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    • 专利摘要:
    The positioning signals broadcast by GNSS constellations on civilian frequencies are likely to be counterfeited, while the use of authentic signals becomes increasingly critical for some applications. According to the invention, the authentication of GNSS signals is carried out by coherence analysis between the measurements of characteristic parameters of the signals (direction of arrival, amplitude, phase) and their state model, said state model taking into account an emulation by software and electronic means of displacements of the phase center of the antenna and / or the main lobe of the radiation pattern. Advantageously, these displacements are generated by a pseudo-random code. Advantageously, the consistency analysis between measurements and models is a multicriteria analysis, the combination of criteria being chosen according to a quality indicator of the reception and / or a presupposed localization.
    公开号:FR3025611A1
    申请号:FR1458337
    申请日:2014-09-05
    公开日:2016-03-11
    发明作者:Lionel Ries
    申请人:Centre National dEtudes Spatiales CNES；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    [0001] TECHNICAL FIELD OF AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNALS RECEIVED FROM A SATELLITE CONSTELLATION FIELD OF THE INVENTION [0001] The present invention applies to signals originating in particular from satellites of a navigation system. More specifically, the invention aims to detect counterfeit signals and / or correct them.
    [0002] BACKGROUND [0002] Increasingly critical applications use information provided by the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) constellations, either the position signal itself or its time reference, or both. . This is the case of military applications, but subject to being exploited by authorities authorized by the government controlling this constellation, they may use protected frequencies whose signal has a guarantee of authenticity. Applications in the civilian sector can not generally obtain such authorizations, even when they are very critical, as is the case with air navigation, maritime navigation or civil security. They must therefore use open signals whose frequencies, waveforms and codes are known. These signals can therefore be counterfeited without undue difficulty in malignant intent. The validation of the authenticity of the navigation signal is therefore a question that is itself critical. Spoofing techniques (or "spoofing" in the most used Anglo-American terminology) have been developed, as well as anti-deception ("anti-spoofing"). A first category of conventional methods of anti-spoofing includes those of correlating the location of the receiver information from the GNSS signal with information from an external source deemed not counterfeit (terrain mapping, altitude, inertial sensors , path traveled compared to an authenticated reference, etc ...). However, these methods are not sufficient, in isolation, for the level of certification required for certain aircraft-based applications such as the Terrain Collision Avoidance System, which assumes the integrity of each component of the system. [0004] Anti-spoofing methods of a second category have therefore been developed to authenticate a GNSS signal on the basis of its intrinsic characteristics perceived by the receiver, in particular the radiation patterns of its antenna. The purpose of these methods is to be able to eliminate the assumption that all received signals would come from a single direction (ie the source of the counterfeit signal), which is done by mechanically generating variations of the radiation pattern into moving his phase center. This state of the art, which will be detailed later, includes in particular the international patent application published under the number W02014 / 047378. The mechanical generation devices of the antenna diversity are bulky and complex to drive and process, which requires a large computing capacity. They are therefore unlikely to be integrated with consumer receivers, for example smart phones. [0005] However, the integrity constraints will rapidly spread to terminals of this type if, as seems to be the case, their use for semi-critical applications, such as transport or electronic payment, grows. In land transport, geo-location and guidance by GNSS system are spread quickly, to the general public: navigation aid of the personal vehicle, booking cycles or cars for rental, followed in 15 time The user can use either a specific GNSS signal processing module (for example installed in his personal vehicle), or his smartphone which integrates GNSS geo-location functions, and or by identification of the cell of the radiocommunication network or Wifi terminal which serves it, and mapping functions. In terms of electronic payment, the use of a QRCode type mark or an NFC type chip (Near Field Communications) already allows a payment on sight but without contact with a smart phone. The timestamping and the certification of the place of the transaction are natural means of authentication of these payments, on the condition of being able to guarantee the integrity of this timestamp and this location, which is not possible today. . SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION [0008] The object of the invention is to overcome this limitation of the prior art. To this end, it provides a system for anti-deception of GNSS signals comprising compact means of remote and secure control of the radiation pattern of the antenna of the receiver. For this purpose, the invention discloses a method for authenticating GNSS signals received by a reception module, said method characterized in that it comprises at least: a step of generating control sequences emulating a scan and / or a movement of a reception cone by at least one antenna for receiving the GNSS signals; a step of transmitting to a raw RF signal authentication module 3 output of said at least one GNSS signal receiving antenna; a raw data acquisition step representative of said GNSS signals, said raw data selected from a group of data representative of a phase angle, a phase center, an amplitude and a carrier power; a step of transmitting to the authentication module of a message containing said raw data representative of said GNSS signals; a step of production by the authentication module of a GNSS signal authentication certificate by a processing receiving as input at least said raw RF signals output from said at least one receiving antenna and said raw data representative of said signals GNSS. [0009] Advantageously, the control sequences are generated by a pseudo-random code produced by an encryption key. [0010] Advantageously, the message transmitted to the authentication module also comprises receiver location data PVT. Advantageously, the scanning of a reception cone comprises a generation of attenuated signals in at least one direction of said cone. [0012] Advantageously, the movement of a reception cone of said signal comprises a switching between at least two antennas. [0013] Advantageously, the raw RF signals output from said at least one GNSS signal receiving antenna are digitized before transmission to the authentication module. Advantageously, the digitized RF signals output from the digitizing step are encrypted by at least a first part of the encryption key, before transmission to the authentication module. Advantageously, said raw data representative of the GNSS signals are encrypted by at least a second portion of said encryption key, before transmission to the authentication module. [0016] Advantageously, the production of the GNSS signal authentication