• 专利附录
  • 专利说明
  • 权利要求
  • 类似技术
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    • 专利摘要:
    MECHANISMS FOR DETECTING VIOLATION OF AN ELECTRONIC DEVICE. The invention relates to an electronic device that has a chassis, and a printed circuit board (PWB) that has a hole. A fastener is installed inside the hole thereby securing the PWB to the chassis. A pair of conductive tracks is formed on the PWB. A cover, being a quantity of conductive glue, covers part of the fixer and fills an electrically insulating gap between the two tracks, thereby forming a conductive path that connects the two tracks. A detection circuit is attached to the tracks, to detect a change in path impedance and signal a violation event alert. Other modalities are also described and claimed.
    公开号:BR112012003102B1
    申请号:R112012003102-3
    申请日:2010-07-26
    公开日:2020-11-03
    发明作者:Timothy M. Johnson
    申请人:Apple Inc；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    RELATED REQUESTS
    [0001] This application claims the benefit of the previous filing date of US Provisional Application Number 61 / 232,686 filed on August 10, 2009, entitled "Mechanisms to Detect a Printed Circuit Board Violation and Exposure to Water on a Device. Electronic". FUNDAMENTALS FIELD
    [0002] The present invention relates generally to electronic devices and, more specifically, to techniques for detecting the occurrence of consumer abuse in electronic devices. RELATIVE TECHNIQUE
    [0003] This section is intended to introduce the reader to various aspects of the technique that may be related to various aspects of the present invention, which are described below and / or claimed. This discussion is believed to be useful in providing the reader with fundamental information to facilitate a better understanding of the various aspects of the present invention. Consequently, it should be understood that these statements should be read in this light, and not as admissions to the prior art.
    [0004] Electronic products purchased by consumers are usually sold with a warranty and return policy that accompanies the product in which the seller and / or manufacturer guarantees that the product is free from defects and will remain operable for at least a limited period of time. . For example, typical warranty and return policies may specify that in the event that a defect is discovered in a product, or that the product becomes inoperable during the warranty period, the manufacturer or seller will either replace the product or provide services repair to restore the product to its operational state with little or no additional cost to the consumer.
    [0005] In general, such warranty and return policies are only intended to cover faults and defects relating to the manufacture or design of the product, and typically do not cover a product failure that occurs as a result of consumer abuse. In fact, many warranty policies explicitly exclude returns or repairs when consumer abuse damage, whether intentional and unintended, is the underlying cause of product failure. For example, consumer abuse may include exposing an electronic device to liquids, temperatures extreme shock or excessive shock (for example, the impact of the device falling). Consumer abuse can also result from a breach which may include any interaction with the device that is unrelated to the operation of the device in a normal way (for example, opening the case or housing of a device and adding, removing, or change internal components).
    [0006] Electronic devices such as personal desktop computers, laptop or notebook computers, smartphones, and portable digital media players are often violated by the end user or consumer. For example, some users would like to test their ability to do it for themselves and try to repair or improve the performance of an electronic device by opening its external housing and trying to remove or modify the electronic components inside, such as a printed wiring board. or a printed circuit board (PCB).
    [0007] Inevitably, a percentage of products sold will eventually fail or become inoperable at some point during the product's life. When this occurs, and if the product is still within the warranty period, the purchasing consumer may choose to return the defective or inoperable device to the seller at the point of sale or directly to the manufacturer or for maintenance or replacement in accordance with the terms of the warranty agreement.
    [0008] However, a problem arises when a device has failed due to consumer abuse which may not be readily apparent upon superficial inspection, but a consumer attempts to return the device for repair or replacement under warranty. Often, specifically at a point of sale, personnel receiving the returned device may be unqualified or untrained to determine whether a device has failed or not due to manufacturing defects or due to consumer abuse. Thus, personnel at the point of sale can often exchange the returned product for a replacement product that works regardless of the cause of the failure in order to avoid potential conflicts with the customer. As a result, it is not uncommon for consumers to receive replacement products or repair services on abused products not covered under a warranty. Such erroneous replacements or repairs can be costly for the seller and / or manufacturer of the product. SUMMARY
    [0009] It would be desirable to detect consumer abuse (generally referred to here as a violation) without having to rely on explanatory statements from the user who may be returning a unit that is no longer functioning according to the original manufacturer's specification. One embodiment of the invention is a tamper sensor mechanism, which can be used to automatically detect an attempt to remove a printed wiring board (PWB) or PCB from an electronic device. This mechanism could replace a typical intrusion or intrusion detection solution, namely an adhesive label or sticker that is often placed over the PCB and covers a fastener that secures the PCB to a housing or chassis on the device. Several embodiments of the invention will now be described.
