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    • 专利摘要:
    Key derivation method, device and system A key derivation method, device and system are provided in the field of mobile communications technologies. the key derivation method is applicable to a process of point-to-point transfer of a user equipment (UE) from an evolved universal terrestrial radio access network (eutran) to a universal terrestrial radio access network (utran ). from the failure of a first peer-to-peer transfer to a second peer-to-peer transfer, it is guaranteed that the derived key in a source mobility management entity (mme) in the first UE peer-to-peer transfer process be different from the derived key in mme in the second u point-to-point transfer process by changing input parameters used in key derivation, such as by generating a random value, by changing a stratum downlink count value not of current access (nas), and by obtaining a fresh value of the ue, in order to avoid the situation in the prior art of, once the key used in one rnc is obtained, the keys in the other rncs can be derived accordingly, thereby improving network security.
    公开号:BR112012000658B1
    申请号:R112012000658-4
    申请日:2010-06-26
    公开日:2021-06-22
    发明作者:Aiqin Zhang；Jing Chen；Xiaoyu BI
    申请人:Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.；
    IPC主号:
    专利说明:

    This application claims priority to Chinese Patent Application No. 200910148423.7, filed with the Chinese Patent Office on June 26, 2009 and entitled "KEY DERIVATION METHOD, DEVICE, AND SYSTEM", which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety . FIELD OF THE INVENTION
    The present invention relates to the field of communications technologies and in particular to a key derivation method, device and system. BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
    In a mobile communication system, a radio access network includes a second-generation mobile communication system, a third-generation sound, and a long-term evolution system (LTE).
    In a point-to-point transfer from a user equipment (UE) from the network in which the UE originally is located, specifically a source network, to a target network, a key of the target network can be derived from a key from the source network, thereby avoiding the process of authentication and key negotiation, so that the UE and a network side generate, through the same key parameter and algorithm, the key eventually used in the target network.
    In a universal terrestrial radio access network (UTRAN), the authentication and key negotiation process generates an encryption key (CK) and an integrity key (IK); and in an evolved UTRAN (EUTRAN), the authentication and key negotiation process generates a root key (Kasme).
    Taking the point-to-point handover of a UE from a EUTRAN to a UTRAN as an example, the base station (BS) originally serving the UE in the EUTRAN (referred to as a source BS for summarizing below) starts a handover process peer-to-peer network; a mobility management entity (MME) associated with the source BS, specifically a source MME, derives a CK key’ | IK' of the UE in a target network according to a key derivation function (KDF), an input parameter, specifically a Kasme root key, and a non-access stratum (NAS) downlink COUNT value in the context current security, and sends the derived key to the target UTRAN; the target network decides a security algorithm for the UE and returns the security algorithm for the UE; and the UE synchronizes the key with a target network side according to the security algorithm.
    In the process of point-to-point transfer above the UE from the EUTRAN to the UTRAN, the point-to-point transfer of the UE to the UTRAN may fail due to failure of the connection of an air interface radio link, so that the UE returns to the EUTRAN and initiates a link re-establishment process with the BS currently serving the UE, i.e. the BS the UE is currently located in, referred to as a current BS to summarize below, and after deciding that it is to perform a peer-to-peer transfer, the BS initiates another peer-to-peer transfer process. In this case, the key derivation in the MME in the second peer-to-peer transfer process and the key derivation in the MME in the first peer-to-peer transfer process are both performed according to the Kasme root key and the COUNT value of downlink of current NAS, and therefore the calculated key CK' | IK' is the same, which results in the fact that the key obtained during point-to-point transfer orientation multiple radio network controllers (RNC) in a UMTS network via a service GPRS support node (SGSN) target be the same. In this way, once the key used in one RNC is obtained, the keys in the other RNCs can be derived accordingly, and network security is at risk. SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
    The present invention is directed to a method of key derivation, a device and a system, for improving network security.
    An embodiment of the present invention provides a method of key derivation, wherein the method comprises: obtaining, by a mobility management entity (MME), a new non-access stratum (NAS) downlink COUNT value; the derivation, by the MME, of a user equipment (UE) key in a target universal terrestrial radio access network (UTRAN) in accordance with a key derivation function (KDF), a root key and the new NAS downlink COUNT value; the saving by the MME of the key after key derivation; and the sending, by the MME, of the new NAS downlink COUNT value to the UE, where before the MME obtains the new NAS downlink COUNT value, the method further comprises: the determination, by the MME, whether or not the UE key in the target UTRAN is currently saved; if so, further determine whether a NAS downlink COUNT value corresponding to the currently saved UE key in the target UTRAN is consistent with the current NAS downlink COUNT value; and if consistent, perform the step of getting the new NAS downlink COUNT value.
    An embodiment of the present invention provides a Mobility Management Entity (MME), comprising: a count value obtaining unit, configured to obtain a new non-access stratum (NAS) downlink COUNT value; a second derivation unit, configured to derive a key from a user equipment (UE) in a target universal terrestrial radio access network (UTRAN) in accordance with a key derivation function (KDF), a root key and the new NAS downlink COUNT value which is obtained by the count value obtaining unit; a save unit, configured to save the key derived by the second branch unit; a point-to-point transfer sending unit configured to send the new NAS downlink COUNT value obtained by the count value obtaining unit to the UE; a determining unit configured to determine whether or not the UE key in the target UTRAN is currently saved; and if so, further determine whether a NAS downlink COUNT value corresponding to the currently saved key of the UE in the target UTRAN is consistent with the current NAS downlink COUNT value, where when a determination result of the determination unit is that the NAS downlink COUNT value corresponding to the currently saved key of the UE in the target UTRAN is consistent with the current NAS downlink COUNT value, the unit of obtaining the COUNT value obtains the new NAS downlink COUNT value.
    An embodiment of the present invention provides a method of key derivation, where the method includes: receiving, by a mobility management entity (MME), a point-to-point transfer request message from a base station (BS ); the derivation, by the MME, of a user equipment (UE) key in a target universal terrestrial radio access network (UTRAN) in accordance with a key derivation function (KDF), a Kasme root key, and a current non-access stratum (NAS) downlink COUNT value; the UE key being CK’ | IK’, with CK’ being an encryption key and IK’ being an integrity key; the sending, by the MME, of the current NAS downlink COUNT value to the UE; the addition, by the MME, of a certain value to the current NAS downlink COUNT value.