certificate is performed only if it satisfies a TC1 consistency test of phase measurements and / or differences in phase measurements between axis signals 3025611 4 satellites different with a model deduces control sequences emulating the scanning and / or moving a cone of reception. Advantageously, the production of the GNSS signal authentication certificate is performed only if it satisfies a TC2 consistency test of the arrival directions measured by the reception module with expected directions determined by a model derived from the control sequences emulating the scanning and / or moving of a reception cone. [0018] Advantageously, the GNSS signal authentication certificate is produced only if it satisfies a TC3 coherence test of the powers, amplitudes and / or signal-to-noise ratios measured according to arrival directions measured by the receiver module with expected powers, amplitudes and / or signal-to-noise ratios in expected directions, these parameters being determined by a model derived from the control sequences emulating the scanning and / or moving of a reception cone. [0019] Advantageously, the GNSS signal authentication certificate is produced only if a coherence test TC is satisfied, said test being defined by a linear combination of the TC1, TC2 and TC3 coherence tests, the weights of said tests. TC1, TC2 and TC3 are defined according to a GNSS signal reception quality indicator and / or a reception module position estimated by a different locating means of the GNSS signals. [0020] Advantageously, the means of localization different from the GNSS signals is chosen from the group comprising a field map, an inertial unit, an identification of a radiocommunication network cell or a Wifi terminal. Advantageously, when there is a presence index of non-authentic GNSS signals, the inter-channel correlation peaks are analyzed on the raw signals at the output of said at least one receiving antenna. [0022] The invention also discloses a GNSS signal authentication system, characterized in that it comprises at least: a plurality of antenna modules, each antenna module comprising at least one antenna; a plurality of GNSS signal receiving modules, each receiving module configured to output raw data representative of said GNSS signals, said raw data selected from a group of data representative of a phase angle, a center phase, amplitude and carrier power; at least one processing module, said at least one processing module configured to generate at least one control sequence emulating a scan and / or a displacement of a cone of reception of said signals by the antenna module; at least one authentication module, said authentication module configured to produce a GNSS signal authentication certificate by a processing receiving as input at least raw RF signals at the output of said at least one receiving antenna and said raw data Representative of said GNSS signals. Advantageously, the system of the invention comprises a server, said server providing the management of the encryption keys and at least part of the functions of the at least one authentication module. [0024] Advantageously, at least a part of the plurality of antenna modules and reception modules is located in automotive land vehicles. [0025] Advantageously, the system of the invention comprises a plurality of processing modules, at least a part of the plurality of reception modules being located in the vicinity of electronic payment terminals. The invention also discloses a GNSS signal receiving antenna housing, characterized in that it comprises: at least one antenna configured to receive GNSS signals; a set of electronic components configured to emulate scanning and / or moving a cone of reception of said at least one antenna under the control of a sequence generated by a pseudo-random code at the digital input of said housing; an analog-to-digital converter 30 configured to provide at least one analog or digital output with sampling of the raw RF signals. [0027] The invention also discloses GNSS signal authentication equipment, characterized in that it comprises: A) a digital input configured to receive encryption keys; B) acquisition means at a predetermined sampling frequency of: i) raw RF signals output from at least one GNSS signal receiving antenna, ii) raw data representative of said GNSS signals, said raw data selected in a data group 3025611 6 representative of a phase angle, a phase center, an amplitude and a carrier power; C) a processing circuit configured to: i) generate a pseudo-random code from an encryption key, said code itself being configured to generate a control sequence emulating a scan and / or a move of a reception cone by said at least one GNSS signal receiving antenna; ii) acquiring or producing a variable state model at the output of the acquisition means, said state model adapted to the control sequence; iii) perform at least one coherence test between at least part of the measured data output of the acquisition means and their state model. Another advantage of the invention is to allow the distribution of the algorithmic processes of validation of the absence of decoy on different processors, which makes it possible to apply the method to terminals having only the capacities of a standard smart phone. Another advantage of the invention is that it can be implemented in several types of physical architecture, which facilitates use in a large number of usage scenarios. Another advantage of the invention, in some of its embodiments, is to use all or part of the same pseudo-random sequence generated by one or more encryption keys to control the radiation pattern of the antenna and to protect data exchanges between the various elements of the system. Another advantage of the invention is to allow to combine different analysis techniques to adapt the authentication procedures to the evolution of use scenarios and decoy techniques. Another advantage of the invention is to promote a centralization of data on the decoy to improve the detection algorithms. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS The invention will be better understood and its various features and advantages will emerge from the description of its different embodiments and from the following figures appended to the present application: FIGS. 1 a and 1 b respectively represent a non-decoy antenna diversity receiver GNSS and a decoy receiver of the same type in prior art embodiments; FIG. 2 represents an architecture diagram of a GNSS receiver including a decoy detection function, according to the prior art; FIG. 3 represents a functional architecture diagram for implementing the invention, in several of its embodiments; FIGS. 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d, 4e and 4f represent different variants of physical architecture, according to several embodiments of the invention; FIG. 5 represents a schematic diagram of the main treatments, according to several embodiments of the invention; FIGS. 6a and 6b illustrate an antenna processing mode implemented to implement the invention, according to several of its embodiments; FIG. 7 illustrates the temporal scheduling of the calculations of the processing module and of the authentication module, according to several embodiments of the invention; FIG. 8 illustrates an exemplary implementation of the invention in a land vehicle; FIG. 9 represents a flowchart of the processes for implementing the invention in the example of FIG. 8; FIG. 10 illustrates an exemplary implementation of the invention for authenticating a payment transaction; FIG. 11 represents a flowchart of the processes for implementing the invention in the example of FIG. 10.
