMS E-FMS1 and of the autopilot, when the first reference position or the first guidance setpoint CG1com reference is not controlled integrity, and a step 112 of informing the pilot of the invalidation of the first autopilot PA1, when the first CV1com reference flight and CV1moN control commands are inconsistent. Preferably, the information is operated by display on a display, typically the FCU control panel (FCU for Flight Control Unit). Preferably, the display of steps 111 and 112 is common. The driver can also be informed by an audio signal, a warning light. The availability is obtained by duplicating the method 100 according to a preferred variant as illustrated in FIGS. 8a, 8b and 8c. The method 100 according to this preferred variant delivers a second reference control command integrates CG2com, a second reference flight control CV2com and a second control flight control CV2MON, obtained simultaneously continuously according to the steps of a method 200 corresponding to the process steps 100 of Figure 6 duplicated, using a second set FMS E-FMS2 and a second autopilot PA2. FIG. 8b describes the method 200 making it possible to generate the second reference guidance command CG2com integrates. The method 200 comprises: a step 101 'consisting in generating a second reference guidance setpoint CG2com, calculated by a part of a second set FMS EFMS2 called the calculation part of the second one, appears to be FMS FMS2-COM, starting from a second reference position POS2com and a second reference trajectory TRAJ2com calculated by the calculation part FMS2-COM of the second set FMS from data from on-board sensors DATA, a second navigation database NAV2 DB) and a second performance database PERF2 DB, a step 102 'of checking the integrity, by a part of the second set FMS E-FMS2 called the control part of the second set FMS F2-MON, of the second reference position POS2com from at least part of said data from on-board sensors. When the second reference position is not controlled integrates the method 200 comprises a step 103 'of invalidating the second set FMS E-FMS2 and the associated guidance system and preferably a step 111' of informing the driver of the invalidation. When the second reference position is tightly controlled, the method 200 comprises: a step 104 'of generating a second control guidance setpoint CG2MON, calculated by the control part of the second set FMS F2-MON, from the second reference position POS2com and the first reference trajectory TRAJ2com -a step 105 'of generating a second reference flight control CV2com, by a reference portion PA2-COM of a second autopilot PA2, from the second reference guide setpoint CG2com, a step 106 'of generating a second control flight control CV2MON, by a control part PA2-MON of the second automatic pilot PA2, from the first reference guidance setpoint CG2COM a step 116 'checks the integrity of the second reference guidance directive CG2com with the aid of the second reference guide of CG2MON control. When the second reference guidance instruction CG2com is not controlled integrates the method 200 invalid in 103 'the second set FMS E-FMS2 and the associated guidance. When the second reference guide setpoint CG2com is integrally controlled, the method 200 outputs the first set of reference reference integrates CG2com.
    [0006] Preferably, the method 100 according to this preferred variant integrates the method 200 further comprising, as illustrated in FIG. 8c: a step 107 'of checking the coherence of the second CV2com reference flight and CV2MON control commands. When the second CV2com reference flight and CV2MON control commands are inconsistent, the method 200 further comprises a step 108 'of invalidating the second autopilot PA2 and preferably a step 112' of informing the pilot of the invalidation. When the second CV2com reference flight and CV2MON control commands are consistent, the method 200 outputs consistent CV2com. From an operational point of view, the method 200 delivers a guidance set CG2com (step 101 ') which is sent on the PA2 to generate a CV2com flight command according to the steps 105', 106 ', 107' and then 113 '. The control using steps 104 'and 116' is performed in parallel. Thus, when an uncompromising CG2com instruction is sent to the PA2 which generates a CV2com, in a very short time the string E-FMS2 / PA2 is disabled. Thus according to this preferred variant, the method 100 simultaneously delivers a first CV1com flight control and a second CV2com flight control. Indeed, to ensure continuity, it is appropriate that the process 200 is implemented parallel, simultaneously and continuously, to the method of FIGS. 6 or 7, so as to be able to have a CG2com control command integrated and preferentially a CV2com flight control consistent and high integrity level in case of invalidation of the first set E-FMS1 or the first autopilot PA1. FIG. 8a describes the method 100 according to the preferred variant of the invention consisting of delivering the second coherent CV2com reference flight control, generated and verified simultaneously in a continuous manner according to the same duplicated steps (method 200) of the method according to the invention , when the first flight management system or the first autopilot is invalid.