    [00010] In one embodiment, the PWB has formed in it a tamper sensor composed of a pair of conductive tracks (circuit), and a cover being a quantity of conductive glue that covers a part of the fastener and, by virtue of being a fluid, which covers part of the fastener and, because it is fluid, fills a gap of air (electrically insulating) between the two tracks to thereby form a conductive path that connects the two tracks. A detection circuit is provided that is coupled to the track pair, to detect a change in path impedance. When the change in detected impedance is considered to be sufficient to indicate that an attempt has been made to remove the fastener (or indeed the fastener has been removed), the detection circuit responds by signaling an alert to a data processor that registers a data structure tamper event on the electronic device, indicating that an attempt was made to detach the PWB from the chassis.
    [00011] In another mode, a single circuit track is sufficient adjacent to the hole (to form the tamper sensor). A cap being a measured amount of conductive glue is deposited in contact with and covering a tool end of the fastener that is installed inside the hole. The cover fills an electrically insulating gap between the circuit track and the tool end to thereby form a conductive path that connects the circuit track to a conductive portion of the chassis through the fastener. In this mode, the fixer can act as part of the conductive path whose impedance is monitored (by the detection circuit) for any changes.
    [00012] When more than one tamper sensor is desired (for example, when multiple fasteners are required to secure the PWB to the chassis, the pairs of circuit tracks associated with each hole can be connected to each other in series. The detection is then coupled to detect any change in the impedance of the entire conductive path that runs through all the violation sensors connected in series, so with each violation sensor being "normally shorted" (or displaying "continuity") in its state not violated, violation of any of the sensors results in an "open" circuit that is detected by the detection circuit as a limit change in impedance.
    [00013] In some cases, the electronic device can be relatively large or complex with a multi-piece PWB or simply with a PWB that has a relatively large number of tamper sensors. In this case, a selection and detection circuit is provided that is coupled to the relatively large number of tamper sensors in the form of a randomly accessible "network" of sensors. Although not necessarily rectangular, this modality can be seen as having "column" and "line" sensor selection signals that are expressed by the selection and detection circuit, in order to pass a current through or apply voltage to any one of the respective conductive paths of the violation sensors each time, and then detect a change in impedance in them. The sensor network can thus be "scanned" periodically, looking for any tamper event alerts. By doing this, the physical location of any tamper event can be inherently identified by the selected row and column selection signals.
    [00014] The above summary does not include an exhaustive list of all aspects of the present invention. It is contemplated that the invention includes all systems and methods that can be practiced in all the appropriate combinations of the various aspects summarized above, as well as those described below in the Detailed Description and specifically highlighted in the claims filed with this application. Such combinations have specific advantages not specifically recited in the summary above. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
    [00015] The modalities of the invention are illustrated by way of example and not by way of limitation in the figures of the accompanying drawings in which the same references indicate similar elements. It should be noted that references to "one" or "the" embodiment of the invention in this description do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, and these mean at least one.
    [00016] Figure 1 is a perspective view or elevation of the open chassis of an electronic device that shows a tamper sensor mechanism.
    [00017] Figure 2 shows an alternative arrangement for the hole in the PCB, as used in the tamper sensor mechanism.
    [00018] Figure 3 is a cross section of an example of the violation sensor.
    [00019] Figure 4 is a cross section of another example of the violation sensor, in this case a grounded violation sensor.
    [00020] Figure 5 is another example of a grounded tamper sensor.
    [00021] Figure 6 is another example of the grounded tamper sensor, which has a different fastener tool end.
    [00022] Figure 7 is a circuit diagram of an exemplary implementation of the detection circuit.
    [00023] Figure 8 shows a series connection of multiple violation sensors.
    [00024] Figure 9 shows a network of tamper sensors attached to the selection and detection logic circuit.
    [00025] Figure 10 is a flow chart of a manufacturing and production test process for tamper sensor mechanisms.
    [00026] Figure 11 is a flowchart of a violation detection process on an electronic device.
    [00027] Figure 12 is a flow chart of another violation detection process in the electronic device, which involves a network of selectable sensors. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
    [00028] Various modalities of the invention with reference to the accompanying drawings will now be explained. Whenever the shapes, relative positions and other aspects of the parts described in the modalities are not clearly defined, the scope of the invention is not limited only to the parts shown, the which are intended solely for the purpose of illustration. Also, although numerous details are presented, it is understood that some embodiments of the invention can be practiced without these details. In other cases, well-known circuits, structures, and techniques have not been shown in detail so as not to obscure the understanding of this description.
    [00029] Figure 1 is a perspective or elevation view of the interior of an electronic device housing, showing an open chassis with a tampering mechanism according to an embodiment of the invention. The electronic device can be a desktop computer, a notebook / laptop computer, a personal digital assistant, a tablet computer, a smartphone, or any other consumer electronic device that is likely to be tampered with by an end user or consumer.
