• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
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    • 专利摘要:
    SMART CARD AND METHOD TO ENABLE OFFLINE SECURITY AUTHENTICATION WITH A SINGLE PIN CODE OF A SMART CARD. The present invention is directed to a smart card that enables offline security authentication with a single use PIN code with a card reader. This is achieved by generating a single-use PIN code when the user enters their PIN code. The PIN code entered is encrypted and matched with the user's correct encrypted PIN code 10. If there is a match, the single use PIN code is stored in memory and the transaction can proceed.
    公开号:BR112013020142B1
    申请号:R112013020142-8
    申请日:2012-02-07
    公开日:2021-02-17
    发明作者:David Ball；Simon Hewitt
    申请人:Scramcard Holdings (Hong Kong) Limited；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    [0001] [001] This invention relates to security authentication devices. In particular, the invention relates to smart cards, smart credit cards and a method for enabling offline security authentication with a card reader, and a microprocessor program product for a smart card. BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
    [0002] [002] Widely, a smart card is a pocket-sized card with built-in integrated circuits. Typically, the smart card includes a microprocessor that interfaces with peripheral components of the microprocessor, such as memory, a contact data I / O terminal and / or user interface components, such as a numeric keypad and a display.
    [0003] [003] A smart card that is used as a smart credit card can improve security authentication over traditional visual security authentication methods. For example, a smart credit card can store a PIN code. Then, the smart credit card can be inserted into a card reader that requires a user to enter the PIN code into the reader. The card reader then compares the PIN code entered with the PIN code stored on the smart credit card and, if they match, a transaction is authorized. This method in which the card reader authenticates the smart credit card is also referred to as offline authentication.
    [0004] [004] However, keystroke registration is still a security risk. A user PIN can be obtained from a numeric keypad on a card reader in a point of sale (POS) system, an ATM or the like. There are numerous methods of registering key combinations, ranging from hardware- and software-based approaches to electromagnetic and acoustic analysis. OBJECTIVE OF THE INVENTION
    [0005] [005] It is an objective of the present invention to provide an alternative smart card that at least reduces the security authentication risks that are associated with smart cards.
    [0006] [006] The invention provides a smart card that enables offline security authentication with a single use PIN code with a card reader, the smart card including: a memory (18) adapted to store single-use PIN codes and make any of the single-use PIN codes stored therein available to the card reader; a user interface that includes a code display (24) operable to display single-use PIN codes and code insertion keys (22) operable to receive input PIN codes; and a microprocessor (16) that interfaces with the memory (18) and the user interface, and operable to receive input PIN codes from the code insertion keys (22), in which: the memory (18) still stores in itself an encrypted compilation of a user PIN, in which the encrypted compilation was generated with an encryption algorithm; the microprocessor (16) generates and displays a single use PIN code for the display (24) when receiving an input PIN code from the code insertion keys (22); the microprocessor (16) further determines whether the input PIN code matches the user's PIN code by generating an encrypted compilation of the input PIN code with the same encryption algorithm with which the stored compilation was created and by comparing the encrypted compilation generated with the stored encrypted build; and the microprocessor (16) stores the single-use PIN code in memory (18) for access by the card reader if the generated encrypted build matches the stored encrypted build, wherein the smart card (10) is configured to reset the single-use PIN code stored in memory (18) to an invalid value after a predetermined condition is met, and wherein the predetermined condition includes any elapsing of a predetermined time, deactivation of the display (24), and detection with the microprocessor (16) that the single-use PIN has been used in an authentication process.