    An embodiment of the present invention provides a method of key derivation, where the method includes: the receipt, by a user equipment (UE), of a current non-access stratum (NAS) downlink COUNT value from an entity mobility management tools (MME) and a first peer-to-peer transfer process; the derivation, by the UE, of a UE key in a target universal terrestrial radio access network (UTRAN) in accordance with a key derivation function (KDF), a Kasme root key, and a downlink COUNT value of current NAS in the first peer-to-peer transfer process; the UE key being CK’ | IK’, with CK’ being an encryption key and IK’ being an integrity key; the receipt by the UE of a new NAS downlink COUNT value obtained by the MME by adding a certain value to the current NAS downlink COUNT value in a second point-to-point transfer process. The method, device and key derivation system according to the embodiments of the present invention are applicable to the process of point-to-point transfer of the UE from the EUTRAN to the UTRAN. From the failure of the first point-to-point transfer to the second point-to-point transfer, it is guaranteed that the derived key in the source MME in the first UE point-to-point transfer process is different from the derived key in the MME in the second process of point-to-point transfer of the UE by obtaining the input parameters used in key derivation, such as generating the random value, changing the current NAS downlink COUNT value, and obtaining the refresh value of the UE , in order to avoid the situation in the prior art that, once the key used in one RNC has been obtained, the keys in the other RNCs can be derived accordingly, thereby improving the security of the network. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
    Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a key derivation method in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 is a flowchart of a key derivation method according to Method Embodiment 1 of the present invention; Figure 3 is a flowchart of a key derivation method according to Method Embodiment 2 of the present invention; Figure 4 is a flowchart of a key derivation method according to Method Embodiment 3 of the present invention; Figure 5 is a flowchart of a key derivation method in accordance with Method Embodiment 4 of the present invention; Figure 6 is a flowchart of a key derivation method according to Method Embodiment 5 of the present invention; Figure 7 is a schematic diagram illustrating a logical structure of an MME in accordance with a Device Mode 1 of the present invention; Figure 8 is a schematic diagram illustrating a logical structure of a UE according to a Device Mode 2 of the present invention; Figure 9 is a schematic diagram illustrating a logical structure of an MME in accordance with a Device Mode 3 of the present invention; Figure 10 is a schematic diagram illustrating a logical structure of a UE according to a Device Mode 4 of the present invention; Figure 11 is a schematic diagram illustrating a logical structure of an MME in accordance with a Device Mode 5 of the present invention; Figure 12 is a schematic diagram illustrating a logical structure of a BS in accordance with a Device Mode 6 of the present invention; Figure 13 is a schematic diagram illustrating a logical structure of a UE according to a Device Modality 7 of the present invention; Figure 14 is a schematic diagram illustrating a logical structure of an MME in accordance with a Device Mode 8 of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF MODALITIES
    Embodiments of the present invention are applicable to the process of end-to-end transfer of a UE from an EUTRAN to an UTRAN. The following method is used to improve network security in the embodiments of the present invention: a NAS downlink COUNT value used when a key derivation is performed on a source MME during a first point-to-point transfer process of the UE is different from the NAS downlink COUNT value used when a key derivation is performed in the MME during a second UE peer-to-peer transfer process, so that the keys generated during each peer-to-peer transfer process of the UE from the EUTRAN to the UTRAN are different, and the UE keys used in the RNC and the SGSN in the target network are thus different. Therefore, the situation in the prior art is that, once the key used in one RNC has been obtained, the keys in the other RNCs can be derived accordingly, thereby improving the security of the network.
    One embodiment of the present invention provides a method of key derivation, where the method includes the following steps:
    Step 10: An MME generates a random value.
    Step 20: MME uses the random value and a root key as input parameters of a KDF to derive a key from a UE in a target UTRAN; or use the random value, a current NAS downlink COUNT value, and the root key as KDF input parameters for deriving the UE key in the target UTRAN.
    For better understanding, the key derivation method, the device and the system according to the embodiments of the present invention are described below through a network specific point-to-point transfer process. Method 1 Mode
    A key derivation method is provided. An application scenario of this modality is a point-to-point transfer process of a UE from an EUTRAN to an UTRAN. A flowchart of the method according to this modality is shown in Figure 2, which includes the following steps:
    Step 101: A BS in which a UE is currently located, specifically a current BS, sends a required point-to-point transfer message to an MME associated with the current BS, specifically, a current MME.
    Step 102: The current MME receives the required point-to-point transfer message, generates a random value, and uses the random value and a root key as input parameters of a KDF for deriving a UE key in a UTRAN target.
    It can be understood that the current MME can generate a random value at any time upon receipt of the required point-to-point transfer message. When generating the random value, the current EMA can randomly generate the random value, that is, a refreshed EMA value through an internal random number generation module.
    The specific description of a KDF is that KDF=Hash Function (HMAC)-SHA-256(Key, S), where Key is an input function, and S=FC | P0 | L0 | P1 | L1 | P2 | L2 | P3 | L3 |... | Pn | Ln, where | represents a concatenation, FC is used for distinguishing different KDFs, P is an input parameter code, and L is the length of the input parameter corresponding to P. When KDF is used for the derivation of a key CK' | | IK', to CK' | IK'=KDF(KASME, S), and S=FC | P0 | L0, where FC is specifically 0x16, P0 is a NAS downlink COUNT value, and L0 is the length of the NAS downlink COUNT value (such as 0x00 0x04).
    When deriving the key in this mode, the current MME can use the renewed value of the MME and the root key as the input parameters of the KDF for deriving the key from the UE in the target UTRAN. In this case, the CK key' | IK'=KDF(Kasme, S), where S=FC | renewed value of MME | length of renewed value of MME.
    Step 103: The current MME sends a relocation request message to a target RNC via a target SGSN, wherein the relocation request message includes the UE key in the target UTRAN calculated in step 102, a corresponding KSI, and a information, such as a UE UTRAN security capability or a GSM/EDGE radio access network (GERAN).
    Step 104: The target RNC sends a relocation forwarding response message to the MME via the target SGSN, wherein the relocation forwarding response message carries an algorithm identifier (ID) selected by the target RNC according to capability of EU security.