    [00030] The device contains a data processor 30 which can be any conventional programmable microprocessor based circuit (or wired state machine) that uses a non-volatile memory 32 to perform various typical functions (for example, general purpose computing , desktop applications, mobile applications that include wireless telephony and wireless Internet access, and multimedia recording and playback, for example, video and audio). These functions are performed using the following hardware components that are typical, for example, of a smartphone: I / O ports 38 (for example, serial computer peripheral communications bus), user input devices 36 (for example, keyboard , mouse, and touch panels), a display device 34 (for example, liquid crystal display panel, an audio I / O interface 40 (for example, microphones and speakers), and network interfaces 39 (for example, network interface controllers for Ethernet and wireless local area network protocols, and mobile telecommunications and cellular telecommunications transceiver circuit). Most of these components can be installed (spun together) on a PWB 4 ( also referred to as a printed circuit board, PCB). PWB 4 can have two or more segments that are connected to each other by a flexible connector, for example. The device has a chassis 2 in which PWB 4 has a hole leaked 6 is secured using a fastener 11 which is installed inside the hole. The chassis 2 can be a separate metal structure or support within an external housing of the device, or it can be a part of the external housing itself (for example, a plastic structure or support member that has a chassis support on which the fastener 11 can be displayed). Hole 6 can be located within the boundary of PWB 4 as shown in Figure 1; alternatively, it can be exactly at the limit or edge as shown in Figure 2. The fastener 11 can be a screw, a combination of nut and screw or another suitable alternative that can attach the PWB to the chassis through the hole 6. Several possibilities for a screw type fastener and how it secures the PWB to the chassis are shown in Figures 3-6 to be described below.
    [00031] PWB 4 has formed in it a pair of conductive tracks also referred to as circuit tracks 8, 9, adjacent to or near hole 6. These can also be described as conductive supports; these can be specifically designed, in terms of their shape and size, for their purpose as part of a tamper sensor 10 which will also include a conductive glue cap 12. The latter can be a measured amount of conductive glue that covers at least a part of the fastener 11 and fills an electrically insulating gap between the two tracks 8, 9 to complete a conductive path - see Figures 3-6. A detection circuit 25, which can be mounted or installed over PWB 4 or otherwise present within the housing of the electronic device, is coupled to track pair 8, 9, to detect a change in impedance of the tamper sensor 10, and specifically in the conductive path through the cap 12 that connects the two tracks 8, 9.
    [00032] As seen in Figures 3-6, the conductive glue cap 12 can cover a tool end of the fastener 11 so that to disengage PWB 4 from the chassis, rupture or removal of part of the cap 12 is required, before a tool can couple the tool end of the fastener 11 and remove or loosen the fastener 11 sufficiently to allow the removal or detachment of the PCB 4. The cover 12 is in contact with the tool end in order to fill at least a part of an opening, or cover a corner at the tool end, so that a tool such as a screwdriver cannot engage the fastener. For example, a user would first need to break through at least a portion of the cap 12, before he can couple the grooved top surface of the tool end of the fastener 11 with the correct key (and before he is able to rotate or otherwise act on it). key to thereby rotate or otherwise disengage the fastener from the chassis 2). This rupture of the cap 12 can change the impedance of the conductive path that connects the two tracks 8, 9, where such a change can be detected by the detection circuit 25. In one embodiment, the impedance must increase sufficiently when the cap 12 is thus broken, even if the user does not want or be able to subsequently detach the fastener from the chassis. In another embodiment, the required breakage of cover 12 (sufficient to be detected as a "tamper event") does not occur until the tool end of the fastener has been loosened to allow PCB 4 to be removed, or the end tool has been removed from the chassis. The shape and size of the cap 12 as well as its material (and conductivity) must be selected so that detachment of the fastener (first breaking the cap 12) is likely to cause a sufficient impedance change that can be detected by the detection circuit 25.
    [00033] Returning to Figure 1, when the detection circuit 25 detected a change in impedance of the conductive path connecting the tracks 8, 9, this can in response signal a violation event alert to the data processor 30 in the electronic device 10. The data processor 30 in turn can evaluate and record a tamper event in non-volatile memory 32, creating a tamper event data structure that identifies the tamper sensor (if more than one exists on PWB 4) and perhaps the time and date of the event, and you can then disable device operations. For example, all device operations can be disabled in response to receiving the tamper event alert, except for a message that is displayed instructing the user to return the device to its manufacturer for maintenance. Additional details regarding such higher tier consumer abuse management functions that can be performed by the data processor 30 are provided in US Patent Application Publication Number 2009/0195394, filed on February 1, 2008, entitled "System and Consumer Abuse Detection Method ".