    [0007] [007] The invention also provides a method including: a memory (18) adapted to store single-use PIN codes and make any of the single-use PIN codes stored therein available to the card reader; a user interface that includes a code display (24) operable to display single-use PIN codes and code insertion keys (22) operable to receive input PIN codes; and a microprocessor (16) that interfaces with the memory (18) and the user interface, and operable to receive input PIN codes from the code insertion keys (22), the method characterized by the fact that it includes: storing a partial encrypted compilation of a user's PIN code in memory (18), in which the partial encrypted compilation was generated with a partial encryption algorithm; receiving an input PIN code from the code insertion keys (22); generate and display a single-use PIN code on the display (24) when receiving the input PIN code from the code insertion keys (22); determine whether the input PIN code matches the user's PIN code by generating a partial encrypted build of the input PIN code with the same partial encryption algorithm with which the stored partial build was created and by comparing the generated partial encrypted build with the stored partial encrypted build; and if the generated partial encrypted build matches the stored partial encrypted build, then store the single-use PIN code in memory (18) for access by the card reader, where the contents of memory (18) are reset to an invalid value after a predetermined time has elapsed, or when the display (24) deactivates, or if the microprocessor (16) detects that the single use PIN has been used in an authentication process.
    [0008] [008] The smart card is preferably configured to include a PIN failure counter in memory, so that if an invalid PIN is entered with the code entry keys and the generated partial encrypted build does not match the stored partial encrypted build , the PIN failure counter increases. Furthermore, the smart card is preferably configured to reset the single-use PIN code in memory to an invalid value each time an invalid PIN code is entered with the code entry keys, for example, to delete a PIN code of a single use that is still resident in memory at that time.
    [0009] [009] The smart card is preferably configured to lock or disable at least some of its functionality if the PIN failure counter reaches a predetermined count.
    [0010] [0010] The smart card preferably includes a function for resetting the PIN failure counter or unlocking the smart card, where the smart card is configured to receive a one-time unlock code from the code entry keys , to process and validate the single-use unlock code, and to unlock or reactivate the locked or disabled functions of the smart card if the single-use unlock code is successfully processed and validated.
    [0011] [0011] The smart card is also preferably configured to reset the PIN failure counter to zero every time a valid PIN code is entered before the PIN failure counter reaches its predetermined count.
    [0012] [0012] In one embodiment, the smart card is preferably configured to include a stored PIN code replacement function which, when activated by inserting an associated code, processes the associated code to generate a new partial encrypted build that is stored on the card smart to replace the existing partial encrypted build.
    [0013] [0013] The smart card is preferably a smart credit card.
    [0014] [0014] The smart card is preferably configured to communicate with a card reader according to the Europay, MasterCard and VISA (EMV) protocols.
    [0015] [0015] The method preferably includes increasing a PIN failure counter in memory if an invalid PIN is entered with the code entry keys and the generated partial encrypted build does not match the stored partial encrypted build.
    [0016] [0016] The method preferably includes resetting the single-use PIN code in memory to an invalid value every time an invalid PIN code is entered with the code insertion keys if a single-use PIN code was still resident in memory at such a time.
    [0017] [0017] The method preferably includes disabling at least some of its functionality if the PIN failure counter reaches a predetermined count.
    [0018] [0018] The method preferably includes resetting the PIN failure counter with a PIN failure reset function by receiving a single-use unlock code from the code insertion keys, processing and validating the unlock code single use, and by reactivating the single use PIN generation function if the single use unlock code is successfully processed and validated.
    [0019] [0019] The method preferably includes resetting the PIN failure counter to zero every time a valid PIN code is entered before the PIN failure counter reaches its predetermined count.
    [0020] [0020] The method preferably includes replacing existing partial encrypted builds with a stored PIN code replacement algorithm by receiving an associated code from the code keypad, processing the associated code to generate a new partial encrypted build and canceling the existing partial encrypted build. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
    [0021] [0021] In order that the present invention may be more readily understood, reference will now be made to the accompanying drawings that illustrate a preferred embodiment of the invention, and in which: Figure 1 is a diagrammatic plan view of a smart card according to the first preferred embodiment of the invention; Figure 2 is a functional schematic block diagram showing some of the components of the smart card shown in Figure 1; Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a data communication network that includes a card reader from the terminal; Figure 4 shows a functional flow chart of a microprocessor program product that is part of the smart card in the first preferred embodiment shown in Figure 1; Figure 5 is a diagrammatic plan view of a proximity smart card according to the second preferred embodiment of the invention; Figure 6 is a functional schematic block diagram showing some of the components of the proximity smart card shown in Figure 5; Figure 7 is a schematic diagram of a data communication network that includes a card reader near the terminal; and Figure 8 shows a functional flow chart of a microprocessor program product that is part of the proximity smart card in the second preferred embodiment shown in Figure 5. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
    [0022] [0022] In relation to Figures 1 to 4, the first preferred modality is shown. Smart card 10 enables offline security authentication with a single use PIN code with a card reader 12.