    [0003] DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION [0034] FIGS. 1a and 1b respectively represent a non-decoy antenna diversity receiver GNSS and a decoy receiver of the same type in embodiments of the prior art. In order to authenticate a GNSS signal, it is assumed that the counterfeit GNSS signals are emitted in a single direction in space, which may correspond to a real satellite axis, while the signals authentic originate from a plurality of satellites. Indeed, an attack simulating signals coming from several satellite axes is very complex to mount, particularly because of the need to precisely align the phases of the signals of the satellite axes. To detect this uniqueness of the transmission direction, the evolution over time of the phases of the carrier waves supposed to come from several satellite axes is analyzed, as explained in comment in FIG. 2 below. Such a system of the prior art is described in particular by the publication Psiaki et al., "GNSS 35 Spoofing Detection Using High-Frequency Antenna Motion and Carrier-Phase Data", Institute of Navigation, GNSS, 2013, and in the patent application. W02014 / 047378 already cited. In the case of undelayed signals of FIG. 1a, three satellites, j-1, j and j + 1 (111a, 112a, 113a) send their signals to an antenna 121a which has a special configuration: it can for example be mounted on a surface of a building or vehicle 124a, via an articulated chain 123a.
    [0004] This special configuration is intended to cause movements of the phase center of the antenna. The antenna must be protected by a radome to prevent its detection. A reference (xa, ya, za) has an origin 123a, from which the measurements and calculations will be made. The signals received by the antenna 121a are processed by the processing module 131a. In FIG. 1b, a lure 111b transmits counterfeit signals intended to reproduce those of several satellites at sight. But all the signals come from a single direction 141b, even if the lure introduced in the calculations of the PVT by the receiver 131a false values of the directions of the axes of the satellites 111a, 112a and 113a. In the case of FIG. 1b, the signals supposed to come from satellites are superimposed, whereas in the case of FIG. 1a, the signals coming from the satellite axes are identified as different. [0039] FIG. 2 represents an architecture diagram of a GNSS receiver 20 including a decoy detection function, according to the prior art. The processing device compares the measurements of the phases taken from the GNSS receiver to their modeling taking into account the movements of the antenna caused by its articulated chain. According to the state of the art, the receiver of the GNSS signals is modified to process the signals received by the articulated antenna 121a. An additional phase loop 220 extracts a transform of the carrier phase, the transformation being aimed at suppressing the attenuation of the effects of the movements of the antenna which results from the signal processing performed in a standard receiver. The signals are then sampled by a sampler, for example of the median filter type, 230, and supplied to a hypothesis test function 240 which also receives as input the receiver's navigation solution and the attitude parameters of the receiver. Antenna parameters measured by a sensor 210. The attitude parameters make it possible to calculate the phase model resulting from the combination of the movements of the antenna with those expected from the satellite axes, and to compare the values calculated from this model with the receiver measurements. The test 240 of the hypothesis of authenticity of the signals can use various methods of data analysis, for example a Monte-Carlo simulation. According to the prior art, it is therefore necessary to have a specific articulated antenna which executes movements of relatively high frequency, preferably provided with a radome and a specially modified receiver. This creates constraints incompatible with a large public use. The invention overcomes these limitations. [0044] FIG. 3 represents a functional architecture diagram for implementing the invention, in several of its embodiments. In some embodiments of the invention, the GNSS signal authentication system 10 uses four separate functional bricks, some of which may, however, be grouped together in one and the same physical element: an antenna module, 310; A GNSS signal receiving module 320; A processing module, 330; An authentication module, 340. The notion of module is used in the description to signify a grouping of basic sub-functions in the same functional entity. Depending on the applications, the optimization of the physical architecture of the system may involve a modification of the distribution of certain sub-functions between the modules. The antenna module, 310, may include one or more antennas, organized where appropriate in a network to create the diversity of radiation for performing subsequent authentication processing. It will also preferably comprise electronic components for driving the antenna array 25 and generating an electronic scanning inducing either a displacement of the phase center of the antenna or of the antenna array, or a spatial scan of a radiation cone. either the two movements, simultaneously or successively. Alternatively, the scan generation components may be located in the processing module. Those skilled in the art microwave waves can choose and configure the components to perform electronic scanning functions for a given antenna array. Antennas of this type have already been made for receiving GNSS signals. By way of example, it is possible, for example, to calculate a radiation pattern of an antenna array consisting of radiating elements in number ranging from four arranged in squares to several tens arranged in a structure, for example central symmetry. Variable weights are assigned by a calculation code to the different radiating elements, which makes it possible to orient the directions of the lobes of the diagram in a desired axis. See, for example, Rao et al., "GPS / GNSS Antennas (GNSS Technology and Applications)", November 2012, ISBN-13: 978-1596931503, Chapter 2.7, pages 147-152). Patch antennas may also be used whose radiating elements are surrounded by a parasitic ring structure whose effect on the surface waves is modified by switching components distributed over the ring structure. See, for example, Rojas, "Multilayer Reconfigurable GPS Antennas and Platform Effects" Ohio State University, September 2007. Alternatively, it is sufficient to switch between two or more antennas, for example patch antennas, distributed according to a geometry 10 to move the phase center of the radiation pattern. A scan of the order of ten Hz allows authentication in near real time while a slower scan will allow verification every minute for example. A robust solution can be based on a scan at slower times determined in a random manner ranging from minute to hour, in particular as a function of external parameter such as location. The GNSS signal receiving module 320 may be a single-frequency or multi-frequency receiver. It may be provided with Precise Point Positioning (PPP) functions, augmented signal reception functions (eg EGNOS - European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service - or WAAS - Wide Area Augmentation System). But it can also be a simple receiver built into a smartphone. However, it is necessary that raw data from the receiver can be taken, including data representative of the phase or amplitude of the carriers, or even raw radio frequency (RF) signals, and, if necessary, send them some data. signals of an auxiliary external antenna, and therefore that the inputs / outputs of its GNSS chip are accessible to embedded applications on the smartphone. In a variant, the reception module 320 may be a module external to the receiver for which it is desired to authenticate the received signal. A parallel receive module receiving the same signals at substantially the same location will behave like the target receiver. The processing module 330 carries out the control of the