    [00034] Now looking at Figure 3, a cross section of an example of the violation sensor 10 is shown. In this embodiment, a tool end of the fastener (referred to as head 14) is above the surface of the PCB 4 on which the pair of conductive tracks 8, 9 is formed. Note that the latter in most cases are likely to be formed in the same plane as PWB 4, that is, in the same metallic layer, and specifically in the uppermost metallic layer. However, as discussed below in connection with Figure 6, an alternative is to form at least one of the tracks 8, 9 in a lower metallic layer (below the uppermost surface of PWB 4).
    [00035] Still referring to Figure 3, the conductive glue cap 12, as shown, is in contact with the upper surface of the tool end of the fastener. In this case, the conductive glue fills a sufficient part of an opening, or covers at least one corner of the tool end of the fastener, so that a tool or wrench cannot engage the fastener (without the cap 12 being broken). The fastener in this case is a hexagon head screw that has been threaded into a chassis support 16 of the chassis, and in doing so it has attached PWB 4 to the top of the chassis support 16 as shown.
    [00036] The conductive glue cap 12 also electrically connects with tracks 8, 9, in order to provide a conductive path between them. The measured amount of conductive glue can be that amount which is sufficient to flow into and fill the gap between tracks 8, 9 and provide a sufficiently thick barrier over the tool end of the fastener to prevent a tool or key is used to uncouple the fastener. In practice, the conductive glue cap 12 can be the result of a measured amount of conductive glue that is deposited in a fluid form approximately in the center of the fixator head 14 and then left to accommodate or spread over the head and come into contact with the tracks 8, 9. This measured amount of conductive glue is then allowed to cure or harden into the final shape presented, so that it needs to be broken to allow the tool end of the fastener to be coupled by a wrench or other tool.
    [00037] Figure 4 is another cross-section of another example of the tamper sensor 10, in this case a grounded tamper sensor 19. The fastener 11 in this case is a conductive screw, so that it forms a conductive path for a conductive portion. chassis that is also grounded. More specifically, a metal screw is shown to have been attached to a metal chassis plate or bracket 20 below PWB 4, by a nut 18 that has been scratched over the open end of the screw. Also note that in this case, the head 14 of the fastener 11 is lowered, lower than the PWB 4, so that as installed, the head 14 is below the uppermost surface of the PWB outside the hole. In addition, the conductive glue cap now also fills a part of the PWB recess within which the head 14 is installed.
    [00038] Now looking at Figure 5, another example of a grounded tamper sensor 19 is shown, this time using a single track 8 and not track 9, to connect with the conductive path provided by the conductive glue cap 12. In this mode, as in Figure 4, the fastener is conductive. Specifically, its head 14 is conductive, so that when the glue cap 12 has been deposited in contact with track 8 and head 14, a conductive path connects circuit track 8 to the conductive portion of the chassis (in this case a metal chassis plate or support 20 which is also grounded) through the fastener body. The detection circuit 25 (not shown) is coupled to the single track 8, but also to the metal chassis plate or bracket 20 via the earth connection (for example, a PWB ground plane). This allows the detection circuit 25 to detect a change in conductive path impedance in much the same way as in the "floating" tamper sensor 10 in Figure 3, except that the tamper sensor 19 is grounded, while the tamper sensor is grounded. violation 10, shown in Figure 3, need not be.
    [00039] It should also be noted that although Figures 4 and 5 show a tamper sensor 19 that is grounded due to the grounding of the chassis plate or support 20, an alternative is to float the metal chassis plate or support 20 above the ground . In this case, the detection circuit 25 would still need to have a connection to the chassis plate or bracket 20 to be able to detect the impedance of the sensor 19, but such a connection is not grounded in this case.
    [00040] Figure 6 presents yet another example of the tamper sensor 10, where in this case, the tool end of the fastener 11 is the open threaded end of a screw on which a nut 18 has been installed to secure the PCB 4. This modality is also similar to that in Figure 4 in that the tool end of the fastener supports within a cutout or indentation or recess in the uppermost surface of the PCB 4. In this modality as in others, the conductive glue cap 12 is in contact com and hereby provides a conductive path between track 8 and track 9, and where the impedance of this path is substantially changed (namely, increased when trying to remove nut 18 from fastener 11 (to remove the PCB from the chassis). Note that as an alternative to having tracks 8, 9 formed in the topmost metallic layer of PWB 4, one or both tracks 8, 9 in this mode may be "buried" in a lower metallic layer of PWB 4 that is exposed above and the upper surface of the recess (near but spaced from the nut 18, to create the insulating gap between them which is filled with by the conductive adhesive cap 12).