    [0023] [0023] In relation to Figures 1 and 2, the smart card 10 in this modality is a smart credit card that includes a flat rectangular body the size of the pocket and a magnetic strip 14 that extends through the body.
    [0024] [0024] The smart credit card 10 also includes built-in integrated circuits, which include a microprocessor 16 that interfaces with peripheral components of the microprocessor, such as memory 18, a data I / O terminal 20 and user interface components, which includes a numeric keypad 22 and display 24.
    [0025] [0025] Those skilled in the art realize that the microprocessor can be any suitable central processing unit (CPU), and the memory can include exclusive read-only memory (ROM) to carry an operating system and embedded programs loaded at the time the chip is installed. card is manufactured and / or configured. The memory may also include non-volatile memory, such as exclusive electrically erasable programmable read memory (EEPROM), used to store data and / or a microprocessor program product 28 that is run by the processor. The smart credit card 10 may additionally include volatile memory, such as random access memory (RAM), used for temporary data storage.
    [0026] [0026] An operating system of the card can also be resident in the processor and memory to control the execution of the program products, the reading and writing of data in memory, and general low-level functions, such as activation and deactivation.
    [0027] [0027] The smart credit card 10 also includes a data communication interface in the form of input / output contact terminals 20 in the form of flat metal electrodes for interfacing with contact terminals of the card reader 12.
    [0028] [0028] In relation to Figure 4, a functional flowchart 40 of the microprocessor program product (card application) 28 is shown that includes instructions executable by the microprocessor and which is stored in memory 18. When the card application 28 is executed, it configures smart credit card 10 in a way that enables offline security authentication with a single use PIN code with card reader 12, as explained in more detail below.
    [0029] [0029] Smart credit card 10 includes a partial encrypted build 26 that is stored in memory 18. Partial encrypted builds 26 were created from a user's personal identification number (PIN) code. The partial encrypted build 26 is in the form of a scatter value that was generated with a scatter encryption algorithm and stored in memory 18 when smart card 10 was configured by the card issuer, which in this case is a bank . It is noticed that the user's PIN code is not stored on the smart credit card 10, but instead a corresponding spread value of the user's PIN code is stored on the smart credit card 10.
    [0030] [0030] When a user wishes to make an acquisition transaction with smart card 10, then the user enters an input PIN code with numeric keypad 22. Smart card 10 receives, in 42, the PIN code input.
    [0031] [0031] At 58, smart card 10 checks whether smart card 10 is locked or opened. If smart credit card 10 is open, then at 60, a PIN failure counter is cleared. The locked and open function of the smart credit card 10 and the role of the PIN failure counter are explained in more detail below.
    [0032] [0032] If the smart credit card 10 is open, then it generates, at 44, a single-use PIN code that is shown, at 46, on the display 24.
    [0033] [0033] The card application then determines whether the entered PIN code is valid. That is, it determines whether the input PIN code is actually the user's PIN code or, if it is an invalid PIN code that was entered, by generating, in 48, a partial encrypted spread value of the input PIN code by use of the same partial dispersion algorithm that was used to generate the stored partial dispersion value.
    [0034] [0034] At 50, the generated partial dispersion value is compared with the stored partial dispersion value.
    [0035] [0035] If the generated partial spread value corresponds to the stored partial value, then it is indicated that the user PIN entered is the same as the user PIN code and therefore valid, and the displayed single use PIN code is stored at 52 in memory 18. The single-use PIN code now stored 29 is the actual PIN code which is then used by the user and the card reader 12 for the offline security authentication of the smart credit card 10 by the reader card reader 12. When card reader 12 authenticates the stored single-use PIN, then the transaction proceeds from point of sale system 30 through data communication network 32 to bank computer system 34.