electronic scanning by the antenna 310. In a preferred embodiment of the invention, this control is achieved by a pseudo-random code generated by an encryption key. The processing module 35 comprises at least one processor and one memory. The processing module can also execute all or part of the signal analysis algorithms preparatory to GNSS signal authentication. It is equipped with communication capabilities, on the one hand with the antenna, on the other hand with the processing module 3025611 11, and finally with the authentication module 340. The processing module can be connected to the antenna module and to the a reception module by wired links or by Bluetooth or Wifi links. It can be connected to the authentication module by a cellular link, when this authentication module is remote. The processing module 330 can also be connected by a communication bus on a local network, using either a standard protocol of the Ethernet, RS432 or CAN type, or a specific protocol, to the antenna 310 and to the reception module 320. if the different objects 310, 320 and 330 are located in the same place, including a vehicle cabin, or a shopping center, as detailed below in the use scenario examples of the invention. The authentication module 340 performs in particular the supply to the processing module of the encryption keys and the validation procedure for the authentication of the GNSS signals from the data received from the processing module 330. It can also execute any or part of the algorithms for analyzing the signals preparatory to the authentication of the GNSS signals. It can also store the history of validations in memory, in order to identify the decoys that have already been identified during previous validation procedures. The authentication module may, in whole or in part, be located on a remote server. It is then operated by a trusted third party who distributes the encryption keys to subscribed users. Users can be registered by the operator by a procedure that reserves the distribution of encryption keys only to users with trusted attributes that are validated during the registration process. The operator normally manages the repudiation of keys that have been used in conditions that do not comply with specified usage rules, or that are subject to the subscription of a fixed-term subscription. The operator can also be a positioning service provider, either a GNSS network operator or a value-added services operator in addition to positioning services, in particular an operator of a particular application, such as transport services. or payment services, according to usage scenarios described later in the description. In some configurations of implementation of the invention, the antenna module 310, the receiving module 320 and the processing module 330 may be included in the same housing. In other configurations, the antenna module 310 and the processing module may be placed in the same housing as described below. Figures 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d, 4e and 4f represent different physical architecture variants, according to several embodiments of the invention. FIG. 4a shows an external accessory 420a, to a GNSS signal receiving module 410a, which may include the elements of the antenna module 310 and the processing module 330. The GNSS signal receiving module 410a can for example be a smart phone, which has been specially configured to implement the invention. The GNSS signal receiving module may be coupled to a positioning module using other means, such as an identification of the antenna of a cellular radio network or the terminal of a Wifi network in the vicinity of which is the device. Hybridization with cartographic localization and / or inertial sensors makes it possible to take the relay of the GNSS signals in case of masking. These hybrid localization devices are known by the acronym LBS (Location Based System). In the variant of FIG. 4b, the accessory 420a comprises functions 420b for driving the antenna of the GNSS signal receiver 410a. The hardware elements (electronic components) and software (encryption key generation software for creating the pseudorandom codes for varying the ANO antenna radiation pattern, 430b) which are necessary to drive the movement and the orientation of the antenna are then implanted in the functions ECD (Elements of Diagram Configuration), 420b of the accessory. In the variant of Figure 4c, the distribution of functions is identical to that shown in Figure 4b, but the accessory is shaped to be used as 410c shell 410a smart phone, which facilitates its use. In the variant of FIG. 4d, the distribution of functions is identical to that of FIGS. 4b and 4c, but the shell 410c is replaced by a dongle 410d, connected below the smart phone 410a. In the variant of FIG. 4e, the accessory 420a comprises an antenna AN1, 420e, and the system is configured to control the radiation patterns of the antennas 430b and 420e. In the variant of FIG. 4f, the accessory 420a comprises a plurality of antennas AN1, 420e, AN2, 421f, ANk, 422f, and the system is configured to control the radiation patterns of the antennas 430b, 420e, 421f, 422f. In the variants of FIGS. 4e and 4f, the accessory 420a and the GNSS signal receiver 410a may be located at a distance, and connected by a local or remote network, as in the variants of FIGS. 8 and 10. , which are detailed later in the description. Thus, a wide variety of configurations is possible to implement the invention, according to the use scenarios. FIG. 5 represents a schematic diagram of the main treatments, according to several embodiments of the invention. The processing module 330 comprises a function 510 for generating a pseudo-random code PRN1 + 2 from an encryption key. The encryption key can be acquired from a server at a predetermined periodicity. It can itself be generated by a pair of keys, symmetrical and asymmetric so that its transmission to the processing module is secured according to the rules of art. The pseudo-random code is used to generate (511, 512) a radiation pattern of antennas ANO, AN1, AN2, ANk, variable. The variation of the antenna radiation pattern may relate to either the phase center, or the orientation of the receiving lobes, or both at the same time as described above. The reception module 320 comprises a function 520 for extracting at a sampling frequency k phases Cpik and / or amplitudes Ak of the carriers acquired from the satellite axes j in visibility and, optionally, calculating the point PVT ( Position, Speed, Time). The processing module extracts, 530, from the encryption key a subset PRN1 of the encryption key, said subset being used to encrypt the data (13k / Ak for transmission to the authentication module 340. The module The receiver may simultaneously or sequentially transmit other elements such as the identifier of the receiver, the PVT, sensor data such as accelerometers, magnetometers, infrared sensors, distance sensors or intrusion detectors. The processing module 330 also comprises a function 540 for extracting GNSS raw RF signals at the output of the antennas.Optionally, the RF signals pass through a repeater RF signals (Raw) ) 30 are expressed by the following generic formula: Raw RF (j, p radiation patterns) = Raw RF (j, antenna 0) + contribution (DoAj, variation p radiation patterns) In which - j is the index of a satellite axis: the radiation patterns p are those generated by the pseudo-random code; the antenna 0 is a fixed reference antenna; - DoAj is the direction of arrival of the signal of the satellite axis j. The RF signals (Raw) can be digitized in a CAN digital converter, 540. Optionally, they are then encrypted by another part of the extracted encryption key, 550, of the main encryption key. The encrypted RF (Raw) signals are then transmitted to the authentication module 5 to be processed in combination with the data (13k / Ak for authentication of the GNSS signal in a step 570. The comparison can be carried out by a combination means as further detailed in comments to Figures 6a and 6b. [0069] At the output of step 570, the signal is authenticated or declared counterfeit.