    [00041] Now looking at Figure 7, a circuit diagram of a detection circuit modality 25 is shown. The detection circuit 25 receives an on / off control signal that controls a transistor switch 22 to activate the tamper sensor 10 by applying a voltage or current from a known current source 21. Note in this example, the tamper sensor 10 does not need to be grounded but it can be a floating type. Alternatively, a grounded tamper sensor 10 can be used. An amplifier 23 is configured with some voltage gain, to measure the voltage developed through the tamper sensor 10 (when switch 22 is on). A measurement of the impedance of the tamper sensor 10 is then taken, using a window detector 24 that includes a low comparator and a high comparator. The limits for each comparator can be programmable, using a digital to analog converter (DAC) 26. When detector 24 indicates that the voltage measured through the violation sensor 10 falls outside the predefined window, that is, or lower than the comparator limit low or higher than the high comparator limit, a tamper event alert signal is expressed at the output of detection circuit 25. This alert signal is provided for consumer abuse management functions highest layer that may be running on the data processor 30 - see Figure 1.
    [00042] For example, in the design or test stage, a given range or voltage window is determined for the violation sensor 10 in its non-violated state, testing or simulating several activated violation sensors 10, to select the range of voltage (or equivalent, the impedance range) which is considered to be the non-violated state of the tamper sensor 10. The window, of course, depends on the design of the tamper sensor 10 including, specifically, the conductivity of the conductive adhesive cap 12 The window can be determined based on an experimental analysis of a sample tamper sensor 10, either in the non-tampered state or in a tampered or interrupted state. Statistical data can be taken from several samples of the violation sensor 10, and several cases of interrupted or violated states, to select a "best-adjusted" window that defines the non-violated condition. This defined window can then be stored in non-volatile memory 32 (see Figure 1), so that the data processor 30, while running the appropriate software, can access this defined window of memory 32 and program the pair of DACs 26 accordingly, in order to initialize the limits of the window detector 24 for operation. As an alternative, the window boundaries can be printed on the circuit at the time of manufacture and assembly of the PWB 4.
    [00043] The window determination process can be used to help select the amount and / or type of material for the conductive glue cap 12, so that, for example, its strength falls within a narrow window. For example, the conductivity of the cap 12 can be designed to be within a narrow band (window) that is substantially less than that of a pure conductor such as copper.
    [00044] Still referring to the detection circuit 25 in Figure 7, the current source 21 can be programmable with several programmable dc current levels (for example, 10 mA, 100 mA, and 250 mA). This would allow data processor 30 to further customize detection circuit 25 for a specific handheld device, which has a specific tamper sensor 10. As for the power supply (Vdc), this can be obtained from a battery in the portable device or it can be another "always on" power source track. Note that a protection diode can be included in series between the power supply rail and transistor switch 22. Also, the gain of amplifier 23 can be programmable (under the command of data processor 30, for example), from to support different types of tamper sensors. It should be noted that although the window detector 24 is shown as a pair of comparators, an alternative may be to use a single comparator, for a less accurate or broader definition of the non-violated state. For example, a single comparator can be used with a single limit voltage, so that the non-violated state is defined as any voltage at the output of amplifier 23 that is below that limit (where in the violated state, the voltage through the violation sensor 10 increases above that limit).
    [00045] Looking now at Figure 8, a serial connection of multiple tamper sensors is shown. Each of the Si, S2, SN sensors can be considered to have a low resistance (here generally referred to as "shorted" or "normally shorted"), until the user has violated any of these. When any of the N sensors is violated, a condition of high resistance (or generally referred to here as "open circuit") is created in the series branch, which is then detected by the detection circuit 25 as an increased voltage across the sensors (see Figure 7). This allows multiple fasteners that may be required to attach to PWB 4, to be protected in this way, while saving the number of pins in the electronic device that are needed to implement such an intrusion detection function. In other words, instead of having a separate detection circuit 25 for each individual sensor Si, S2 ..., a single window detector 24 as in Figure 7 can be shared by N sensors connected in series.
    [00046] Looking at Figure 9, another arrangement of multiple sensors is shown that is also effective in reducing pin count. Here, a "network" of Sn, S12, ..., SMN tamper sensors is shown, where there are MxN sensors on the network. This so-called array or matrix arrangement is also referred to as a scanned sensor mode, in which column selection and individual line selection lines are connected to the Sy sensor network to generate a randomly accessible sensor network. In addition to providing a lower pin count, this arrangement also allows the isolation of any individual Sy sensor to locate a fault (tamper event). As well as a reduction in energy consumption since only a single sensor needs to be connected or activated at any given time. For example, to activate the S22 sensor, only the line selection line 2 and only the line selection column 2 would be activated, thereby allowing the current source 21 to force a current through only that sensor. In this case, each sensor is an example of the tamper sensor 10, 19 which is normally shorted in its non-tampered state. This condition sensing detection circuit 25 is connected to a specific column selection line via a switch or multiplexer 27 as shown, thereby allowing you to detect the condition of any of the sensors in the network as commanded by the selection logic line and column 28. A single sensor can be selected with only the transistor switch 29 of that line connected. The row and column selection logic 28 decodes a sensor selection received from the data processor 30 into the appropriate column and line selection logic lines to be activated. Note that in this mode, the line selection lines are relatively high impedance lines that are connected to the ports or control electrodes of the respective transistor switches 29, while the column selection lines would be switched to the current source 21 for activate or activate a given sensor. The designation "column" and "row" is only used to distinguish between these two types of selection lines and is not otherwise intended to limit the layout of the network of randomly accessible sensors.