    [0036] [0036] The single-use PIN code 29 is only temporarily stored and available on the smart credit card 10, and a timer is activated at 53, which, when the time limit expires, clears the single-use PIN code, in 54. In this mode, a time of 30 seconds is used, after which the PIN code for a single use is cleared from memory 18. However, other predetermined conditions can also be used, for example, when display 22 deactivates or if microprocessor 16 detects that the single use PIN code was used in an authentication process.
    [0037] [0037] Every time a user wants to use smart credit card 10 with a card reader 12, the user needs to enter the user PIN to generate a new single-use PIN code that is used for security authentication by card reader 12.
    [0038] [0038] If the smart credit card 10 determines, at 50, that an invalid user PIN is inserted in the smart credit card 10, then a memory failure PIN counter increases by 56. That is, if the scatter value generated from the input PIN code does not match the stored scatter value. At 62, the meter is checked and, if the meter has not reached a predetermined interruption count, then the smart credit card 10 proceeds and ensures that the single use PIN value is reset, at 54, to a value invalid, so the smart card may not be used with card reader 12 to authenticate a transaction. This gives a user some chances to enter the valid user's PIN code.
    [0039] [0039] However, if the PIN failure counter has reached its predetermined count at 62, then the smart card is locked at 64, for example, the function that stores the PIN code for a single use can be disabled.
    [0040] [0040] If the smart credit card 10 determines, at 58, that the smart credit card is actually locked while receiving an input PIN code, then another check can be performed, at 58, to reset the counter PIN failure and unlock the smart credit card. This is to facilitate a function in which the user can unlock the smart credit card 10.
    [0041] [0041] For example, a user or cardholder can obtain a unlock code for a single use from the card issuer, that is, the bank, with a personal computer 36 via the Internet 32, after a verification appropriate identification, or by any other method approved by the bank. The single-use unlock code can be entered with the code entry keys 22. Then, the single-use unlock code is verified and processed, at 58, and, if the single-use unlock code is Once the PIN failure counter is validated, it is reset to 60, so that the normal functionality of the smart credit card 10 can be resumed.
    [0042] [0042] In another mode (not shown), a smart credit card can be configured to include a stored PIN code replacement algorithm that, when activated by entering an associated code, processes the associated code to generate a new value partial spread for a new user PIN, which is then stored on the smart card to replace the existing partial encrypted build.
    [0043] [0043] In this modality, the smart credit card 10 is configured to communicate with a card reader 12 according to the Europay, MasterCard and VISA (EMV) protocols.
    [0044] [0044] In relation to Figures 5 to 8, the second preferred embodiment is shown, in which a proximity smart card 110 enables security authentication before transferring the stored information from the proximity smart card to the proximity card reader.
    [0045] [0045] In relation to Figures 5 and 6, the proximity smart card 110 of this modality is a proximity smart credit card that includes a flat rectangular body the size of a pocket and a magnetic strip 114 that extends through the body .
    [0046] [0046] The proximity smart credit card 110 also includes built-in integrated circuits, which include a microprocessor 116 that interfaces with peripheral components of the microprocessor, such as memory 118, a proximity data communication interface 120 and interface components. that includes a numeric keypad 122 and display 124.
    [0047] [0047] Those skilled in the art realize that the microprocessor can be any suitable central processing unit (CPU), and the memory can include exclusive read-only memory (ROM) to carry an operating system and embedded programs loaded at the time the chip is installed. card is manufactured and / or configured. The memory may also include non-volatile memory, such as exclusive electrically erasable programmable readout memory (EEPROM), used to store data and / or a microprocessor program product 128 that is run by the processor. The proximity smart credit card 110 may additionally include volatile memory, such as random access memory (RAM), used for temporary data storage.