    [0005] A validation signal may be sent to the processing module, or to applications that use the signal. It may also be broadcast to other subscriber user terminals located in the vicinity of the first terminal on which a decoy has been detected. Different learning based on temporal and / or geographical learning patterns can also be combined with the validation algorithms. Figures 6a and 6b illustrate an antenna processing mode implemented to achieve the invention, according to several of its embodiments. The two figures illustrate a case of implementation of the invention in which a single antenna, for example ANO, is used. In FIG. 6a, the maximum amplitude of the signal on the main lobe 630a of the antenna radiation pattern is at a time t1 in the axis 640a of the satellite 610. In FIG. 6b, the amplitude maximum the signal on the main lobe 630b of the antenna radiation pattern is at a time t2 in the axis 640b 25 of the satellite 620. The rotation of the axis of the main lobe of the antenna is controlled by electronic circuits of the diode and / or ferrite type, as indicated above. The characteristic values of the components are chosen according to the orientations of the main and secondary lobes to be emulated according to rules known to those skilled in the art according to the work of Basrur Rama Rao cited above, and the bibliographical references. These components are controlled by a microcontroller and a digital analog converter, the microcontroller itself being driven by pseudo-random code sequences PRN1 + 2 generated by the encryption key. This may itself consist of a symmetrical key and an asymmetric key 35. The principle can be extended to a network with two or more antennas, such as those illustrated in Figures 4e and 4f. In this case, each antenna in the network has a radiation pattern that has a main lobe at a given time. If one switches from one antenna to another either according to a predetermined frequency, or according to a sequence driven by a part of the pseudo-random code, the phase center of the received signal is displaced at the same time. allows to analyze the coherence of the phase jumps, with the reception model which would be coherent with the configuration of the satellite axes at a given instant. It is also possible to control the pseudo-random code generation of reception amplitude zeros. The combination of the main lobe orientation variations, phase center displacements and zeros makes it possible to provide several types of verifications, which can themselves be combined, for example: the verification of the coherence of the measurements of phases and phase differences between antennas with an "expected" estimate thereof developed from other information, possibly a priori; The verification of the coherence of the arrival direction measured with an "expected" estimate thereof, drawn up from other information, possibly a priori; - Verification of the consistency of jumps and differences in signal amplitude, or value of the signal-to-noise ratio, with an "expected" estimate thereof, developed from other information, possibly a priori; The verification of the coherence of the amplitude of the signal, or the value of the signal-to-noise ratio, with an "expected" estimate thereof, elaborated from other information, possibly a priori. As an illustration, the analysis of the similarity of the variations of phase measurements from different satellites caused by the modifications of the parameters of the reception antenna or antennas (phase center for example) considers two hypotheses, that of counterfeit signals and that of non-counterfeit signals, compares them and chooses the most likely assumption (TC1 Consistency Test). An analysis of the coherence between the arrival directions measured by the processing module and the expected arrival directions developed from information from the signals received by the GNSS signal receiving module can be carried out. compared to external information from motion or attitude sensors, a 3D environment model, or a coarse position estimate from other means than GNSS, or, in the context of a GNSS model, from satellite positions extrapolated using force model (orbital model), etc. (TC2 consistency test). It is also possible to perform an analysis of the similarity between the powers of reception of the signals, following the insertion of strong attenuations (or zeros) in the radiation pattern of the or. This attenuation is repeated regularly for different arrival directions to cover all the coverage of interest (for example 4-r steradians). This is done in the form of a sounding of the receiving environment (TC3 coherence test): direct or indirect measurement of the power of the received signals in a direction of arrival. This analysis considers two hypotheses, that of counterfeit signals and that of non-counterfeit signals, compares them and selects the most probable hypothesis. In an exemplary embodiment, if all the signals are attenuated simultaneously, it is likely that they come from the same direction of arrival, so there may be suspicion of fraud. If only a limited and changing subset of signals is attenuated, the signals probably come from different directions and there may be a higher level of confidence in the received signals. In another exemplary embodiment: the quality of the signal (s) coming from a satellite present in the "attenuated" direction of interest will be affected with regard to the quality of the signals of the other satellites, the quality of reception may be deduced. indicators provided in the receiver or developed from these signals or measures: measurement noise, signal-to-noise ratio, etc. If the signal is affected by a deterioration of quality at the expected times, it comes at first from the right direction of arrival and could hardly be counterfeited. On the other hand, if the signals related to the directions of interest do not exhibit quality degradation at the expected times, they may be suspected of counterfeiting. It is also possible to perform an analysis of the coherence between the powers of reception of the signals in a particular direction and the expected powers, elaborated on the basis of information coming from the signals received by the GNSS signal processing module, and from external information such as motion sensors, attitude, 3D environment model, coarse position other than GNSS (telephone network cell, Wifi cell), satellite position extrapolated using force model (orbital model) , antenna pattern of the user receiver, etc. It is possible to combine all or part of these analyzes with, for example, a weighting coefficient, the selected analyzes depending on the reception environment, defined, for example, a reception quality indicator drawn up from the GNSS signals received. by the user (signal-to-noise ratio, estimator based on the outputs of the correlators, etc.) or developed from the estimated position of the user and a 3D mapping to know if a particular satellite is masked , assigned multiple paths, etc. According to the details of their implementation, the various analyzes defined above can be performed: - on the raw RF data developed by the GNSS signal processing module, which has the advantage of simplicity (use existing functions of the GNSS receiver of the equipment) but