    [00047] A flowchart of a manufacturing process and production test for a tamper sensor mechanism is described in Figure 10. The operation starts at block 42 where a PWB that has a hole through which a fastener is to be installed is produced . The PWB includes at least one circuit track (for example, a pair of circuit tracks) formed in an upper metallic layer of the PWB, adjacent to the hole. As an alternative, the circuit track can be formed in a buried metallic layer of the PWB. Next, the electronic components (such as packaged integrated circuits, connectors, and discrete circuit devices) are mounted over the (for example, soldered on) the PWB. These components can include a detection circuit that is coupled to the circuit track through at least one signal line (for example, a pair of signal lines formed in one or more metallic layers of the PWB). The operation then proceeds with the attachment of the PWB mounted on a chassis of an electronic device (block 46). For example, the PWB can be attached to a metal or plastic plate or a support portion of the chassis. This is achieved by installing a fastener through the hole to secure the PCB to the chassis. Then, an amount of conductive glue is deposited over the installed fastener, where this amount is sufficient to cover at least part of a tool end of the fastener in order to prevent access to the fastener (unless the conductive glue is substantially broken). The deposited conductive glue is then allowed to flow in and fill an air gap between at least one circuit track and the tool end, or between a pair of circuit tracks, to thereby form a conductive path for a sensor of violation. The deposited conductive glue is fluid and can therefore conform to the shape of the tool tip as it flows and spreads within the gap; it can then be allowed to cure and harden before being tested. The tamper sensor mechanism can be tested by measuring or evaluating the output of the associated detection circuit (block 50). Specifically, the non-tampered state of the tamper sensor can be recorded and verified as falling within a predefined window (or above a given threshold voltage). This window or limit which defines a violation event for the sensor may have been printed on the circuit within the detection circuit or may have been written on the non-volatile memory installed on the PWB. The assembled PCB can now be considered to have passed this aspect of the production test.
    [00048] Now looking at Figure 11, a flowchart of a violation detection process that runs on an electronic device is shown. The process starts at operation 52 with the detection circuit being reset, including initializing a window or threshold that defines a violation event. Note that as an alternative, the window or threshold that defines a breach event may have been printed on the circuit within the detection circuit. Then, the detection circuit is enabled or activated, to apply a voltage (current) to at least one violation sensor that is coupled to it (block 54). This can be done by a data processor expressing the on / off signal for the detection circuit 25 of Figure 7 described above. The data processor then waits for a detection circuit tamper event alert signal (block 56). It should be noted that this reference to the data processor "waiting" for the breach event alert signal covers both the situation where the processor is investigating the detection circuit and when it is being interrupted by the alert. When the breach event alert is received after block 56, the data processor records a detected breach event (block 58). The latter may include identifying the sensor for which the breach alert was received, and storing this identification along with a time stamp and date associated with the alert. The recorded breach event can be stored in a non-volatile memory inside the electronic device. Then, certain device operations can be disabled (block 59) and an instruction can be displayed or given to the user of the electronic device to return the device for maintenance (block 60). Once the device has been returned to the manufacturer, the recorded tamper event can be read and the tampered sensor can be inspected to confirm that the electronic device has actually been tampered with by its user.
    [00049] Figure 12 is a flow chart of another tamper detection process in the electronic device this time involving a selectable or randomly accessible sensor network. The operation starts with block 62 in which the detection circuit is reset, including initializing a window or limit that defines a tamper event for a network of selectable tamper sensors integrated in the electronic device. Note that each tamper sensor can be associated with a different window or limit, as long as the detection circuit is able to be reconfigured or programmed for each different window or limit. The operation then continues with block 64 in which the detection circuit is enabled, to apply a voltage (current) to at least one selected violation sensor. For example, in the mode of Figure 9, this is accomplished by sending a sensor selection command from data processor 30 to the row and column selection logic 28, where the latter in response decodes the requested selection on the appropriate pair of lines. of column and row selection to be activated or expressed. This causes the detection circuit 25 to be connected to a specific sensor on the network. If a tamper event is detected at this point (block 66), then the detection circuit expresses its tamper event alert signal to the data processor, in response to which the data processor records the tamper event detected as being associated with the selected sensor (block 68). If no event is detected by detection circuit 25, then the data processor, recognizing this, selects another violation sensor (block 67). This is accomplished by sending another sensor selection command to the row and column selection logic. 28. The network can thus be scanned in this mode, until a breach event is detected and recorded in block 68. Subsequently, device operations can be disabled in response to a detected breach event (block 69), and the user can be instructed to return the device for maintenance (on block 70).