    [0048] [0048] An operating system of the card can also be resident in the processor and in memory to control the execution of the program products, the reading and writing of data in memory, and general low-level functions, such as activation and deactivation.
    [0049] [0049] The proximity smart credit card 110 also includes a proximity data communication interface 120 which includes a radio frequency transmitter for wireless communication with a proximity card reader receiver 112.
    [0050] [0050] In relation to Figure 8, a functional flowchart 140 of the microprocessor program product (card application) 128 is shown that includes instructions executable by the microprocessor and which is stored in memory 118. When the application of card 128 is executed, it configures the proximity smart card 110 in a way that enables security authentication before transferring stored information from the proximity smart card to the proximity card reader.
    [0051] [0051] The proximity smart credit card 110 includes a partial encrypted build 126 that is stored in memory 118. Partial encrypted builds 126 were created from a user's personal identification number (PIN) code. The partial encrypted build 126 is in the form of a partial scatter value that was generated with a partial scatter encryption algorithm and stored in memory 118 when the proximity smart card 110 was configured by the card issuer, which in this case , is a bank. It is realized that the user's PIN code is not stored on the proximity smart credit card 110, but instead a corresponding spread value of the user's PIN code is stored on the proximity smart credit card 110.
    [0052] [0052] When a user wishes to make an acquisition transaction with the proximity smart credit card 110, then the user enters an input PIN code with the numeric keypad 122. The proximity smart credit card 110 receives, in 142 , the input PIN code.
    [0053] [0053] In 158, the proximity smart credit card 110 checks whether the proximity smart credit card 110 is locked or opened. If the proximity smart credit card 110 is open, then at 160, a PIN failure counter is cleared. The locked and opened function of the proximity smart credit card 110 and the role of the PIN failure counter are explained in more detail below.
    [0054] [0054] If the proximity smart card 110 is open, then it displays, in 144, a command. The command can be, for example, the word 'ACENE', which indicates to the user that the card should be waved above the proximity card reader.
    [0055] [0055] The card application then determines whether the entered PIN code is valid. That is, it determines whether the input PIN code is actually the user's PIN code or, if it is an invalid PIN code that was entered, by generating, in 146, a partial encrypted spread value of the input PIN code by use of the same partial dispersion algorithm that was used to generate the stored partial dispersion value.
    [0056] [0056] In 149, the generated partial dispersion value is compared with the stored partial dispersion value.
    [0057] [0057] If the generated partial dispersion value corresponds to the stored partial dispersion value, the user's PIN code entered is the same as the user's PIN code and therefore valid, in response to that, the active proximity credit card , at 50, the wireless interface.
    [0058] [0058] When the user's PIN code is validated, a timer is triggered at 152, which, when the time limit is reached, disables the proximity communication interface at 154.
    [0059] [0059] Whenever a user wishes to use the proximity smart card 110 with a proximity card reader 112, users need to enter the user PIN to activate the proximity communication interface of the proximity smart card 110.
    [0060] [0060] If the proximity smart card 110 determines, in 149, that an invalid user PIN is inserted in the proximity smart card 110, then a memory fault PIN counter is increased, by 156. That is, if the scatter value generated from the input PIN code does not match the stored scatter value. At 162, the counter is checked and, if the counter has not reached a predetermined interruption count, then the proximity smart card 110 disables, at 154, the proximity communication interface of the proximity smart card 110 .
    [0061] [0061] However, if the PIN failure counter has reached its predetermined count, at 162, then the proximity smart card is locked, at 164, for example, the function that triggers the proximity communication interface is disabled.
    [0062] [0062] If the proximity smart card 110 determines, at 158, that the proximity smart card is actually locked while receiving an input PIN code, then another check can be performed at 158, to reset the PIN failure counter and unlock the proximity smart credit card. This is to facilitate a function in which the user can unlock the proximity 110 smart credit card.