the disadvantage of limiting the algorithms because they must accommodate the operation of the existing receiver 5. or a capture of given duration of the raw RF signals digitized at the digital analog conversion output ("snapshot" of the RF signal from the antenna module). This solution makes it possible to implement signal processing and fraud detection algorithms that are totally optimized for the intended application, but requires an ad hoc interface to recover the signal capture and a high computing power to carry out the processing. . According to a variant based on the capture of the digitized RF signals, the capture or at least the transmission of the signals is carried out at intervals spaced in time to reduce the communication bandwidth. Also the processing can be carried out for all or part of the deferred time if the authentication is used primarily as a check element a posteriori. According to a variant, in the event of suspicion of fraud, it is possible to estimate authentic position and fraudulent positions and to identify the authentic position. This algorithm is executed directly on a capture of the digital analog conversion output signals. This algorithm analyzes the correlation functions produced during the different successive instantiations of the antenna diagram and / or its phase center, and in particular their difference, to identify the correlation peak that corresponds to the authentic signals and to discard the peak correlation corresponding to the fraudulent signals. According to the use cases, whether they are operated on raw measurements from the user receiver or algorithms specific to the detection of fraud and operated on a capture of digitized signals, the algorithms described above, which fall within the functions of the authentication module, can be operated on a processor embedded on the user equipment or on the remote server. The above analyzes are advantageously aided by the use of information external to the GNSS reception stages, such as, for example, external motion sensors, attitude, maps and assistance information originating from a network or from a network. a server, etc. Thanks to the implementation of the invention, it is possible to differentiate the desired phenomena from the natural effects of the multiple paths because, on the one hand, the multitude of satellites (the signals of all the satellites are not simultaneously affected 302 5 6 1 1 18 by the lure), and secondly, because of the correlation with the pseudo-random sequence which drives the modifications of the properties of the antenna or antennas. [0087] FIG. 7 illustrates the temporal scheduling of the calculations of the processing module and of the authentication module, according to several embodiments of the invention. It also illustrates a difference with the state of the art commented above that allows to apply the invention to receivers whose hardware configuration has not been significantly changed. Reference 710 illustrates the frequency with which the processing module performs the processes 530 through 560 and the authentication module performs the authentication processing 570, i.e. the frequency with which the RF data Raw are taken, the data cDk / Ak are sent to the server and the authentication procedure is performed. This frequency can be chosen by the operator or by the service user. The operator can vary this frequency according to the times and geographical areas to which the service is provided. The user may also wish that his position and / or his speed and / or his time (PVT) is authenticated only when he performs certain transactions, but not continuously, for reasons of confidentiality and / or economy of energy. A frequency of the order of a minute will appear to be sufficient for the majority of applications. Its PVT can be determined jointly, or independently as conventionally done on unauthenticated consumer receivers. [0090] Reference numeral 720 illustrates the sampling frequency of the PVT calculation. This frequency is normally of the order of a few seconds. The reference numeral 730 illustrates the frequency differences of the two calculations, the authentication calculation 710 and the position calculation 720. Between two authentication calculations, the GNSS signals received by the processing module are considered authentic. Thus, according to the invention, unlike the embodiments of the prior art already cited, the authentication processes and the processing of the PVT are decoupled. Indeed, in the prior art, the low-level components of the GNSS signal receiver must be modified and they will operate at the clock frequency of the receiver. FIG. 8 illustrates an exemplary implementation of the invention in a land vehicle. The vehicle 800 is equipped with a signal processing module GNSS 820. It is also equipped with one or more cables / antenna boxes 811, 812, 813, 3025611 19 814. A driver or a passenger can have a smart phone 830 that can perform some of the functions of the processing module 330 of the system according to the invention. In this embodiment of the invention, an external box 840 is added to the receiver to perform the antenna control and picking functions of the Raw RF signals, (13k / Ak under the control of the smartphone 830. Preferably The case 840 performs the function of a repeater of the raw RF signals PRN1 + 2, PRN1, PRN2 are generated in the smart phone PRN1 + 2 is sent to the box 840 to control the antennas. 820 by the 840 are encrypted with 10 and then sent to the smart phone The data analysis functions can be divided between the 840, the 820 phone and the server. exchanges with the server According to a simplified variant, a single common PRN code is used: PRN1 + 2 = PRN1 = PRN 2. The PVT can also be determined at the telephone. For compatibility with old equipment, the 840 can perform some of the processing and provide either the raw RF signals or the raw RF data in the Receiver Independent Exchange Format (RINEX) format, or the receiver-independent exchange format. example as well as a PVT. Thus the old equipment will be able to receive the PVT, for example in the NMEA format (National 20 Marine Electronics Association, or National Association of Manufacturers of Electronic Equipment for the Navy). FIG. 9 represents a flowchart of the processes for implementing the invention in the example of FIG. 8. During an initialization step 910, the configuration parameters of the one or more antennas 811, 812, 813, 814 (positions, attitudes, electromagnetic characteristics), receiving unit 820 and outer housing 840 are supplied to the system. A radiation pattern is deduced when the vehicle is stationary and, when the vehicle is moving, it is possible to estimate a trajectory of the vehicle (6 axes) during a step 920. A function of Transfer known to those skilled in the art allows to deduce radiation patterns at rest and the estimated trajectory of moving radiation patterns. The combination of this transfer function with the pseudo-random code PRN1 + 2 sent to the box 840 by the smart phone 830 during a step 940 allows the modified radiation patterns to be obtained. In parallel, as described in commentary to Fig. 5, Raw and (13k / Ak) data are retrieved in steps 950, 970. Raw RF data can be digitized Raw RF data and data ( 13k / Ak, sensors and / or PVTs can be encrypted with keys PRN1 and PRN2 during steps 960, 980, especially if most of the functions of the authentication module are located on a remote server. transmitted to the authentication module 5 (step 990), which carries out the authentication procedure (9A0) comprising the consistency checks between the raw data, the measured phase data and the data of the sensors and / or PVT data, in comparison with the values provided by the modelizations of these data, as indicated above As indicated above, the RINEX format is preferably used for the raw RF data (raw). format, as is the practice in the case of GNSS hybridization with accelerometers, magnetometers, pedometers, gyroscopes, or even altimeters and barometers, According to a simplified variant, a single common PRN code is used: PRN1 + 2 = PRN1 = PRN2. For compatibility reasons, with some equipment, the sensor data or the PVT can be transmitted without encryption by PRN2. FIG. 10 illustrates an exemplary implementation of the invention for authenticating a payment transaction. The GNSS signals include a precise time reference which is used more and more for timestamping transactions. Payment transactions therefore constitute a use scenario of the invention. In a store 1010 of a shopping center shown in the figure, an Electronic Payment Terminal (TPE) 1020 is connected to a box 1030, which comprises a GNSS signal receiver 320 also configured to implement a part functions, including antenna control, and if necessary analysis of a portion of the data, the processing module 330. One or more antennas 1040, which may for example be located on the roof of the mall, are connected to the housing 1030 by a connection 1050, which may be a part of the shopping center's local network. A customer of the store, subscriber of the authentication service and equipped with a smartphone 1060, who shows up to make a purchase that he intends to settle by electronic means, makes his purchase, then his payment. The payment can be made by credit card, by transaction using his mobile phone (via a communication Near Field 35 Communication - NFC - or via a QRCode issued by an application of his smartphone). The transaction is then authenticated by a signal generated by the TPE, which simultaneously acquires GPS location and time stamp data. The GPS signal is authenticated by the method of the invention, using the functions distributed between the housing assembly 1030, antenna 1040, smart phone 1060 and GNSS signal authentication service operator server (not shown). on the face). Alternatively, the authentication may rely on authentication data previously determined by the customer's telephone so as to ensure that the phone has progressively moved closer to the payment terminal and that it is not just appeared next to the terminal while it was several tens or hundreds of kilometers in the minutes or hours before. Alternatively, data from antifracting sensors or even accelerometers and / or magnetometers at the antennas 1040 and / or the box 1030 are used instead of or in addition to the PVT to determine any damage to the integrity of the antenna. this part of the system (tampering). FIG. 11 represents a flowchart of the processes for implementing the invention in the example of FIG. 10. During an initialization step 1110, the configuration parameters of the one or more antennas 1140 (positions, attitudes, electromagnetic characteristics), the receiving module and the processing module contained in the outer casing 1130 are supplied to the system. [00102] A radiation diagram is deduced therefrom when the antenna device 1140 is not excited by the housing 1130. As in the usage scenario commented on with reference to FIG. 9, the combination of this radiation diagram in the absence of excitation with the pseudo-random code PRN1,2 sent to the case 1130 by the smart phone 1160 during a step 1120 allows to obtain the modified radiation patterns. In parallel, as described in commentary to Fig. 5, the raw and (13k / Ak RF signals are read out in steps 1140, 1160. The raw RF signals can be digitized.The raw RF signals and (13k / Ak) The sensors, and / or PVTs may be encrypted with PRN1 and PRN2 keys during steps 1150, 1170. These encrypted data are transmitted to the authentication module (step 1180), which performs the authentication procedure 1190 including the consistency checks between the raw data, the measured phase data and the sensor data and / or PVT, in comparison with the values provided by the modelizations of these data. [00103] The payment transaction can thus be definitively authenticated. [00104] The examples described above are only illustrative of some of the embodiments of the invention and in no way limit the scope of the invention which is defined by the claims which follow.
    权利要求:
    Claims (20)
    [0001]
    REVENDICATIONS1. A method of authenticating GNSS signals received by a receiving module (320), said method characterized in that it comprises at least: - A step of generating (510, 512, 513) control sequences emulating a scan and / or a displacement of a reception cone by at least one GNSS signal receiving antenna; A step of transmitting (550) to a module for authentication of raw RF signals at the output of said at least one antenna for receiving the GNSS signals; A step of acquisition (520) of raw data representative of said GNSS signals, said raw data chosen from a group of data representative of a phase angle, a phase center, an amplitude and a power carrier; A step of transmitting to the authentication module a message containing said raw data representative of said GNSS signals; A production step (570) by the authentication module of a GNSS signal authentication certificate by a processing receiving as input at least said raw RF signals at the output of said at least one receiving antenna and said raw data; representative of said GNSS signals.
    [0002]
    2. The method of claim 1, wherein the control sequences are generated by a pseudo-random code produced by an encryption key.
    [0003]
    3. Method according to one of claims 1 to 2, wherein the message transmitted to the authentication module further comprises receiver location data PVT.
    [0004]
    4. Method according to one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the scan 35 of a reception cone comprises a generation of attenuated signals in at least one direction of said cone. 3025611 23
    [0005]
    5. Method according to one of claims 1 to 4, wherein the displacement of a cone for receiving said signal comprises a switch between at least two antennas. 5
    [0006]
    6. Method according to one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the raw RF signals output from said at least one GNSS signal receiving antenna are digitized before transmission to the authentication module.
    [0007]
    The method of claim 6, wherein the digitized RF signals output from the scanning step are encrypted by at least a first portion of the encryption key prior to transmission to the authentication module.
    [0008]
    8. Method according to one of claims 1 to 7, wherein said raw data representative of the GNSS signals are encrypted by at least a second part of said encryption key, before transmission to the authentication module.