    Step 105: The current MME sends the random value obtained in step 102 to the UE via a point-to-point transfer command message.
    It can be understood that the MME can send the point-to-point transfer command message to the BS, in which the point-to-point transfer command message can include the generated random value, and further include such information. as the algorithm ID and current NAS downlink COUNT value; and the BS then sends information such as the random value, the current NAS downlink COUNT value and the algorithm ID included in the point-to-point transfer command message to the UE via a HO command message. from EUTRAN.
    Step 106: The UE receives the end-to-end transfer command message, derives the key according to the random value via the method in step 102 above, thereby obtaining key synchronization between the UE and the target network, and sends a completed HO message to the target RNC to complete the network point-to-point transfer. It can be understood that the UE can calculate the specific CK’ or the specific IK’ according to the algorithm ID.
    It should be noted that in the first point-to-point transfer process from the UE to the UTRAN, the source MME can apply the key derivation method used in the network point-to-point transfer of this mode; and, after failure of the first point-to-point transfer of the UE, the MME can also apply the key derivation method of this modality, for the derivation of the key in the second point-to-point transfer of the UE.
    In another specific embodiment, when performing the key derivation in step 102, the MME may use the random value, the current NAS downlink COUNT value and the root key as the KDF input parameters for the derivation of the key of the UE in the target UTRAN. In this case, the CK key' | IK'=KDF(Kasme, S), where S=FC | P0 | L0 | renewed value of MME | length of 8 mme. Then, in step 105, the MME sends the point-to-point transfer command message including the random value and the current NAS downlink COUNT value to the UE, and only four least significant bits of the downlink COUNT value of Current NAS can be included here. Thereby, in step 106, the UE derives the key according to the random value and the downlink COUNT value of the current NAS by using the method in step 102.
    In other specific arrangements, on the first point-to-point transfer of the UE, the source MME can save the key, after deriving the key; and, when the first peer-to-peer transfer of the UE is successful, the saved key can be erased. The source MME receives a relocation complete routing message sent by the target SGSN after the UE sends the HO completed message, which indicates that the first point-to-point transfer is successful. Upon receipt of the required point-to-point transfer message, the MME determines whether the UE key in the target UTRAN is currently saved; if so, the MME still determines whether the NAS downlink COUNT value corresponding to the UE's currently saved key in the target UTRAN is consistent with the current NAS downlink COUNT value; and, if consistent, the EMA gets a random value. Definitely, when the MME determines that the UE key in the target UTRAN is not currently saved, a random value is obtained by using the method of this modality, and then the derivation is performed; and, if the consistency determination result above is inconsistent, the derivation will be performed using the current derivation method.
    It can be understood that, in the second point-to-point transfer of the UE after the first point-to-point transfer of the UE fails and before the MME receives the requested point-to-point transfer message again, a NAS process can be performed, and the NAS downlink COUNT value changes, so that when the above determination result is inconsistent, the MME can use the current NAS downlink COUNT value for the key derivation, and the derived key in this way is different from the derived key in the first point-to-point transfer; if the determination result is positive, a random value will be obtained.
    In the embodiment of the present invention, the key derivation method used in the point-to-point transfer of the UE from the EUTRAN to the UTRAN is that: upon receipt of the required point-to-point transfer message, the MME generates a random value , and derive the key of the UE in the target UTRAN according to the KDF, the root key and the random value. In this case, the key derived in the second peer-to-peer transfer process after the failure of the first UE peer-to-peer transfer is surely different from the key derived in the first peer-to-peer transfer process, thus avoiding the situation in the art. earlier and improving network security. Method 2 Mode
    A network peer-to-peer transfer method is provided. An application scenario of this modality is that in the process of point-to-point transfer of a UE from a EUTRAN to an UTRAN, after a first point-to-point transfer of the UE fails, the UE returning to an original EUTRAN and selecting a SGSN for a second point-to-point transfer. A flowchart of the method according to this modality is shown in Figure 3, which includes the following steps:
    Step 201: UE sends an RRC connection re-establishment request message to a source BS, and performs an RRC connection re-establishment process.
    It can be understood that, after the first point-to-point transfer fails, the UE may return to a different cell under the source BS, or return to the same cell under the source BS, or return to a BS different from the source BS. source. In this embodiment, an example of the UE returning to the same cell under the source BS is used for illustration.
    Step 202: After the RRC connection is re-established, the source BS sends a required point-to-point transfer message to a source MME.
    Step 203: The source MME receives the required point-to-point transfer message, and obtains a new NAS downlink COUNT value, in which the new NAS downlink COUNT value is different from a downlink COUNT value of current NAS.
    When obtaining the new NAS downlink COUNT value, the source MME can obtain the new NAS downlink COUNT value as follows: by adding a certain value to the current NAS downlink COUNT value, such as as adding 1; or sending a NAS message, such as a NAS security mode command (SMC) message, to the UE, so that the currently saved NAS downlink COUNT value is added 1, and the link COUNT value NAS downlink after the NAS message is sent is used as the new NAS downlink COUNT value.
    Step 204: The source MME derives the UE key in a target UTRAN according to a KDF, a root key and the new NAS downlink COUNT value.
    The key derived by the source MME is CK' | IK'=KDF(Kasme, S), where S=FC | new AS downlink COUNT value | length of new AS downlink COUNT value.
    Step 205: The source MME sends a relocation request message to a target RNC via the target SGSN, wherein the relocation request message includes the key of the UE in the target UTRAN calculated in step 204.
    Step 206: The target RNC sends a relocation forwarding response message to the source MME via the target SGSN, wherein the relocation forwarding response message carries an algorithm ID selected by the target RNC according to a capability of EU security.
    Step 207: The source MME sends the new NAS downlink COUNT value to the UE via a point-to-point transfer command message, in which only four least significant bits of the new NAS downlink COUNT value can be sent to the EU.
    It can be understood that the MME can send the point-to-point transfer command message to the BS, in which the point-to-point transfer command message may include the new NAS downlink COUNT value, and may also include an information such as an algorithm ID; and the BS then sends the new NAS downlink COUNT value to the UE via a HO command message from EUTRAN.