    [0063] [0063] For example, a user or cardholder can obtain a unlock code for a single use from the card issuer, say, the bank, with a personal computer 136 via the Internet 132, after a verification appropriate identification, or by any other method approved by the bank. The single-use unlock code can be entered with the code insertion keys 122. Then, the single-use unlock code is verified and processed, in 158, and, if the single-use unlock code is validated, then the PIN failure counter is reset, so that the normal functionality of the proximity smart card 110 can be resumed.
    [0064] [0064] In another mode (not shown), a proximity smart card can be configured to include a stored PIN code replacement algorithm that, when activated by entering an associated code, processes the associated code to generate a new partial spread value for a new user PIN, which is then stored on the proximity smart card to replace the existing partial encrypted build.
    [0065] [0065] In this modality, the proximity smart credit card 110 is configured to communicate with a proximity card reader 112 according to the VISA PayWave and / or MasterCard PayPass protocols. BENEFITS
    [0066] [0066] Advantageously, smart card 10 enables offline security authentication with a single use PIN code with a card reader 12, which resists the risks of key combination registration attacks.
    [0067] [0067] Another advantage of smart card 10 is that it enables security authentication with a single use PIN code independently. In other words, security authentication with single-use PIN code can be used with standard card readers 12 that are based on the EMV protocol. Therefore, card readers 12 do not require technological changes or alterations.
    [0068] [0068] The proximity smart card 110 enables offline authentication with the user's PIN code, thereby reducing the risk of fraudulent use of proximity smart credit cards. VARIATIONS
    [0069] [0069] Certainly, it is clear that, although the above was given as an illustrative example of this invention, all such modifications and variations of this, and still others, as will be apparent to those skilled in the art, are considered to fall within the broad scope and scope of this invention, as it is presented here.
    [0070] [0070] Throughout the description and claims of this specification, it is not intended that the word "comprises" and variations of this word, such as "comprise" and "comprising", exclude other additions, components, whole numbers or steps.
    权利要求:
    Claims (10)
    [0001]
    Smart card (10) that enables offline security authentication with a single use PIN code with a card reader (12), the smart card characterized by the fact that it includes: a memory (18) adapted to store single-use PIN codes and make any of the single-use PIN codes stored therein available to the card reader; a user interface that includes a code display (24) operable to display single-use PIN codes and code insertion keys (22) operable to receive input PIN codes; and a microprocessor (16) that interfaces with the memory (18) and the user interface, and operable to receive input PIN codes from the code insertion keys (22), in which: the memory (18) still stores in itself an encrypted compilation of a user PIN, in which the encrypted compilation was generated with an encryption algorithm; the microprocessor (16) generates and displays a single use PIN code for the display (24) when receiving an input PIN code from the code insertion keys (22); the microprocessor (16) further determines whether the input PIN code matches the user's PIN code by generating an encrypted compilation of the input PIN code with the same encryption algorithm with which the stored compilation was created and by comparing the encrypted compilation generated with the stored encrypted build; and the microprocessor (16) stores the single-use PIN code in memory (18) for access by the card reader if the generated encrypted build matches the stored encrypted build, wherein the smart card (10) is configured to reset the single-use PIN code stored in memory (18) to an invalid value after a predetermined condition is met, and wherein the predetermined condition includes any elapsing of a predetermined time, deactivation of the display (24), and detection with the microprocessor (16) that the single-use PIN has been used in an authentication process.
    [0002]
    Smart card (10) according to claim 1, characterized in that the memory (18) is further adapted to store a PIN failure counter, and the microprocessor (16) is configured to increase the PIN failure counter when an invalid PIN is entered with the code entry keys and the generated partial encrypted build does not match the stored partial encrypted build.
    [0003]
    Smart card (10) according to either of claims 1 or 2, characterized in that the microprocessor (16) is configured to update the contents in memory (18) by an invalid value every time an invalid PIN code is entered with the code insertion keys (22).
    [0004]
    Smart card (10) according to claim 2, characterized by the fact that the smart card (10) is configured to lock or disable at least some of its functionality if the PIN failure counter reaches a predetermined count.