    [0009]
    9. Method according to one of claims 1 to 8, wherein the production of the GNSS signal authentication certificate is performed only if it satisfies a TC1 consistency test of phase measurements and / or differences in measurements. of phases between signals of different satellite axes with a model deduced from the control sequences emulating the scanning and / or the displacement of a reception cone. 25
    [0010]
    10. Method according to one of claims 1 to 8, wherein the production of the GNSS signal authentication certificate is performed only if it satisfies a TC2 consistency test of the incoming directions measured by the receiving module with model-determined expected directions deduced from the control sequences emulating the scanning and / or moving of a reception cone.
    [0011]
    11. Method according to one of claims 1 to 8, wherein the production of the GNSS signal authentication certificate is performed only if it satisfies a TC3 consistency test of the powers, amplitudes and / or signal-to-noise ratios. measured according to directions of arrival measured by the receiving module with powers, amplitudes and / or signal-to-noise ratios expected in expected directions, these parameters being determined by a model derived from the 24 control sequences emulating the scanning and / or moving a cone of reception.
    [0012]
    The method according to one of claims 1 to 8, wherein the production of the GNSS signal authentication certificate is performed only if a coherence test TC is satisfied, said test being defined by a linear combination of the coherence tests. TC1, TC2 and TC3, the weights of said tests TC1, TC2 and TC3 being defined according to a GNSS signal reception quality indicator and / or an estimated receiver module position by a different locating means GNSS signals.
    [0013]
    13. The method of claim 12, wherein the means for locating different GNSS signals is selected from the group consisting of a field map, an inertial unit, an identification of a radio network cell or a Wifi terminal.
    [0014]
    14. Method according to one of claims 1 to 13, wherein, when there is a presence index of non-authentic GNSS signals, cross-channel correlation peaks are analyzed on the raw signals output from said at least 20 a receiving antenna.
    [0015]
    15. A GNSS signal authentication system, characterized in that it comprises at least: a plurality of antenna modules, each antenna module comprising at least one antenna; A plurality of GNSS signal receiving modules, each receiving module configured to output raw data representative of said GNSS signals, said raw data selected from a group of data representative of a phase angle, a center phase, amplitude and carrier power; - At least one processing module, said at least one processing module configured to generate at least one control sequence emulating a scan and / or a movement of a cone 35 of said signals by the antenna module; At least one authentication module, said authentication module configured to produce a GNSS signal authentication certificate by a processing receiving as input at least raw RF signals at the output of said at least one receiving antenna, and said raw data representative of said GNSS signals.
    [0016]
    16. System according to claim 15, comprising a server, said server providing management of the encryption keys and at least part of the functions of the at least one authentication module.
    [0017]
    17. System according to one of claims 15 to 16, wherein at least a part of the plurality of antenna modules and receiving modules is implanted in automotive land vehicles.
    [0018]
    18. System according to one of claims 15 to 16, comprising a plurality of processing modules, at least a portion of the plurality of receiving modules being located in the vicinity of electronic payment terminals.
    [0019]
    19. GNSS signal receiving antenna housing, characterized in that it comprises: at least one antenna configured to receive GNSS signals;
    [0020]
    A set of electronic components configured to emulate scanning and / or moving a cone of reception of said at least one antenna under the control of a sequence generated by a pseudo-random code at the digital input of said box; An analog-to-digital converter configured to provide at least one analog or digital output with sampling of raw RF signals. 20. GNSS signal authentication equipment, characterized in that it comprises: A digital input configured to receive encryption keys; Acquisition means at a predetermined sampling frequency of: o raw RF signals at the output of at least one GNSS signal receiving antenna, o raw data representative of said GNSS signals, said raw data chosen in a group of data representative of a phase angle, a phase center, an amplitude and a carrier power. A processing circuit configured to: Generate a pseudo-random code from an encryption key, said code itself being configured to generate a control sequence emulating a scan and / or a displacement of a cone receiving by said at least one GNSS signal receiving antenna; Acquiring or producing a state model of variables at the output of the acquisition means, said state model adapted to the control sequence; o Execute at least one coherence test between at least part of the data measured at the output of the acquisition means and their state model. 15
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    同族专利:
    公开号 | 公开日
    EP3189350A1|2017-07-12|
    FR3025611B1|2019-04-19|
    CN106796294A|2017-05-31|
    US10564289B2|2020-02-18|
    WO2016034623A1|2016-03-10|
    CN106796294B|2019-12-03|
    KR20170059984A|2017-05-31|
    US20170285171A1|2017-10-05|
    EP3189350B1|2021-11-03|
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    法律状态:
    2015-08-25| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 2 |
    2016-03-11| PLSC| Publication of the preliminary search report|Effective date: 20160311 |
    2016-08-26| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 3 |
    2017-08-29| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 4 |
    2018-09-13| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 5 |
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    2020-08-26| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 7 |
    2021-08-26| PLFP| Fee payment|Year of fee payment: 8 |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    FR1458337|2014-09-05|
    FR1458337A|FR3025611B1|2014-09-05|2014-09-05|METHOD OF AUTHENTICATING SIGNALS RECEIVED FROM A CONSTELLATION OF SATELLITES|FR1458337A| FR3025611B1|2014-09-05|2014-09-05|METHOD OF AUTHENTICATING SIGNALS RECEIVED FROM A CONSTELLATION OF SATELLITES|
    US15/508,376| US10564289B2|2014-09-05|2015-09-02|Method for authenticating signals received from a constellation of satellites|
    CN201580047526.8A| CN106796294B|2014-09-05|2015-09-02|For authenticating the method from satellite constellation received signal|
    PCT/EP2015/070048| WO2016034623A1|2014-09-05|2015-09-02|Method for authenticating signals received from a constellation of satellites|
    KR1020177006084A| KR20170059984A|2014-09-05|2015-09-02|Method for authenticating signals received from a constellation of satellites|
    EP15759743.6A| EP3189350B1|2014-09-05|2015-09-02|Method for authenticating signals received from a constellation of satellites|
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