    [00050] Although certain modalities have been described and shown in the accompanying drawings, it should be understood that such modalities are merely illustrative and not restrictive of the broad invention, and that the invention is not limited to the specific constructions and arrangements shown and described, since various other modifications can occur to those skilled in the art. For example, although the fastener 11 shown in the drawings is of a threaded type, the fastener can alternatively be of a different type or another tool (which still requires a wrench to disengage it from the chassis), for example, a rivet; a spring loaded plunger. The description should therefore be considered as illustrative rather than limiting.
    权利要求:
    Claims (23)
    [0001]
    1. Electronic device, comprising: a chassis (2); a printed circuit board, PWB (4), having a hole (6), a fastener (11) installed inside the hole (6) thereby attaching the PWB (4) to the chassis (2), the PWB (4) having formed a pair of conductive tracks (8, 9) therein; and a detection circuit (25) coupled to the pair of tracks (8, 9) to detect a change in path impedance and, in response, signal an alert to a data processor (30) that evaluates and records violation events in the electronic device, characterized by the fact that the PWB (4) comprises a cover (12) being an amount of conductive glue covering a part of the fastener (11) and filling electrically insulating gaps between each track (8, 9) and the fastener ( 11) to thereby form a conductive path that connects the two tracks (8, 9).
    [0002]
    2. Electronic device according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that as installed, one tool end (14) of the fastener (11) is below a surface of the PCB (4) that is outside the hole (6) , and the amount of conductive glue fills a part of the hole (6).
    [0003]
    3. Electronic device, according to claim 2, and characterized by the fact that the amount of conductive adhesive is in contact with the end of the fastener (11).
    [0004]
    4. Electronic device, according to claim 2, characterized by the fact that the pair of conductive tracks (8, 9) is formed in the same plane as the PWB (4) and above the end of the fastener (11).
    [0005]
    5. Electronic device, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that as installed, a tool end (14) of the fastener (11) is above a surface of the PWB (4) on which the pair of tracks (8 , 9) conductive is formed, and the amount of conductive glue is in contact with the end of the fastener (11).
    [0006]
    6. Electronic device, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that it still comprises: the PWB (4) having another hole, an additional fastener installed inside the other hole thereby attaching the PWB (4) to the chassis (2 ), the PWB (4) having formed an additional pair of conductive tracks, and an additional cover (12) being a measured amount of conductive glue covering a part of the additional fastener and filling electrically insulating gaps between the additional fastener and each one of the respective additional tracks to thereby form an additional conductive path that connects the additional track pair, the detection circuit (25) being coupled to the additional track pair to detect the impedance changes of the additional pair, and in that the route and the additional route are connected in series in series.
    [0007]
    7. Electronic device, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that: the chassis (2) has a conductive portion; the fastener (11) is a conductive fastener having a tool end (14); the PWB (4) has a circuit track (8) formed therein.
    [0008]
    8. Electronic device, according to claim 7, characterized by the fact that the conductive portion of the chassis (2) is grounded.
    [0009]
    9. Electronic device, according to claim 7, characterized by the fact that the conductive portion of the chassis (2) is a grounded metal plate or support.
    [0010]
    10. Electronic device, according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that: the PWB (4) has a plurality of holes (6), and a plurality of fasteners (11) installed inside the holes, respectively, by means of this attaching the PWB (4) to the chassis (2), where for each hole the PWB (4) has formed a respective pair of conductive tracks (8, 9) and a respective cover (12), with a measured amount of conductive glue, covering a part of the fastener (11) that is inside the hole (6) and filling electrically insulating gaps between each fastener (11) and each of the respective tracks (8, 9) to thereby form a respective conductive path with the pair of trails (8, 9), the respective conductive paths being coupled together in series; and a detection circuit (25) is coupled to the respective conductive paths coupled in series to detect a change in impedance in them and, in response, signal an alert to a data processor (30) that evaluates and records the violation events in the electronic device.
    [0011]
    11. Electronic device, according to claim 10, characterized by the fact that the detection circuit (25) is coupled to the respective conductive paths coupled in series in only two nodes.
    [0012]
    12. Electronic device according to claim 10, characterized in that as installed, one tool end of each fastener is below a surface of the PCB (4) inside the respective hole, and the measured amount of conductive glue fills a part of the hole.
    [0013]
    13. Electronic device according to claim 12, characterized by the fact that the measured amount of conductive adhesive is in contact with the end of each fastener.
    [0014]
    14. Electronic device, according to claim 12, characterized by the fact that each pair of conductive tracks (8, 9) is formed in the same plane as the PWB (4) and above the end of each fastener.