    [0007] Preferably, as illustrated in FIG. 8a, the method 100 further comprises a step 113 of displaying the second reference flight control CV2com, when the first flight management system or the first autopilot is invalid. Preferably, as illustrated in FIG. 8a, the method 100 further comprises a step 114 consisting in triggering the automatic guidance of the aircraft with the second reference flight control CV2coM. According to one option, the triggering step 114 is operated manually by the pilot. According to another option, the triggering step 114 is operated automatically without intervention of the pilot. Thus the method 100 according to the preferred variant, implementing in parallel a method 200 on a second set FMS coupled to a second autopilot, on the one hand to guide the aircraft with an initial flight management and guidance system ( E-FMS1 and PA1) with a high level of integrity and on the other hand, if a failure of this initial system is detected, to switch to another flight management and guidance system (E -FMS2 and PA2) and to guide the aircraft with this other system with the same level of integrity as that of the initial system. Advantageously, step 102 of checking the integrity of the first POS1com reference position comprises a sub-step of comparing the reference position POS1com with an estimated position POSl is calculated by the control part of the first FMS FMS1-MON, from at least a portion of the DATA data from on-board sensors, typically GPS data, using a position criterion. The position criterion is, for example, that the computed position POS1com is located at a distance less than a certain threshold (function of the desired accuracy in an RNPxx approach) of the estimated position POS1est. For example, less than 0.2 NM for an RNP approach 0.3 . From an operational point of view, one option is for the aircraft to fly cruising using the two sets FMS E-FMS1 and E-FMS2 in a conventional manner, i.e. with a simplified method implementing steps 100, 105, 106, 107 (108, 112) 109 and 110, or a guidance with CG1 com and CV1com without implementing the controls operated by the parts F1-MON and F2-MON. Then, when the aircraft is in the approach phase according to a constrained corridor procedure requiring an RNP AR procedure, the complete method 100 is activated, implementing steps 102, 103 (111), 104, 116, and tilting. on the second system and steps 113 and 114 in case of invalidation or inconsistency of the first set E-FMS1. Thus the complete method 100 is implemented only during the RNP approach phase requiring a level of integrity of "hazardous" type. The RNP procedure is geo-referenced, which means that the flight plan and the trajectory have the same definition, and preferentially we try to validate that the extraction of the procedure from the database is correct. Thus, advantageously, the method according to the invention, when the aircraft is in the RNP approach phase, comprises a preliminary step of validation of the flight plan of: -selecting the procedure RNP AR (pilot action) -insert the procedure in the flight plan. This insertion is done by FMS1-COM and FMS2-COM. - compare the inserted flight plans. If the result of the comparison is incorrect, the pilot is alerted to restart a new insertion, to deactivate the incorrect FMS and to stop stealing the procedure. If the result of the comparison is correct, each FMS-COM calculates the trajectory and provides this trajectory to its F-MON which stores it ... For an optimal automatic guidance and a fast switchover in the event of a problem on the first channel, the first and second automatic pilots PA1 and PA2 are simultaneously engaged before starting the process 100.
    [0008] The method is intended to be executed by the overall flight management system of the aircraft, that is to say the flight management system comprising the first and second sets E-FMS1 and E-FMS2, the two automatic pilots PA1 and PA2, and a platform making it possible to operate, if necessary, a triggering of the simplified method, and a triggering of the complete method according to the invention in parallel on the two sets and associated guidance during an RNP procedure, and as switching from one to the other in case of invalidation of the first. In another aspect, the invention relates to a system 10 for managing the flight and guidance of a high integrity aircraft illustrated in FIG. 9 and comprising a first set FMS E-FMS1 and a first autopilot PA1 coupled to E-FMS1. The first set FMS E-FMS1 comprises a calculation part FMS1-COM and a control part F1-MON. The FMS1-COM part comprises: a first NAV1 DB navigation database and a first PERF1 DB performance database, a first LOCI position calculation module configured to calculate a first POS1com reference position from data. from embedded sensors and databases, a first trajectory calculation module TRAJ / PRED1 configured to calculate a first trajectory trajectory TRAJlcom from data from onboard sensors and databases, a first module reference guide GUID1com configured to generate a first reference guidance set CGicom, from the first reference position POS1com and the first reference trajectory TRAJ1com. The FMS1-COM part corresponds to a conventional architecture of FMS as described in the state of the art. The F1-MON control part is configured to check the integrity of the first POS1com reference position from at least part of the data from on-board sensors (functionality illustrated by the LOCMONI module) The LOCMONI module is not a module of the same type as LOCI and TRAJ / PRED1 and its role is not to recalculate completely POS1com but to verify it, that is to say to detect a calculation error. It therefore requires a much lower computing power. For example the POS1com position is transmitted to LOCMONI by FMS1-COM and this