    Step 208: The UE receives the point-to-point transfer command message, derives the key according to the random value via the method in step 204 above, thereby obtaining key synchronization between the UE and the target network, and sends a completed HO message to the target RNC to complete the network point-to-point transfer.
    In other specific embodiments, in the first UE point-to-point transfer process, the source MME may save the key after key derivation and, upon receipt of a relocation forwarding completed message sent by the target SGSN, the MME can erase the saved key. Therefore, prior to executing step 203, the source MME determines whether the key of the UE in the target UTRAN is currently saved; if so, it still determines whether the NAS downlink COUNT value corresponding to the UE's currently saved key in the target UTRAN is consistent with the current NAS downlink COUNT value; and, if consistent, performs step 203 to obtain the new NAS downlink COUNT value. Definitely, when the source MME determines that the key of the UE in the target UTRAN is not currently saved, the MME can perform step 203 to obtain the new NAS downlink COUNT value; and, if the consistency determination result above is inconsistent, the MME will perform the derivation according to the current derivation method.
    It can be understood that in the second UE end-to-end handover, after the second UE end-to-end handover fails and before the source MME receives the requested end-to-end handover message again, a NAS process can is performed, and the NAS downlink COUNT value changes, so that when the above determination result is inconsistent, the source MME can use the current NAS downlink COUNT value to derive the key, and the key derived in this way is different from the key derived in the second point-to-point transfer; if the determination result is positive, key derivation will be performed after the new NAS downlink COUNT value is obtained.
    In an embodiment of the present invention, two state machines are regulated in the source MME, respectively, for key derivation unable to use the saved NAS downlink COUNT value and the key derivation capable of using the link COUNT value saved NAS downlink and the key derivation capable of using the saved NAS downlink COUNT value, and are respectively indicated by State 0 and State 1. When the source MME receives the required point-to-point transfer message, state 0 is regulated; and when the MME goes through a certain internal process and satisfies a preset condition, State 1 is regulated, that is, key derivation can be performed, where the preset condition includes: the MME receives a message After relocation forwarding is completed, the current NAS downlink COUNT value is added by a certain value, and the MME delivers a NAS message. For example, after the MME receives the required point-to-point transfer message and delivers the message from the NAS, key derivation can be performed.
    In the embodiment of the present invention, in the process of UE point-to-point transfer from EUTRAN to UTRAN, after the first point-to-point transfer fails, the key derivation method in the second network point-to-point transfer is that, upon receipt of the required point-to-point transfer message, the source MME obtains the new NAS downlink COUNT value different from the current NAS downlink COUNT value, and derives the UE key in the target UTRAN from according to KDF, the root key and the new NAS downlink COUNT value. In this way, the key derived in the second point-to-point transfer process is surely different from the key derived in the first point-to-point transfer process, thus avoiding the situation in the prior art and improving the security of the network. Method 3 Mode
    A key derivation method is provided. An application scenario of this modality is that, in the process of peer-to-peer transfer of a UE from a EUTRAN to an UTRAN, after the first peer-to-peer transfer of the UE fails, the UE returns to the original EUTRAN and selects an SGSN for a second point-to-point transfer. A flowchart of the method is shown in Figure 4, which includes the following steps:
    Step 301: The UE sends an RRC connection re-establishment request request message to an 85, where the UE currently is located, specifically a current BS, for performing an RRC connection re-establishment process.
    It can be understood that, after the first point-to-point transfer fails, the UE may return to a different cell under a source BS, or return to the same cell under the source BS, or return to a different BS from the Source BS.
    Step 302: After the RRC connection is re-established, the current BS sends an RRC connection re-establishment completed message to an MME associated with the current BS, specifically, a current memory.
    It can be understood that the RRC connection re-establishment completed message may be an HO notify message, or it may be a route switching message. Specifically, if the UE returns to the different cell under the source BS, the current BS, specifically, the source BS, can send the HO notify message to the current MME to indicate that connection re-establishment is complete; if the UE returns to the BS other than the source BS, the current BS can send the path switch message to the current MME.
    Step 303: The current MME receives the RRC connection re-establishment completed message sent by the current BS, and obtains a new NAS downlink COUNT value, where the new NAS downlink COUNT value is different from a COUNT value of current NAS downlink.
    The method of obtaining is the same as that described in step 203 of Method Modality 2, and the details will not be described again here.
    Step 304: The current BS determines that it is to perform the second point-to-point transfer and sends a required point-to-point transfer message to the current MME.
    Step 305: Upon receipt of the required point-to-point transfer message, the current MME derives the key of the UE in the target UTRAN according to a KDF, a root key and the new NAS downlink COUNT value obtained in step 303, and sends the derived key to a target RNC.
    After the key is sent to the target RNC, the network point-to-point transfer method is the same as the Method Mode 2 method after step 205, and the details are not described here again. In addition, step 303 and step 304 in this mode can be performed at the same time, but preferably they are performed in sequence, and therefore the network point-to-point transfer process cannot be affected, which saves point-to-point network transfer time.
    The key derivation method in the embodiment of the present invention is that, during the point-to-point transfer of the UE from the EUTRAN to the UTRAN, after the first point-to-point transfer fails and before the second point-to-point transfer of the UE, the MME obtains the new NAS downlink COUNT value different from the current NAS downlink COUNT value, so that after the MME receives the required point-to-point transfer message, the key is derived and calculated from the UE in the UTRAN The target is surely different from the derived key in the first point-to-point transfer process, thus avoiding the situation in the prior art and improving network security.
    Furthermore, due to the fact that obtaining the new NAS downlink COUNT value is performed before the second point-to-point transfer, the network point-to-point transfer cannot be affected, and compared to the Modality of Method 1, the network peer-to-peer transfer time is reduced. Method Mode 4
    A key derivation method is provided. An application scenario of this modality is that, in the process of point-to-point transfer of a UE from an EUTRAN to an UTRAN, after a first point-to-point transfer of the UE fails, the UE returns to the original EUTRAN for a second transfer from point to point. A flowchart of the method is shown in Figure 5, which includes the following steps:
    Step 401: The UE sends an RRC connection re-establishment request message to a BS, where the UE currently is located, specifically a current BS, in which the RRC connection re-establishment request message may include 2 odd bits to carry a renewed EU value, specifically a random value.