    [0015]
    15. Electronic device, according to claim 10, characterized by the fact that as installed, one tool end of each fastener is above a surface of the PWB (4) on which each pair of conductive tracks is formed, and the quantity conductive glue measure is in contact with the end of each fastener.
    [0016]
    16. Electronic device according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that: the PWB printed circuit board (4) has a plurality of holes (6), and a plurality of fasteners (11) installed inside the holes, respectively , hereby attaching the PWB (4) to the chassis (2), where for each hole the PWB (4) has formed a respective pair of conductive tracks (8, 9), and a respective cover (12), being a measured amount of conductive glue, covering part of the fastener (11) that is inside the hole (6) and filling electrically insulating gaps between each fastener (11) and each of the respective tracks (8, 9) to, through from this, form a respective conductive path with the pair of tracks (8, 9), the respective conductive paths being connected as a network of sensors randomly accessible; and a selection and detection circuit coupled to the randomly accessible sensor network, to pass a current through any of the respective conductive paths at a time and then detect a change in impedance in them, the selection and detection circuit stops, in response to detect the change in impedance, signal an alert to a data processor (30) that evaluates and records the violation events on the electronic device, in which the alert identifies the one of the respective conductive paths in which the change in impedance was detected.
    [0017]
    17. Electronic device according to claim 16, characterized in that as installed, one tool end of each fastener is below a surface of the PCB (4) inside the respective hole, and the measured amount of conductive glue fills a part of the hole.
    [0018]
    18.Electronic device according to claim 17, characterized by the fact that the measured amount of conductive glue is in contact with the end of each fastener.
    [0019]
    19. Electronic device, according to claim 17, characterized by the fact that each pair of conductive tracks is formed in the same plane as the PWB (4) and above the end of each fastener.
    [0020]
    20. Electronic device according to claim 16, characterized by the fact that as installed, one tool end of the fastener is above a surface of the PWB (4) on which each pair of conductive tracks is formed, and the quantity measured conductive glue is in contact with the end of each fastener.
    [0021]
    21.Method to manufacture an electronic device, comprising the steps of: attaching (46) a printed circuit board, PWB (4), mounted to a chassis (2) of the electronic device by installing a fastener (11) through a hole (6) in the PWB (4), where the PWB (4) includes at least one circuit track formed in a metallic layer of the PWB (4) adjacent to the hole, characterized by the fact that it also comprises: deposit (48) an amount of conductive glue over the installed fastener (11) that is sufficient to cover one tool end (14) of the fastener (11) and fill an electrically insulating gap between at least one circuit track and the tool end ( 14) to thereby form a tamper sensor.
    [0022]
    22.Method, according to claim 21, characterized by the fact that it still comprises: testing (50) the tamper sensor by evaluating the output of the detection circuit (25) on the mounted PWB (4), in which the detection circuit (25) is coupled to the circuit track through a signal line formed in a metallic layer of the PWB (4); and recording a non-tampered state of the tamper sensor based on the assessment.
    [0023]
    23. Method according to claim 22, characterized by the fact that it still comprises adjusting a window or limit in the detection circuit (25) that defines a violation event for the violation sensor, in which the detection circuit (25 ) used to apply a voltage or current to the tamper sensor and compare a tamper sensor output to the adjusted window or threshold to determine whether to signal a tamper event alert.
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    同族专利:
    公开号 | 公开日
    HK1172435A1|2013-04-19|
    US20110031985A1|2011-02-10|
    WO2011019496A1|2011-02-17|
    EP2465102A1|2012-06-20|
    CN102549626A|2012-07-04|
    US8736286B2|2014-05-27|
    CN102549626B|2014-03-12|
    KR101347474B1|2014-01-02|
    US8278948B2|2012-10-02|
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    KR20120041255A|2012-04-30|
    AU2010282888A1|2012-03-08|
    BR112012003102A2|2016-02-23|
    AU2010282888B2|2013-09-26|
    JP2013502002A|2013-01-17|
    JP5336660B2|2013-11-06|
    EP2465102B1|2013-12-04|
    MX2012001821A|2012-06-08|
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    法律状态:
    2019-01-15| B06F| Objections, documents and/or translations needed after an examination request according [chapter 6.6 patent gazette]|
    2019-07-09| B06T| Formal requirements before examination [chapter 6.20 patent gazette]|
    2019-11-05| B06A| Notification to applicant to reply to the report for non-patentability or inadequacy of the application [chapter 6.1 patent gazette]|
    2020-05-26| B09A| Decision: intention to grant [chapter 9.1 patent gazette]|
    2020-11-03| B16A| Patent or certificate of addition of invention granted|Free format text: PRAZO DE VALIDADE: 10 (DEZ) ANOS CONTADOS A PARTIR DE 03/11/2020, OBSERVADAS AS CONDICOES LEGAIS. |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
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    US61/232,686|2009-08-10|
    US12/721,211|2010-03-10|
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