position is compared with data DATA, typically GPS and / or inertial, from on-board sensors, directly received by F1-MON. If the POS1com position differs from the position estimated from these sensors, the position POS1com is considered unhealthy. The control part F1-MON is also configured to store the reference trajectory TRAJ1com transmitted by FMS1-COM (a function illustrated by the memory module MEM-Tra) and to generate a first control command set CGIMON (illustrated functionality by the first control guiding module GUID1MON), calculated from the first reference position POS1com controlled and the first reference trajectory TRAJlcom stored. The first control guidance instruction CG1MON is generated by F1-MON independently of CG1 com, using control laws identical to those used by FMS1-COM to calculate CG1com. The control part F1-MON is also configured (module GUID1moN to check the integrity of the first reference guide setpoint CG1com.For this the first reference guide setpoint CG1com is transmitted by FMS1-COM to F1-MON. integrity check typically consists in comparing the first reference guidance setpoint CG1com calculated by the first reference guide module GUID1com with the first control guidance setpoint CGIMON calculated by the first control guide module GUID1 MON, at the using a guidance criterion If there is too much difference between the two setpoints, the CG1com instruction is declared as non-integral Operationally, during an RNP xx approach, the current CG1com setpoint will cause the aircraft to exit of the corridor is disabled and the coupled autopilot PA1 is disengaged According to a preferred variant, only a lateral guidance setpoint is calculated by the GUID1moN module, the control of the vertical guidance is performed by a comparison of parameters, as described above.
    [0009] 3028975 Thus the part F1-MON (module GUIDIMON) makes it possible to detect a computation error on the level of CG1com, and constitutes a means of verification of the integrity of CG1com, which makes it possible to be compatible of the level "hazardous". In addition, the integrity has been increased independently of the FMS1-COM "basic" initial flight management system by adding an external F1-MON monitoring system. F1-MON does not include complex functions and does not require significant computing resources, resources that it must be able to share with another application and on an existing platform. An additional advantage is to use the capacity of the F-MON for developing a guidance instruction. Indeed on loss of 2 FMS due to a circuit failure for example, by connecting the F-MON to the Autopilot, it is possible, in this degraded configuration, to maintain the guidance of the aircraft from the trajectory memorized by the F-MON. The CG1com setpoint generated by FMS1-COM and controlled by F1-MON is then sent to the first autopilot PA1. PA1 comprises a PA1-COM reference part and a PA1-MON control part, according to a conventional architecture. But the system 10 according to the invention is configured to send CG1com to PA1-COM and PA1-MON in parallel independently. PA1-COM is configured to generate a first reference flight control CV1com from the first reference guidance set CGI com, for example conventionally. PA1-MON is configured to generate a first control flight control CV1 MON, from the first reference guide setpoint CG1com. The CV1com and CV1 MON commands are thus generated by both parts of the autopilot independently. PA1 is further configured to check the consistency of the first CV1com reference flight and CV1 MON control commands, typically with its comparator. Thus the CV1com flight control is firstly generated from a high integrity instruction, and secondly verified independently by PA1-MON. The system 10 thus has the ability to fly the aircraft with a CV1com flight control system with a highly improved level of integrity, highly compatible with a "hazardous" level. This level of integrity has been achieved without substantially modifying the classical architecture COM / MON autopilot. The flight management and guidance system 10 is further configured to invalidate the first set FMS E-FMS1 when the first reference position or the first reference trajectory or the first guidance instruction is not integrally controlled, and for invalidating the first autopilot PA1 when the first CV1com reference flight and CV1 MON control commands are inconsistent. Preferably the flight management and guidance system 10 further comprises at least one DISP display module configured to display the first CV1com reference flight commands when the first set FMS and the first autopilot are valid. Advantageously, the flight management and guidance system 10 according to the invention is configured to trigger the automatic guidance of the aircraft with the first reference flight control CV1com, when the first flight management system and the first autopilot are valid. The triggering can take place automatically or on the pilot's action. FIG. 10 describes a more detailed implementation of the system according to the invention highlighting the 2 verification levels of FMS1-COM operated by F1-MON. According to a variant illustrated in FIG. 11, the flight management and guidance system 10 for a high integrity aircraft according to the invention also comprises a second set FMS E-FMS2 and a second autopilot PA2 respectively corresponding to a duplication of the first set FMS E-FMS1 and the first autopilot PA1. The system 10 is configured to generate a first CV1com reference flight command and a second CV2com reference flight control simultaneously and continuously. The CV1com flight command is issued from the chain consisting of E-FMS1 coupled to the PA1, and the CV2com flight command is issued from the chain consisting of E-FMS2 coupled to the PA2.