    Step 402: Upon receipt of the RRC connection re-establishment request message, the current BS determines that it is to perform the second UE point-to-point transfer, and sends, via a required point-to-point transfer message, the renewed UE value for the MME associated with the current BS, specifically the current MME, for the derivation of the UE key in the target UTRAN.
    Step 403: Upon receipt of the required peer-to-peer transfer message, the current MME uses the renewed UE value included in the required peer-to-peer transfer message and a root key as input parameters of a KDF for derivation of the UE key in the target UTRAN.
    When deriving the key, the current MME can use the UE refresh value and the root key as the KDF input parameters for deriving the UE key in the target UTRAN; and, in this case, the CK key' | IK'=KDF(Kasme, S), where S=FC | renewed value of EU | renewed value length of EU.
    Step 404: The current MME sends a relocation request message to a target RNC via a target SGSN, wherein the relocation request message includes the key of the UE in the target UTRAN calculated in step 403.
    Step 405: The target RNC sends a relocation forwarding reply message to the current MME via the target SGSN, wherein the relocation forwarding reply message carries an algorithm ID selected by the target RNC according to a security capability of the EU.
    Step 406: The current MME sends a peer-to-peer transfer command message to the BS, where the peer-to-peer transfer command message may include the current NAS downlink COUNT value, and may even include a information such as an algorithm ID; and then the BS sends the point-to-point transfer command message to the UE, wherein the point-to-point transfer command message may include the current NAS downlink COUNT value.
    Step 407: The UE receives the end-to-end transfer command message, and derives the key according to the refreshed value of the UE via the method in step 403 above, thereby obtaining key synchronization between the UE and the target network .
    In another specific embodiment, in step 403, the MME can use the UE refresh value, the current NAS downlink COUNT value and the root key as KDF input parameters for deriving the UE key in the target UTRAN . In this case, the CK key' | IK'=KDF(Kasme, S), where S=FC | P0 | L0 | renewed value of EU | UE refresh value length, such that the end-to-end transfer command message sent to the UE in step 406 must include the current NAS downlink COUNT value, and may include the least significant four bits; and, in step 407, the UE can derive the key according to the refresh value of the UE and the current NAS downlink COUNT value by using the method in step 403.
    It can be understood that the subsequent process is similar to the prior art, and the details are not described again here.
    In other specific embodiments, in the first UE point-to-point transfer process, the source MME may save the key after key derivation and, upon receipt of a relocation forwarding completed message sent by the target SGSN, the MME can erase the saved key. Therefore, upon receipt of the required point-to-point transfer message, the current MME determines whether the UE key in the target UTRAN is currently saved; if so, it still determines whether the NAS downlink COUNT value corresponding to the UE's currently saved key in the target UTRAN is consistent with the current NAS downlink COUNT value; and, if consistent, key derivation is performed according to the method of this modality. Definitely, when the MME determines that the key of the UE in the target UTRAN is not currently saved, the derivation is performed according to the method of this modality; and, if the consistency determination result above is inconsistent, the derivation will be performed according to the derivation method in the prior art.
    It can be understood that, in the second UE end-to-end handover, after the first UE end-to-end handover fails, before the MME receives the requested end-to-end handover message again, a NAS process can be performed, and the NAS downlink COUNT value changes, so that when the above determination result is inconsistent, the MME can use the current NAS downlink COUNT value for key derivation, and the key derived from it. way is different from the derived key in the first point-to-point transfer; if the determination result is positive, the key derivation will be performed according to the method of this modality.
    The key derivation method in the embodiment of the present invention is that, in the process of point-to-point transfer of the UE from the EUTRAN to the UTRAN, when the UE performs the second point-to-point transfer after the first point transfer at the point of failure, the UE calculates a fresh value, and sends the fresh value to the current MME via the current BS; upon receipt of the required point-to-point transfer message, the MME derives the UE key in the target UTRAN according to the UE refresh value, the KDF, the root key and the current NAS downlink COUNT value included in the required point-to-point transfer message. In this way, the derived key in the second peer-to-peer transfer process is different from the derived key in the first peer-to-peer transfer process, thus avoiding the situation in the prior art and improving network security. Method Mode 5
    A key derivation method is provided. An application scenario of this modality is that, in the process of point-to-point transfer of a UE from a EUTRAN to an UTRAN, a BS in the original EUTRAN of the UE, specifically, a source BS, initiates a point-to-point transfer. net point. A flowchart of the method is shown in Figure 6, which includes the following steps.
    Step 501: The source BS sends a required point-to-point transfer message to a source MME.
    Step 502: Source MME derives CK' | IK' according to a KDF, a Kasme root key, and a NAS downlink COUNT value in a current security context.
    Step 503: The source MME sends a relocation request message to a target RNC via a target SGSN, wherein the relocation request message includes CK' | IK', KSI, and an information such as a security capability of the UTRAN/GERAN of the UE.
    Step 504: The target RNC sends a relocation forwarding response message to the source MME via the target SGSN, wherein the relocation forwarding response message carries a security capability algorithm ID of the UE.
    Step 505: The source MME completes a point-to-point transfer preparation process, and sends a point-to-point transfer command message to the UE via the source BS, wherein the point-to-point transfer command message the dot carries the current NAS downlink COUNT value and the security capability algorithm ID.
    Step 506: Source MME changes the current NAS downlink COUNT value, for example by adding a certain value to the current NAS downlink COUNT value, such as adding 1, and saves the NAS downlink COUNT value changed; the changed NAS downlink COUNT value is used for deriving the key of the UE in the target UTRAN.
    Step 507: After receiving the peer-to-peer transfer command message, the UE derives and calculates the CK' | IK' according to KDF and the NAS downlink COUNT value that is included in the point-to-point transfer command message, so that the UE key and the target network are synchronized, and a HO message completed is sent to the target RNC.
    It can be understood that, in the first point-to-point transfer process in this mode, after the source MME sends the point-to-point transfer command message, the NAS downlink COUNT value is changed, so that after the first UE point-to-point transfer fails, the NAS downlink COUNT value saved in step 506 and used by the MME for key derivation in the second point-to-point transfer is surely different from the NAS downlink COUNT value used in the first peer-to-peer transfer, and therefore the keys derived and calculated in the two peer-to-peer transfers are different, which achieves the purpose of improving network security. Device Mode 1
    An MME is provided. A schematic structural diagram of the MME is shown in figure 7, which includes a generating unit 10, a shunt unit 11 and a sending unit 12.