    [0005]
    Smart card (10) according to claim 2, characterized by the fact that the code insertion keys (22) are operable to receive unlock codes for a single use, and the smart card (10) is configured to receive a single-use unlock code using the code entry keys (22), to process and validate the single-use unlock code, and to unlock or reactivate the locked or disabled functions of the smart card (10) if the single use unlock code has been successfully processed and validated.
    [0006]
    Smart card (10) according to claim 2, characterized by the fact that the microprocessor (16) resets the PIN failure counter to zero every time a valid PIN code is entered before the PIN failure counter reaches its predetermined count.
    [0007]
    Smart card (10) according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that the smart card (10) is configured to include a stored PIN code replacement function that, when activated by inserting an associated code, processes the associated code to generate a new partial encrypted build that is stored on the smart card (10) to replace the existing partial encrypted build.
    [0008]
    Smart card (10) according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that the smart card (10) is a smart credit card.
    [0009]
    Smart card (10) according to any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that the smart card (10) is configured to communicate with a card reader according to the Europay, MasterCard and VISA (EMV) protocols.
    [0010]
    Method for offline security authentication with a single use PIN code of a smart card (10) with a card reader (12), where the smart card (10) includes: a memory (18) adapted to store single-use PIN codes and make any of the single-use PIN codes stored therein available to the card reader; a user interface that includes a code display (24) operable to display single-use PIN codes and code insertion keys (22) operable to receive input PIN codes; and rio, and operable to receive input PIN codes from the code insertion keys (22), the method characterized by the fact that it includes: storing a partial encrypted compilation of a user's PIN code in memory (18), in which the partial encrypted compilation was generated with a partial encryption algorithm; receiving an input PIN code from the code insertion keys (22); generate and display a single-use PIN code on the display (24) when receiving the input PIN code from the code insertion keys (22); determine whether the input PIN code matches the user's PIN code by generating a partial encrypted build of the input PIN code with the same partial encryption algorithm with which the stored partial build was created and by comparing the generated partial encrypted build with the stored partial encrypted build; and if the generated partial encrypted build matches the stored partial encrypted build, then store the single-use PIN code in memory (18) for access by the card reader, where the contents of memory (18) are reset to an invalid value after a predetermined time has elapsed, or when the display (24) deactivates, or if the microprocessor (16) detects that the single use PIN has been used in an authentication process.
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    DK2673741T3|2021-01-25|
    US10963864B2|2021-03-30|
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    ES2844348T3|2021-07-21|
    PT2673741T|2021-01-22|
    CN103415863A|2013-11-27|
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    法律状态:
    2018-01-16| B25G| Requested change of headquarter approved|Owner name: DAVID BALL (AU) , SIMON HEWITT (AU) |
    2018-02-06| B25A| Requested transfer of rights approved|Owner name: SCRAM CARD HOLDINGS PTY LTD (AU) |
    2018-02-27| B25A| Requested transfer of rights approved|Owner name: SCRAMCARD HOLDINGS (HONG KONG) LIMITED (HK) |
    2018-12-18| B06F| Objections, documents and/or translations needed after an examination request according [chapter 6.6 patent gazette]|
    2019-10-22| B06U| Preliminary requirement: requests with searches performed by other patent offices: procedure suspended [chapter 6.21 patent gazette]|
    2020-12-08| B09A| Decision: intention to grant [chapter 9.1 patent gazette]|
    2021-02-17| B16A| Patent or certificate of addition of invention granted [chapter 16.1 patent gazette]|Free format text: PRAZO DE VALIDADE: 20 (VINTE) ANOS CONTADOS A PARTIR DE 07/02/2012, OBSERVADAS AS CONDICOES LEGAIS. |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    AU2011900380|2011-02-07|
    AU2011900381A|AU2011900381A0|2011-02-07|A proximity smartcard with verification means|
    AU2011900380A|AU2011900380A0|2011-02-07|A smart card with verification means|
    AU2011900381|2011-02-07|
    PCT/AU2012/000110|WO2012106757A1|2011-02-07|2012-02-07|A smart card with verification means|
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