    [0010] Preferably, the system is configured to trigger the automatic guidance with the first reference flight control CV1com when the first flight management system and the first autopilot are valid, and to trigger the automatic guidance of the aircraft with the second CV2com reference flight control when the first flight management system and the first autopilot are invalid. In this way, the continuity of the guidance is ensured in case of failure of the first chain E-FMS1 / PA1. Thus the double requirement of high integrity and continuity is fulfilled with only two complete FMS, FMS1-COM and FMS2-COM, verified by respectively the external chain F1-MON and F2-MON. This architecture is called DUAL COM / MON, because it consists of two independent channels, each being verified by a MON part. This solution is less expensive than the Triplex solution because it avoids a third FMS, additional calculator which on the other hand increases the weight of the aircraft and its power consumption. In addition this architecture leads to a low level of modification of the autopilot. Advantageously, the DISP display module is further configured to display the second CV2com reference flight control when the first flight management system and the first autopilot are invalid. From an operational point of view, the system 10 according to the variant of FIG. 11 complies with the requirements of the RNP AR approaches for aircraft having only two FMSs. The "hazardous" integrity and availability constraints are met automatically. During the RNP approach, the two chains operate in parallel, the second being ready at any moment to take over in case of failure detected on the first. FIG. 12 describes an exemplary detailed implementation of the system 10 of FIG. 11. Only the modules that are useful for understanding the invention are represented.
    [0011] DATA are redundant GPS1, GPS2 data, ADIRS stands for Air Data Inertial Reference System, HPATH stands for Horizontal Path, FG stands for Flight Guidance and FD for Flight Director. According to another variant described in FIG. 13, the CGcom setpoint (1 or 2) is sent only to the PA-COM part (1 or 2), and it is the CGMON setpoint (1 or 2) that is sent to the PA part. -MON (1 or 2) autopilot. According to another aspect the invention relates to a computer program product comprising code instructions for performing the steps of the method according to the invention. The method can be implemented from hardware and / or software elements. The method may be available as a computer program product on a computer readable medium. The method can be implemented on a system that can use one or more dedicated electronic circuits or a general purpose circuit. The technique of the method according to the invention can be realized on a reprogrammable calculation machine (a processor or a microcontroller for example) executing a program comprising a sequence of instructions, or on a dedicated computing machine (for example a set of logical gates such as an FPGA or an ASIC, or any other hardware module). The different modules of the system according to the invention can be implemented on the same processor or on the same circuit, or distributed over several processors or several circuits. The modules of the system according to the invention consist of calculation means including a processor. The reference to a computer program that, when executed, performs any of the functions described above, is not limited to an application program running on a single host computer. On the contrary, the terms computer program and software are used herein in a general sense to refer to any type of computer code (for example, application software, firmware, microcode, or any other form of computer code). computer instruction) that can be used to program one or more processors to implement aspects of the techniques described herein.