    Generation unit 10 is configured to generate a random value.
    The derivation unit 11 is configured to use a root key and the random value that is generated by the generation unit 10 as input parameters of a KDF for the derivation of a key of a UE in a target UTRAN.
    The sending unit 12 is configured to send the random value generated by the generating unit 10 to the UE, so that the UE derives the key in the target UTRAN according to the random value.
    The derivation unit 11 is further configured to use a current NAS downlink COUNT value, the root key and the random value generated by the generation unit 10 as the KDF input parameters, for the derivation of the UE key in the target UTRAN; and the sending unit 12 is configured to send the current NAS downlink COUNT value and the random value generated by the generation unit 10 to the UE, so that the UE derives the key in the target UTRAN according to the random value and the current NAS downlink COUNT value.
    In this mode, the MME generation unit 10 generates a random value, and the derivation unit 11 derives the key according to the random value, so that in the process of UE point-to-point transfer from EUTRAN to the UTRAN, after the first point-to-point transfer fails, the key derived by the MME in the second point-to-point transfer process is surely different from the key derived in the first point-to-point transfer process, therefore avoiding the situation in the art earlier and improving network security. Device Mode 2
    One UE is provided. A structural schematic diagram of the self is shown in figure 8, which includes a message receiving unit 20 and a key bypass unit 21.
    The message receiving unit 20 is configured to receive a point-to-point transfer command message.
    The key derivation unit 21 is configured to use a random value and a root key as input parameters of a KDF for the derivation of the UE key in a target UTRAN, if the received point-to-point transfer command message by the message receiving unit 20 including the random value; and configured to use the random value, a current NAS downlink COUNT value, and the root key as the KDF input parameters for the derivation of the UE key in the target UTRAN, if the point-to-point transfer command message point received by message receiving unit 20 include the random value and the current NAS downlink COUNT value. Device Mode 3
    An MME is provided. A structural schematic diagram of the MME is shown in Fig. 9, which includes a count value acquisition unit 31, a second derivation unit 32 and a point-to-point transfer sending unit 33.
    Count value get unit 31 is configured to get a new NAS downlink COUNT value.
    When the new NAS downlink COUNT value is obtained, a NAS message can be sent to the UE, such as a NAS SMC message, so that the currently saved NAS downlink COUNT value can be added 1 , and the NAS downlink COUNT value after the NAS message is sent can be used as the new NAS downlink COUNT value. A certain value, such as 1, can be added to the current NAS downlink COUNT value.
    The second derivation unit 32 is configured to derive a key of the UE in a target UTRAN, according to a KDF, a root key and the new NAS downlink COUNT value which is obtained by the counting value obtaining unit. 31.
    The point-to-point transfer sending unit 33 is configured to send the new NAS downlink value COUNT obtained by the count value obtaining unit 31 to the UE via a BS, where the UE is currently located, from so that the UE derives the key in the target UTRAN.
    It can be understood that in other specific embodiments, the MME may further include: a determination unit 34, configured to determine whether the key of the UE in the target UTRAN is currently saved; and, if so, further determines whether the NAS downlink COUNT value corresponding to the UE's currently saved key in the target UTRAN is consistent with the current NAS downlink COUNT value.
    When the determination result of the determination unit 34 is that the NAS downlink COUNT value corresponding to the currently saved key of the UE in the target UTRAN is consistent with the current NAS downlink COUNT value, the count 31 gets the new NAS downlink COUNT value.
    The count value obtaining unit 31 in the MME according to the embodiment of the present invention obtains the new NAS downlink COUNT value different from the current NAS downlink COUNT value; and finally, the second derivation unit 32 derives the key of the UE in the target UTRAN according to the KDF, the root key and the new NAS downlink COUNT value, and the point-to-point transfer sending unit 33 sends the new NAS downlink COUNT value to the UE. In this way, in the UE point-to-point transfer process from the EUTRAN to the UTRAN, after the first point-to-point transfer fails, the key derived by the MME in the second point-to-point transfer process is surely different from the key derivative in the first point-to-point transfer process, thus avoiding the situation in the prior art and improving network security.
    Furthermore, it can be understood that, after the first point-to-point transfer of the UE fails, during the second point-to-point transfer of the UE, before the MME receives the requested point-to-point transfer message again, a process of NAS can be realized, and the NAS downlink COUNT value therefore changes, the MME still includes the determination unit 34 for consistency determination. If the consistency determination result is inconsistent, the current NAS downlink COUNT value can be used for key derivation; if the consistency determination result is positive, the key will be derived after the count value obtain unit 31 obtains the new NAS downlink COUNT value. Therefore, obtaining the new NAS downlink COUNT value is reduced when the consistency determination result is inconsistent, thus saving the MME load. Device Mode 4
    One UE is provided. A structural schematic diagram of the UE is shown in Fig. 10 which includes a second message receiving unit 40 and a second key derivation unit 41.
    The second message receiving unit 40 is configured to receive a peer-to-peer transfer command message, wherein the peer-to-peer transfer command message includes a new NAS downlink COUNT value.
    The second key derivation unit 41 is configured to derive a key of the UE in a target UTRAN according to a KDF, a root key and the new NAS downlink COUNT value in the point-to-point transfer command message received by the second message receiving unit 40. Device Mode 5
    An MME is provided. A structural schematic diagram of the MME is shown in Figure 11 which includes a point-to-point transfer receiving unit 50 and a third bypass unit 51.
    The point-to-point transfer receiving unit 50 is configured to receive a requested point-to-point transfer message, in which the requested point-to-point transfer message includes a renewed value of a UE.
    The third derivation unit 51 is configured to use a root key and the renewed UE value in the required peer-to-peer transfer message received by the peer-to-peer transfer receiving unit 50 as input parameters of a KDF, to deriving the key of the UE in a target UTRAN, or using a current NAS downlink COUNT value, the root key and the renewed value of the UE in the required point-to-point transfer message received by the transfer receiving unit. point-to-point 50 as the KDF input parameters for deriving the UE key in the target UTRAN.