    权利要求:
    Claims (22)
    [0001]
    REVENDICATIONS1. A method (100) for error detection of a flight management system coupled to a guidance of an aircraft according to a flight plan, comprising the steps of -generating (101) a first reference guidage instruction (CG1com ), calculated by a part of a first set FMS (E-FMS1) called the calculation part of the first set FMS (FMS1-COM), from a first reference position (POS1com) and a first trajectory of 10 reference (TRAJ1com) calculated by the calculation part of the first set FMS (FMS1-COM) from data from onboard sensors (DATA), a first navigation database (NAV1 DB) and a first performance database (PERF1 DB), -controlling (102) the integrity, by a part of the first set FMS (E15 FMS1) called the control part of the first set FMS (F1-MON), of the first reference position (POS1com), from at least part of said data from c on-board aircraft -when the first reference position is not controlled integrates: 20 * Invalidate (103) the first FMS set (E-FMS1) and the associated guidance system, - when the first reference position is checked integrates: generating (104) a first control guidance setpoint (CG1 moN), calculated by the control part of the first set FMS (F1-MON), from the first reference position (POS1com) and the first trajectory reference (TRAJ1com), * generating (105) a first reference flight command (CV1com), by a reference part (PA1-COM) of a first autopilot 30 (PA1), from the first instruction of reference guidance (CG1com), * generating (106) a first control flight control (CV1MON), by a control part (PA1-MON) of the first autopilot (PA1), from the first guidance command of control, (CG1 * .ye), 3028975 31 * control (116) l integrity of the first reference guidance setpoint (CG1 oom) using the first control guidance setpoint (CG1moN), -when the first reference guidance setpoint (CG1 oom) is not controlled integrates * to invalidate the first set FMS (E-FMS1) and the associated guidance, -when the first reference guidance setpoint (CG1 oom) is checked integrates: * to deliver the first set of reference guide integrates (CG1oom)
    [0002]
    2. Method (100) according to claim 1 further comprising the step of, when the first reference guidance setpoint (CG1c0M) is controlled integrates: -check (107) the coherence of the first reference flight commands (CV1o0m) ) and control (CV1 MON), + when the first reference flight (CV1oom) and control (CV1moN) commands are inconsistent: invalidate (108) the first autopilot (PA1)., + when the first flight commands reference (CV100m) and control (CV1moN) are consistent: deliver the first coherent reference flight command (CV1o0m)
    [0003]
    The method (100) of claim 2 further comprising the etam consisting of, when the first reference flight (CV1oom) and control (CV1moN) commands are consistent: displaying (109) the first flight control of reference (CV100m)
    [0004]
    The method of claim 3 further comprising a step of triggering (110) the automatic guidance of the aircraft with the first reference flight control (CV1com), when the first reference flight commands (CV1 oom) and control (CVIMON) are consistent. 3028975 32
    [0005]
    5. Method according to one of the preceding claims further comprising a step of, when the first reference position or the first reference guidance set (CG1 com) is not controlled integrity, or when the first flight controls reference (CV1c00 and control (CV1moN) are inconsistent, inform (111,112) a pilot of the invalidation of the first flight management system and the first autopilot.
    [0006]
    6. Method according to one of the preceding claims wherein the checking of the integrity of the first reference guidance set (CG1 cm) is to compare it with the first control guidance setpoint (CGIMON) using a guidance criterion.
    [0007]
    7. Method according to one of the preceding claims wherein the step 15 of checking the integrity of the first reference position (POS1com) comprises the step of: -comparing the reference position (POS1com) with a position estimated (POSIMON) calculated by the control part of the first FMS (FMS1-MON) from at least part of said data from on-board sensors 20 using a position criterion.
    [0008]
    8. Method (100) according to one of the preceding claims further providing a second coherent reference flight control (CV2com) obtained simultaneously continuously according to the same duplicate steps (200) of the method according to claim 2 using a second FMS set (E-FMS2) and a second autopilot (PA2).
    [0009]
    The method (100) of claim 8 further comprising a step (113) of displaying the second reference flight control (CV2com) when the first flight management system or the first autopilot is invalid.
    [0010]
    The method (100) of claims 8 or 9 further comprising a step (114) of initiating automatic guidance of the aircraft 35 with the second reference flight control (CV2com), when the first flight control system (CV2com) flight management or the first autopilot is invalid.
    [0011]
    The method (100) of claim 10 wherein the triggering step (114) is manually operated by the pilot.
    [0012]
    The method (100) of claim 10 wherein the triggering step (114) is performed automatically without pilot intervention.
    [0013]
    13. Method according to one of claims 8 to 12 wherein the aircraft is in the approach phase according to a forced corridor procedure (RNP AR).
    [0014]