    In this mode, after the MME point-to-point transfer receiving unit 50 receives the required point-to-point transfer message, the third derivation unit 51 derives the key according to the renewed value of the UE included in the transfer message. point-to-point transfer process required, so that, in the UE point-to-point transfer process from the EUTRAN to the UTRAN, after the first point-to-point transfer fails, the key derived by the MME in the second point transfer process to point is reliably different from the key derived in the first point to point transfer process, thus avoiding the situation in the prior art and improving network security. Device Mode 6
    A BS is provided. A schematic structural diagram of the BS is shown in Figure 12, which includes a reset receiving unit 60 and a sending and tapping unit 61.
    The re-establishment receiving unit 60 is provided to receive an RRC connection re-establishment request message, wherein the RRC connection re-establishment request message includes a refresh value from the UE.
    The sending and bypass unit 61 is configured to send the refresh value of the UE included in the RRC connection re-establishment request message received by the re-establishment receiving unit 60 to an MME via a requested point-to-point transfer message. , when a second point-to-point transfer of the UE is determined, so as to facilitate the MME for deriving the key of the UE in the target UTRAN. Device Mode 7
    One UE is provided. A structural schematic diagram of the UE is shown in Figure 13 which includes a reset sending unit 71 and a third key tap unit 72.
    The re-establishment sending unit 71 is configured to send an RRC connection re-establishment request message, wherein the RRC connection re-establishment request message includes a refresh value of a UE.
    The third key derivation unit 72 is configured to use the UE refresh value and a root key as input parameters of a KDF for deriving the UE key in a target UTRAN upon receipt of a command message. point-to-point transfer, and use the renewed UE value, a current NAS downlink COUNT value, and the root key as the KDF input parameters for the derivation of the UE key in the target UTRAN, if the message point-to-point transfer command parameters include the current NAS downlink COUNT value. Device Mode 8
    An MME is provided. A structural schematic diagram of the MME is shown in Fig. 14 which includes a message receiving unit 81 and a count value change unit 82.
    The message receiving unit 81 is configured to receive a relocation forwarding reply message sent by a target SGSN.
    The count value change unit 82 is configured to change a current NAS downlink COUNT value and save the changed NAS downlink COUNT value after sending a point-to-point transfer command message to a UE , in which the changed NAS downlink COUNT value is used for deriving a UE key in a target UTRAN.
    It can be understood that: after the message receiving unit 81 in the MME receives the relocation forwarding response message sent by the SGSN in the target network, which indicates that the target network has performed a relocation to the UE, the point-to-point transfer point can be performed. In this case, after the count value change unit 82 sends the point-to-point transfer command message, the current NAS downlink COUNT value is changed.
    Therefore, after the first peer-to-peer transfer of the UE fails, during a second peer-to-peer transfer, the MME uses the NAS downlink COUNT value saved in the MME for key derivation, which ensures that the COUNT value The NAS downlink COUNT value is different from the NAS downlink COUNT value used in the first point-to-point transfer, so the keys derived and calculated in the two point-to-point transfers are different. Therefore, the purpose of improving network security is achieved. System Mode
    A communication system is provided which includes an MME. The MME is similar to any of the MMEs in Device Modes 1, 3, 5 and 8, and the key derivation method according to the above modalities can be performed.
    It can be understood that the communication system still includes other devices, such as a UE and a BS, and network security can be improved through communication between the UE and the BS.
    The key derivation method, device and system according to the embodiments of the present invention are applicable to the UE point-to-point transfer process from EUTRAN to UTRAN. From the failure of the first point-to-point transfer to the second point-to-point transfer, it is guaranteed that the derived key in the source MME in the first UE point-to-point transfer process is different from the derived key in the MME in the second UE point-to-point transfer process, by changing the input parameters used in key derivation by the MME, such as generating the random value, changing the current NAS downlink COUNT value, and obtaining the renewed value of the UE, in order to avoid the situation in the prior art that, once the key used in one RNC is obtained, the keys in the other RNCs can be derived accordingly, thereby improving the security of the network.
    Persons skilled in the art should understand that all or a part of the steps of the method according to the embodiments of the present invention can be implemented by a program instructing relevant hardware. The program can be stored on a computer-readable storage medium, such as read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disk, or optical disk.
    Key derivation method, device and system are described in detail above. The principle and implementation of the present invention are described here through specific examples. The description of the embodiments of the present invention is merely provided for ease of understanding of the method and core ideas of the present invention. Persons skilled in the art can make variations and modifications to the present invention in terms of specific implementations and scopes of application in accordance with the ideas of the present invention. Therefore, the descriptive report should not be construed as a limit to the present invention.
    权利要求:
    Claims (15)
    [0001]
    1. Key derivation method, characterized by comprising: obtaining, by a mobility management entity (MME), a new non-access stratum (NAS) downlink COUNT value; the derivation, by the MME, of a user equipment (UE) key in a target universal terrestrial radio access network (UTRAN) in accordance with a key derivation function (KDF), a root key and the new NAS downlink COUNT value; the saving by the MME of the key after key derivation; and the sending, by the MME, of the new NAS downlink COUNT value to the UE, where before the MME obtains the new NAS downlink COUNT value, the method further comprises: the determination, by the MME, whether or not the UE key in the target UTRAN is currently saved; if so, further determine whether a NAS downlink COUNT value corresponding to the currently saved UE key in the target UTRAN is consistent with the current NAS downlink COUNT value; and if consistent, perform the step of getting the new NAS downlink COUNT value.
    [0002]
    2. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the MME obtains the new NAS downlink COUNT value comprising: the addition, by the MME, of a certain value to a current NAS downlink COUNT value .
    [0003]
    3. Method according to claim 2, characterized in that the certain value is 1.
    [0004]
    4. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the obtaining by the MME of the new NAS downlink COUNT value comprises: the sending, by the MME, of a NAS message to the UE, and the use of a value NAS downlink COUNT after the NAS message is sent as the new NAS downlink COUNT value.
    [0005]
    5. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the sending, by the MME, of the new NAS downlink COUNT value to the UE comprises: the sending, by the MME, of the lower four digits of the new COUNT value of downlink from NAS to UE.
    [0006]
    6. Mobility Management Entity (MME), characterized by comprising: a count value obtaining unit, configured to obtain a new non-access stratum (NAS) downlink COUNT value; a second derivation unit, configured to derive a key from a user equipment (UE) in a target universal terrestrial radio access network (UTRAN) in accordance with a key derivation function (KDF), a root key and the new NAS downlink COUNT value which is obtained by the count value obtaining unit; a save unit, configured to save the key derived by the second branch unit; a point-to-point transfer sending unit configured to send the new NAS downlink COUNT value obtained by the count value obtaining unit to the UE; a determining unit configured to determine whether or not the UE key in the target UTRAN is currently saved; and if so, further determine whether a NAS downlink COUNT value corresponding to the currently saved key of the UE in the target UTRAN is consistent with the current NAS downlink COUNT value, where when a determination result of the determination unit is that the NAS downlink COUNT value corresponding to the currently saved key of the UE in the target UTRAN is consistent with the current NAS downlink COUNT value, the unit of obtaining the COUNT value obtains the new NAS downlink COUNT value.
    [0007]
    7. Mobility Management Entity (MME), according to claim 6, characterized in that: the count value obtaining unit is configured to obtain the new NAS downlink COUNT value by adding a certain value to a current NAS downlink COUNT value.
    [0008]
    8. Mobility Management Entity (MME), according to claim 7, characterized in that the certain value is 1.
    [0009]
    9. Key derivation method, characterized by comprising: receiving, by a mobility management entity (MME), a point-to-point transfer request message from a base station (BS); the derivation, by the MME, of a user equipment (UE) key in a target universal terrestrial radio access network (UTRAN) in accordance with a key derivation function (KDF), a Kasme root key, and a current non-access stratum (NAS) downlink COUNT value; the UE key being CK’ | IK’, with CK’ being an encryption key and IK’ being an integrity key; the sending, by the MME, of the current NAS downlink COUNT value to the UE; the addition, by the MME, of a certain value to the current NAS downlink COUNT value.
    [0010]
    10. Key derivation method according to claim 9, characterized in that the derivation, by the MME, of a UE key in a target UTRAN according to a KDF, a root key, and a COUNT value of Current NAS downlink comprises: the derivation, by the MME, of the UE key in the UTRAN according to the KDF, the root key, and the current NAS downlink COUNT value in a current security context.
    [0011]
    11. Method according to claim 9 or 10, characterized in that the certain value is 1.
    [0012]
    12. Method according to claim 9, characterized in that the sending, by the MME, of the current NAS downlink COUNT value to the UE comprises: the sending, by the MME, of a point-to-point transfer command message carrying the current NAS downlink COUNT value to the UE.
    [0013]
    13. Key derivation method, characterized in that it comprises: the receipt, by a user equipment (UE), of a current non-access stratum (NAS) downlink COUNT value from a mobility management entity (MME) and a first point-to-point transfer process; the derivation, by the UE, of a UE key in a target universal terrestrial radio access network (UTRAN) in accordance with a key derivation function (KDF), a Kasme root key, and a downlink COUNT value of current NAS in the first peer-to-peer transfer process; the UE key being CK’ | IK’, with CK’ being an encryption key and IK’ being an integrity key; the receipt by the UE of a new NAS downlink COUNT value obtained by the MME by adding a certain value to the current NAS downlink COUNT value in a second point-to-point transfer process.
    [0014]
    14. Method according to claim 13, characterized in that the certain value is 1.
    [0015]
    15. Method according to claim 13, characterized in that the receipt, by the UE, of a current NAS downlink COUNT value comprises: the receipt, by the UE, of a point-to-point transfer command message sent by the MME, where the point-to-point transfer command message comprises the current NAS downlink COUNT value.
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    同族专利:
    公开号 | 公开日
    EP2658300A2|2013-10-30|
    EP3654684B1|2022-01-19|
    EP2416598A1|2012-02-08|
    US11240019B2|2022-02-01|
    RU2517410C2|2014-05-27|
    CN101931951A|2010-12-29|
    EP3651490A1|2020-05-13|
    BR112012000658A2|2016-11-16|
    AU2010265281B2|2013-10-31|
    PL3651490T3|2022-01-10|
    ES2436552T5|2021-04-08|
    EP3651490B1|2021-08-04|
    AU2010265281A1|2011-12-01|
    ES2436552T3|2014-01-02|
    EP3654684A1|2020-05-20|
    RU2012102647A|2013-08-10|
    EP2658300A3|2014-01-22|
    EP2416598A4|2012-05-30|
    EP2416598B1|2013-08-28|
    CN101931951B|2012-11-07|
    EP2658300B1|2019-09-18|
    US20120077501A1|2012-03-29|
    EP2416598B2|2020-07-29|
    WO2010149083A1|2010-12-29|
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    法律状态:
    2019-01-15| B06F| Objections, documents and/or translations needed after an examination request according [chapter 6.6 patent gazette]|
    2020-02-11| B15K| Others concerning applications: alteration of classification|Free format text: A CLASSIFICACAO ANTERIOR ERA: H04W 12/04 Ipc: H04L 9/08 (2006.01), H04L 29/06 (2006.01), H04W 12 |
    2020-02-11| B06U| Preliminary requirement: requests with searches performed by other patent offices: procedure suspended [chapter 6.21 patent gazette]|
    2021-04-06| B09A| Decision: intention to grant [chapter 9.1 patent gazette]|
    2021-06-22| B16A| Patent or certificate of addition of invention granted [chapter 16.1 patent gazette]|Free format text: PRAZO DE VALIDADE: 20 (VINTE) ANOS CONTADOS A PARTIR DE 26/06/2010, OBSERVADAS AS CONDICOES LEGAIS. PATENTE CONCEDIDA CONFORME ADI 5.529/DF, , QUE DETERMINA A ALTERACAO DO PRAZO DE CONCESSAO. |
    优先权:
    申请号 | 申请日 | 专利标题
    CN2009101484237A|CN101931951B|2009-06-26|2009-06-26|Method, device and system for secret key deduction|
    CN200910148423.7|2009-06-26|
    PCT/CN2010/074559|WO2010149083A1|2009-06-26|2010-06-26|Method, device and system for deducing keys|
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