    14. The method of claim 13 comprising a preliminary step of validating the flight plan.
    [0015]
    15. The method of claim 8 wherein the first and second autopilots are simultaneously engaged prior to starting the process. 20
    [0016]
    A system (10) for flight management and guidance of a high integrity aircraft comprising: a first FMS assembly (E-FMS1) comprising: a part called the calculation part of the first FMS set (FMS1-COM ) comprising: a first navigation database (NAV1 DB) and a first performance database (PERF1 DB), a first position calculation module (LOCI) configured to calculate a first reference position (POS1com) from data from onboard sensors and databases, ..a first trajectory calculation module (TRAJ / PRED1) configured to calculate a first reference trajectory (TRAJlcom) from data from onboard sensors and databases, a first reference guide module (GUID1com) configured to generate a first reference guidance setpoint (CG1com), from the first reference position (POS1com) and the first reference guide (CG1com); reference path (TRAJ1com) 5 * a part called the control part of the first set FMS (F1-MON) configured to ..control the integrity of the first reference position (POS1com) from at least a part of data from onboard sensors, 10 ..store the first reference path (TRAJ1com) transmitted by the calculation part of the first set FMS (FMS1-COM), ..generate a first control guidance setpoint (CG1MON) calculated from of the first reference position (POS1com) and the first reference trajectory (TRAJ1com) stored, 15 'check the integrity of the first reference guidance setpoint (CG1com) with the first control guidance setpoint (CG1moN). said flight management and guidance system (10) further comprising: a first autopilot (PA1) comprising: a reference section (PA1-COM) configured to generate a first reference flight command (CV1com) at from the first reference guidance setpoint (CG1com), * a control part (PA1-MON) configured to generate a first control flight control (CV1MON), from the first reference guidance setpoint (CG1com) ), said first autopilot (PA1) being further configured to check the consistency of the first reference flight control (CV1com) and control (CV1MON), 30 -said flight management and guidance system (10) being further configured to disable the first set FMS (E-FMS1) and the first associated autopilot (PA1), when the first reference position is not controlled integrates or when the reference flight controls 35 (CV1 com) and control (CV1MON) are inconsistent. 3028975 35
    [0017]
    The flight management and guidance system (10) of claim 16 further comprising at least one display module (DISP) configured to display the first reference flight commands (CV1com) when the first set FMS and the first autopilot are valid.
    [0018]
    The flight management and guidance system (10) according to claim 16 or 17 configured to trigger the automatic guidance of the aircraft with the first reference flight control (CV1com), when the first flight management system and the first autopilot are valid.
    [0019]
    The high integrity aircraft flight management and guidance system (10) according to one of claims 16 to 18 further comprising a second FMS assembly (E-FMS2) and a second autopilot (PA2). respectively corresponding to a duplication of the first set FMS (E-FMS1) and the first autopilot (PA1), the system being configured to generate a first reference flight control (CV1com) and a second reference flight control (CV2com ) simultaneously and continuously. 20
    [0020]
    The system (10) of claim 19 further configured to trigger the automatic guidance with the first reference flight control (CV1com) when the first flight management system and the first autopilot are valid, and to trigger the guidance. 25 the aircraft with the second de-reference flight control (CV2com) when the first flight management system and the first autopilot are invalid.
    [0021]
    The system (10) of claim 20 wherein the display module (DISP) is further configured to display the second reference flight control (CV2com) when the first flight management system and the first autopilot are invalid. 3028975 36
    [0022]
    22. A computer program product, said computer program comprising code instructions for performing the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 15.
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    同族专利:
    公开号 | 公开日
    CN105632246A|2016-06-01|
    FR3028975B1|2016-12-02|
    US20160147224A1|2016-05-26|
    CN105632246B|2020-06-26|
    US9575489B2|2017-02-21|
    CA2913551A1|2016-05-26|
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    法律状态:
    2015-10-23| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 2 |
    2016-05-27| PLSC| Publication of the preliminary search report|Effective date: 20160527 |
    2016-10-28| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 3 |
    2017-10-26| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 4 |
    2018-10-26| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 5 |
    2019-10-29| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 6 |
    2020-10-26| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 7 |
    2021-11-09| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 8 |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    FR1402675A|FR3028975B1|2014-11-26|2014-11-26|ERROR DETECTION METHOD OF AN AIRCRAFT FLIGHT AND GUIDANCE SYSTEM AND HIGH INTEGRITY FLIGHT AND GUIDE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM|FR1402675A| FR3028975B1|2014-11-26|2014-11-26|ERROR DETECTION METHOD OF AN AIRCRAFT FLIGHT AND GUIDANCE SYSTEM AND HIGH INTEGRITY FLIGHT AND GUIDE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM|
    US14/951,420| US9575489B2|2014-11-26|2015-11-24|Method of error detection of an aircraft flight management and guidance system and high-integrity flight management and guidance system|
    CN201510845586.6A| CN105632246B|2014-11-26|2015-11-26|Aircraft flight management and guidance system and error detection method thereof|
    CA2913551A| CA2913551A1|2014-11-26|2015-11-26|Method of error detection of an aircraft flight management and guidance system and high-integrity flight management and guidance system|
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